News Archives – Page 33 of 102 – Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

31May

Cartographie du lien entre Désinformation, Coupures d’Internet, Pandémies et Diaspora au Cameroun et en RD Congo

CIPESA May 31, 2021February 13, 2023

Par Richard Ngamita |

Le phénomène de la désinformation sur les médias sociaux est devenu une source de préoccupation croissante dans la politique mondiale depuis plusieurs années. Bien plus, ledit phénomène explose maintenant en Afrique subsaharienne, où les campagnes de désinformation via les médias sociaux sont de plus en plus déployées par des entités et des gouvernements étrangers pour influencer l’opinion.

Plusieurs facteurs sociopolitiques et économiques offrent un terrain propice à la désinformation dans les pays africains. L’explosion démographique avec prédominance de jeunes – dont la plupart se connectent à l’Internet pour la première fois via les médias sociaux, la disponibilité et l’utilisation croissantes des téléphones portables connectés à Internet, les conflits ethnico-religieux et l’insécurité sont quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont contribué à la prolifération d’informations accessibles via les médias numériques, fournissant ainsi de nouveaux canaux de diffusion rapide et d’amplification de fausses informations.

Cette montée de la désinformation dans la région constitue un nouveau test de solidité pour les nouvelles dispositions politiques et législatives en matière d’Internet. Par exemple, en mars 2020, l’Éthiopie a promulgué la loi sur la prévention et la répression du discours de haine et de la désinformation, pour lutter contre ces deux phénomènes qui ont troublé le pays par le passé. Cependant, il s’avère selon plusieurs observateurs que cette nouvelle réglementation gouvernementale, bien que légitime pour lutter contre le discours de haine, constitue en même temps une menace pour la liberté d’expression et l’accès à l’information en ligne.

Au Cameroun, en vertu de la loi relative à la cybersécurité et à la cybercriminalité, la publication et la propagation d’information en ligne “sans pouvoir en attester la véracité” ou justifier qu’il y avait de bonnes raisons de croire en ladite information est correcte constituent un délit. Lors d’une conférence de presse tenue en juillet 2020, René Emmanuel Sadi, ministre camerounais de la communication, s’est dit préoccupé par l’utilisation “irresponsable” des médias sociaux pour ternir l’image des fonctionnaires ou saboter les actions du gouvernement et a prévenu que ceux qui continueraient à propager de telles informations sur les plateformes de médias sociaux s’exposeraient à de lourdes peines prévues par la loi.

D’autres pays comme le Zimbabwe et la Tanzanie, disposent de lois plus générales sur les médias qui ont été utilisées pour lutter contre les fausses informations. Ces différentes lois ont été critiquées pour la menace qu’elles font peser sur les droits numériques, en particulier lorsqu’elles sont mises en place pour contrer toute opinion critique ou débat contradictoire dans des pays africains présentant des déficits démocratiques.

De nombreux pays africains, dont le Cameroun et la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), continuent de se débattre contre la désinformation, par laquelle une mauvaise action en ligne pourrait causer des dommages hors ligne. Ce rapport examine la situation dans ces pays, où – malgré des niveaux de connectivité relativement bas – la désinformation représente une préoccupation considérable.

En 2017, le Cameroun comptait 19,7 millions d’abonnés à la téléphonie mobile, soit un taux de pénétration de 85 %, tandis que la pénétration d’Internet était de 35,6 %. Parallèlement, la RD Congo avait un taux de pénétration d’Internet de 19,2 % en décembre 2019, tandis que le taux de pénétration de la téléphonie mobile était de 42 %.

Compréhension des conflits et désinformation

Les citoyens du Cameroun et de la RD Congo recourent à une gamme variée de sources d’information traditionnelles (notamment la presse écrite et audiovisuelle), ainsi qu’à des sources en ligne pour suivre l’actualité sociale, économique et politique. Cependant, les médias sociaux jouent un rôle de plus en plus important comme source d’informations relatives aux conflits, par le fait que les médias traditionnels sont censurés par les gouvernements respectifs.

Au Cameroun, les tensions entre les régions anglophones et francophones remontent à l’indépendance du pays en 1961. Au fil des ans, des violences mortelles et des actions de protestation ont eu lieu contre la “francophonisation” continue et la marginalisation des anglophones qui affirment que le gouvernement central privilégie la population francophone majoritaire.

En 2015, une vidéo montrant deux femmes et deux enfants abattus par des soldats dans la ville de Zelevet, dans l’extrême-Nord, a commencé à circuler sur les médias sociaux. Selon une enquête de BBC Africa Eye de juillet 2018, le gouvernement a d’abord rejeté la vidéo la qualifiant de fausse nouvelle. Cependant, Amnesty International a révélé avec des preuves crédibles que l’armée camerounaise était responsable, ce qui a poussé les autorités à se rétracter et à déclarer que les 10 soldats représentés dans la vidéo avaient été arrêtés et seraient poursuivis. Cinq ans après l’incident, un tribunal militaire a déclaré les soldats coupables et les a condamnés à des peines d’emprisonnement.

