Cybercrime Laws, “False News” Offences, and Online Expression in Africa

By CIPESA Writer |

As African societies become increasingly digital, governments are grappling with the balance between the protection of citizens from online harms while preserving the fundamental freedoms of free expression, access to information and freedom to participate in governance.   

The legal tools adopted to address these challenges are raising an equally pressing concern. Cybercrime and so-called “false news” laws are increasingly extending beyond their stated purpose of combating digital harm and are instead being used to regulate political speech, suppress dissent, and narrow civic space.

This emerging tension sits at the heart of CIPESA’s latest policy brief, Cybercrime Laws, “False News” Offences, and Online Expression in Africa. Drawing on legislative developments, court decisions, and recent cases from select countries, the brief examines how cybercrime legislation has evolved into one of the defining governance issues of Africa’s digital era.

Many countries have introduced offences such as “false information”, “offensive communication”, “malicious communication”, and “harmful content”. While these provisions are often justified as necessary responses to online abuse, they frequently suffer from vague drafting and broad enforcement powers. This creates uncertainty about what constitutes unlawful speech and allows authorities considerable discretion in deciding who should face criminal investigation or prosecution.

In several African countries, journalists, activists, bloggers, opposition politicians, and ordinary citizens have been arrested or prosecuted for online expression that would ordinarily fall within the boundaries of legitimate public debate. At the same time, restrictions on online speech increasingly operate alongside expanding surveillance powers, internet shutdowns, and growing state control over digital communications, reinforcing broader patterns of digital authoritarianism.

Importantly, however, this is not simply a story of shrinking freedoms. Encouraging developments in several jurisdictions demonstrate that alternative approaches are both possible and necessary. Recent constitutional decisions in Uganda and Kenya have reaffirmed that restrictions on freedom of expression must be clearly defined, proportionate, and consistent with constitutional protections. Similarly, in Nigeria legislative reforms illustrate how sustained engagement by civil society can improve legal frameworks, even if implementation challenges persist.

These developments highlight an important policy lesson as to how regulation can effectively address genuine digital harms without criminalising legitimate expression or weakening democratic accountability.

This policy brief explores these issues in greater depth, examining the emerging patterns across Africa, the evolving role of national and regional courts, and the reforms needed to ensure that cybercrime regulation strengthens both digital security and democratic governance. It concludes that the future of digital freedom in Africa will depend on how governments, courts, regional institutions, and technology companies navigate this balance.

The brief sets out concrete recommendations for four groups of actors. Governments should repeal or amend vague offences, including those relating to false information, offensive communication, and similarly broad categories, that have been used to criminalise legitimate online expression. They should prioritise civil remedies over criminal sanctions in defamation and reputation-related disputes, refrain from imposing internet shutdowns, and ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression comply with international human rights standards.

Legislators and regulators should ensure that cybercrime and digital governance laws comply with the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. They should also require human rights impact assessments before introducing new cybercrime or disinformation laws and establish meaningful public participation throughout the law-making processes. Laws developed without meaningful public scrutiny and civil society engagement are more likely to undermine rights than protect them.

Regional institutions should strengthen the monitoring and implementation of regional human rights commitments and promote common standards on digital rights and accountable digital governance to guide national legal reforms across the continent.

Finally, technology platforms should invest in African language content moderation and local contextual expertise, improve transparency around content moderation decisions and algorithmic decision making, and strengthen grievance and appeals mechanisms for users in African countries, where existing processes often remain inaccessible or ineffective.

Please read the full Policy Brief here.

What Global South Civil Society Wants from AI Governance

By CIPESA Writer |

As global discussions on the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI) governance take place at the AI for Good Global Summit and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, questions about who shapes AI systems, whose interests they serve, and how affected communities can participate in decision-making are becoming increasingly urgent.

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East & Southern Africa (CIPESA) is pleased to share this joint statement by the Global Digital Justice Forum and the Global South Alliance, of which it is a member. The statement reflects concerns that CIPESA has consistently raised through its research and policy engagement, namely, current approaches to AI development risk deepening existing inequalities, and meaningful AI governance requires stronger corporate accountability, equitable data governance, and investment in public-interest AI infrastructure.

Through submissions to national AI strategies in Africa, analysis of AI governance trends across 14 African countries, and engagement with global AI policy discussions, CIPESA has consistently advocated for inclusive, rights-based approaches that ensure communities most affected by AI developments have a meaningful role in shaping its future.

