New Cyber Law Impedes Civil Liberties in Increasingly Repressive Zambia

By CIPESA Writer |

Zambia is increasingly repressing the exercise of civic rights, a trend that is growing as the country heads to general elections in August 2021. Human rights defenders are equally worried that state agencies could apply the recently enacted Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act 2021 to further undermine the digital civic space.

President Edgar Lungu, who has been in power since 2015, is standing for re-election in the August 12 elections. In the last five years of his reign, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly have come under increasing attack, with opposition leaders and activists jailed, and independent media outlets shut down, according to an Amnesty International Report.

The government denies these accusations, claiming the country has a vibrant civil society, a thriving independent media, and an impartial judiciary that protects civil liberties. However, independent analysts dismiss the government’s claims, pointing out that there has been “a creation of a fear society through the demonising of civil society and political opposition, the punishing of dissent, and weaponising the law and applying it selectively against anyone critical of the state.”

The repression in the southern African country has been witnessed both offline and online. Freedom House ranked the country’s state of internet freedom in 2020 as “partly free”, citing network restrictions, arrest of pro-government commentators and online users. And with the recent enactment of the cyber crimes law, worries are growing that the government could employ it as yet another weapon to silence dissenters and critics. Crucially, the new law falls short on protecting individual rights to privacy, anonymity, and freedom of expression online.

Notably, the law was passed amidst criticism that it was primarily aimed at policing cyber space and gagging freedom of expression and speech of government critics and opponents ahead of the August 12, 2021 general election. The government passed the law after rejecting concerns raised by civil society about its regressive provisions.

According to the Bloggers of Zambia, during 2020 seven people were arrested under the Criminal Procedure Code for purportedly defaming the president through posts on social media. Meanwhile, a 2020 report by Citizen Lab, a global digital rights watchdog, identified Zambia as a possible customer of cyber espionage software. This was the second time that Zambia, alongside other African governments, was featured in the report that unmasks clients of surveillance software. The country has also embarked on a Safe City Project that is mounting 24-hour surveillance cameras in public places and on the main road networks, despite its lack of an operational data protection law and regulations to govern the use of such video surveillance.

According to CIPESA’s analysis of the law, while cyber security is critical in the highly evolving technological era, it is important that a rights-based approach is employed in the development of policies and laws to ensure that the adopted laws and policies do not wantonly limit individual rights and freedoms. The Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act, 2021 in its current state offers some solutions to emerging challenges in the digital space but has wide negative impacts on the protection, promotion and enjoyment of digital rights and freedoms.

Under international human rights law, the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and information may only be restricted if prescribed by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and if the restrictions are necessary and proportionate in pursuance of a legitimate aim. Many provisions in the Zambian law are vague and overly broad, and in contravention of the principle of legality. The law extends the powers of state authorities to restrict and punish online expression, and gives law enforcement agents leverage to conduct unsupervised surveillance without judicial oversight.

Indeed, the CIPESA analysis shows that Zambia’ cyber law falls short of the established regional and international human rights standards on the right to privacy as laid down in the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 

Accordingly, the Zambian parliament should consider repealing or amending the regressive provisions to ensure the protection of digital rights and freedoms. Short of this, the new law could only serve the purpose of handing enemies of democracy yet another weapon for silencing the legitimate expression of critics, political opponents, and ordinary citizens.

See here CIPESA’s full review of the ramifications of Zambia’s Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act 2021.

Uganda Abandons Social Media Tax But Slaps New Levy on Internet Data

By Daniel Mwesigwa |

Uganda has ditched the Over-The-Top (OTT) tax that it introduced three years ago on the use of social media services after the tax failed to raise revenues and constrained internet usage. But appearing to not have learnt any lessons, the country has instead introduced a 12% tax on internet data.

Introduced on July 1, 2018, the infamous OTT tax, widely known as ‘social media tax’, required Ugandans to pay a daily levy of Uganda Shillings (UGX) 200 (USD 0.05) in order to access over 50 platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. President Yoweri Museveni directed the introduction of the social media tax as a ‘sin tax’ to punish social media users in Uganda for the consequences of their “opinions, prejudices [and] insults” and as a means to raise government revenues. 

