Where Digital Rights and Economic Freedom Intersect

By Anna Kompanek |

The internet is the lifeblood of a modern economy. From a tech company bringing innovative solutions to the market, to a farmer using his mobile phone to check current crop prices and receive payments, connectivity has become key to unlocking economic opportunity. Building affordable infrastructure remains a challenge in many places. But connectivity now raises an equally daunting question: how to keep that access both available and rights-preserving.

New challenge of the internet era

At the 2026 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), co-hosted in Mauritius by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Halley Movement, Executive Director Dr. Wairagala Wakabi described a shift: when the Forum began in 2014, connectivity was the leading challenge. Today, the questions concern not just getting online but data privacy, governance, and the risks of being online. In Africa and beyond, the key issue is how that vital access can be denied by actors ranging from authoritarian governments to hackers – and, increasingly, bots or misused agentic artificial intelligence (AI).

On the government side, internet shutdowns and throttling remain a persistent reality in many places. While they are often seen through the perspective of suppressing human rights, there is an important economic dimension as well. When an internet disruption stops a merchant from advertising her goods, a small exporter from contacting buyers, or a chamber of commerce from reaching its members, digital repression becomes an economic issue. The question is no longer just how to connect entrepreneurs to the digital economy, but how to keep them connected when that access becomes fragile or politically contested.

I came to this year’s FIFAfrica to explore how emerging technologies can help digital rights advocates and local businesses defend their shared online space. As in past years, the Forum brought together an impressive group of open internet advocates, researchers, technologists, and policymakers. My main practical lesson: tools that help civil society operate under pressure might also protect local businesses and their independent associations.

When efficiency can become dependency

CIPESA’s State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 report examines digital public infrastructure (DPI) across 11 countries, focusing on identity, payment, and data sharing systems. Such systems can lower transaction costs, widen inclusion, and improve public services, but weak safeguards can entrench exclusion and enable intrusive surveillance. As the report explains, their shared dependence on connectivity means a cable cut, power failure, cloud outage, or internet disruption can interrupt identity, payments, and public services, affecting both socio-economic and civil-political rights.

The response – like with all new technologies – is not to reject DPI advancement, but to demand transparency, data protection, due process, accessible appeals, and practical alternatives.

Tools from the digital rights’ front lines

This year, FIFAfrica’s Digital Reality Walk showcased tools relevant to civil society and local businesses, including OONI Probe, Orbot, Tor Browser, and Butter Box. Custom VPNs offer another promising application. Bitcoin and other decentralised payment arrangements, while not without their own risks, have helped civil society groups retain channels for funding when conventional banking is constrained. Such tools empower users to monitor internet restrictions, anonymise mobile traffic, browse the web securely, share digital resources offline, use private encryption servers, and retain financial freedom. These civil society applications may also help businesses in challenging environments.

What businesses are already doing

Local businesses, chambers of commerce, and business associations around the world have a direct stake in privacy, free expression, and an open digital economy. This business case for digital rights, as outlined by the Center for International Private Enterprise, provides a foundation for connecting digital rights advocacy to economic opportunity.

Leading business organisations are also paying attention to these issues. The International Chamber of Commerce advances the digital economy agenda through its Digital Standards Initiative (DSI), which promotes a globally harmonised digital trade environment; its Global Digital Economy Commission, which advocates trustworthy, risk-based AI governance and responsible cross-border data flows; and its cybersecurity and internet governance positions, which emphasise security without excessive fragmentation or restrictions on legitimate use.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also supports an open and competitive digital economy. Its U.S.-Africa Business Center’s Digital Economy Task Force has championed affordable connectivity, enabling regulations, cross-border data flows, and digital entrepreneurship; Africa Digital Innovation Competition has supported African startups developing solutions in fintech, cybersecurity, and digital supply chains; and Global Connect initiative advocates against forced data localisation and other restrictions that fragment digital markets, while promoting privacy, cybersecurity, and sound regulation of emerging technologies.

These initiatives demonstrate the business community’s recognition that digital openness underpins economic opportunity. They focus on trade regulatory ecosystems that promote competitive markets and innovation rather than digital rights explicitly. Yet, they reinforce the same principle: businesses, like civil society, need open, dependable, secure digital systems governed by predictable rules.

A shared economic freedom agenda

In November, global business leaders will gather in Washington, DC for the B20 Summit where digital transformation will feature prominently. An equally important question is what happens when technologies that connect businesses to customers, finance, and global markets become instruments of surveillance, censorship, or economic control.

