Strengthening Digital Rights for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons

By Tsion Meingstu and Paul Kimumwe |

As part of efforts to strengthen the integration of digital inclusion and digital accessibility for persons with disabilities and older persons into its human rights monitoring and oversight mandate, the Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC) held a two-day capacity-building workshop for its staff on September 21st and 22nd, 2026.

The workshop, which was facilitated by experts from the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), sought to equip participants with foundational knowledge and skills in digital accessibility and inclusion, how to design and implement monitoring checklists for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons, and how to communicate and advocate for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

The staff capacity building workshop was one of the Commission’s key deliverables under a ten-month grant from CIPESA’s Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF). Other activities under the grant include monitoring and assessing the impact of digital technologies’ (in)accessibility on the daily lives of older persons and persons with disabilities, and organising advocacy activities to raise awareness of digital rights for persons with disabilities and older persons among relevant government and non-government stakeholders to foster inclusive practices.

During the workshop, Shimels Ashagre, Senior Human Rights Officer for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons at the EHRC, presented a draft monitoring toolkit developed as part of the grant that will be used to assess the state of digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons in Ethiopia.

The toolkit is organised around eight key dimensions of digital inclusion, with specific questions tailored to both persons with disabilities and older persons. It draws on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the UN Principles for Older Persons, the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA), the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Older Persons, and the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 3.0).

The Commission will use the findings from the assessment to inform the design and implementation of advocacy activities about the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

Opening the workshop, the thematic Commissioner for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons, Mohammed Ahmed, emphasised that the world is undergoing rapid digital transformation, with technology increasingly shaping how people access information, services, and opportunities. While these advancements bring significant benefits, they also raise important human rights considerations that must not be overlooked.

He stressed that particular attention should be given to the rights of vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities and older persons, who often face barriers to accessing and benefiting from digital technologies. Commissioner Mohammed underscored that digital inclusion and accessibility are not merely technical issues but fundamental human rights concerns that require deliberate action from governments, institutions, and other stakeholders.

Dr Wairagala Wakabi, the Executive Director of CIPESA, noted that digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons has become a central thematic area for CIPESA, which is why it partners with institutions such as the EHRC to strengthen their capacity to monitor and promote digital inclusion. He noted that through the ADRF, CIPESA provides financial and technical support to organisations that are championing digital inclusion.

For example, in the last round of the ADRF grant, USD 320,000 was awarded to 18 initiatives in 14 countries to support efforts to advance digital rights, inclusion, and online safety. Three of the recipients, including Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Council for the Blind, and the Rwanda-based Organisation d’Integration et de Promotion des Personnes Atteintes d’Albinisme (OIPPA), are focusing on Digital Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons.

Dr Wakabi noted that for effective advocacy around digital rights, participants need to understand how digital technologies intersect and affect the rights of persons with disabilities. And for Human Rights Commissions, this understanding helps them to integrate digital rights into their monitoring and oversight mandates of human rights.

Reactions from the participants:

“The training was very fascinating. I gained a tremendous amount of knowledge about digital rights and how they are directly related to human rights and their intersection. This was beginner-friendly training that provided participants with a foundational experience in the field.” Female participant

“Overall, the training was highly informative and educational. Prior to attending the training, I did not have a clear understanding of the concept of digital technologies and their practical applications. However, the training helped me develop a solid understanding of the subject and enhanced my knowledge of key digital concepts.” Male participant

The sessions on digital rights, as well as the rights of older persons and persons with disabilities, significantly broadened my perspective and enhanced my understanding of inclusion and accessibility from a digital technologies’ perspective. The knowledge gained has provided me with a clear framework for integrating these concepts into my future work, particularly on emerging issues related to the rights and participation of older persons and persons with disabilities.

Additionally, the training focus on Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) offered valuable and thought-provoking insights into an important and evolving area. Overall, the training was highly informative, practical, and relevant to my professional responsibilities.”

The training was attended by 18 individuals (10 men and 8 women) drawn from various departments of the commission, including the Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons Department, Human Rights Education Department, Women and Children’s Rights Department, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Monitoring and Investigation Department, and the Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Migrants’ Rights Department.

When Smart Cities Turn Menacing

By Wairagala Wakabi |

In June 2025, Uganda switched on the Automated Electronic Penalty System (EPSAuto), using CCTV cameras, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), and an intelligent transport monitoring system (ITMS) to fine motorists. But the system, ostensibly aimed at bringing order to the country’s chaotic roads, quickly generated controversy.

