Promoting Effective and Inclusive ICT Policy in Africa

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  HomeCollaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)  /  Digital Rights
25Jun

Accelerating Digital Accessibility and Solutions for Africa’s Future

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Raylenne Kambua |

More than 150 million persons with disabilities across Africa navigate a digital landscape not designed for them, with inaccessible websites, unusable mobile applications, unreachable government services, and educational platforms that often lock them out. This exclusion carries a direct economic cost, which the World Bank estimates at 3–7% of countries’ Gross Domestic Product.

Increasingly, connectivity for persons with disabilities has become less a question of infrastructure coverage and more about accessibility and meaningful usage. While internet services are available to 85% of Africa’s population, 64% of those within coverage do not use them, with persons with disabilities among the most excluded groups. The exclusion has been reinforced by the high costs of devices, with some markets taxing entry-level smartphones up to 50%, making them unaffordable for low-income households.

Figures from the Assistive Technology Landscape in Africa Report show that only one in ten people who need assistive technologies across the continent have access to them, while 85% of mobility devices are still imported. This is a reflection of weak local production systems and heavy reliance on external supply chains.

At the seventh Inclusive Africa Conference, convened by inABLE in Nairobi from June 2–4, 2026, conversations examined whether Africa’s fast-expanding digital economy works for everyone or reproduces recurring forms of exclusion.

As Irene Mbari-Kirika, Executive Director of inABLE, noted, many technologies continue to fail because they are not developed with persons with disabilities in mind. This means that such devices can not be used by millions of potential users, and it has direct consequences for several users’ financial autonomy, privacy, and safety, especially in digital financial services such as mobile money.

Africa’s challenge is therefore not only access to assistive technologies, but the absence of a coherent local ecosystem for their design, production, distribution, and implementation. Building a sustainable assistive technologies value chain grounded in local materials, regional manufacturing, and culturally and linguistically relevant design is increasingly central to closing this gap.

The structural barriers to inclusion are deeply embedded across sectors, including in the education sector, where teacher training often excludes digital accessibility, curricula are rarely tested with assistive technologies, and assessment methods continue to assume uniform modes of learning and expression. These gaps, including digital literacy gaps, are compounded by the limited availability of African-language datasets, particularly for learners with communication disabilities, which constrains the development of inclusive digital and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled learning tools.

Notably, AI presents both opportunity and risk for digital inclusion. The outcome depends on whether inclusion is embedded in design, data, and deployment. On the upside, AI-enabled tools have expanded access for blind and low-vision users, while applications in healthcare are widening access to psychosocial support on a continent with less than two mental health professionals per 100,000 people. Real-time sign language translation and voice-to-text tools are also creating new pathways for participation.

At the same time, without targeted upskilling and bias audits, AI risks simultaneously opening one door for persons with disabilities while closing others. For example, AI systems are automating roles such as data entry, transcription, and customer service, which have historically provided key employment pathways for persons with disabilities. Yet, AI models trained on biased or unrepresentative datasets and automated decision-making processes risk excluding persons with disabilities from recruitment systems.

Mercy Ndegwa, Director of Public Policy for Africa at Meta, stressed this point, noting that AI systems can only reflect communities whose data and voices are included in their design and training. This makes the inclusion of organisations of persons with disabilities in AI governance not only a rights imperative but also a technical requirement for building functional systems.

However, African-language datasets remain severely underdeveloped,  and the cost of building them at scale is prohibitive for most actors.

The launch at the summit of the development of Africa’s first Harmonised Digital Accessibility Standard for ICT Products and Services marks an important step toward continent-wide alignment. The 24-month participatory process targets adoption across all 45 African Organisation for Standardisation (ARSO) member countries. The regional standard will be adapted to African languages, culture, and infrastructural realities, changing the procurement baseline for governments while setting a compliance reference for private technology developers across the continent. Fourteen countries have reportedly confirmed participation.