The B20’s focus on innovation, trusted digital systems, small business participation, and resilient supply chains offers an opening. Businesses need more than reduced economic barriers and better digital infrastructure: they must be able to communicate securely, access information, receive payments, and organise independently.

Digital rights defenders have spent years developing technologies to preserve these freedoms under pressure. Entrepreneurs in challenging environments can learn from them to defend the basic capacity of businesses to communicate, associate, access markets, and transact.

My main takeaway from FIFAfrica is that economic freedom and internet freedom are inseparable. Digital freedom organisations bring experience operating under pressure; chambers and business associations bring knowledge of members’ operational needs and the economic costs of politically motivated restrictions. Connecting their advocacy and resilience strategies could particularly benefit smaller businesses and independent local associations facing similar challenges as civil society organisations.

Anna Kompaneck is an International Development Consultant.

Kenya’s 2027 Elections Will Test Its Commitment to Digital and Media Rights

By Raylenne Kambua |

As Kenya approaches its August 2027 general elections, there are growing concerns about how the country’s digital and media laws and practices could affect citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process.

Over the last few years, Kenya has passed or amended several laws, such as the Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA) and the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (CMCA), which directly impact citizens’ online participation in civic and democratic processes. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) has flagged more than 20 pieces of legislation that contain retrogressive provisions that threaten journalists’ right to report, their privacy, and citizens’ access to information.

As in many other African countries, digital technologies, including social media platforms and Artificial Intelligence (AI), have become central to citizens’ social, economic and political participation, particularly during periods of contestation, such as elections and protests.

During the 2024 Gen Z protests, young Kenyans used AI and other digital tools to simplify legislation and produce mobilisation materials, and used social media platforms to coordinate protests. The state responded with digital repression, including online threats, unwarranted arrests, abductions, internet disruptions, and unlawful surveillance. The 2027 campaigns will run on the same digital infrastructure, with more AI capabilities and with human rights at stake.

Digital Threats as Electoral Threats

On October 6, 2026, the Collaboration of International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) attended a stakeholder engagement hosted by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in Nairobi, where the Roadmap to a Violence-Free 2027 General Election report was launched.

The report identified the weaponisation of AI and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as key threats to peaceful elections. It also found that social media is where election violence is seeded, incubated, and mobilised, and called for digital hygiene and responsible use of digital media.

In an earlier engagement with the commission, CIPESA asserted that no single institution can address digital threats alone. Clear inter-institutional protocols can, however, enable timely, coordinated and rights-respecting responses, while strengthening the accountability of digital platforms.

Digital tools and AI were used in the 2022 general elections, and their use has since grown. As these tools become more sophisticated, real and fabricated content becomes harder to distinguish, increasing the risk of harm during elections.

CIPESA’s report, Navigating the Implications of AI on Digital Democracy in Kenya, finds that AI is reshaping digital participation and access to information in the country. However, the report warns that the existing AI governance gaps, rise of AI-powered political advertising, deepfakes, and microtargeting threaten to distort democratic processes and the information ecosystem in profound ways.

Internet and platform shutdowns also contribute to the information disorder and threaten electoral integrity. Election periods carry a heightened risk of internet shutdowns, which can limit voters’ access to information, silence observers and journalists, and leave rumours unchallenged.

There is the fear that Kenya could borrow the shutdown script from neighbours such as Uganda and Tanzania during next year’s elections. The country has already seen the warning signs. Telegram is often blocked during national examinations, and internet disruptions were reported during the 2024 Gen Z protests. In response, stakeholders secured interim orders restraining the government and mobile operators from shutting down internet access. Although the orders are temporary, the final ruling and the commitment of regulators and telecom operators will determine whether Kenyans stay connected during the August 2027 elections.

Press Freedom Under Threat

Private media houses lead in listenership and viewership, and mainstream media remains more trusted than social media as a source of information. Yet these outlets face threats to press freedom and state interference, while journalists encounter harassment. Media stakeholders have condemned these trends ahead of the elections.

Defamation is also a growing concern, and courts have been faulted for awarding serious damages against bloggers and the media, even though international standards hold that public officials should be open to greater scrutiny. Fear of legal consequences can force investigative journalists to slow down, undermining the public’s right to know.