Alors que l’enquête de BBC Africa Eye sur l’incident de la fusillade a révélé que plusieurs personnes n’aimaient pas diffuser en ligne des discours de haine et des contenus graphiques sur les violences, elles reconnaissaient que ces contenus pourraient parfois révéler des informations utiles à la sécurité en particulier pour ceux qui vivent dans des zones de conflit.

Source: Twitter

En RD Congo, la succession de conflits armés a fait des millions de morts et déstabilisé le pays, avec une violence continue perpétrée par plusieurs groupes armés actifs dans la région, notamment les forces démocratiques alliées (ADF : Allied Democratic Forces), les Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) et de nombreuses autres milices. La Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO) opère dans la région depuis 1999 et constitue la plus grande mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies dans le monde.

Lors des élections tant attendues de 2018, des irrégularités électorales généralisées ont été signalées, des partis politiques concurrents prétendaient être en tête après que les résultats de divers comptages non officiels aient commencé à circuler sur les médias sociaux. Des contenus sponsorisés produits sur Google et sur Facebook ont faussement prétendu qu’Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, dauphin du président sortant Joseph Kabila, avait remporté le scrutin. Ces annonces ont été publiées avant la proclamation officielle des résultats par la commission électorale, arrivée tardivement. Il y a eu des coupures d’Internet dans les principales villes du pays, ce qui a davantage compliqué la vérification de toute information en rapport avec ces élections.

Source : Twitter

Sachant que les élections avaient été reportées de novembre 2016 à décembre 2017, puis à avril 2018, la propagation de faux résultats électoraux aurait pu prolonger le cycle d’instabilité.

Le rôle de la diaspora

La communauté de la diaspora contribue énormément à attiser les tensions en ligne dans les deux pays, souvent par le biais de faux comptes qui partagent régulièrement des contenus haineux incitant à la violence contre des factions politiques rivales.

Lors des élections de 2018 au Cameroun, il y a eu plusieurs cas de publications sur les médias sociaux en provenance de la diaspora affirmant que le président de longue date Paul Biya était mort. Biya a finalement gagné lesdites élections et deux ans plus tard, le contenu des médias sociaux, souvent en provenance de la diaspora, continue d’alimenter les tensions politiques et ethniques.

Source: Facebook

Avec le conflit dans les régions anglophones qui provoque des appels à un État indépendant, et les séparatistes qui recherchent activement le soutien de la diaspora camerounaise, il y a un risque permanent que le contenu en ligne qualifiant le gouvernement camerounais de répressif et violent puisse entraîner des dommages hors ligne.

Source: Facebook

Quant aux messages mensongers sur les médias sociaux qui affirmaient que Shadary avait remporté l’élection présidentielle de 2018 en RD Congo, et compte tenu de la coupure de l’Internet à l’époque, tous les indices montrent que les auteurs des annonces sponsorisées et les administrateurs des comptes en question étaient des membres de la diaspora. Le compte Lumumba aime LE CONGO qui figurait parmi les principaux propagateurs des annonces, avait été créé juste avant les élections et misait sur l’héritage de Patrice Lumumba, célèbre héros de l’Indépendance. Outre le contenu revendiquant la victoire de Shadary, la page partageait également des messages provenant de plusieurs faux domaines ou sites web d’agrégation d’informations comme CongoActu24.com. Ceci constitue un autre exemple frappant de désinformation en ligne susceptible de causer des dommages hors ligne dans un environnement politique fragile.

Pandémies

À l’instar d’autres pays africains, le Cameroun et la RD Congo ont connu une recrudescence de la désinformation en ligne à propos du Covid-19, en partie liée aux sensibilités culturelles, politiques et religieuses, notamment la promotion de remèdes à base de plantes, de bains de vapeur, de l’alcool, de commentaires contradictoires et spéculatifs sur les traitements et/ou de conseils confus sur les Procédures Opérationnelles Normalisées (PON).

La propagation de la désinformation autour des maladies peut constituer un danger pour la santé publique, comme cela a été le cas au Cameroun et en RD Congo concernant Ebola et, plus récemment, le Covid-19. La désinformation sur les maladies cultive la méfiance par rapport aux données scientifiques, freine la sensibilisation, politise les actions de santé publique et sème le doute sur les motivations des autorités sanitaires.