EPSAuto was suspended within days. More than a year later, on October 6, Ugandan Attorney General Sam Mayanja declared that the 2021 contract with a Russian company for the ITMS, including digital number plates and vehicle tracking, was legally void and unenforceable. The experience points to a bigger question confronting countries in Africa and elsewhere: what happens when the technologies introduced to make cities safer also make it easier for the government to identify and track its citizens?

A recent report,  Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, identified more than US$2 billion in spending on the surveillance of public spaces in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, although the real amount is likely much higher. And much of this financing came from Chinese companies.

The research finds no compelling evidence of smart-city surveillance reducing terrorism or serious crime in Africa. Senegal and Zambia have invested heavily in these systems despite facing relatively few security threats. In Mozambique, the technology — which, tellingly, is concentrated in opposition strongholds — has not improved the authorities’ response to serious crimes like kidnappings. Similarly, in Nigeria, heavy spending on surveillance has done little to stem insecurity.

This raises the problem of “function creep.” As the uproar around Uganda’s EPSAuto shows, there are concerns — often valid — that smart-city surveillance tools are being used to identify and monitor activists, opposition figures, critics, and protesters. The same unease was documented in Zimbabwe.

NB: The excerpts above are drawn from an article by Wairagala Wakabi published on Project Syndicate on October 21, 2026. The research, Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, is available on open access.

How Spyware and Digital Surveillance Undermine Democratic Participation

By Jimmy Kainja |

Mobile devices such as smartphones, computers, and tablets have transformed how journalists, activists, public figures, and ordinary citizens access, produce, and circulate information. By connecting people to a global communication infrastructure, these technologies have expanded opportunities for public debate, civic engagement, and accountability. Yet the same technologies can also facilitate surveillance, particularly targeting individuals and groups whose work challenges established power structures.

These tensions were explored at a panel discussion titled Spyware on Trial: A Comparative Discussion Across Jurisdictions, held at the recent Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26). The panel hosted by Media Defence examined how spyware operates within surveillance systems and how its effects extend beyond individual privacy, undermining journalism, collective organising, and democratic participation.

Spyware as Part of a Wider Surveillance Ecosystem

A key argument that emerged during the discussion was that spyware should not be seen as an isolated technology, but as part of a broader surveillance ecosystem. As one panellist observed, surveillance takes multiple forms, including physical monitoring and confiscating personal devices for further examination. Spyware, however, adds a distinct dimension because it enables remote, often less visible monitoring, increasing uncertainty about whether an individual’s communications, activities, or personal information are being accessed.

Importantly, the panellist argued that the mere possibility of surveillance can have consequences, even when there is no definitive evidence of its occurrence. The uncertainty surrounding spyware can generate fear and distrust, prompting individuals to reconsider whom they communicate with, what information they share, and whether they should continue engaging with particular networks.

As the panellist explained, although spyware’s effects may initially seem individual, their consequences extend well beyond the person targeted. Peers may stigmatise or ostracise individuals suspected of being compromised, weakening their relationships and isolating them from the networks on which their work depends. In this sense, surveillance can disrupt social relationships and collective action without necessarily targeting an entire organisation or movement.

The Chilling Effect on Journalism and Collective Organising

The investigative journalist on the panel reinforced this argument by recounting his own experience in Malawi. He explained that a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) leader who had pledged his support before the journalists were arrested and had their devices confiscated stopped communicating with the journalist after it became known that Malawian authorities had confiscated and tampered with his devices. The incident illustrated how the perceived risk of surveillance can undermine trust between journalists and their sources, even when the sources themselves have not been directly targeted.

The chilling effect of surveillance is often discussed in relation to freedom of expression, but it can be difficult to demonstrate how it operates in practice. This example provided a concrete illustration of how the fear of compromised communications can alter people’s behaviour and relationships. The NGO leader’s decision to stop communicating with the journalist suggests that the perceived risk of surveillance can be enough to discourage engagement, even in the absence of conclusive evidence that spyware has been deployed against a particular person or communication channel.

The implications extend way beyond individual privacy and a journalist’s ability to communicate freely. When people become reluctant to exchange information, attend meetings, or associate with individuals perceived to be under surveillance, the consequences can include restrictions on freedom of association, reduced opportunities for mobilisation, and weakened democratic participation. Surveillance therefore affects not only those directly targeted but also the wider networks and movements that depend on trust, communication, and collaboration. For civil society organisations and public interest groups, this can undermine the very relationships necessary for collective organising and movement building.

Device Confiscation, Legal Mechanisms, and Digital Surveillance

The panel also explored how surveillance operates across African countries through different but interconnected practices. These include physically confiscating mobile phones and computers, examining or manipulating seized devices, and using legal mechanisms to justify or facilitate their seizure. Once authorities possess devices, they may access sensitive information, examine communications, and expose confidential material. When spyware is installed, or devices are compromised and the risks may persist even after authorities return the devices to their owners.