The statement below brings together civil society perspectives from across the Global South and calls for an AI governance approach grounded in human rights, equity, public interest, and meaningful participation.

Joint Statement issued by the Global Digital Justice Forum and the Global South Alliance in the lead-up to the Global Dialogue on AI Governance

July 2026

The current trajectory of Artificial Intelligence (AI) innovation has consolidated the neocolonial structures of development. Today, a handful of US and Chinese transnational corporations dominate global AI systems. Driven by massive capital, semiconductor manufacturing dominance, and hyperscale cloud infrastructure, these companies control over 90% of global AI data center capacity. Their market capitalization exceeds the combined national income of many countries in the Global South. The wealth and power amassed by these corporations come at a staggering cost, borne disproportionately by the South. From the devalued, dehumanizing labor that is essential for training AI models to the critical minerals, land, energy, and water, communities in the South continue to provide the scaffolding for the AI economy and society, without the voice and power to shape and benefit from this paradigm. These systemic injustices also perpetuate deep dependencies on current and future infrastructures — over which communities lack control and sovereign agency.

The Global Digital Justice Forum (GDJF) and the Global South Alliance (GSA) believe that the emerging AI order lacks legitimacy; it grants unbridled impunity to powerful corporations, while reducing humanity and nature to objects of limitless extraction. The many summits and conversations about AI governance have failed to tackle these core issues. 

Against this backdrop, we exhort the UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance to deliver on a South-led AI paradigm, anchored in a vision of rights-based development, respectful of planetary boundaries, and committed to intergenerational justice and human rights. We urge that the Global Dialogue on AI Governance commit to the following.

  • End AI extractivism 

A ‘move-fast-break-things’ approach to digital innovation aids profit, not people. In particular, the systemic and collective risks and harms associated with the violation of human rights, the erosion of democratic processes, the abuse of the environment, and the discrimination and invisibility of marginalized citizens in AI-driven decision-making in public services remain consistently ignored and underplayed in international consensus declarations. AI innovation must embrace the precautionary principle. It must be ethically and transparently developed, democratically accountable, and grounded in a globally agreed minimum floor for meaningful and dignified work, pluralistic knowledge, diversified economies, and planetary flourishing.

  • Apply the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle in international AI cooperation

The reckless path of data and AI technologies, designed and controlled by a few, has led to predatory value capture, strengthening the geo-economic and geo-political power of a handful of corporate actors and countries. The human and planetary costs arising from such opportunism are indeed a common concern. However, power diff erentials in international economic law have led to a status quo where trade, taxation, and Intellectual Property regimes clearly disadvantage developing countries, disproportionately enabling a massive transfer of wealth from the South to the North. This seriously undermines the development of digital infrastructure and human and institutional capabilities in developing countries. Such asymmetry must be remedied through global commitments to underwrite the development of regenerative, locally-led, AI infrastructures and models in the South.

  • Address corporate impunity in data and AI value chains

A global moratorium on the sale and use of AI systems that pose a high risk to human rights (such as remote biometric recognition, social scoring, spyware, and AI-driven autonomous weapons) is urgently needed. The proposed UN Binding Treaty on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to hold global businesses accountable for human rights violations and environmental degradation in supply chains needs to be adopted without delay and appropriately future-proofed against the specific risks of harms and abuses in data and AI value chains.

  • Design a data governance framework that delivers on global equity

A ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy playbook for cross-border data flows governance will not deliver on equitable development. Development sovereignty must be recognized as a core principle in the global governance of cross-border data flows. Furthermore, the governance of the non-personal data commons requires a societal approach that includes safeguards for collective privacy and the rights of communities to steward the use and re-use of their data resources in innovation ecosystems, together with strong personal data protection rights.

  • Invest in the development of global public compute

The foundational infrastructure of compute is controlled by a few corporations. Even open-source AI models are often dependent on closed/proprietary infrastructure systems for their hosting and distribution. To ensure that data science and AI innovation deliver on public innovation, a global facility for public compute is needed. A ‘CERN for AI’ could support a distributed network of AI research centers coordinated by a central hub and provide access to innovators and researchers from developing countries.

The current trajectory of AI innovation is not working for the majority. The Global Dialogue on AI Governance must move the needle with conviction and courage towards people’s participation, planetary wellbeing, and public value. Anything less will not do justice to the people of the South.