Throughout the discussions, the principle “Nothing about us without us” remained central, with an acknowledgement that persons with disabilities are contributors, decision-makers, and leaders in designing systems that affect them, and not merely end-users or research subjects to be consulted only after decisions are made. Design consultant Rama Gheerawo framed this through three registers: designing for, designing by, and designing with persons with disabilities as co-creators throughout all processes.

CIPESA has been emphatic that governments, regulators, and telecommunication operators bear the greatest responsibility for digital inclusion for persons with disabilities. Civil society efforts cannot substitute for enforceable action and measurable implementation. Limited capacity to engage in technical standard-setting also continues to hinder progress on digital rights for persons with disabilities. At the same time, fragmented approaches and shifting donor priorities are placing increasing strain on the sustainability of this work.

The European Union (EU) AI Act sets a benchmark for how regulation can protect marginalised groups, while the African Union (AU) Continental AI Strategy provides guiding principles on how AI should be developed, governed, and used across the continent. However, no African has developed definitive AI legislation, although several are developing policies or strategies. As CIPESA has emphasised, AI policy frameworks across Africa must include persons with disabilities from the outset.

More specifically, efforts must be geared toward fixing AI at the source by including representatives of persons with disabilities in training data, ensuring algorithmic accountability, and making AI-powered public services accessible to all. Moreover, all AI regulations and policies must have explicit disability provisions.

Additionally, governments must reduce sector-specific taxes on entry-level assistive devices and assistive technology hardware, and mandate that Universal Service Access Fund disbursements include explicit, measurable targets for connectivity for persons with disabilities.

23Jun

Towards Regulation of App-Based Health Data in Africa

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Edrine Wanyama |

Digital health technologies are reshaping healthcare delivery across Africa. App-based systems now connect patients, clinicians, pharmacies, laboratories, and public health agencies, creating new opportunities to improve access, efficiency, and coordination of care. At the same time, they generate large volumes of highly sensitive health data, much of it moving across platforms, providers, and in some cases, national borders.

A new Policy brief by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) examines the critical need for robust governance of app-based health data in Africa.

The brief highlights significant health data governance gaps, which include the lack of health-specific AI regulation, fragmented legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and the unresolved distinction between wellness tracking and clinical care. These gaps fundamentally undermine health data handling and management standards, with flaws in consent, accountability, and cross-border data management requirements.

Across the continent, digital health applications now span multiple functions within health systems, from clinical management systems and electronic medical records (EMR) platforms to pharmaceutical logistics and supply chains. Alongside these systems, AI-enabled and specialist care platforms are expanding diagnostic and treatment capacity. Patient-facing applications are also expanding, particularly in chronic care, maternal health, and home-based services.

While these innovations are improving access to services and efficiency, they also introduce significant governance risks. Health data is among the most sensitive categories of personal data, capable of revealing medical history, reproductive health, mental health status, and genetic information. In app-based systems, this data is often processed by multiple actors, including developers, health providers, cloud infrastructure providers, and third-party analytics firms, many of which are not visible to users.

In practice, consent is often weak or poorly understood, data sharing arrangements are opaque, and users have limited visibility or control over the use of their information. This creates risks not only to privacy, but also to trust in digital health systems.

These risks are compounded by fragmented legal and institutional frameworks. Although many countries have enacted data protection laws and digital health policies, enforcement remains uneven and coordination between health ministries, data protection authorities, and digital regulators is often weak. This creates a persistent governance gap between the rapid expansion of app-based health systems and the capacity of institutions to regulate them effectively.

At the continental level, emerging frameworks such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and global guidance such as the World Health Organization (WHO) Digital Health Strategy set important normative directions for secure, rights-respecting health data governance. However, translating these commitments into enforceable national systems remains limited, particularly in relation to interoperability, cross-border data flows, and platform accountability.