The discussion also highlighted the use of law as an instrument to facilitate surveillance, a practice that may be understood as lawfare. In this context, legal powers can justify actions such as seizing activists’ devices, potentially creating opportunities to access information about their communications and networks. Panellists cited examples of the seizure and alleged tampering with activists’ mobile phones in Kenya, illustrating how these practices can affect people working on public interest issues across the region.

For investigative journalists, these practices pose a particular threat because their work often depends on maintaining confidential relationships with sources. Investigative journalists often handle sensitive information, and their sources often have a lot to lose, including the threat of death if their identities are known or disclosed. The security of a journalist’s device is therefore not merely a matter of personal privacy; it is also central to protecting their sources, preserving sensitive evidence, and ensuring that information can be reported in the public interest. When authorities confiscate or compromise devices, the consequences can extend to the people whose identities, communications, or disclosures may be exposed.

Reflecting on the impact of his arrest and the confiscation of his and his organisation’s devices, the Malawian journalist described the consequences for his work:

We’ve lost a big chunk of information that we used to get from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and we’ve lost a good number of our sources because of the idea [that our gadgets spied on] that is being planted in our sources out there, making the job of journalists so difficult because you cannot just wake up one day and do the stories that we do without sources of information, so the impact of spyware is huge on the public. When investigative journalism fails, the biggest victim is the public.

This testimony highlights the broader public consequences of surveillance. The loss of sources and information does not merely inconvenience a journalist or compromise an individual investigation; it can also prevent important stories from reaching the public. When sources fear that their identities or communications may be exposed, they may withhold information about corruption, misconduct, or abuses of power. Investigative journalism becomes harder, and those whose actions might otherwise be scrutinised face fewer opportunities for public accountability.

Citizens ultimately bear the cost, as they depend on independent journalism to access information, assess the conduct of public institutions, and make informed decisions about public affairs.

Spyware and the Erosion of Democratic Freedoms

The discussion demonstrated that spyware raises concerns extending far beyond digital security and the protection of personal data. Its use, or even the perception that it is being used, can undermine several fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, and access to information. These freedoms are closely interconnected: citizens need to communicate freely, associate with others, and access reliable information to participate meaningfully in democratic processes. Although surveillance may target particular individuals, its broader effect can weaken the relationships and institutions that sustain public interest work and democratic participation.

A key insight from the panel was that understanding contemporary surveillance requires moving beyond a narrow focus on what a particular technology can do. The more important question is how spyware interacts with other surveillance practices, legal powers, institutional arrangements, and social relationships. Device confiscation, legal intimidation, digital monitoring, and the erosion of trust can reinforce one another, producing consequences greater than any single practice in isolation.

Looking Beyond the Technology

The session offered an important reminder that digital technologies are not inherently democratic or repressive; their effects depend substantially on how they are deployed, by whom, and within what political and legal contexts.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technical safeguards against spyware. It also demands scrutiny of the legal and institutional arrangements that enable surveillance, protection for journalists and their sources, and stronger accountability mechanisms to prevent the misuse of surveillance capabilities.

Ultimately, the question is not simply whether spyware can be brought to trial, but whether the broader surveillance ecosystem in which it operates can be subjected to meaningful democratic oversight. Without such scrutiny, technologies that promise greater connectivity and participation may instead contribute to an environment in which communication becomes a source of vulnerability and the exercise of fundamental democratic freedoms carries increasing risks.

Social Media, AI and the Age Debate: Optimising Child Online Safety Policy

By DIID |

Children have one job: to make mistakes, try things out, and figure out who they are becoming. Generative AI tools, by handing children ready-made answers, risk taking that job away before children ever get the chance to do it themselves. Yet, a blanket ban is never really a comprehensive solution.

At this year’s forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica ‘26), our Executive Director, Adeboro Odunlami, raised the above as a quiet but pointed concern.

The forum, organized by CIPESA, ran from 28 September to 1 October 2026 in Mauritius. Adeboro represented DIID on the panel “Children, AI, and the Age Debate in Africa”, speaking alongside Belinda Matore (University of Pretoria), Afia Asantewaa Asare-Kyei (Meta’s Oversight Board), Yasmin Ahmed (FemTech Law Initiative) and Lillian Kariuki (Africa Child Online Safety Alliance).

The panel’s focus was to discuss a question of AI, social media and age-based bans in Africa, as countries like Australia, Gabon, and the UK have moved to ban under-16s from social media.

