DataBytes: Strengthening the Data Confidence of Africa Digital Rights Fund Grantees

By Data4Change |

“Numbers? Yes, but I was never very good at maths.”
“Data? Sure, but I don’t know how to use spreadsheets.”

Mathematical anxiety is real. These expressions are often heard from people who think data isn’t for them. For advocates, data-driven storytelling and investigations can support powerful campaigns to raise awareness and engage relevant stakeholders. Data4Change has designed an immersive and practical introduction to using data for advocacy. Dubbed DataBytes, the four-week remote programme shows data advocacy is for everyone, and that sometimes all you need is a pen and paper.

Image: Visual prototypes designed by participants in the Sketch a Data Story workshop

DataBytes itself uses a unique data-led approach. In the preparatory stage, participants take a Data Personality Quiz and chat with “Dot the Bot.” The data generated through these two activities helps the Data4Change facilitators understand the key strengths and potential areas of work for each specific participant.


Image: Data4Change’s quiz calculates a data personality type for respondents

DataBytes was piloted by Data4Change and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) as part of institutional capacity building efforts under the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF). The ADRF provides rapid response and flexible grants to initiatives advancing digital rights in Africa.

Targeting grantees of the fifth round of ADRF, the programme combined interactive questionnaires, games, offline self-study courses and live sessions (with simultaneous translation to French) to boost data confidence among participants.

“Numbers help understand the urgency and magnitude of the problem. It helps to legitimise our advocacy and creates more impact in our reporting” – DataBytes participant

The 16 participants, representing nine countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda – gained hands-on experience in getting, cleaning, understanding and communicating with data.

Participants also learned to read datasets and develop data communication techniques as they produced their own bar and line charts, range plots, choropleth maps and scatter plots to uncover trends and patterns.

Image: A selection of charts created in Datawrapper by DataBytes participants

The programme closed with a much-needed conversation around Data Values and Data Ethics which explored the issues of data extractivism, real consent, and the ethics around data collection and processing. These complex topics were interrogated through a game of “Fortunately, Unfortunately” where participants collaboratively analysed possible scenarios where data collection ethics could be at stake.

Image: One of the “Fortunately, Unfortunately” scenarios created by DataBytes participants

The DataBytes programme builds on earlier joint efforts by CIPESA and Data4Change in strengthening data advocacy among digital rights actors in Africa. Previous efforts, targeted at the first and second round of ADRF grantees, featured capacity assessments followed by data workflow and visualisation workshops – foundational and advanced levels. Two ADRF grantees – the Mozambique Disabled Person’s Organisation (FAMOD) and Digital Shelter – went on to be supported to develop data-driven campaigns. FAMOD’s campaign promotes web accessibility for persons with disability in Mozambique, while that of Digital Shelter is on women’s inclusion and safety online in Somalia.


Images: A selection of screenshots from campaigns co-created with FAMOD and Digital Shelter

Furthermore, CIPESA and Data4Change conducted a data-driven Sketchathon for digital rights at the 2021 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) targeting actors in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Image: The cover of the Sketching Shutdowns workbook

Image: Sketches created during the Sketching Shutdowns Workshop

New Report: Disinformation Pathways and Effects on Democracy and Human Rights in Africa

By Simone Toussi |

Disinformation is on the rise in Africa, spurred by increased internet connectivity and social media usage. In 2021, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated that 33% of the continent’s population of 1.37 billion had access to the internet, with about 255 million individuals active on Facebook. YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest, Instagram, and LinkedIn are the other platforms with large numbers of users. 

This rapid adoption of online platforms has led to shifts in political discourse, enabling strong public participation, organising, and online protests that have in some cases, such as Sudan and Algeria, contributed to the overthrow of autocratic leaders. Consequently, many governments in the region consider the internet and social media a threat and have unleashed repressive strategies to curtail their use, including retrogressive legislation, internet shutdowns, and disinformation campaigns. 

A new report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) explores the nature, perpetrators, pathways and effects of disinformation in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda and shows how contextual similarities have underpinned the proliferation of disinformation. These countries are classified as ‘Not Free’ or ‘Partly free’ in terms of speech and internet freedom and are largely authoritarian with a penchant for constraining the digital space.