From inception, sections of civil society and the public saw the tax as an attempt to stifle free speech and access to information – and they warned that the tax would have disastrous effects on the country’s fledgling digital economy and digital civic space. These fears were not unfounded, as Uganda is a notable digital rights predator that has ordered social media blockages and internet shutdowns, besides harassing some social media users that are critical of the government.

Predictions that the social media tax would harm internet use and fail to generate the envisaged revenues indeed came true. At the time the government filed proposals to introduce the OTT tax, the Ministry of Finance projected that up to UGX 486 billion (USD 131 million) could be collected annually by 2022. However, by the end of July 2018, the projections had been revised downwards to UGX 284 billion (USD 78 million) annually. In July 2019, one year after the introduction of the tax, the revenue body reported that it had experienced an annual shortfall of 83%, having collected only UGX 49.5 billion (USD 13.5 million). In the second year, the social media tax fetched a paltry USD 16.3 million. 

Now, beginning July 1, 2021, the government has replaced the OTT tax with a direct 12% levy on the net price of internet data, after which a value added tax (VAT) of 18% will apply. 

According to a social media notice by Roke Telkom, an internet service provider, the charges for a basic 60GB monthly bundle will increase by an extra USD 1.5 per month with the new levy compared to what the same bundle cost when the OTT tax was being levied. In other words, this will cost an additional USD 18 per year compared to what the same bundle cost when the OTT tax was being levied.

Within the first year of the social media tax, Uganda lost five million internet subscriptions due to the negative effects of the tax. Although the tax was envisioned as small and manageable, it did not meet the fairness and proportionality requirements: for a country whose average phone subscriber spends just UGX 10,500 (about USD 2.8) per month on all their voice calls, data, SMS, and access taxes, according to Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) figures, a monthly social media tax of USD 1.5 alone consumes up to 54% of their telecommunication services spend. 

Moreover, in 2018, the Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI) showed that the social media tax was likely going to push basic connectivity out of reach for many including the underemployed and unemployed youth who make up over 78% of the population. Additionally, A4AI explained that this tax would increase the lowest income group’s access to the internet by 10%, resulting in just 1GB of data costing them nearly 40% of their average monthly income. 

In the 2020 Affordability Report, Uganda’s data costs are higher than the African average, with 1 GB of data costing up to 8.07% of an average Ugandan’s monthly income compared to Sub-Saharan Africa’s average of 3.1%. According to a 2018 nation-wide survey by the National Information Technology Authority of Uganda (NITA-U), 76.6% of respondents named high cost as the main reason why their use of the internet was limited.

Based on problematic assumptions and projections?

The tax was clearly based on wrong assumptions, and the signs were ominous from early on. In January 2019, the then Minister of ICT, Frank Tumwebaze, reportedly said his ministry could have been misguided by the finance ministry in introducing the social media tax and he promised an impact assessment to gauge potential policy re-alignments. A year later in January 2020, the then revenue body’s Commissioner General, Doris Akol, decried social media tax avoidance through the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN). She called for the tax to be repealed and replaced with a direct levy on internet data. 

Indeed, since the social media shutdown during Uganda’s 2016 general elections, the use of VPN apps has been growing. These have helped users to avoid paying the OTT tax and to sidestep further internet shutdowns, such as the recent disruption during the 2021 election and the suspension of Facebook access in Uganda, which is in the fifth month now.

According to UCC, as of December 2020, there are 21.4 million active internet subscriptions – translating into a little more than one active connection for every two Ugandans – but the number of subscribers  who paid the OTT tax at least once during that month was 13.7 million. For most months in the lifetime of the tax, the number of OTT taxpayers remained under 10 million. At the time Uganda introduced the tax, the internet penetration rate stood at 47.4% (18.5 million internet subscriptions), meaning in three years, the country has added under three million subscriptions and the penetration rate has risen marginally. 