Please find the links to prior submissions from GDJF and GSA to official consultations of the Global Dialogue below:
GDJF’s April 2026 submission
GSA’s April 2026 submission

Towards Regulation of App-Based Health Data in Africa

By Edrine Wanyama |

Digital health technologies are reshaping healthcare delivery across Africa. App-based systems now connect patients, clinicians, pharmacies, laboratories, and public health agencies, creating new opportunities to improve access, efficiency, and coordination of care. At the same time, they generate large volumes of highly sensitive health data, much of it moving across platforms, providers, and in some cases, national borders.

A new Policy brief by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) examines the critical need for robust governance of app-based health data in Africa.

The brief highlights significant health data governance gaps, which include the lack of health-specific AI regulation, fragmented legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and the unresolved distinction between wellness tracking and clinical care. These gaps fundamentally undermine health data handling and management standards, with flaws in consent, accountability, and cross-border data management requirements.

Across the continent, digital health applications now span multiple functions within health systems, from clinical management systems and electronic medical records (EMR) platforms to pharmaceutical logistics and supply chains. Alongside these systems, AI-enabled and specialist care platforms are expanding diagnostic and treatment capacity. Patient-facing applications are also expanding, particularly in chronic care, maternal health, and home-based services.

While these innovations are improving access to services and efficiency, they also introduce significant governance risks. Health data is among the most sensitive categories of personal data, capable of revealing medical history, reproductive health, mental health status, and genetic information. In app-based systems, this data is often processed by multiple actors, including developers, health providers, cloud infrastructure providers, and third-party analytics firms, many of which are not visible to users.

In practice, consent is often weak or poorly understood, data sharing arrangements are opaque, and users have limited visibility or control over the use of their information. This creates risks not only to privacy, but also to trust in digital health systems.

These risks are compounded by fragmented legal and institutional frameworks. Although many countries have enacted data protection laws and digital health policies, enforcement remains uneven and coordination between health ministries, data protection authorities, and digital regulators is often weak. This creates a persistent governance gap between the rapid expansion of app-based health systems and the capacity of institutions to regulate them effectively.

At the continental level, emerging frameworks such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and global guidance such as the World Health Organization (WHO) Digital Health Strategy set important normative directions for secure, rights-respecting health data governance. However, translating these commitments into enforceable national systems remains limited, particularly in relation to interoperability, cross-border data flows, and platform accountability.

The brief calls for the adoption of a strategic governance architecture grounded in seven data governance principles, namely:

  1. Data sovereignty that reflects African public health priorities, democratic oversight and defined accountability mechanisms;
  2. Cross-border data flows where adequate and comparable safeguards exist and support reciprocal recognition arrangements among Data Protection Authorities (DPAs);
  3. Consent, purpose limitation, and data minimisation that enable individuals to make informed decisions about participation and ensure secondary uses are subject to transparency and safeguards;
  4. Interoperability and standardisation of systems to ensure integration and portability;
  5. Governance of AI-based health tools that require algorithmic impact assessments, independent audits and ongoing monitoring;
  6. Equity and inclusion to ensure systems do not further exclude vulnerable and marginalised communities; and
  7. Accountability and institutional coordination through clear allocations of responsibilities across institutions, consistent oversight, enforcement, and compliance monitoring.

The principles are consistent with the CDC Health Data Governance Framework. Together with other continental instruments, they can support a harmonised, rights-respecting and secure health data governance in Africa.

The brief presents recommendations for various stakeholders which, if implemented, could foster a progressive and trustworthy digital health ecosystem in Africa. Among theses include:

For the African Union and Regional Bodies

  • Support implementation of the Africa CDC Continental Health Data Governance Framework through clear timelines, monitoring mechanisms, knowledge sharing platforms, and technical assistance for member states.
  • Develop a continental health-app certification framework, recognised across participating jurisdictions, covering consent requirements, interoperability standards, cybersecurity safeguards, data governance obligations, and algorithmic accountability.
  • Facilitate regional data trust zones through reciprocal recognition agreements among Data Protection Authorities, enabling secure and accountable cross-border health data flows for disease surveillance, research collaboration, and pandemic preparedness.