According to the report, elections and armed conflicts are key drivers of disinformation. Yet authoritarianism has played a big part too, as governments have used both disinformation and the response to it to entrench themselves in power, shrink civic space, and target opponents and critics.

The increased use of digital technologies, low media literacy levels, the lucrative nature of disinformation, the fractious politics (Kenya and Uganda), conflict situations (such as in Ethiopia, Cameroon and Nigeria), and the closure of civic space that makes offline speech dangerous (Uganda, Ethiopia, Cameroon) fuel disinformation.

Common tactics used by disinformation actors include mass sharing, which leverages the viral power of social media and the lucrative nature of disinformation for “influencers for hire”. There is also a significant rise in political astroturfing, mass brigading and the use of fake and pseudonymous social media accounts. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) on Facebook and Twitter is prevalent too, and between 2019 and 2021, Facebook dismantled several such schemes, some of which perpetuated disinformation, with many linked to French and Russian actors. 

The main disinformation instigators are political actors including governments, ruling parties and opposition parties, while key spreaders are social media “gurus” or digital “influencers” that are often paid to create or spread disinformation.

Weaponising Disinformation Laws

In the countries studied, governments have weaponised disinformation laws to silence critical voices. Rather than serving to counter the ills of disinformation, related laws have in most cases been used to target political critics while government officials complicit in promoting disinformation are protected. 

Moreover, the retrogressive laws enacted to combat disinformation have been used to further stifle legitimate expression while hampering access to critical and pluralistic information. Instructively, some of these laws are vague and ambiguous and fail to distinguish between disinformation or falsified information, often making their enforcement open to the subjective interpretation of law enforcement agencies, who become the arbiters of the truth. The laws have been used to arrest, charge and prosecute individuals, thereby promoting censorship and undermining legitimate speech.

Cameroon’s Law on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime and the law governing electronic communications are often cited in actions against spreaders of “false news”, while Nigeria has employed the Criminal Code Act and the Cybercrimes Act 2015. Ethiopia enacted the problematic Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation in 2020. Without a specific disinformation law, Uganda relies on the Penal Code Act, the Computer Misuse Act of 2011 and the Communications Act of 2013 to target “false news”. Kenya relies on the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act 2018, the Kenya Information and Communications Act, 2013 (KICA) and the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008. 

Impact of Disinformation on Democracy and Human Rights

Disinformation erodes trust in democratic institutions, hampers citizens’ ability to make informed decisions, and affects the right of citizens to hold individual opinions without interference. Disinformation can therefore hijack the political discourse and undermine elections by limiting access to credible, factual and pluralistic information about candidates, parties, and issues, in order to make informed choices. 

When it occurs in an election context, disinformation affects electoral processes by fuelling politically motivated violence and preventing citizens and democracy actors from accessing credible, timely, and reliable information. In times of socio-economic or political crises, disinformation uses existing ethnic divisions to further divide, and perpetuates tribal antagonisms through hate speech. 

The existence of countermeasures such as unclear legal provisions further creates a climate of fear that leads to self-censorship, in the same way that internet shutdowns and content takedowns ordered by governments to limit the spread of false information instead limit access to pluralistic information. In turn, these counter-measures further restrict the participation of many citizens in online political discourse and limit their ability to express themselves without fear of retaliatory attacks. 

Across all the five study countries, platforms’ remedial measures to tackle misinformation and disinformation remain ineffective and inadequate.

Recommendations

Governments:

  • Desist from selectively applying laws on countering disinformation to targeting critics, media, the political opposition and human rights groups. 
  • Repeal repressive laws and amend existing ones such as Kenya’s Computer Misuse Act, Uganda’s Communications Act, Ethiopia’s Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation, and Cameroon’s Law on Cyber Security and Cybercrime, to provide clear definitions of disinformation and ensure they conform to international human rights standards. 
  • Train law enforcement agencies as to what constitutes disinformation and how to combat it without stifling citizens’ rights.

Intermediaries:

  • Deepen collaboration with local media and civil society groups in African countries to identify, debunk and moderate disinformation. 
  • Work to reduce the processing and response times for complaints regarding disinformation content reported to encourage reporting and to minimise the circulation of disinformation.
  • Increase transparency in content moderation measures and conduct periodic reviews of policies with broad public consultations.