La RD Congo n’est pas novice en matière d’épidémie, puisqu’elle a subi de plein fouet l’épidémie d’Ebola entre 2017 et 2019. En mai 2020, France 24 News a fait état d’une campagne de désinformation sur le Covid-19 en RD Congo. Les rapports de France 24 ont ensuite été corroborés par Facebook et le DFRLab, qui ont trouvé un lien entre le réseau avec un homme politique appelé Honoré Mvula. Le réseau a diffusé plusieurs propos sur le Covid-19 faussement attribuées à des personnalités publiques, notamment à l’expert français en maladies infectieuses Didier Raoult, au président français Emmanuel Macron et au président malgache Andry Rajoelina. Ces allégations ont fait le tour des pages Facebook très suivies en RD Congo. Mvula a nié les accusations portées contre lui. Facebook a dû supprimer lesdites pages.

Coupures d’Internet

Le Cameroun et la RD Congo ont l’habitude d’ordonner des coupures d’accès à l’Internet à de multiples occasions lors de protestations publiques et d’élections. En janvier 2017, la connectivité à Internet a été coupée dans la région anglophone du Cameroun suite à des appels à sa sécession de la région francophone. Cette interruption qui a duré plus de 230 jours jusqu’en mars 2018, est connue comme la plus longue coupure d’Internet sur le continent.

De la même manière, l’instabilité en RD Congo a été continuellement caractérisée par des coupures répétitives d’Internet depuis décembre 2011. Après la journée électorale relativement calme du 30 décembre 2018, le gouvernement a coupé l’accès à Internet le 31 décembre, puis a progressivement fermé les médias audiovisuels, tout en expulsant certains journalistes internationaux qui couvraient les élections. Les raisons officielles fournies par les responsables politiques étaient “afin d’éviter la diffusion de faux résultats”.

D’après des analystes, la coupure d’Internet au Cameroun a coûté à l’économie 1,67 million de dollars par jour, tandis que celle de la RD Congo coutait 3 millions de dollars par jour.

Source: Twitter

Les coupures d’Internet pendant les élections sont une tendance courante et croissante de la répression numérique, en particulier dans les pays autoritaires d’Afrique, dont les dirigeants sont au pouvoir depuis de nombreuses années. Lorsque les gouvernements imposent des blackouts médiatiques ou restreignent la libre circulation de l’information en ligne par d’autres moyens, la désinformation se développe car la vérification des faits et le débat contradictoire sont entravés. Dans le cas du Cameroun et de la RD Congo, cette désinformation, provenait en grande partie de la diaspora qui propageait un discours de haine et de fausses informations risquant d’exacerber les conflits civils et de compromettre l’intégrité électorale. À leur tour, les coupures d’accès à Internet et la désinformation propagées par des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques érodent le potentiel de la technologie pour améliorer l’intégrité électorale, l’engagement civique et la lutte contre des maladies telles que le Covid-19.

Source: Twitter

Venir à bout de la désinformation

La création de comptes de messagerie visant uniquement les périodes électorales est devenue monnaie courante, et ils sont particulièrement inquiétants du fait que leur contenu est souvent mensonger, carrément faux ou incitatif. Cette récente émergence de campagnes en ligne via les plateformes de médias sociaux a donc soulevé d’autres préoccupations quant à la manière dont les données requises sont obtenues, au niveau de vulnérabilité des démocraties africaines face à l’ingérence étrangère, à la façon dont les algorithmes des médias sociaux sont enclins à la manipulation, et à l’éthique du fait que des pays africains soient utilisés comme terrain d’essai pour de nouvelles technologies numériques.

Alors que les efforts visant à légiférer contre la désinformation deviennent des points de pression sur les droits humains, des mesures alternatives prises en collaboration avec les opérateurs de plateformes de médias sociaux s’avèrent prometteuses. En 2020, plusieurs gouvernements d’Afrique subsaharienne ont établi des partenariats avec des plateformes de médias sociaux et d’autres intermédiaires pour lutter contre la désinformation en rapport avec le Covid-19. Plus tôt en 2018, le Cameroun a directement travaillé avec Facebook pour explorer les moyens de lutte contre la diffusion d’informations fausses et mensongères dans le pays. Entre-temps, la promotion du renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de l’utilisation du numérique et de la capacité de vérification des faits, ainsi que la sensibilisation sur ce qui constitue un contenu inacceptable sur les plateformes et à la manière de signaler un contenu répréhensible, restent des actions clés nécessaires. Par conséquent, les efforts et les autres mesures pour lutter contre la désinformation et autres contenus préjudiciables, notamment durant les périodes électorales et la lutte contre le Covid-19, nécessitent une collaboration plus étroite par rapport à celle dont nous avons été témoins jusqu’ici, entre les gouvernements, la société civile et les plateformes.

Richard Ngamita est un chercheur dans le domaine du traitement de données qui travaille actuellement sur les droits de l’homme, la désinformation et l’espionnage. Il a précédemment travaillé chez Google au sein de l’équipe contre les pourriels. Il a également mené des recherches d’investigation dans le domaine de la santé, l’agriculture et les mouvements de réfugiés.