Law as the Main Instrument of Control

Participants at a multi-stakeholder dialogue on ‘Advocacy Strategies for Better Tech and Media Policies’, hosted by KICTANet and the Bloggers Association of Kenya on October 8, 2026, in Nairobi, named vague legislation as one of the most persistent threats to online expression.

Laws such as the CMCA illustrate this pattern. Enacted in 2018, the Act criminalises certain forms of online expression, including false publications. In March 2026, the Court of Appeal struck down two sections of the 2025 Amendment Act for failing the test of constitutional clarity. The ruling prompted Parliament to appeal. The court left the Act’s investigative powers largely intact, while cautioning that courts must act as gatekeepers because those powers can be abused.

Following the court ruling, further amendments to the CMCA introduced new powers for the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee (NC4), including the authority to order the blocking or removal of websites, pages and applications without a court order. In July 2026, the High Court declared two of the new provisions unconstitutional, as the amendments could risk criminalising legitimate speech.

The pattern is consistent: Parliament passes broad provisions, civil society challenges them in court, and courts later narrow their scope or strike them down. Some earlier cases followed a similar course. In 2014, a court rejected an attempt to restrict journalists and bloggers from publishing terror-related content without permission from the national police, holding that laws limiting fundamental rights do not enjoy the usual presumption of constitutionality. In another case, the High Court found the KICA offence of “misusing a telecommunication device” unconstitutionally vague. The court held that any limit on expression must be clear, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate.

The laws used to restrict expression also evolve. The Prevention of Terrorism Act has been used against protesters, and authorities have invoked the CMCA to arrest online critics, some of whom were first abducted. During the 2027 electoral cycle, advocates should watch for existing legal provisions being used in new ways.

Civil society has also shown that early engagement can influence legislation. For instance, it persuaded Parliament to withdraw a proposed KICA amendment on the liability of social media administrators. This calls for proactiveness in policy development processes, ensuring bills are monitored throughout the stages rather than waiting until they have been passed.

Recommendations

  1. Parliament should publish bills early, allow meaningful public participation, and ensure that restrictions on online expression and access to information are clearly defined and consistent with constitutional rights.
  2. The Director of Public Prosecutions and the police should refrain from pursuing arbitrary and politically motivated prosecutions, and from misusing or selectively enforcing laws to prosecute protesters, social media users, bloggers and journalists.
  3. Courts should apply strict scrutiny to search, seizure and surveillance orders, and keep interim protections against internet disruption.
  4. The Communications Authority and telecom operators should commit publicly not to shut down or throttle the internet and publish transparency reports on government takedown requests.
  5. The NCIC, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the judiciary, and the MCK should agree on protocols for responding to digital threats during the elections, with clear roles for each.
  6. Media houses should adopt the MCK election guideline and AI code of conduct, invest in verification and deepfake detection, and strengthen legal support for their journalists.
  7. Digital platforms should expand election integrity and moderation capacity for Kenya, respond promptly to TFGBV and hate speech reports, clearly label AI-generated or manipulated political content, and publish transparency reports on government requests to remove or restrict content.
  8. Civil society should track bills at the policy stage through a shared system and pool legal analysis.
  9. Development partners should fund legal defence for bloggers and journalists, and support strategic litigation, because cases like the CMCA challenge take years to resolve.

Strengthening Digital Rights for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons

By Tsion Meingstu and Paul Kimumwe |

As part of efforts to strengthen the integration of digital inclusion and digital accessibility for persons with disabilities and older persons into its human rights monitoring and oversight mandate, the Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC) held a two-day capacity-building workshop for its staff on September 21st and 22nd, 2026.

The workshop, which was facilitated by experts from the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), sought to equip participants with foundational knowledge and skills in digital accessibility and inclusion, how to design and implement monitoring checklists for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons, and how to communicate and advocate for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

The staff capacity building workshop was one of the Commission’s key deliverables under a ten-month grant from CIPESA’s Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF). Other activities under the grant include monitoring and assessing the impact of digital technologies’ (in)accessibility on the daily lives of older persons and persons with disabilities, and organising advocacy activities to raise awareness of digital rights for persons with disabilities and older persons among relevant government and non-government stakeholders to foster inclusive practices.

During the workshop, Shimels Ashagre, Senior Human Rights Officer for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons at the EHRC, presented a draft monitoring toolkit developed as part of the grant that will be used to assess the state of digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons in Ethiopia.