Media:

  • Build the capacity of journalists and editors on fact-checking and countering disinformation online. 
  • Work closely with fact-checkers to identify and expose disinformation.
  • Institute in-house systems to enhance fact-checking and information verification.

Civil Society:

  • Undertake strategic litigation to challenge retrogressive laws and practices that undermine access to the internet and digital rights under the guise of fighting disinformation. 
  • Advocate against laws and practices that hamper the ability of journalists to provide accurate information, and hamper citizens’ rights to information and free expression. 
  • Monitor, report and hold states accountable for their violations of international human rights principles including restrictions on the enjoyment of digital rights.

Read the full report: Disinformation Pathways and Effects: Case Studies from Five African Countries

Le Forum sur la liberté d’Internet en Afrique (FIFAfrica) 2022 se tiendra à Lusaka, en Zambie

Annonce |

La Collaboration sur les Politiques Internationales des TIC pour l’Afrique orientale et australe (CIPESA) est heureuse d’annoncer le retour en présentiel de la neuvième édition du Forum annuel sur la liberté d’Internet en Afrique (FIFAfrica22). L’événement historique, qui réunit un éventail de parties prenantes de tous les domaines de la gouvernance de l’internet et des droits numériques en Afrique et au-delà, aura lieu à Lusaka, en Zambie, du 26 au 29 septembre 2022.

Ce sera la première fois depuis 2019 que FIFAfrica se tiendra physiquement. Sous l’ombre de la COVID-19, les éditions 2020 et 2021 de FIFAfrica ont adopté une approche hybride. Le retour en présentiel est une réponse au succès mondial dans le contrôle de la propagation du coronavirus et à la levée des restrictions qui en résulte par divers pays.

En outre, le retour en présentiel est une reconnaissance des défis techniques inhérents aux approches virtuelles et hybrides, et de leur incapacité commune à offrir un niveau équivalent de mise en réseau, d’engagement avec des acteurs clés tels que les décideurs politiques et une plate-forme d’engagement pour le renforcement des capacités et les interactions physiques. Les précédentes éditions physiques de FIFAfrica ont eu lieu à Kampala, en Ouganda ; Johannesbourg, Afrique du Sud ; Accra, Ghana ; et Addis-Abeba, Éthiopie.

L’accueil du premier FIFAfrica en personne à la suite de COVID-19 en Zambie est une reconnaissance du rôle central du pays dans la décolonisation et la démocratisation de l’Afrique, ainsi que de ses efforts pour faire avancer la transformation numérique pour le développement durable. La Zambie a longtemps été un bastion de stabilité caractérisé par des élections régulières et un transfert pacifique du pouvoir. De plus, le pays a toujours été un courtier de la paix sur le continent et un hôte de mouvements anticoloniaux. Le premier président de la Zambie, Kenneth Kaunda, était un membre fondateur du Mulungushi Club, une formation d’États africains nouvellement indépendants pour instiguer la libération totale du continent. Le club était une pierre angulaire de l’intégration régionale.

En 2021, la Zambie comptait environ 20 millions d’abonnés au téléphone mobile et 10 millions d’abonnés à Internet mobile, ce qui représente des taux de pénétration de 110% et 50% respectivement. Le gouvernement, par l’intermédiaire de l’Autorité zambienne des technologies de l’information et de la communication (ZICTA), entreprend diverses initiatives pour stimuler l’accès à Internet et son utilisation abordable dans divers secteurs. La Zambie a une loi sur la protection des données et la vie privée et, en mai 2022, fait partie des 13 pays à avoir ratifié la Convention de l’Union africaine sur la cybersécurité et la protection des données à caractère personnel.

Bien qu’elle ait connu une certaine régression ces dernières années, la Zambie occupe toujours un rang élevé en matière de liberté et de gouvernance par rapport à la plupart des pays de la région. Par exemple, sur l’indice de la démocratie, la Zambie est classée comme un régime hybride (seuls sept pays africains sont mieux classés comme démocraties complètes ou imparfaites, tandis que 23 pays sont classés comme autoritaires). Dans les indices « Liberté dans le Monde » (Freedom in the World) et « Liberté sur Internet » (Freedom on the Net), il est classé comme partiellement libre, alors qu’un grand nombre de pays africains sont classés comme non libres.