The brief calls for the adoption of a strategic governance architecture grounded in seven data governance principles, namely:

  1. Data sovereignty that reflects African public health priorities, democratic oversight and defined accountability mechanisms;
  2. Cross-border data flows where adequate and comparable safeguards exist and support reciprocal recognition arrangements among Data Protection Authorities (DPAs);
  3. Consent, purpose limitation, and data minimisation that enable individuals to make informed decisions about participation and ensure secondary uses are subject to transparency and safeguards;
  4. Interoperability and standardisation of systems to ensure integration and portability;
  5. Governance of AI-based health tools that require algorithmic impact assessments, independent audits and ongoing monitoring;
  6. Equity and inclusion to ensure systems do not further exclude vulnerable and marginalised communities; and
  7. Accountability and institutional coordination through clear allocations of responsibilities across institutions, consistent oversight, enforcement, and compliance monitoring.

The principles are consistent with the CDC Health Data Governance Framework. Together with other continental instruments, they can support a harmonised, rights-respecting and secure health data governance in Africa.

The brief presents recommendations for various stakeholders which, if implemented, could foster a progressive and trustworthy digital health ecosystem in Africa. Among theses include:

For the African Union and Regional Bodies

  • Support implementation of the Africa CDC Continental Health Data Governance Framework through clear timelines, monitoring mechanisms, knowledge sharing platforms, and technical assistance for member states.
  • Develop a continental health-app certification framework, recognised across participating jurisdictions, covering consent requirements, interoperability standards, cybersecurity safeguards, data governance obligations, and algorithmic accountability.
  • Facilitate regional data trust zones through reciprocal recognition agreements among Data Protection Authorities, enabling secure and accountable cross-border health data flows for disease surveillance, research collaboration, and pandemic preparedness.

For National Governments and Health Ministries

  • Enact or strengthen health-specific data governance legislation that addresses the full data lifecycle in app-based health systems, including consent, purpose limitation, data minimisation, retention, breach notification, and cross-border transfers.
  • Establish regulatory sandboxes to assess the safety, effectiveness, and governance implications of emerging digital health technologies before large-scale deployment.

For  Data Protection Authorities

  • Conduct risk-based audits and impact assessments of high-impact health applications, including privacy, security, and algorithmic fairness, where AI systems are deployed.
  • Develop sector-specific guidance on the processing of health, biometric, and demographic data, including standards for research use, secondary use, and commercial processing.
  • Enter into reciprocal recognition arrangements with counterpart DPAs across Africa to support coordinated enforcement and trusted cross-border data flows.

For Health Service Providers

  • Formalise data processing agreements with health app vendors and third-party processors, including provisions on security, breach notification, audit rights, and liability.
  • Strengthen workforce capacity through regular training on health data governance, cybersecurity, incident reporting, and the responsible handling of sensitive health information.
  • Implement strong authentication, access-control, and encryption measures to protect patient information throughout its lifecycle.

For App Developers and Platform Operators

  • Embed privacy-by-design and security-by-design principles throughout the development, deployment, and operation of health applications.
  • Provide clear and accessible consent mechanisms that enable users to understand and control how their health data is collected, shared, retained, and reused.
  • Conduct regular testing and independent assessments of digital health tools to identify and address bias, accuracy concerns, and performance disparities across African populations.

For Health Service Consumers and App Users

  • Exercise rights over personal health data, including rights of access, correction, portability, and deletion where provided under applicable legal frameworks.
  • Use health applications that comply with relevant regulatory requirements and recognised data protection standards.
  • Report suspected data breaches, misuse of personal information, or harmful automated decision-making outcomes to relevant regulators and oversight bodies.

Please read the full Policy Brief here.

Donatien of the Integrated Refugee Organisation points to a flip-chart of verification tools while leading an OSINT session
20Jun

Building Digital Security and Verification Capacity Among Refugees

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Brian Byaruhanga |

In May 2026, CIPESA joined the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and partners to conduct a three-day workshop on digital security and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) for Congolese human rights defenders and journalists  in exile in Uganda. 

The workshop addressed the various threats this community continues to navigate daily including account compromise, phishing-borne malware, surveillance by state and non-state actors, device confiscation, and exposure to coordinated disinformation operating across both home-country and diaspora information spaces.