The toolkit is organised around eight key dimensions of digital inclusion, with specific questions tailored to both persons with disabilities and older persons. It draws on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the UN Principles for Older Persons, the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA), the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Older Persons, and the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 3.0).

The Commission will use the findings from the assessment to inform the design and implementation of advocacy activities about the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

Opening the workshop, the thematic Commissioner for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons, Mohammed Ahmed, emphasised that the world is undergoing rapid digital transformation, with technology increasingly shaping how people access information, services, and opportunities. While these advancements bring significant benefits, they also raise important human rights considerations that must not be overlooked.

He stressed that particular attention should be given to the rights of vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities and older persons, who often face barriers to accessing and benefiting from digital technologies. Commissioner Mohammed underscored that digital inclusion and accessibility are not merely technical issues but fundamental human rights concerns that require deliberate action from governments, institutions, and other stakeholders.

Dr Wairagala Wakabi, the Executive Director of CIPESA, noted that digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons has become a central thematic area for CIPESA, which is why it partners with institutions such as the EHRC to strengthen their capacity to monitor and promote digital inclusion. He noted that through the ADRF, CIPESA provides financial and technical support to organisations that are championing digital inclusion.

For example, in the last round of the ADRF grant, USD 320,000 was awarded to 18 initiatives in 14 countries to support efforts to advance digital rights, inclusion, and online safety. Three of the recipients, including Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Council for the Blind, and the Rwanda-based Organisation d’Integration et de Promotion des Personnes Atteintes d’Albinisme (OIPPA), are focusing on Digital Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons.

Dr Wakabi noted that for effective advocacy around digital rights, participants need to understand how digital technologies intersect and affect the rights of persons with disabilities. And for Human Rights Commissions, this understanding helps them to integrate digital rights into their monitoring and oversight mandates of human rights.

Reactions from the participants:

“The training was very fascinating. I gained a tremendous amount of knowledge about digital rights and how they are directly related to human rights and their intersection. This was beginner-friendly training that provided participants with a foundational experience in the field.” Female participant

“Overall, the training was highly informative and educational. Prior to attending the training, I did not have a clear understanding of the concept of digital technologies and their practical applications. However, the training helped me develop a solid understanding of the subject and enhanced my knowledge of key digital concepts.” Male participant

The sessions on digital rights, as well as the rights of older persons and persons with disabilities, significantly broadened my perspective and enhanced my understanding of inclusion and accessibility from a digital technologies’ perspective. The knowledge gained has provided me with a clear framework for integrating these concepts into my future work, particularly on emerging issues related to the rights and participation of older persons and persons with disabilities.

Additionally, the training focus on Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) offered valuable and thought-provoking insights into an important and evolving area. Overall, the training was highly informative, practical, and relevant to my professional responsibilities.”

The training was attended by 18 individuals (10 men and 8 women) drawn from various departments of the commission, including the Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons Department, Human Rights Education Department, Women and Children’s Rights Department, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Monitoring and Investigation Department, and the Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Migrants’ Rights Department.

How Spyware and Digital Surveillance Undermine Democratic Participation

By Jimmy Kainja |

Mobile devices such as smartphones, computers, and tablets have transformed how journalists, activists, public figures, and ordinary citizens access, produce, and circulate information. By connecting people to a global communication infrastructure, these technologies have expanded opportunities for public debate, civic engagement, and accountability. Yet the same technologies can also facilitate surveillance, particularly targeting individuals and groups whose work challenges established power structures.

These tensions were explored at a panel discussion titled Spyware on Trial: A Comparative Discussion Across Jurisdictions, held at the recent Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26). The panel hosted by Media Defence examined how spyware operates within surveillance systems and how its effects extend beyond individual privacy, undermining journalism, collective organising, and democratic participation.

Spyware as Part of a Wider Surveillance Ecosystem

A key argument that emerged during the discussion was that spyware should not be seen as an isolated technology, but as part of a broader surveillance ecosystem. As one panellist observed, surveillance takes multiple forms, including physical monitoring and confiscating personal devices for further examination. Spyware, however, adds a distinct dimension because it enables remote, often less visible monitoring, increasing uncertainty about whether an individual’s communications, activities, or personal information are being accessed.

Importantly, the panellist argued that the mere possibility of surveillance can have consequences, even when there is no definitive evidence of its occurrence. The uncertainty surrounding spyware can generate fear and distrust, prompting individuals to reconsider whom they communicate with, what information they share, and whether they should continue engaging with particular networks.