The new 12% levy comes when Uganda is in the middle of a second wave of Covid-19, which saw the government recently instituting a 42-day lockdown that prohibits all public gatherings, inter-district travel, and public transport. This has rendered digital technologies indispensable to working, learning, public participation, and livelihoods, yet Uganda’s new tax will adversely affect internet access and citizens’ access to information – perhaps more than the now repealed social media tax

Having recently secured a USD 200 million loan from the World Bank to support “access [to] high-quality and low-cost internet, public services online, a digital economy driving growth, innovation and job creation,” Uganda’s new tax seems inconsistent to the larger national visions of digital transformation, including the National Broadband Policy (2018-2023) and the Digital Vision 2040.

But Uganda is not alone on this worrying path. Following the Covid-19 disruptions to domestic economies marked by weakening tax bases, various countries in the region have turned to, or are considering, some form of digital tax as one of the new revenue streams. For example, Zambia and Nigeria have considered plans of imposing direct taxes on OTT services but have withdrawn following backlash. Botswana has indicated it is exploring a digital tax due to a decrease in tax revenue and in 2020, Mauritius introduced a 15% VAT on digital services provided by non-resident companies.

Uganda Communications Tribunal Regulations Fail to Constitute an Impartial Arbiter

By Edrine Wanyama |

Uganda is in the process of establishing the Uganda Communications Tribunal which is provided for by section 60 of the Uganda Communications Act. Among others, the tribunal will hear and determine all matters relating to communication services arising from decisions made by the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) and the minister responsible for information and communications technology. 

The establishment of a Communications Tribunal has been long overdue as it was first provided for under the now repealed 1997 Communications Act. Once it comes into operation, the tribunal will provide an opportunity for separation of the policy making and regulatory organ of the communications sector from the organ that delivers justice.

The failure to establish the tribunal in a timely manner has in the past drawn criticism to the communications regulator for often failing to operate in a free, fair and independent manner. Further, the UCC has been criticised for failure to provide comprehensive and coherent information about its operations and its lack of independence from the executive branch of the government.

Moreover, UCC has been accused of overstepping its powers in ordering the suspension or revocation of operating licenses and meting out excessive penalties without providing avenues for redress for those that feel aggrieved by its actions. Increasingly, the commission has also taken steps to regulate online content including on blogs and social media, although its regulatory mandate over digital media is contested.

In this brief, CIPESA examines the regulations as proposed and whether they would provide for an effective and independent appellate body that will check the actions of the minister and the communications regulator. We also make proposals and recommendations for an effective, independent and transparent tribunal.

The long delay in establishing the tribunal has limited the ability of aggrieved citizens, the media and telecom service providers to swiftly challenge some of UCC’s and the ministry’s edicts. Once put in place the tribunal could potentially guarantee justice, and the speed of its delivery, in the communications sector. However, the effectiveness of the tribunal is dependent on independent and impartial operations that are not subject to external influence including from the appointing authorities. Hence, the recruitment of the tribunal’s members and indeed the composition of the tribunal need to be rethought to enhance the independence of its operations. Similarly, provisions in the regulations that hamper the swift and effective dispensing of justice by the tribunal need to be repealed.

See the full brief here.

Après Une année au Pouvoir, le Président du Burundi Evariste Ndayishimiye Présente Un Bilan Mitigé en Matière de Liberté de la Presse

Par CIPESA |

Une année après son arrivée au pouvoir, Evariste Ndayishimiye présente un bilan mitigé concernant la liberté de la presse au Burundi. Ayant connu de sévères restrictions sous le règne du prédécesseur de Ndayishimiye, le défunt Pierre Nkurunziza, les professionnels des media et les activistes avaient de l’espoir qu’après sa prestation de serment, Ndayishimiye initierait des réformes positives dans le pays.

Depuis son entrée en fonction le 18 Juin 2020, Ndayishimiye a activement travaillé avec les media, ce qui conduit à la levée de certaines sanctions. Comme actions notables, soulignons la grâce présidentielle accordée à des journalistes emprisonnés, la levée de certaines sanctions contre des media en ligne à l’instar d’Iwacu et Ikiriho, et contre les radiodiffuseurs dont la BBC et Radio Sans Frontières Bonesha FM (RSF Bonesha). Il ne s’agit cependant que de réformes partielles car bien d’autres media indépendants restent sous sanction, sans oublier que la culture de l’auto censure et le harcèlement de la société civile sont toujours notables.