The 23 participants were drawn from women’s rights organisations, community documentation initiatives, justice and accountability groups, and broader human rights defender (HRD) support structures. A pre-workshop participant assessment found that one in three respondents had received no prior digital security training, highlighting a significant gap between the threats faced and necessary skills and knowledge to mitigate them.

The findings underscored the need to begin with foundational digital security practices before moving on to more advanced verification and documentation techniques.

Reported incidents within the cohort included hacked accounts, phishing attempts, confiscation of phones by security agents, surveillance of digital communications, and impersonation. One respondent described documentation work conducted in close proximity to alleged perpetrators of human rights violations, with no possibility of relocating, and elevated personal risk attached to ordinary data collection. These conditions, common across conflict-affected zones as is the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), shape the technical and ethical constraints under which any digital security training must be designed.

CIPESA’s contribution builds on the organisation’s broader work supporting at-risk communities across the region, including through the Level-Up programme, which has provided digital security support to HRD organisations in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Uganda.

It also draws on CIPESA’s wider efforts to strengthen the capacity of civil society actors to advance digital rights in Africa. Across these engagements, a consistent key insight is that defenders rarely need more tools than they already have. More often, they need a clearer  understanding of how those tools work, where the vulnerabilities lie, and which everyday habits can expose them to risks.

The workshop therefore began with the fundamentals of digital security: how information travels online, where vulnerabilities emerge, how accounts are compromised, and why stronger authentication practices matter. Participants explored common attack pathways and practical measures for reducing exposure in their day-to-day work. The tools and exercises were selected for compatibility with the devices and operating systems that participants already relied on.

Foundations of digital safety

Participants installed secure communication tools like Tor and Orbot on their devices, worked through phishing recognition exercises based on scenarios familiar to the cohort, and tested safer-browsing configurations. The goal was not to introduce defenders to a long list of tools but to build working familiarity with a few, including practices of opening, inspecting, and configuring in ways they could transfer the acquired skills and knowledge onto their communities’ and colleagues’ devices.

Building on these foundations, the workshop moved onto OSINT and verification techniques that help defenders assess contested information and strengthen the credibility of human rights documentation. Participants practised reverse image searching against cases of recycled imagery presented as fresh evidence; used ExifTool to extract and read image metadata; and verified short-form video using the InVID-WeVerify verification plugin, parsing keyframes and tracing material across platforms.

Secure OSINT Documentation

Effective documentation and digital security are increasingly interconnected skills. The session on secure documentation walked participants through eyeWitness to Atrocities, the camera application developed by the International Bar Association that embeds metadata to support evidentiary chain of custody. In 2018, footage captured with eyeWitness was admitted as evidence before a military tribunal in Bukavu town, which subsequently convicted two armed group commanders of murder and torture, constituting crimes against humanity. It was the first time eyeWitness footage had been used in court proceedings in the DRC. The session also demonstrated structured data collection and management using Uwazi and  KoBoToolbox, both open-source platforms widely adopted for field research and human rights documentation.

These tools strengthened participants’ capacity to document and verify human rights abuses while also helping them to understand how their digital footprints can be exploited by adversaries. They also helped participants assess potentially misleading or manipulated content without inadvertently amplifying false information.

Outcomes

The training was grounded in the recognition that participants understand their own operating environments better than external facilitators ever can. The sessions were designed to strengthen existing knowledge and support locally informed security practices.

According to pre- and post-workshop evaluations, participant capacity increased from a composite score of 2.27 to 3.69 on a five-point scale. The results reflected a shift from limited familiarity with core concepts to practical competence in applying digital security and verification tools within their own documentation and advocacy work.

To extend the impact of the workshop beyond the participants in the room, CIPESA adopted a Training of Trainers (ToT) approach. Participants were encouraged to cascade the knowledge, tools, and practices acquired during the training within their organisations and communities. The approach supports the development of locally embedded digital security capacity and reduces reliance on external technical support.