Le gouvernement précédent a restreint l’accès à certains médias en ligne, arrêté des journalistes et des dirigeants de l’opposition pour leurs publications sur les réseaux sociaux, principalement sur des allégations de diffamation contre l’ancien président Edgar Lungu, et aurait mené une surveillance de masse. Lors des élections de 2021 qui ont chassé le président Lungu du pouvoir, la Zambie a rejoint la ligue des pays qui ont initié des perturbations du réseau. Le nouveau gouvernement zambien qui a remporté les élections d’août 2021 a mis un terme à la tendance régressive du président Lungu, mais le nouveau président réformiste a lui-même rencontré quelques difficultés.

Au moment où le continent connaît une inquiétante régression de la démocratie, la Zambie se place ainsi en posture avantageuse pour faire le point sur l’état des droits et de la démocratie numériques et construire une solidarité et des partenariats entre les principales parties prenantes afin de faire progresser les droits de l’homme en ligne, en particulier les droits à l’accès à l’information, à la vie privée et à la liberté d’expression sur le continent.

Pendant quatre jours, l’agenda de FIFAfrica22 proposera des panels, des ateliers, des expositions et des présentations. Toutes les interactions maintiendront et respecteront les procédures opérationnelles standard (POS) COVID-19 nationales.

L’inscription et l’appel à propositions de session ouvriront plus tard ce mois-ci. Pour les dernières nouvelles sur le Forum, suivez @cipesaug. Les hashtags de l’événement sont #FIFAfrica22 et #InternetFreedomAfrica.

Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) 2022 set to take place in Lusaka, Zambia

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is pleased to announce the return to a physical event of the ninth edition of the annual Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica22). The landmark event, which convenes a spectrum of stakeholders from across the internet governance and digital rights arenas in Africa and beyond, will take place in Lusaka, Zambia, from September 26-29, 2022.

This will be the first time since 2019  that FIFAfrica is held physically. In the shadow of COVID-19, the 2020 and 2021 editions of FIFAfrica took on a hybrid approach. The return to a physical event is a response to the global success in controlling the spread of the coronavirus and the resultant lifting of restrictions by various countries.

Furthermore, returning to the physical mode is in recognition of the technical challenges inherent in virtual and hybrid approaches, and their common failure to offer an equivalent level of networking, engagement with key actors such as policymakers, and a platform for engaged capacity building, to physical interactions. Previous physical editions of FIFAfrica were hosted in Kampala, Uganda; Johannesburg, South Africa; Accra, Ghana; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Hosting the first in-person FIFAfrica in the aftermath of COVID-19 in Zambia is in recognition of the country’s pivotal role in Africa’s decolonisation and democratisation, as well as its efforts to advance digital transformation for sustainable development. Zambia has for long been a bastion of stability characterised by regular elections and peaceful transfer of power. Further, the country has traditionally been a peace broker on the continent and host of anti-colonial movements. Zambia’s first president, Kenneth Kaunda, was a founding member of the Mulungushi Club, a formation of newly-independent African states to push for the total liberation of the continent. The club was a strong building block for regional integration.

As of 2021, there were an estimated 20 million mobile subscriptions and 10 million mobile internet subscriptions in Zambia, representing penetration rates of 110% and 50% respectively. The government through the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority (ZICTA), is undertaking various initiatives to boost internet access and affordable usage in various sectors. Zambia has a data protection and privacy law and as of May 2022, is among the 13 countries to have ratified the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.

Though recent years have seen some regression, Zambia still ranks highly on freedom and governance relative to most regional countries. For instance, on the Democracy Index, Zambia is ranked as a hybrid regime (only seven African countries are ranked better as full or flawed democracies, while 23 countries are categorised as authoritarian). On Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net indices, it is categorised as partly free, whereas a large number of African countries are categorised as not free.

The previous government restricted access to some online media, arrested some journalists and opposition leaders over their posts on social media, mostly on allegations of defaming former President Edgar Lungu, and reportedly conducted mass surveillance. During the 2021 elections that ejected President Lungu from power, Zambia joined the league of countries that initiated network disruptions. Zambia’s new government, which won elections in August 2021, put a break to the regressive streak under President Lungu, yet the new reformist president has himself hit a few hitches.