24May

Ethiopia’s New Telecommunications Operator Could Be Bogged Down By Old Habits

CIPESA May 24, 2021February 13, 2023

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Ethiopia, one of the world’s last closed telecommunications markets, has been liberalised. On May 22, 2021, the Ethiopian government announced that a new telecommunications license had been awarded to the Global Partnership for Ethiopia – a consortium comprising Kenya’s Safaricom PLC, Vodacom Group, Vodafone Group, the United Kingdom’s development finance institution CDC Group plc, the Japanese-owned Sumitomo Corporation, and the Development Finance Corporation. The award is likely to boost quality of service provision and promote access to information online, in the historically troubled country.

The newly licensed operator will compete with the state-owned Ethio telecom to serve the country’s population of more than 100 million people. Currently, the country has low connectivity rates, with internet penetration standing at 20% and mobile phone penetration at 38.5%. Earlier in May 2021, Ethio telcom launched a mobile phone-based financial service, Telebirr, to boost the digital economy by offering cashless transactions as an alternative to an inefficient banking system. The Huawei built Telebirr is likely to face off with MPesa – the mobile banking system pioneered by Safaricom 14 years ago, whose popularity has seen it being adopted by multiple other countries and has served as a key enabler of increased financial inclusion in Kenya and beyond.

The liberalisation of Ethiopia’s telecommunications sector is part of the country’s ongoing reforms to promote social, political and economic development. Reform efforts under the premiership of Abiy Ahmed have included the release of prisoners and dropping charges against opposition actors and activists. Further, efforts have been made to reconnect mobile and broadband internet services disrupted since 2016, including reinstating access to 246 websites, blogs, and news sites that were inaccessible for an extended period of time.

Abiy was shortlisted for a Nobel Peace Prize within a year of his leadership. He went on to win the prize in October 2019. The commitment to reforms saw Ethiopia jump 40 places up in the World Press Freedom Index in 2019 and the country also hosted the May 2019 commemoration of World Press Freedom Day. A few months later, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology partnered with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to host the 2019 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), a landmark convening of digital rights actors from across the continent and beyond.

However, the various positive strides are marred by actions in response to ongoing ethnic conflict. The Tigray region in the north of the country, which is currently the epicentre of the conflict, has experienced government-initiated blocks on communications, including internet access and voice calls. Meanwhile, prosecution and persecution of the media and human rights activists alongside state-sponsored disinformation propaganda in the context of the conflict is eroding the initial press freedom and governance gains.

On the policy front, in March 2020, Ethiopia enacted a new Proclamation on hate speech and disinformation, which weighs heavily on social media users and intermediaries, with hefty fines and long jail terms for offenders. Critics have argued that the proclamation undermines free speech, especially as it was passed just months before the general election, which was set to take place in August 2020. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the elections were rescheduled to take place in June 2021 and will likely mark a key test for democratic reforms in the country.

Indeed, the autonomy of the newly licensed private operator during the upcoming elections and any periods of public unrest is one to watch. Indications from other parts of the African continent are grim – government overreach in intermediaries operations remains a threat to citizens’ rights, political engagement and economic activity.

See this State of Internet Freedom in Ethiopia report which mapped 20 years of Government internet controls in the country.

Moreover, Ethiopia has traditionally used Ethio telecom to monitor and control citizens’ communications, a scenario it may try to replicate with the new licensee. It remains to be seen whether the new licensee will be ready to resist any illegitimate actions by state agencies to impede citizens’ access to digital information and platforms.

21May

Charting the Link Between Disinformation, Disruptions, Diseases and the Diaspora in Cameroon and DR Congo

CIPESA May 21, 2021

By Richard Ngamita |

Disinformation on social media has been a growing concern in global politics for several years, and it is now exploding across Sub-Saharan Africa, where social media-based disinformation campaigns are increasingly being deployed by foreign entities and governments to influence narratives.

Several socio-political and economic factors provide fertile ground for disinformation to thrive in African countries. The exploding youth population – with many coming online for the first time through social media – growth in the use and availability of internet-enabled mobile phones, ethno-religious conflicts, and insecurity are some of the factors that have contributed to the large amount of information accessible via digital media and provided new, fast-moving channels for spreading and amplifying false information.

This growth in disinformation in the region has presented a new stress test for emerging internet policy and legislative responses. For instance, in March 2020, Ethiopia enacted the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation to address hate speech and disinformation, which have historically troubled the country. However, it has been argued that whereas government regulation is legitimate to control hate speech, Ethiopia’s new law poses a threat to freedom of expression and access to information online.

In Cameroon, under the Law Relating to Cyber Security and Cyber Criminality, it is an offense to publish and propagate information online “without being able to attest its veracity” or truthfulness. In a July 2020 press conference, Cameroon’s Communication Minister, René Emmanuel Sadi, expressed concerns over “irresponsible” use of social media to tarnish the image of public officials or sabotage government actions and warned that those who continued to propagate such information on social media platforms would face the heavy arm of the law.