 Bref historique de la Répression

En Mai 2015, la candidature de Nkurunziza pour un nouveau mandat à la présidence de la République a déclenché une contestation, par laquelle les partis politiques d’opposition et des organisations de la société civile protestaient contre ce qu’ils considéraient comme un troisième mandat inconstitutionnel à la tête de l’Etat. Il s’en est suivi des manifestations publiques qui ont conduit à une crise politique sanglante, plusieurs rapports faisant état de brutalités policières, de destructions physiques de stations de radio et de télévision, et d’arrestation de plusieurs journalistes. Ces évènements ont été précédés d’un ordre du gouvernement aux fournisseurs d’accès à internet (FAI) de bloquer l’accès aux plateformes de media sociaux tel que Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter et Viber.

Nkurunziza a poursuivi le processus électoral et remporté le scrutin de 2015, succès qui l’a conduit à verrouiller systématiquement l’espace public. La période qui a précédé son décès en Juin 2020, fut caractérisée par une augmentation de la répression contre des médias en ligne et hors ligne, et un harcèlement des journalistes, forçant beaucoup d’entre eux à fuir en exil.

En Juillet 2016, Jean Bigirimana, journaliste indépendant est porté disparu dans des circonstances non encore éclaircies jusqu’à présent. Des témoins anonymes affirment que Bigirimana fut enlevé par des officiels du service secret burundais. Bien que les autorités du Burundi nient toute implication dans l’enlèvement de Bigirimana, des rapports ont fait état de menaces de mort adressées ultérieurement à sa famille forçant sa femme et ses enfants à fuir en exil.

En Octobre 2017, l’accès à des sites web appartenant à des médias locaux   http://www.iwacu-burundi.org, http://www.isanganiro.org, et http://www.ikiriho.org depuis le Burundi était bloqué, sauf  à travers des techniques de contournement (http://www.isanganiro.org fut débloqué peu après, les deux autres demeurent bloqués en Juin 2021). La station de radio Isanganiro et l’hebdomadaire Iwacu sont restés respectivement opérationnels et en circulation. L’équipe du journal en ligne IWACU a contacté le Conseil National de la Communication (CNC) ainsi que l’Agence de Régulation et de Contrôle des Télécommunications ( ARCT), mais tous ont nié toute responsabilité, arguant que le problème serait dû à une panne technique à chercher chez le fournisseur du service internet.  Afin de maintenir l’accès à ses publications en ligne, IWACU a dû mettre en place un site web alternatif ( https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/ ). Entretemps, la lettre de demande de déblocage du site web adressée par Ikiriho au CNC est restée sans réponse.

En mai 2018, le CNC a adressé des mises en garde respectivement à la Radio Isanganiro, à la Radio CCIB FM+ et à la Radio France Internationale, et a suspendu les licences de la BBC et de la Radio Voie d’Amérique (VOA) pour une période de six mois, les accusant de diffuser des informations non rigoureusement vérifiées ou des informations tendancieuses. Quelques mois plus tard, le gouvernement  suspendait les activités d’Organisations Non Gouvernementales internationales, les accusant de violer le cadre général de coopération entre la République du Burundi et les organisations non gouvernementales étrangères de 2017, qui leur exige un recrutement de leur personnel en suivant des quotas ethniques.

Du point de vue législatif, Nkurunziza a décrété un nouveau code de procédure pénale le 11 May 2018, qui comprend notamment des dispositions sur l’interception de communications électroniques. Ces dernières octroient à des agences gouvernementales les pleins droits pour la saisie de communications électroniques et de données informatiques dans la conduite d’enquêtes. Ledit code fut décrété deux semaines seulement après avoir été présenté au conseil des ministres en violation de la constitution selon certains observateurs.