For National Governments and Health Ministries

  • Enact or strengthen health-specific data governance legislation that addresses the full data lifecycle in app-based health systems, including consent, purpose limitation, data minimisation, retention, breach notification, and cross-border transfers.
  • Establish regulatory sandboxes to assess the safety, effectiveness, and governance implications of emerging digital health technologies before large-scale deployment.

For  Data Protection Authorities

  • Conduct risk-based audits and impact assessments of high-impact health applications, including privacy, security, and algorithmic fairness, where AI systems are deployed.
  • Develop sector-specific guidance on the processing of health, biometric, and demographic data, including standards for research use, secondary use, and commercial processing.
  • Enter into reciprocal recognition arrangements with counterpart DPAs across Africa to support coordinated enforcement and trusted cross-border data flows.

For Health Service Providers

  • Formalise data processing agreements with health app vendors and third-party processors, including provisions on security, breach notification, audit rights, and liability.
  • Strengthen workforce capacity through regular training on health data governance, cybersecurity, incident reporting, and the responsible handling of sensitive health information.
  • Implement strong authentication, access-control, and encryption measures to protect patient information throughout its lifecycle.

For App Developers and Platform Operators

  • Embed privacy-by-design and security-by-design principles throughout the development, deployment, and operation of health applications.
  • Provide clear and accessible consent mechanisms that enable users to understand and control how their health data is collected, shared, retained, and reused.
  • Conduct regular testing and independent assessments of digital health tools to identify and address bias, accuracy concerns, and performance disparities across African populations.

For Health Service Consumers and App Users

  • Exercise rights over personal health data, including rights of access, correction, portability, and deletion where provided under applicable legal frameworks.
  • Use health applications that comply with relevant regulatory requirements and recognised data protection standards.
  • Report suspected data breaches, misuse of personal information, or harmful automated decision-making outcomes to relevant regulators and oversight bodies.

Please read the full Policy Brief here.

Is Africa’s Digital Future Being Bargained Away?

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Africa’s digital future is being negotiated away piece by piece – through opaque infrastructure deals, data-sharing arrangements, and political decisions that narrow the space for journalists, civil society, and other stakeholders to gather and speak freely.

Just over a month ago, this year’s UNESCO World Press Freedom Day (WPFD) Global Conference was set to be held under the theme “Journalism Shapes Peace: Promoting Press Freedom for Human Rights, Development and Security” – and it could not have come at a more critical time, as media freedom and digital rights in Africa are under pressure.

The WPFD was scheduled to share a host city (Lusaka, in Zambia) with RightsCon, the world’s largest gathering on technology and human rights. Combined, the events were set to attract thousands of journalists, technologists, human rights defenders, and policymakers from all over the world, signaling Africa’s growing role in global debates on journalism, digital rights, and internet governance.

However, the Government of Zambia abruptly “postponed” RightsCon, citing the need to ensure “full alignment with Zambia’s national values, policy priorities, and broader public interest considerations.” According to Access Now, the conference organiser, “foreign interference” was the reason RightsCon 2026 did not proceed in Zambia.

Officials from Zambia’s Ministry of Technology and Science had purportedly informed Access Now that they were under pressure from Chinese diplomats over the participation of Taiwanese civil society actors in RightsCon. Critics have argued that this is a clear abuse of power and influence over other governments to silence dissent and restrict fundamental rights.

Following this, Zambia also lost out on hosting key WPFD-related events, which shifted online or to Paris, France. A scaled-down physical event was held in Zambia.

These developments exposed a broader pattern: civic space in Africa is not only constrained by arrests, vague laws and media intimidation, but also by foreign pressure and various forms of dependence. Zambia illustrated how quickly external political pressure can contribute to narrowing civic space on the continent, and how geopolitical influence is most dangerous where local institutions are already vulnerable and democracy is under strain.

Geopolitical tensions are no longer limited to military alliances or commodity diplomacy. They are instead increasingly being exercised through digital infrastructure, platform governance, cross-border data arrangements, cyber laws, standards-setting, mining rights, and now, the policing of civic forums. Powerful states are influencing digital policy choices through debt dependency, mineral extraction, infrastructure dependence, diplomatic pressure, or access to funding and technical systems.

The developments in Zambia illustrate a worrying phenomenon that the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has been tracking – the steady erosion of digital rights and press freedom on the continent, through attacks on information integrity and financial dependency on larger economies.