A ban gives political salience, but it is not a holistic solution.

Adeboro opened with a wider picture of what is at stake. Africa is projected to be home to the youngest population in the world by 2030. She also noted a Research where only about 2 percent of adults passed a test on divergent thinking, while roughly 90 percent of children in nursery school passed the same test. This showed that children have a natural capacity for creative, outside-the-box thinking. Generative AI tools, used without guidance, risk handing them answers before they ever practice using that capacity. A generation raised this way enters the labour force well served by tools, but under-trained in thinking for themselves. A child’s pre-existing disadvantage may compound problems here too. That is, children who start behind stay behind, carried further apart by how differently they get to use these tools.

Against that backdrop, Adeboro’s case against a blanket ban has several layers.

A ban offers real political value to politicians. To the public, it comes off as a decisive action; much stronger than  saying “we conducted a risk assessment”. This is why  policymakers reach for it since many parents already clamour for it.

A blanket ban can also regulate the wrong place. Platforms flagged by UNICEF for risk include messaging apps that are outside Meta’s own oversight structures, and non-consensual images frequently move through platforms like Telegram that a social-media ban might not reach at all.

And the evidence has not caught up to the policy. Bans are spreading fast. Australia, the UK, Rwanda and Gabon have all moved on it, and more countries are following. But the early data from countries further along only tells part of the story. The number of accounts are dropping on major platforms, while usage rises on smaller, less regulated ones. However, a  reduction in accounts is not the outcome anyone is actually after. Child online safety is.

Adeboro’s conclusion on this point was that children’s attention has become a commodity, and the fix starts with the design of the platforms built to capture it. Safety by design and platform accountability, using the least restrictive method available, address the actual mechanism at work. Whereas, a ban only addresses its visibility.

Where DIID stands

This is the version of child online safety DIID keeps advocating for. Rather than look for a single switch to flip, policy should be based on a set of deliberate, evidence-led choices. Regulation should target the actual harm and be built with an honest view of who it reaches, and the practical capacity to enforce it. Children should be treated as participants rather than subjects. 

We were glad to bring this thinking to FIFAfrica26, in a room full of people working on the same questions from different corners of the continent.

This article was first published by the Digital Initiative for Innovation and Development (DIID). Click here to read more on its website.

Digital public infrastructure reshaping state-citizen relations in Africa, report warns

By Lu-Hai Liang |

Study warns that expanding digital ID and public service systems could deepen exclusion without stronger governance and human rights safeguards.

A new report from CIPESA (Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa) finds that the expansion of digital public infrastructure (DPI) systems across 11 African countries could have significant implications for human rights, democratic governance and civic participation.

The State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 report examines DPI developments in Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Governments across the continent are investing heavily in digital identity, payment and data-sharing systems to modernize public services and drive digital transformation.

But the report argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the governance and human rights implications of these systems. It calls for stronger rights-respecting frameworks before DPI becomes further entrenched in public administration and everyday life.

“Foundational credentials such as mandatory gateways and access to essential public and private services are increasingly facing flaws in architectural design and utility, technical failures, and inaccurate records,” the report claims in its conclusion.

The result is often widespread exclusion of vulnerable groups, according to the report, particularly affecting people with limited digital skills, poor connectivity or difficulties accessing civil registration systems which include rural communities, women, children and the elderly.

The report lists an extensive number of recommendations that can offset such problems. The recommendations include establishing robust governance such as rights-respecting national policies and laws, along with investment in complementary infrastructure to foster connectivity and capacity enhancement.

It recommends replacing coverage-only targets with disaggregated meaningful-connectivity and service-completion indicators; stopping internet shutdowns and other blanket connectivity restrictions as tools of political or security management, among other suggestions. The full State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 report can be read here.

The report was launched at the closing ceremony of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26) held in Mauritius. Mauritius’ Minister of Information and Communication Technology, Dr Avinash Ramtoh, described DPI as “a critical infrastructure in any forward-looking country” and stressed the need to ensure digital systems are inclusive, accessible and rights-respecting.

The report’s release marked the conclusion of FIFAfrica26, a four-day gathering that brought together policymakers, researchers, civil society organizations, journalists, technologists, activists and development partners from across Africa and beyond. Discussions focused on issues including AI, data governance, platform accountability, digital inclusion and security, and civic participation. A recurring message was that technology is inseparable from society and that decisions about the design, governance and use of digital systems have profound consequences for rights, participation and power.

As Africa’s digital transformation accelerates, the report argues that these questions will become increasingly important in shaping how citizens access services, engage with governments and exercise their rights in the years ahead.

This article was originally posted by Biometric Update.Com on October 13, 2026.