Other countries like Zimbabwe and Tanzania have broader media laws that have been used to target fake news. The various laws have been criticised for posing a threat to digital rights, especially when deployed as tools against critical opinion, the media, and dissent in African countries with democratic deficits.

Many African countries, including Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), continue to grapple with disinformation, with a high risk of online activity resulting in offline harm. This report reviews the situation in these countries, where – despite relatively low connectivity levels – disinformation presents a considerable concern.

As of 2017, Cameroon had 19.7 million mobile phone subscribers representing a penetration rate of 85%, while internet penetration was 35.6%. Meanwhile, as of December 2019, the DR Congo had an internet penetration rate of 19.2%, while mobile phone penetration was 42%.

Conflict Awareness and Disinformation

Citizens in Cameroon and the DR Congo rely on a wide range of traditional sources of information (including print and broadcast media), alongside online sources to keep abreast of social, economic and political issues. However, social media has come to play an increasing role on issues related to conflict because mainstream media is censored by their governments.

In Cameroon, tensions between Anglophone and Francophone regions date back to the country’s independence in 1961. Over the years, there have been fatal violence and protest action against the continued “francophonisation” and marginalisation of English speakers who say that the central government privileges the majority French-speaking population.

In 2015, a video showing two women and two children being shot dead by soldiers in the Far North town of Zelevet started to circulate on social media. According to a July 2018 BBC Africa Eye investigation, the government initially dismissed the video as fake news. However, Amnesty International revealed credible evidence that the Cameroon military was responsible, prompting the authorities to retract and state that the 10 soldiers depicted in the video had been arrested and would be prosecuted. Five years after the incident, a military court convicted and sentenced the soldiers to imprisonment.

Whereas the BBC Africa Eye investigation into the shooting incident revealed that several people did not like to spread hate speech and graphic violence content online, sometimes they recognised that such content could include safety information, especially for those who live in conflict areas.


Source: Twitter

In the DR Congo, a history of armed conflict has left millions dead and the country destabilised, with continued violence perpetrated by several armed groups active in the region, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and numerous militias. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the region since 1999 and is the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world.

During the 2018 elections that had been long awaited, there were reports of widespread election irregularities, with competing political parties claiming to be in the lead as several unofficial tallies started to circulate on social media. Sponsored content from Google and Facebook falsely alleged that former President Joseph Kabila’s surrogate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, had won the elections. The ads were published before the official results announcement by the Electoral Commission, which had been delayed. There were internet shutdowns in key cities, which made it even harder for fact checkers to verify any information related to the elections.

Considering the elections had been postponed from November 2016 to December 2017, and then to April 2018, the circulation of false election results could have prolonged the cycle of instability.

Role of the Diaspora Community

The diaspora community is a huge contributor to the inflaming of tensions online in both countries, often through fake accounts that regularly share hateful and inciting content against rival political factions.

During the 2018 elections in Cameroon, there were several instances of social media posts from the diaspora claiming that long-serving President Paul Biya had died. Biya went on to win the disputed elections, and two years on, social media content, often from the diaspora, continues to fuel political and ethnic tensions.

: Source: Facebook

With the conflict in Anglophone regions leading to calls for a break-away state and separatists actively seeking support from the Cameroonian diaspora, there is an ongoing risk that online content that depicts the Cameroonian government as repressive and violent could result in offline harm.

: Source: Facebook

As for the social media posts falsely claiming that Shadary had won the 2018 presidential election in DR Congo, considering the internet disruption at the time, indications are that the perpetrators of the sponsored ads and admins of the accounts in question were based in the diaspora. Lumumba aime LE CONGO (Lumumba loves Congo), which was among the key propagators of the ads, had been created just before the elections and traded on the likeness of Patrice Lumumba, a famous independence leader. Besides content claiming victory for Shadary, the page also shared posts from several fake domains or news aggregation websites like CongoActu24.com. This was another example in which disinformation had the potential to lead to offline harms within a fragile political environment.

Pandemics

Like in other African countries, Cameroon and DR Congo have seen a surge in Covid-19 disinformation online, some of it pegged on cultural, political and religious sensitivities including promotion of herbal remedies, steaming, alcohol, contradictory and speculative reports about treatments and/or confusing guidance about standard operating procedures (SOPs).

The spread of disinformation around diseases can be a public health risk, as has been the case in Cameroon and the DR Congo regarding Ebola and, more recently, Covid-19. Disease disinformation undermines confidence in underlying science, slows down sensitisation, politicises health activities and questions the motives of health officials.