Text Block: In Zambia, China is also deeply embedded in mining, energy, healthcare, and the construction of national facilities, including the conference venue where RightsCon was due to be held. Source:  Just Security

Over the years, Chinese firms such as Huawei have invested heavily in Africa’s internet infrastructure, including through “smart city” deployments,  national fibre-optic backbones, and data transmission projects including in South Africa and in Senegal. In Uganda, China has invested more than USD 110 million in the National Backbone Data Transmission Project through additional concessional financing. Critics have argued that these investments also limit civic rights, including through enabling surveillance and undermining elections.

However, not every African government decision involving China is coerced. Yet dependence can narrow the room for resistance when political demands are made, and that influence can extend into tighter restrictions on civic participation and digital rights organising.

Moreover, to frame Africa’s sovereignty challenges as a problem created only by China is incorrect, as some Western powers are also advancing strategic interests through data-heavy arrangements that can test national safeguards.

For instance, as part of the America First Global Health Strategy, the United States has signed bilateral health agreements with numerous African states including Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Lesotho, and Uganda.

These agreements tie funding to extensive data-related cooperation including long-term sharing of comprehensive national health data for periods of up to 25 years, alongside expansive health surveillance arrangements. In exchange for financial support, African states are surrendering health data without the guarantee of equitable access to vaccines or research outputs developed from that data. Zambia, Ghana, and Zimbabwe have expressed reservations about signing on, and a court in Kenya suspended implementation of the agreement pending alignment with the country’s national data protection regime.

As African countries navigate shifting technology standards, expanding digital infrastructure, and competing data governance regimes – often without a shared rights-based framework – the result is an increasingly fragmented digital landscape. This fragmentation is not accidental; it is being shaped by geopolitical interests and power asymmetries that determine who builds the technologies, who controls the data, and ultimately, who governs the digital future.

 Meanwhile, African governments appear ready to trade civic rights, with countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, and Zambia collectively spending at least USD 1 billion a year on digital surveillance technology contracts with companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the European Union, and Israel.

Text block: However, the key policy challenge facing Africa is not whether governments should work with powerful economies like China, the United States, and various European states, or private technology firms. They will, and they must. The issue is whether African states have the legal, institutional, and political capacity to engage those powers without trading away civic space, data autonomy, and democratic accountability.

The continent is not without policy tools. The African Union Data Policy Framework, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), the African Continental Free Trade Area Digital Trade Protocol, and new calls such as the African Declaration on Digital Freedom and Democracy all point toward a more rights-respecting path. They emphasise harmonised safeguards, trusted data governance, universal and meaningful internet access, transparency, and accountability. However, implementation remains a persistent challenge, with limited progress in practice across many states.

The Zambia case offers clear lessons.  African governments should require parliamentary review and public engagement for all major cross-border data-sharing and digital infrastructure agreements. Procurement contracts involving critical digital systems should be published, including provisions on data storage, access, transfers, and vendor liability. Transparency in DPI procurement processes is critical in ensuring that deployed systems are rights-respecting and those responsible can be held accountable.

While numerous global convenings are hosted on the continent, Zambia set a worrying precedent. Organisations that co-host global convenings in Africa should demand enforceable non-discrimination and freedom-of-assembly guarantees from host states as regional civil society spaces must be protected and expanded, not treated as expendable.

The spaces where African civil society, journalists, and policymakers can gather are fundamental to the digital rights movement on the continent. If African governments cannot protect the right of journalists and civil society actors to assemble freely, then they will struggle to protect anything else in the digital age. These communities are integral parts of the democratic infrastructure Africa needs to negotiate its way out of debt dependency, surveillance overreach, and geopolitical capture.

This is why global and regional gatherings, such as the upcoming Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26), are critical. They are necessary spaces for interrogation, debate, and the forging of consensus on civic and digital rights. These are the convenings where the shifts in sovereignty are understood, including the risks of opaque cross-border data-sharing agreements, unchecked surveillance infrastructure, and politically motivated cyber laws, all of which are named and challenged through multistakeholder engagement.

Ultimately, Africa’s digital future should not be bargained away through debt dependency, opacity agreements and geopolitical pressure. It must be shaped openly, democratically, and on terms that serve its people rather than the geopolitical interests of others.

Protecting Children Online in Africa Must Move from Policy to Practice

By Patricia Ainembabazi |

Child online safety has returned to the forefront of digital governance discussions across Africa and globally. New regulatory initiatives from the United Nations, the African Union, and industry coalitions reflect growing concern about the risks children face in increasingly digital societies. Yet, while policy commitments are multiplying, implementation continues to lag.