Beyond the training

CIPESA’s work with refugee and exiled defender communities will continue, in collaboration with OMCT and other partners with adjacent mandates. The next phase will build on this foundation through sequenced follow-up modules, applied casework on documented matters, and ongoing technical support for the organisations represented in the cohort.

The aim is not simply to transfer skills during a workshop, but to strengthen the long-term resilience of organisations and networks engaged in human rights documentation, advocacy, and accountability work in increasingly complex digital environments.

16Jun

Is Africa’s Digital Future Being Bargained Away?

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Africa’s digital future is being negotiated away piece by piece – through opaque infrastructure deals, data-sharing arrangements, and political decisions that narrow the space for journalists, civil society, and other stakeholders to gather and speak freely.

Just over a month ago, this year’s UNESCO World Press Freedom Day (WPFD) Global Conference was set to be held under the theme “Journalism Shapes Peace: Promoting Press Freedom for Human Rights, Development and Security” – and it could not have come at a more critical time, as media freedom and digital rights in Africa are under pressure.

The WPFD was scheduled to share a host city (Lusaka, in Zambia) with RightsCon, the world’s largest gathering on technology and human rights. Combined, the events were set to attract thousands of journalists, technologists, human rights defenders, and policymakers from all over the world, signaling Africa’s growing role in global debates on journalism, digital rights, and internet governance.

However, the Government of Zambia abruptly “postponed” RightsCon, citing the need to ensure “full alignment with Zambia’s national values, policy priorities, and broader public interest considerations.” According to Access Now, the conference organiser, “foreign interference” was the reason RightsCon 2026 did not proceed in Zambia.

Officials from Zambia’s Ministry of Technology and Science had purportedly informed Access Now that they were under pressure from Chinese diplomats over the participation of Taiwanese civil society actors in RightsCon. Critics have argued that this is a clear abuse of power and influence over other governments to silence dissent and restrict fundamental rights.

Following this, Zambia also lost out on hosting key WPFD-related events, which shifted online or to Paris, France. A scaled-down physical event was held in Zambia.

These developments exposed a broader pattern: civic space in Africa is not only constrained by arrests, vague laws and media intimidation, but also by foreign pressure and various forms of dependence. Zambia illustrated how quickly external political pressure can contribute to narrowing civic space on the continent, and how geopolitical influence is most dangerous where local institutions are already vulnerable and democracy is under strain.

Geopolitical tensions are no longer limited to military alliances or commodity diplomacy. They are instead increasingly being exercised through digital infrastructure, platform governance, cross-border data arrangements, cyber laws, standards-setting, mining rights, and now, the policing of civic forums. Powerful states are influencing digital policy choices through debt dependency, mineral extraction, infrastructure dependence, diplomatic pressure, or access to funding and technical systems.

The developments in Zambia illustrate a worrying phenomenon that the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has been tracking – the steady erosion of digital rights and press freedom on the continent, through attacks on information integrity and financial dependency on larger economies.

Text Block: In Zambia, China is also deeply embedded in mining, energy, healthcare, and the construction of national facilities, including the conference venue where RightsCon was due to be held. Source:  Just Security

Over the years, Chinese firms such as Huawei have invested heavily in Africa’s internet infrastructure, including through “smart city” deployments,  national fibre-optic backbones, and data transmission projects including in South Africa and in Senegal. In Uganda, China has invested more than USD 110 million in the National Backbone Data Transmission Project through additional concessional financing. Critics have argued that these investments also limit civic rights, including through enabling surveillance and undermining elections.

However, not every African government decision involving China is coerced. Yet dependence can narrow the room for resistance when political demands are made, and that influence can extend into tighter restrictions on civic participation and digital rights organising.

Moreover, to frame Africa’s sovereignty challenges as a problem created only by China is incorrect, as some Western powers are also advancing strategic interests through data-heavy arrangements that can test national safeguards.