Entretemps, un blocage de YouTube fut signalé au Burundi par Open Observatory of Network Interference durant le mois de Décembre 2019 sans aucune explication officielle. Avant la coupure de YouTube, le Gouvernement avait suspendu les commentaires de la chaine YouTube de l’agence de presse en ligne Nawe, et interdit toute nouvelle publication sur ladite chaîne. Au départ, le site web de Nawe et son compte twitter restèrent actifs mais n’ont plus publié depuis Aout 2020. De plus, Nawe ne figure plus sur la liste des médias en ligne disposant d’une licence d’opération au Burundi.

Le début de la pandémie de Covid-19 a présenté des défis encore plus importants. En mai 2020, le Burundi a expulsé des fonctionnaires de l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé pour avoir contesté la stratégie nationale de riposte la pandémie de Covid-19, dans un contexte de tensions pré-électorales. Alors que le pays a communiqué certaines statistiques sur la pandémie de Covid-19, le gouvernement ont été accusé de cacher les vraies données en les minimisant et de museler la société civile et les travailleurs de la santé.

Une nouvelle aube

Sous la direction du nouveau chef d’Etat Ndayishimiye, qui venait de remporter les élections avec un score de 67%, la répression s’est quelque peu atténuée. Quatre journalistes du magazine Iwacu ont été libérés de prison en Décembre 2020 par une grâce présidentielle après  avoir purgé 14 mois d’une peine qui devait durer deux ans et demi pour « tentative de complicité d’atteinte à la sûreté de l’État ». Les accusations étaient relatives à la couverture de combats entre l’Armée du Burundi et une milice armée venue de la République Démocratique du Congo voisine. Avant leur libération, plusieurs organisations, dont le Comité pour la Protection de Journalistes (CPJ), avaient écrit une pétition pour démontrer que les journalistes avaient été emprisonnés injustement.

Comme autre évolution positive, le Président Ndayishimiye a tenu une session de dialogue avec les journalistes burundais en Janvier 2021, durant laquelle il a affirmé que les media sont un pilier solide pour la démocratie et le développement. Il a encouragé le régulateur des Médias (CNC) à engager rapidement un dialogue avec les organismes de presse sous sanctions afin d’explorer la voie vers leur réouverture.

Suite à cette directive du Président, le CNC invita Léandre Sikuyavuga, Rédacteur en chef chez Iwacu à une réunion le 11 Février 2021. Sikuyavuga a été informé que le CNC était en pourparlers avec les services techniques habiletés pour rétablir l’accès au site web d’Iwacu depuis le Burundi. De plus, le forum de discussion sur le site web, fermé depuis Avril 2018 a également été rouvert. Cependant, l’accès au site web d’Iwacu depuis le Burundi n’est toujours pas effectif au moment cet article est écrit.

Par ailleurs, le Président du CNC a tenu une conférence de presse en Février 2021 pour annoncer la levée de toutes les sanctions prises à l’encontre de la RSF Bonesha FM. Le radiodiffuseur est l’une des stations indépendantes détruites en 2015, et sa licence d’exploitation avait été révoquée pour une durée indéterminée en 2017. La station a repris ses émissions quatre jours après la conférence de presse. Exprimant sa joie après la levée de sanctions, Léon Masengo, Directeur de Bonesha FM a expliqué que plusieurs équipements avaient été détruits en 2015, mais que la station commencerait à émettre dans la capitale économique Bujumbura d’abord, puis couvrirait tout le pays lorsque les équipements seraient remplacés. Il a déclaré que le coût total de rénovation serait estimé à 60.000 Dollars US.

Plus récemment, le CNC a levé les sanctions contre Ikiriho et contre la BBC. Pour reprendre ses activités, il a été demandé à la BBC de refaire une demande pour l’obtention d’une nouvelle licence. De son côté, Ikiriho a immédiatement repris ses activités notamment ses publications sur son compte Twitter qui était resté inactif depuis Octobre 2018. Son site web demeure cependant inaccessible.

Néanmoins, plusieurs autres radio dont la VOA, la Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) et la Radiotélévision Renaissance restent bannies. Pour contourner l’interdiction nationale, la RPA et la Radiotélévision Renaissance, dont les journalistes sont actuellement en exil continuent à préparer et à diffuser activement les éditions quotidiennes sur leurs chaines YouTube (Radio Publique Africaine Ijwi ry’Abanyagihugu et Radio Télé Renaissance). Ces éditions quotidiennes sont très partagées par des citoyens Burundais via WhatsApp.