At a time when the continent is experiencing a worrying regression in democracy, Zambia thus presents a vantage point to take stock of the state of digital rights and digital democracy and to build solidarity and partnerships among key stakeholders so as to advance human rights online, especially the rights to access to information, privacy and freedom of expression on the continent.

Over the course of four days, the FIFAfrica22 agenda will feature panels, workshops, exhibitions, and presentations. All interactions will maintain and observe national COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Registration and call for session proposals will open later this month. For the latest on the Forum, follow @cipesaug. The event hashtags are #FIFAfrica22 and #InternetFreedomAfrica.

Advancing Internet Freedom in Africa Through the Universal Periodic Review: Lessons and Gaps

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

Since its establishment in 2006, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) has provided a unique process for reviewing the human rights records of all United Nations (UN) Member States. Over the years, however, there has been limited participation by African civil society in the review process. In particular, there is limited work by African actors to promote internet freedom through this process.

Accordingly, since 2018, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), Small Media Foundation and a coalition of regional partners have been working to support civil society organisations across Africa to engage with the UPR process through capacity development in research and advocacy. The project has made up to 16 UPR submissions on digital rights in Africa with a focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe

To further concretise CIPESA and Small Media’s efforts, a survey was commissioned to gauge the awareness, engagement and existing capacities of stakeholders in relation to the UPR process and their development needs with regard to UPR advocacy, campaigning, and research. Conducted between July 2019 and December 2021, the survey recorded a total of 134 respondents from all 16 countries on which CIPESA, Small Media and partners made UPR submissions focused on digital rights. The respondents included activists, academics, diplomats, lawyers, journalists, government officials, development actors, and civil society organisations. 

The survey found that there is limited participation by African civil society in the UPR process despite the review process providing a framework within which activists and human rights defenders can lobby and hold governments to account to promote internet freedom. The number of internet freedom-related submissions on Africa is still small though growing, which is a reflection of the low number of actors conducting internet freedom work and participating in UPR reviews. 

While there is a relatively high level of awareness of the existence of the UPR process, partly the result of training efforts by various organisations in recent years, the level of knowledge about the process is limited. Similarly, the level of participation in the review is moderate, with only 27% having taken part in national consultations and one in four having participated in submission of stakeholder reports. It is also noteworthy that even for those processes that many respondents had participated in, such as stakeholder submissions, those efforts were often led by entities based outside the continent. Only one third of respondents had ever received UPR-related capacity development.

The survey findings indicate the need for skills and knowledge development in UPR engagement including advocacy and follow-up on recommendations; making stakeholder submissions; and participating in national consultations and review sessions. Further, it is crucial to capacite legacy human rights organisations to embrace digital rights work. Other skills development needs identified included data collection; analysis and report writing to feed into submissions; stakeholder engagement; and diplomacy and international negotiations. 

Specifically on digital rights, skills building in understanding the legal and regulatory environment for the digital sector at national, regional and global levels, as well as coalition building strategies, and communications for advocacy, were identified. Other skills needed included digital security for human rights  defenders; knowledge of the full range of the UN Human Rights Mechanisms; and crafting human rights policy recommendations.

In line with the capacity gaps identified by the survey, CIPESA and Small Media convened CSOs, activists and human rights defenders from the 16 countries for a three days workshop on UPR advocacy and coalition building for digital rights. The workshop, which was held in Kampala, Uganda on March 20-22, 2022, featured sessions on local engagement and mobilisation, international and regional legal frameworks, researching digital rights and identifying policy issues, campaign and advocacy planning and impact communications, among others.  

Speaking at the opening of the workshop, CIPESA’s Programme Manager Ashnah Kalemera stated that the training sought to capacitate organisations to more effectively leverage the UPR for advancing digital rights. “Increasing African-based organisations’ participation in the UPR, national level uptake and follow up on recommendations by governments requires growing skills and engendering collaboration among stakeholders,” said Kalemera.

The workshop builds on CIPESA’s multi-country efforts in building skills and knowledge in collaborative internet policy research, research methods, communicating research, and data-driven advocacy, among others, towards a free, open and secure internet in Africa.

See the Internet Freedom and UPR in Africa Survey report here.