For instance, as part of the America First Global Health Strategy, the United States has signed bilateral health agreements with numerous African states including Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Lesotho, and Uganda.

These agreements tie funding to extensive data-related cooperation including long-term sharing of comprehensive national health data for periods of up to 25 years, alongside expansive health surveillance arrangements. In exchange for financial support, African states are surrendering health data without the guarantee of equitable access to vaccines or research outputs developed from that data. Zambia, Ghana, and Zimbabwe have expressed reservations about signing on, and a court in Kenya suspended implementation of the agreement pending alignment with the country’s national data protection regime.

As African countries navigate shifting technology standards, expanding digital infrastructure, and competing data governance regimes – often without a shared rights-based framework – the result is an increasingly fragmented digital landscape. This fragmentation is not accidental; it is being shaped by geopolitical interests and power asymmetries that determine who builds the technologies, who controls the data, and ultimately, who governs the digital future.

 Meanwhile, African governments appear ready to trade civic rights, with countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, and Zambia collectively spending at least USD 1 billion a year on digital surveillance technology contracts with companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the European Union, and Israel.

Text block: However, the key policy challenge facing Africa is not whether governments should work with powerful economies like China, the United States, and various European states, or private technology firms. They will, and they must. The issue is whether African states have the legal, institutional, and political capacity to engage those powers without trading away civic space, data autonomy, and democratic accountability.

The continent is not without policy tools. The African Union Data Policy Framework, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), the African Continental Free Trade Area Digital Trade Protocol, and new calls such as the African Declaration on Digital Freedom and Democracy all point toward a more rights-respecting path. They emphasise harmonised safeguards, trusted data governance, universal and meaningful internet access, transparency, and accountability. However, implementation remains a persistent challenge, with limited progress in practice across many states.

The Zambia case offers clear lessons.  African governments should require parliamentary review and public engagement for all major cross-border data-sharing and digital infrastructure agreements. Procurement contracts involving critical digital systems should be published, including provisions on data storage, access, transfers, and vendor liability. Transparency in DPI procurement processes is critical in ensuring that deployed systems are rights-respecting and those responsible can be held accountable.

While numerous global convenings are hosted on the continent, Zambia set a worrying precedent. Organisations that co-host global convenings in Africa should demand enforceable non-discrimination and freedom-of-assembly guarantees from host states as regional civil society spaces must be protected and expanded, not treated as expendable.

The spaces where African civil society, journalists, and policymakers can gather are fundamental to the digital rights movement on the continent. If African governments cannot protect the right of journalists and civil society actors to assemble freely, then they will struggle to protect anything else in the digital age. These communities are integral parts of the democratic infrastructure Africa needs to negotiate its way out of debt dependency, surveillance overreach, and geopolitical capture.

This is why global and regional gatherings, such as the upcoming Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26), are critical. They are necessary spaces for interrogation, debate, and the forging of consensus on civic and digital rights. These are the convenings where the shifts in sovereignty are understood, including the risks of opaque cross-border data-sharing agreements, unchecked surveillance infrastructure, and politically motivated cyber laws, all of which are named and challenged through multistakeholder engagement.

Ultimately, Africa’s digital future should not be bargained away through debt dependency, opacity agreements and geopolitical pressure. It must be shaped openly, democratically, and on terms that serve its people rather than the geopolitical interests of others.

11Jun

Protecting Children Online in Africa Must Move from Policy to Practice

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Patricia Ainembabazi |

Child online safety has returned to the forefront of digital governance discussions across Africa and globally. New regulatory initiatives from the United Nations, the African Union, and industry coalitions reflect growing concern about the risks children face in increasingly digital societies. Yet, while policy commitments are multiplying, implementation continues to lag.

The challenge is particularly acute in Africa, where internet access is expanding rapidly while child protection systems struggle to keep pace. As more children go online, they are increasingly exposed to cyberbullying, online grooming, sexual exploitation, harmful content, privacy violations, and emerging Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled risks such as disinformation and misinformation.