DR Congo is no novice to pandemics, having borne the brunt of the Ebola outbreak between 2017 and 2019. In May 2020, France 24 News reported a Covid-19 fake news campaign in DR Congo. The France 24 reports were later corroborated by Facebook and DFRLab, which linked the network to a politician called Honore Mvula. The network carried several Covid-19 false claims attributed to public figures including French infectious disease expert Didier Raoult, French president Emmanuel Macron and Madagascar president Andry Rajoelina and these made rounds on Congolese Facebook pages, recording a high rate of engagement. Mvula denied the allegations against him. Facebook took down the pages.

Internet Disruption

Cameroon and DR Congo have a history of ordering internet disruptions on multiple occasions during public protests and elections. In January 2017, internet connectivity was restricted in the Anglophone region of Cameroon following dissent and calls for succession from the Francophone region. The disruption, which lasted for over 230 days until March 2018 is recorded as the longest internet shutdown on the continent.

Similarly, in the DR Congo, instability in the country has been continuously characterised by persistent internet shutdowns since December 2011. Following a relatively peaceful voting day on December 30, 2018, the government shut down the internet on December 31 and progressively, broadcast media, and expelled some international journalists reporting on the elections. The official reasons provided by policymakers were “to avoid fake results from circulating”.

According to analysts, the internet shutdown in Cameroon cost the economy USD 1.67 million per day, while the shutdown in DR Congo cost the economy USD 3 million per day.

: Source: Twitter

Internet shutdowns during elections are a common and growing trend of digital repression especially in authoritarian countries in Africa, whose leaders have been in power for many years. When governments impose information blackouts or curtail the free flow of information online through other means, disinformation thrives as fact-checking and the production of counter-narratives are hampered. In the case of Cameroon and DR Congo, that disinformation, much of it originating from the diaspora, propagates hate speech and disinformation that threaten to exacerbate civil strife and undermine electoral integrity. In turn, the shutdowns and the disinformation propagated by state and non-state actors, are eroding technology’s potential to enhance electoral integrity, to civic engagement and the fight against diseases such as Covid-19.

: Source: Twitter

Overcoming Disinformation

Accounts of targeted messaging during elections have become common, and they are particularly concerning as the content of the messages is often misleading, out-rightly false, or inciting. This recent rise of online campaigning through social media platforms has thus raised further concerns about how the required data is obtained, the extent to which African democracies are vulnerable to foreign interference, the ways in which social media algorithms are prone to manipulation, and the ethics of using African countries as a testing ground for new digital technologies.

Whereas efforts to legislate against disinformation are human rights pressure points, alternative countermeasures, in collaboration with social media platform operators, hold some promise. In 2020, several sub Saharan African governments partnered with social media platforms and other intermediaries to fight Covid-19 disinformation. Earlier in 2018, Cameroon directly engaged with Facebook to explore opportunities for fighting the spread of false and misleading information within the country. Meanwhile, promoting digital literacy skills and fact checking capacity, and creating awareness about what is unacceptable content on platforms and how to report objectionable content, remain key needed actions. Hence efforts and other measures to combat disinformation and other harmful content, including around elections and in the fight against Covid-19, require closer collaboration between governments, civil society and platforms than we have witnessed this far.

Richard Ngamita is a Data Researcher who currently works on human rights, disinformation and espionage. He previously worked at Google with the Spam team. He has also led investigative research across health, agriculture and refugee movements.

20May

Malawi Telcos Further Reduce Data Prices But Affordability Concerns Remain

CIPESA May 20, 2021

By Jimmy Kainja |

Data prices in Malawi have been reduced following recent engagements between the Malawi Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) and telecommunications operators. Under the new rates, the cost of 1GB to 4GB bundles are down by between 10% and 31% across the country’s two leading internet service providers – Airtel and TNM.

Announcing the reductions, MACRA stated that it was cognisant of affordability concerns raised by citizens and thus worked with telecommunications operators to “review and revise the current data prices more especially the lower volume bundles which are commonly used by the majority of internet users in the country.”

The new rates, which came into effect in April this year, cut across different validity periods – daily, weekly and monthly. In addition, Airtel Malawi has also removed the validity period for its 1GB PaNet NoVa, which is priced at MK3,500 (USD 4.40). Further, the reductions include packages for social media access and weekend access.

Validity	Bundle	Operator
		Airtel		TNM
		Old rate	New rate	Old rate	New rate
Daily	1GB	MK 1.800 (USD 2.30)	MK 1.500 (USD 1.90)
Weekly	1GB	MK 2.500 (USD 3.14)	MK 2.000 (USD 2.55)
Monthly	1.2GB	MK3.500 (USD 4.40)	MK2.500 (USD 3.14)
	1GB			MK3.500 (USD 4.40)	MK2.450 (USD 3.10)
	2GB	MK5,000 (USD 6.30)	MK4,000 (USD 5.05)	MK5,000 (USD 6.30)	MK4,200 (USD 5.30)
	4GB			MK8,000 (USD 10.05)	MK7,000 (USD 8.80)
Unlimited	1GB		MK3,500 (USD 4.40)

This is the second time in less than a year that data prices have been reduced in Malawi. Last August, telcos reduced data prices in response to a joint statement by the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), and other organisations urging the Malawi government to review the cost of telecommunications services, especially in view of Covid-19 restrictions some of which have led to increased reliance on digital technologies in Malawi and across the world.