De surcroit, plus de 70 journalistes burundais qui ont fui la crise de 2015 vivent toujours en exil selon le journal Le Monde. De plus, l’auto censure et la répression de la société civile persistent.

Les quatre prochaines années

Afin de ramener l’espace médiatique et civique burundais au dynamisme d’avant 2015, Ndayishimiye doit s’engager à défendre la liberté des médias et de l’internet en levant sans condition les interdictions imposées à tous les organes de presse, notamment en amnistiant tous les journalistes qui vivent actuellement en exil. Les réformes des pratiques doivent s’accompagner de réformes en matière de politiques, notamment par la modification des lois qui accordent des pouvoirs abusifs aux autorités leur permettant de mener des activités de surveillance et de censure injustifiées. Ndayishimye devrait également rompre avec l’habitude de coupure d’accès à l’Internet et aux médias sociaux.

One Year into his Reign, Burundi’s President Evariste Ndayishimiye has a Mixed Media Freedom Record

By CIPESA Writer |

A year into his presidency, Evariste Ndayishimiye has posted a mixed scorecard for media freedom in Burundi. Having experienced harsh restrictions under Ndayishimiye’s predecessor, the late Pierre Nkurunziza, there was optimism among media practitioners and activists that once sworn in, Ndayishimiye would usher in progressive reforms in the country.

Since taking office on June 18, 2020, Ndayishimiye has actively engaged the media, leading to the lifting of some sanctions. Notable actions have seen the pardon of jailed journalists, lifting of bans against online publishers such as Iwacu, Isanganiro and Ikirihoo as well as broadcasters including the BBC and Radio Sans Frontières Bonesha (RSF Bonesha). However, these have only been partial reliefs as many independent media houses remain banned, while the culture of self-censorship and civil society oppression prevails. 

A History of Repression

In May 2015, Nkurunziza’s bid for a new term in office triggered contestation, with opposition parties and civil society organisations protesting against what they considered an unconstitutional third term in office. The ensuing public demonstrations led to a deadly political crisis, with widespread reports of police brutality, physical destruction of radio and televisions stations, and the arrest of several journalists. The events were preceded by a government order to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block access to social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Viber.

Nkurunziza eventually had his way and won the 2015 elections, after which he set upon systematically shrinking civic space. The period until his death in June 2020 saw an escalation in the crackdown on independent media and journalists, both offline and online, forcing many to flee to exile.

In July 2016, Jean Bigirimana, an independent online journalist, went missing and his whereabouts remain unknown. Witness testimonies allege that Bigirimana was abducted by officials of Burundi’s national intelligence services. Although authorities have denied any involvement in Bigirimina’s abduction, further reports indicate that his family received death threats, forcing his wife and children to flee into exile.

As of October 2017, access to the websites of independent local news publishers http://www.iwacu-burundi.org, http://www.isanganiro.org, and http://www.ikiriho.org was blocked from within Burundi except through use of circumvention methods. Isanganiro’s radio station and Iwacu’s weekly print newspaper remained operational and in circulation, respectively. The management of Iwacu contacted the National Communication Council (CNC) as well as the telecommunication regulatory authority regarding the website blockage, but the authorities denied responsibility, arguing that it could be a technical issue at the Internet Service Provider level. In order to keep its services accessible, Iwacu set up an alternative website (https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/). Meanwhile, a letter from Ikiriho to the CNC requesting for its website to be unblocked went unanswered.

In May 2018, the CNC issued warnings to Radio Isanganiro, Radio CCIB FM+, and Radio France Internationale, and suspended the licenses of the BBC and Voice of America (VOA) for six months on allegations of not verifying sources and broadcasting unbalanced news. Months later in October 2018, the government suspended the operations of international non-governmental organisations, accusing them of violating the 2017 General Framework for Cooperation between the Republic of Burundi and Foreign NGOs, which requires recruitment of national staff by ethnic quotas. 