As the panellist explained, although spyware’s effects may initially seem individual, their consequences extend well beyond the person targeted. Peers may stigmatise or ostracise individuals suspected of being compromised, weakening their relationships and isolating them from the networks on which their work depends. In this sense, surveillance can disrupt social relationships and collective action without necessarily targeting an entire organisation or movement.

The Chilling Effect on Journalism and Collective Organising

The investigative journalist on the panel reinforced this argument by recounting his own experience in Malawi. He explained that a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) leader who had pledged his support before the journalists were arrested and had their devices confiscated stopped communicating with the journalist after it became known that Malawian authorities had confiscated and tampered with his devices. The incident illustrated how the perceived risk of surveillance can undermine trust between journalists and their sources, even when the sources themselves have not been directly targeted.

The chilling effect of surveillance is often discussed in relation to freedom of expression, but it can be difficult to demonstrate how it operates in practice. This example provided a concrete illustration of how the fear of compromised communications can alter people’s behaviour and relationships. The NGO leader’s decision to stop communicating with the journalist suggests that the perceived risk of surveillance can be enough to discourage engagement, even in the absence of conclusive evidence that spyware has been deployed against a particular person or communication channel.

The implications extend way beyond individual privacy and a journalist’s ability to communicate freely. When people become reluctant to exchange information, attend meetings, or associate with individuals perceived to be under surveillance, the consequences can include restrictions on freedom of association, reduced opportunities for mobilisation, and weakened democratic participation. Surveillance therefore affects not only those directly targeted but also the wider networks and movements that depend on trust, communication, and collaboration. For civil society organisations and public interest groups, this can undermine the very relationships necessary for collective organising and movement building.

Device Confiscation, Legal Mechanisms, and Digital Surveillance

The panel also explored how surveillance operates across African countries through different but interconnected practices. These include physically confiscating mobile phones and computers, examining or manipulating seized devices, and using legal mechanisms to justify or facilitate their seizure. Once authorities possess devices, they may access sensitive information, examine communications, and expose confidential material. When spyware is installed, or devices are compromised and the risks may persist even after authorities return the devices to their owners.

The discussion also highlighted the use of law as an instrument to facilitate surveillance, a practice that may be understood as lawfare. In this context, legal powers can justify actions such as seizing activists’ devices, potentially creating opportunities to access information about their communications and networks. Panellists cited examples of the seizure and alleged tampering with activists’ mobile phones in Kenya, illustrating how these practices can affect people working on public interest issues across the region.

For investigative journalists, these practices pose a particular threat because their work often depends on maintaining confidential relationships with sources. Investigative journalists often handle sensitive information, and their sources often have a lot to lose, including the threat of death if their identities are known or disclosed. The security of a journalist’s device is therefore not merely a matter of personal privacy; it is also central to protecting their sources, preserving sensitive evidence, and ensuring that information can be reported in the public interest. When authorities confiscate or compromise devices, the consequences can extend to the people whose identities, communications, or disclosures may be exposed.

Reflecting on the impact of his arrest and the confiscation of his and his organisation’s devices, the Malawian journalist described the consequences for his work:

We’ve lost a big chunk of information that we used to get from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and we’ve lost a good number of our sources because of the idea [that our gadgets spied on] that is being planted in our sources out there, making the job of journalists so difficult because you cannot just wake up one day and do the stories that we do without sources of information, so the impact of spyware is huge on the public. When investigative journalism fails, the biggest victim is the public.

This testimony highlights the broader public consequences of surveillance. The loss of sources and information does not merely inconvenience a journalist or compromise an individual investigation; it can also prevent important stories from reaching the public. When sources fear that their identities or communications may be exposed, they may withhold information about corruption, misconduct, or abuses of power. Investigative journalism becomes harder, and those whose actions might otherwise be scrutinised face fewer opportunities for public accountability.

Citizens ultimately bear the cost, as they depend on independent journalism to access information, assess the conduct of public institutions, and make informed decisions about public affairs.

Spyware and the Erosion of Democratic Freedoms

The discussion demonstrated that spyware raises concerns extending far beyond digital security and the protection of personal data. Its use, or even the perception that it is being used, can undermine several fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, and access to information. These freedoms are closely interconnected: citizens need to communicate freely, associate with others, and access reliable information to participate meaningfully in democratic processes. Although surveillance may target particular individuals, its broader effect can weaken the relationships and institutions that sustain public interest work and democratic participation.