At the time, MACRA agreed with CHRR, CIPESA and others that the cost of the internet in Malawi was too high. The regulator committed to engaging with telcos to explore further possibilities for data cost reduction. Since then, the regulator reports having been engaging telcos “to further review the standard volume bundles offered to consumers to align to the cost of providing the services in the country.”

Malawi is currently ranked 174 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index, which measures a country’s average achievement in key dimensions of human development. An estimated 71% of Malawians live in extreme poverty. Malawi has one of the lowest mobile and internet connectivity rates in the world, owing to socioeconomic factors but also due to policy gaps that have contributed to the high cost of the internet and limited investment in critical infrastructure that could spur connectivity, especially in rural areas where the majority of Malawians live.

According to the 2019 National Household Survey on Access and Usage of ICT Services in Malawi, mobile phone ownership at household and individual level was at 36.5% and 43.2% respectively. During the same period, internet penetration stood at 14.6%, of which 40.7% of users were in urban areas while 9.3% were in rural areas. The majority of internet users (96.8%) accessed the internet via mobile phones compared to 11.8% who connected via a laptop or a desktop computer. The survey revealed that poor quality of service, affordability, and literacy were among the factors inhibiting greater access to and use of the internet. Indeed, compared to its regional counterparts, Malawi scores lowly on the 2020 GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, which measures the key enablers of mobile internet adoption in various countries.

The recent reductions are commendable efforts towards improving access to the internet for all citizens including disadvantaged and marginalized groups of the population, by improving affordability. They reinforce the interventions of the Universal Service Fund (USF), whose aims include providing universal access “in areas that are not economically viable or that are marginally viable without subsidies.”

However, other barriers to access such as the prevailing taxation regime need to be addressed in order to more meaningfully enable affordability for the majority of Malawians. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure a competitive environment through quality of service and compliance monitoring of dominant operators and removing barriers for licensing new market entrants. As stated by the GSMA in the Inclusive Internet Index 2020 report, “the country’s efforts to extend internet access are stymied by weak communications market competition [and] high prices for data.”

07May

Mauritius’ Social Media Regulation Proposal Centres State-Led Censorship

CIPESA May 7, 2021February 13, 2023

By Daniel Mwesigwa |

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius leads in many aspects. It is the only country on the continent categorised as a “full democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2020. Additionally, it has the second highest per capita income (USD 11,099) and one of the highest internet penetration rates in the region (72.2%).

However, the recently published consultation paper on proposed amendments to the country’s Information and Communications Technology (ICT) law, purportedly aimed at curbing abuse and misuse of social media, could place Mauritius among the ranks of regressive states. The proposed establishment of a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) to determine what content is problematic in addition to a Technical Enforcement Unit to oversee the technical enforcement of NDEC’s measures has potential surveillance and censorship implications.

The social media regulation proposals by Mauritius are made in light of increasing calls for accountability of technology platforms such as Google and Facebook by western countries. Indeed, the consultation paper cites Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (colloquially known as the Facebook Act), which requires social media platforms to remove “illegal content” from their platforms within 24 hours of notice by users and complaint bodies. Non-compliance penalties are large – with fines ranging between five million and 50 million euros.

The paper states that, unlike in Germany and other countries like France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, complaints by Mauritian local authorities to social media platforms “remain unattended to or not addressed in a timely manner”. Moreover, it adds, cooperation under the auspices of domestic laws and regulations is only effective in countries where technology companies have local offices, which is not the case in Mauritius. As such, according to the Authority, “the only practical solution in the local context would be the implementation of a regulatory and operational framework which not only provides for a legal solution to the problem of harmful and illegal online content but also provides for the necessary technical enforcement measures required to handle this issue effectively in a fair, expeditious, autonomous and independent manner.”

However, the Authority’s claims of powerlessness appear unfounded. According to Facebook’s Transparency report, Mauritius made two requests for preservation of five user accounts pending receipt of formal legal processes in 2017. In 2019, Mauritius made one request to Facebook for preservation of two accounts. Similarly, the country has barely made any requests for content take down to Google, with only a total of 13 since 2009. The country has never made a user information or content takedown request to Twitter. In comparison, South Africa made two requests to Facebook for preservation of 14 user accounts in 2017 and 16 requests for preservation of 68 user accounts in 2019. To Google, South Africa has made a total of 33 requests for 130 items for removal since 2009 while to Twitter, it has made six legal demands between 2012 and 2020.