On the legislative front, on May 11, 2018, Nkurunziza assented to a new interception of communications law, with sweeping powers granted to government agencies carrying out investigations to intercept electronic communications and seize computer data. The law was passed within two weeks of first being tabled –  in contravention of the constitution.

Meanwhile,  YouTube block in Burundi was documented by the Open Observatory of Network Interference during December 2019 without official explanation. Leading up to the alleged restriction on YouTube, the Burundian government suspended the comments section on the YouTube channel of Nawe, an independent media outlet, and prohibited new channel uploads. Initially, Nawe’s website and Twitter remained active but both have been inactive since August 2020. Moreover, Nawe is no longer listed among CNC’s licensed online media houses. 

The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic presented even bigger challenges. In May 2020, Burundi expelled officials of the World Health Organisation for challenging the country’s Covid-19 response, amidst a looming election. Whereas the country reported some Covid-19 statistics, there was criticism of under-reporting and gagging of civil society and health workers. 

A New Dawn

Under the new head of state Ndayishimiye, who won the 2020 polls by 67%, the repression has eased somewhat. Four Iwacu journalists were released from prison in December 2020 by way of a presidential pardon after serving 14 months of a two-and-a-half year jail sentence for “complicity in undermining state safety.” The charges related to coverage of clashes between the Burundian army and militia from neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. Prior to their release, various organisations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), had petitioned Ndayishimiye, arguing that the four journalists’ conviction was unjust.

In another positive development, Ndayishimiye held a dialogue with Burundi journalists in January 2021, during which he said that the media are a strong pillar for democracy and development and urged the country’s media regulatory body CNC to urgently engage with media houses that were banned or sanctioned to explore possible reopening.

Following the president’s directive, the CNC invited Léandre Sikuyavuga, Editor-in-Chief of Iwacu, for a meeting on February 11, 2021. Sikuyavuga was informed that the CNC was in talks with the relevant technical service providers to reinstate access to the Iwacu website in Burundi. The ban on the discussion forum of the website, which was imposed back in April 2018, was also revoked. However, at the time of writing, Iwacu remains inaccessible within Burundi.

Also in February, the President of the CNC held a press conference during which he announced the end of all restrictions against RSF Bonesha FM. The broadcaster was one of the independent radio stations destroyed in 2015 and its operating license was indefinitely revoked in 2017. Within four days of the press conference, the station resumed broadcasting. While expressing his joy at the lifting of the sanctions, Leon Masengo, the Director of Bonesha FM, said a lot of their equipment was destroyed in 2015, but the station would start airing in the capital Bujumbura initially and later countrywide once the necessary equipment was replaced. The estimated cost of replacing the damaged equipment was USD 60,000.

More recently, on June 16, 2021, the CNC lifted the ban on Ikiriho and the BBC. In order to resume operations, the BBC is required to apply for a new license. For its part, Ikiriho immediately resumed operations including posts via its Twitter account which had been dormant since October 2018. However, its website remains inaccessible. 

Nonetheless, many other broadcasters including VOA, Radio Publique Africaine (RPA), and Radio Télévision Renaissance remain off air. In order to overcome the national ban, RPA and Radio Télévision Renaissance, whose journalists live in exile, maintain active Youtube channels (Radio Publique Africaine Ijwi ry’Abanyagihugu and Tele Renaissance), whose daily news editions are widely circulated among Burundians via Whatsapp. 

Further, more than 70 journalists who fled the country during the 2015 crisis for fear of their lives are still living in exile as reported by the Le Monde. Meanwhile, self-censorship and civil society repression persists.

 The Next Four Years

In order to rejuvenate the media landscape and civic space to its dynamism prior to 2015, Ndayishimiye must show commitment to uphold media and internet freedom by unconditionally lifting bans on all media houses, including granting amnesty to all journalists currently living in exile. The practice reforms should be matched with policy reforms including amendments to laws that grant undue powers to authorities to conduct unwarranted surveillance and censorship. Ndayishimye should also desist from interrupting access to the internet and social media.