A key insight from the panel was that understanding contemporary surveillance requires moving beyond a narrow focus on what a particular technology can do. The more important question is how spyware interacts with other surveillance practices, legal powers, institutional arrangements, and social relationships. Device confiscation, legal intimidation, digital monitoring, and the erosion of trust can reinforce one another, producing consequences greater than any single practice in isolation.

Looking Beyond the Technology

The session offered an important reminder that digital technologies are not inherently democratic or repressive; their effects depend substantially on how they are deployed, by whom, and within what political and legal contexts.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technical safeguards against spyware. It also demands scrutiny of the legal and institutional arrangements that enable surveillance, protection for journalists and their sources, and stronger accountability mechanisms to prevent the misuse of surveillance capabilities.

Ultimately, the question is not simply whether spyware can be brought to trial, but whether the broader surveillance ecosystem in which it operates can be subjected to meaningful democratic oversight. Without such scrutiny, technologies that promise greater connectivity and participation may instead contribute to an environment in which communication becomes a source of vulnerability and the exercise of fundamental democratic freedoms carries increasing risks.

Social Media, AI and the Age Debate: Optimising Child Online Safety Policy

By DIID |

Children have one job: to make mistakes, try things out, and figure out who they are becoming. Generative AI tools, by handing children ready-made answers, risk taking that job away before children ever get the chance to do it themselves. Yet, a blanket ban is never really a comprehensive solution.

At this year’s forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica ‘26), our Executive Director, Adeboro Odunlami, raised the above as a quiet but pointed concern.

The forum, organized by CIPESA, ran from 28 September to 1 October 2026 in Mauritius. Adeboro represented DIID on the panel “Children, AI, and the Age Debate in Africa”, speaking alongside Belinda Matore (University of Pretoria), Afia Asantewaa Asare-Kyei (Meta’s Oversight Board), Yasmin Ahmed (FemTech Law Initiative) and Lillian Kariuki (Africa Child Online Safety Alliance).

The panel’s focus was to discuss a question of AI, social media and age-based bans in Africa, as countries like Australia, Gabon, and the UK have moved to ban under-16s from social media.

A ban gives political salience, but it is not a holistic solution.

Adeboro opened with a wider picture of what is at stake. Africa is projected to be home to the youngest population in the world by 2030. She also noted a Research where only about 2 percent of adults passed a test on divergent thinking, while roughly 90 percent of children in nursery school passed the same test. This showed that children have a natural capacity for creative, outside-the-box thinking. Generative AI tools, used without guidance, risk handing them answers before they ever practice using that capacity. A generation raised this way enters the labour force well served by tools, but under-trained in thinking for themselves. A child’s pre-existing disadvantage may compound problems here too. That is, children who start behind stay behind, carried further apart by how differently they get to use these tools.

Against that backdrop, Adeboro’s case against a blanket ban has several layers.

A ban offers real political value to politicians. To the public, it comes off as a decisive action; much stronger than  saying “we conducted a risk assessment”. This is why  policymakers reach for it since many parents already clamour for it.

A blanket ban can also regulate the wrong place. Platforms flagged by UNICEF for risk include messaging apps that are outside Meta’s own oversight structures, and non-consensual images frequently move through platforms like Telegram that a social-media ban might not reach at all.

And the evidence has not caught up to the policy. Bans are spreading fast. Australia, the UK, Rwanda and Gabon have all moved on it, and more countries are following. But the early data from countries further along only tells part of the story. The number of accounts are dropping on major platforms, while usage rises on smaller, less regulated ones. However, a  reduction in accounts is not the outcome anyone is actually after. Child online safety is.

Adeboro’s conclusion on this point was that children’s attention has become a commodity, and the fix starts with the design of the platforms built to capture it. Safety by design and platform accountability, using the least restrictive method available, address the actual mechanism at work. Whereas, a ban only addresses its visibility.

Where DIID stands

This is the version of child online safety DIID keeps advocating for. Rather than look for a single switch to flip, policy should be based on a set of deliberate, evidence-led choices. Regulation should target the actual harm and be built with an honest view of who it reaches, and the practical capacity to enforce it. Children should be treated as participants rather than subjects. 

We were glad to bring this thinking to FIFAfrica26, in a room full of people working on the same questions from different corners of the continent.

This article was first published by the Digital Initiative for Innovation and Development (DIID). Click here to read more on its website.