The challenge is particularly acute in Africa, where internet access is expanding rapidly while child protection systems struggle to keep pace. As more children go online, they are increasingly exposed to cyberbullying, online grooming, sexual exploitation, harmful content, privacy violations, and emerging Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled risks such as disinformation and misinformation.

Just last month, the United Nations Human Rights Office called for stronger regulation and government oversight, publishing 10 key points to make platforms safer for children, urging technology companies to embed child safety into their product design and address the growing risk posed by AI. This reflects a broader shift in global digital policy. The Global Digital Compact has committed states to strengthen legal and policy frameworks for children’s rights in digital spaces and to prioritise national online child safety policies and standards by 2030.

At the continental level, the African Union Child Online Safety and Empowerment Policy of 2024 sets out principles on children’s safety and privacy, and participation to guide member states in developing national strategies, while the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), UNICEF, and partners recently launched the Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection to strengthen coordination among governments, mobile operators, technology companies, regulators, law enforcement, civil society, and young people.

Some African countries are already taking steps to strengthen child protection online. Rwanda is considering restrictions on social media access for children under 16, while Zimbabwe recently approved a National Child Online Protection Policy for 2026–2030 aimed at addressing online sexual exploitation, cyberbullying, grooming, harmful content, sextortion, and privacy violations.

These developments reflect a broader global shift in approaches to child online safety. Australia has legislated to restrict social media access for children under 16, while the United Kingdom recently concluded a national consultation examining age-based protections and enforcement mechanisms. Across several countries, governments, regulators, and civil society organisations are increasingly calling on technology companies to strengthen safeguards and take greater responsibility for protecting children online.

A broader strategy would expand efforts to ensure that while policies and frameworks on child protection are being developed, children are involved. This would help them understand the several platforms available for use, associated risks, pressures, and opportunities for digital life. The Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection recognises this mode of participation and has now included youth representatives by integrating their voices for a child-centered digital future in Africa. Replicating this approach at the national level, through wide youth consultations, school-based dialogues, child-friendly policy forums, and participatory design of reporting and safety tools, will foster a healthy digital environment for the young.

It is against this backdrop that the Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) report, “Child Protection and Safety Online in Africa: The Law, Privacy, Challenges and Solutions, provides crucial, ground-level evidence across 10 countries – Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. It highlights the gaps in child safety and protection online despite technological advancement and expansion.

The report highlights several recommendations that could help foster child safety and protection online, which are directed to different stakeholders, including the government, civil society organisations, international organisations, development partners, the technology sector, media, academia, parents, and the general community, and among others include;

  1. Parliaments should enact specific national laws that protect children’s privacy and safety in digital spaces, with clear safeguards tailored to children’s particular vulnerabilities, such as cyberbullying, grooming, online sexual exploitation, image-based abuse, harmful content, misuse of children’s data, profiling, and age-inappropriate design.
  2. Governments should invest in the implementation of national strategies that set out the roles of government agencies, the judiciary, data protection authorities, law enforcement actors, educators, parents, and the private sector in protecting children in the digital age.
  3. Platforms and telecom companies should design child-friendly products and services, minimise the collection and retention of children’s data, introduce age verification and parental controls, publish transparency reports, and submit protection measures to independent audits.
  4. The media should monitor, document, and report objectively, and expose all cases of online child abuse and demand accountability from the responsible parties.
  5. Civil society organisations should engage in advocacy, awareness raising, legal reform, evidence-based research, and documentation of issues affecting child safety online in order to demand and push for accountability of all the relevant stakeholders.
  6. All stakeholders must ensure that children are meaningfully included in innovation and programming, and that children and young people are actively engaged as participants in discussions, collaborations, and co-design of digital solutions.

Ultimately, for children to stay online, measures must go beyond mere policy expressions and aspirations as reiterated in the Global Digital Compact’s 2030. Laws and frameworks specific to child protection and safety online should be developed and stringently implemented. Moreover, digital service providers must be held accountable, and other stakeholders, including parents, schools, and communities, should join efforts to ensure that children are empowered to safely utilise digital technologies.

CIPESA and partners continue to advocate for rights-respecting policies that advance children’s protection, participation, access, and safe use of digital technologies, while calling on technology companies to embed these principles in platform design, governance, and accountability systems.