Broad and Ambiguous Definitions

According to section 18(m) of Mauritius’ Information and Communication Technologies Act (2001, amended multiple times including in 2020), the ICT Authority shall “take steps to regulate or curtail the harmful and illegal content on the Internet and other information and communication services”.

Although the consultation paper states that the Authority has previously fulfilled this mandate in the fight against child pornography, it concedes that it has not fulfilled the part of curtailing illegal content as it is not currently vested with investigative powers under the Act. The consultation paper thus proposes to operationalise section 18(m) through an operational framework that empowers the Authority “to carry out investigations without the need to rely on the request for technical data from social media administrators.”

The amendments to the ICT Act will relate to defining a two-pronged operational framework with the setting up of: i) a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) as the decision making body on illegal and harmful content; and ii) a Technical Enforcement Unit to enforce the technical measures as directed by the NDEC.

However, neither the existing Act nor the consultation paper define what constitutes “illegal content”. Whereas the consultation paper indicates that the Chairperson and members of NDEC would be “independent, and persons of high calibre and good repute” in order to ensure transparency and public confidence in its functions, the selection criteria and appointing Authority are not specified, nor are recourse mechanisms for fair hearing and appeals against the decisions of the proposed entity.

An Authoritarian Approach to Internet Architecture

Through a technical toolset (a proxy server), proposed under section 11, the regulator will be able to identify social media traffic which will then be automatically decrypted, archived, and analysed. For instance, the technical toolset would undermine HTTPS in order to inspect internet traffic. This means that information of all social media users pertaining to device specifics, content type, location, among others, would be available to the authorities. The regulator expects that once a complaint regarding social media is received, they will be able to block the implicated web page or profile without necessarily needing the intervention of social media platforms.

Additionally, the Authority expects social media users to accept installation of a one-time digital certificate on their internet-enabled devices to facilitate the re-encryption of traffic before it is transferred to the social networking sites. In other words, the Authority wants internet users in Mauritius to replace their own padlocks used for their home security with ones given to them by the Authority, which it has open and unfettered access to.

On the other hand, Mauritius’ commitments to freedom of expression, data protection and privacy potentially collide with these social media regulation proposals. In particular, Mauritius’ Data Protection Act (2017) requires informed consent of users, prohibits disproportionate collection of user data, and mandates fair and lawful processing of user data. The Data Protection Act was enacted to align with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In March 2018, Mauritius also ratified the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, although the Convention is yet to be enforced due to lack of quorum. Moreover, in September 2020, Mauritius signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data.

Indeed, the Authority is aware of the potential infractions of the proposed technical measures on basic freedoms — stating in the paper that “the proposed statutory framework will undoubtedly interfere with the Mauritian people’s fundamental rights and liberties in particular their rights to privacy and confidentiality and freedom of expression”. Its seeking views and suggestions of “an alternative technical toolset of a less intrusive nature” may very well be an open solicitation for more surreptitious ways of monitoring social media data, with fundamental rights still at stake.

Democracy and Local Investment

While Mauritius runs a multiparty system of government, its human rights record has been steadily deteriorating, according to the United States Department of State’s Human Rights Report 2020. Moreover, basic freedoms such as freedom of expression are being curtailed through digital taxation and clampdown on social media dissent. Recently, Twitter cited stability and democracy as the key reasons for the opening of its first Africa offices in Ghana. Although Mauritius is strategically placed as a regional and economic hub in Africa, and has been positioning itself as a “Cyber Island”, legal frameworks such as the proposed ICT law amendments and mixed rankings on democracy alongside high rankings on internet access and ease of doing business may likely undermine the country’s international competitiveness and internet freedom standing.

Accordingly, the Authority would do well to immediately discontinue these plans to employ technical measures to monitor social media and internet traffic as they would amount to multiple breaches of fundamental freedoms. The proposals also run counter to the Data Protection Act which prioritises minimisation of data collected and informed user consent. Moreover, the technical proposal would promote self-censorship and undermine the basic workings of the institutions of democracy.

Further, although social media regulation could be paved by good intentions such as the need to stamp out inflammatory content, it could be more beneficial to explore alternative options with a range of stakeholders to promote more fair and transparent content moderation practices in line with international human rights law. Mauritius has already proved that aligning domestic and international laws and practices is necessary by fashioning its data protection law along the lines of the GDPR. Additionally, Mauritius could leverage existing partnerships with other countries of regional economic blocs such as The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to form a coalition of fact-checkers that have direct access to social media platforms.

Finally, the Authority could collaborate with technology platforms such as Facebook to support Creole language human moderators. This could be a necessary step to enhancing content moderation through automated decisions and more so for “low resource” groups of languages including Mauritian Creole.

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