Just last month, the United Nations Human Rights Office called for stronger regulation and government oversight, publishing 10 key points to make platforms safer for children, urging technology companies to embed child safety into their product design and address the growing risk posed by AI. This reflects a broader shift in global digital policy. The Global Digital Compact has committed states to strengthen legal and policy frameworks for children’s rights in digital spaces and to prioritise national online child safety policies and standards by 2030.

At the continental level, the African Union Child Online Safety and Empowerment Policy of 2024 sets out principles on children’s safety and privacy, and participation to guide member states in developing national strategies, while the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), UNICEF, and partners recently launched the Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection to strengthen coordination among governments, mobile operators, technology companies, regulators, law enforcement, civil society, and young people.

Some African countries are already taking steps to strengthen child protection online. Rwanda is considering restrictions on social media access for children under 16, while Zimbabwe recently approved a National Child Online Protection Policy for 2026–2030 aimed at addressing online sexual exploitation, cyberbullying, grooming, harmful content, sextortion, and privacy violations.

These developments reflect a broader global shift in approaches to child online safety. Australia has legislated to restrict social media access for children under 16, while the United Kingdom recently concluded a national consultation examining age-based protections and enforcement mechanisms. Across several countries, governments, regulators, and civil society organisations are increasingly calling on technology companies to strengthen safeguards and take greater responsibility for protecting children online.

A broader strategy would expand efforts to ensure that while policies and frameworks on child protection are being developed, children are involved. This would help them understand the several platforms available for use, associated risks, pressures, and opportunities for digital life. The Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection recognises this mode of participation and has now included youth representatives by integrating their voices for a child-centered digital future in Africa. Replicating this approach at the national level, through wide youth consultations, school-based dialogues, child-friendly policy forums, and participatory design of reporting and safety tools, will foster a healthy digital environment for the young.

It is against this backdrop that the Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) report, “Child Protection and Safety Online in Africa: The Law, Privacy, Challenges and Solutions, provides crucial, ground-level evidence across 10 countries – Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. It highlights the gaps in child safety and protection online despite technological advancement and expansion.

The report highlights several recommendations that could help foster child safety and protection online, which are directed to different stakeholders, including the government, civil society organisations, international organisations, development partners, the technology sector, media, academia, parents, and the general community, and among others include;

  1. Parliaments should enact specific national laws that protect children’s privacy and safety in digital spaces, with clear safeguards tailored to children’s particular vulnerabilities, such as cyberbullying, grooming, online sexual exploitation, image-based abuse, harmful content, misuse of children’s data, profiling, and age-inappropriate design.
  2. Governments should invest in the implementation of national strategies that set out the roles of government agencies, the judiciary, data protection authorities, law enforcement actors, educators, parents, and the private sector in protecting children in the digital age.
  3. Platforms and telecom companies should design child-friendly products and services, minimise the collection and retention of children’s data, introduce age verification and parental controls, publish transparency reports, and submit protection measures to independent audits.
  4. The media should monitor, document, and report objectively, and expose all cases of online child abuse and demand accountability from the responsible parties.
  5. Civil society organisations should engage in advocacy, awareness raising, legal reform, evidence-based research, and documentation of issues affecting child safety online in order to demand and push for accountability of all the relevant stakeholders.
  6. All stakeholders must ensure that children are meaningfully included in innovation and programming, and that children and young people are actively engaged as participants in discussions, collaborations, and co-design of digital solutions.

Ultimately, for children to stay online, measures must go beyond mere policy expressions and aspirations as reiterated in the Global Digital Compact’s 2030. Laws and frameworks specific to child protection and safety online should be developed and stringently implemented. Moreover, digital service providers must be held accountable, and other stakeholders, including parents, schools, and communities, should join efforts to ensure that children are empowered to safely utilise digital technologies.

CIPESA and partners continue to advocate for rights-respecting policies that advance children’s protection, participation, access, and safe use of digital technologies, while calling on technology companies to embed these principles in platform design, governance, and accountability systems.

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