By Raylenne Kambua |
As Kenya approaches its August 2027 general elections, there are growing concerns about how the country’s digital and media laws and practices could affect citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process.
Over the last few years, Kenya has passed or amended several laws, such as the Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA) and the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (CMCA), which directly impact citizens’ online participation in civic and democratic processes. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) has flagged more than 20 pieces of legislation that contain retrogressive provisions that threaten journalists’ right to report, their privacy, and citizens’ access to information.
As in many other African countries, digital technologies, including social media platforms and Artificial Intelligence (AI), have become central to citizens’ social, economic and political participation, particularly during periods of contestation, such as elections and protests.
During the 2024 Gen Z protests, young Kenyans used AI and other digital tools to simplify legislation and produce mobilisation materials, and used social media platforms to coordinate protests. The state responded with digital repression, including online threats, unwarranted arrests, abductions, internet disruptions, and unlawful surveillance. The 2027 campaigns will run on the same digital infrastructure, with more AI capabilities and with human rights at stake.
Digital Threats as Electoral Threats
On October 6, 2026, the Collaboration of International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) attended a stakeholder engagement hosted by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in Nairobi, where the Roadmap to a Violence-Free 2027 General Election report was launched.
The report identified the weaponisation of AI and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as key threats to peaceful elections. It also found that social media is where election violence is seeded, incubated, and mobilised, and called for digital hygiene and responsible use of digital media.
In an earlier engagement with the commission, CIPESA asserted that no single institution can address digital threats alone. Clear inter-institutional protocols can, however, enable timely, coordinated and rights-respecting responses, while strengthening the accountability of digital platforms.
Digital tools and AI were used in the 2022 general elections, and their use has since grown. As these tools become more sophisticated, real and fabricated content becomes harder to distinguish, increasing the risk of harm during elections.
CIPESA’s report, Navigating the Implications of AI on Digital Democracy in Kenya, finds that AI is reshaping digital participation and access to information in the country. However, the report warns that the existing AI governance gaps, rise of AI-powered political advertising, deepfakes, and microtargeting threaten to distort democratic processes and the information ecosystem in profound ways.
Internet and platform shutdowns also contribute to the information disorder and threaten electoral integrity. Election periods carry a heightened risk of internet shutdowns, which can limit voters’ access to information, silence observers and journalists, and leave rumours unchallenged.
There is the fear that Kenya could borrow the shutdown script from neighbours such as Uganda and Tanzania during next year’s elections. The country has already seen the warning signs. Telegram is often blocked during national examinations, and internet disruptions were reported during the 2024 Gen Z protests. In response, stakeholders secured interim orders restraining the government and mobile operators from shutting down internet access. Although the orders are temporary, the final ruling and the commitment of regulators and telecom operators will determine whether Kenyans stay connected during the August 2027 elections.
Private media houses lead in listenership and viewership, and mainstream media remains more trusted than social media as a source of information. Yet these outlets face threats to press freedom and state interference, while journalists encounter harassment. Media stakeholders have condemned these trends ahead of the elections.
Defamation is also a growing concern, and courts have been faulted for awarding serious damages against bloggers and the media, even though international standards hold that public officials should be open to greater scrutiny. Fear of legal consequences can force investigative journalists to slow down, undermining the public’s right to know.
Law as the Main Instrument of Control
Participants at a multi-stakeholder dialogue on ‘Advocacy Strategies for Better Tech and Media Policies’, hosted by KICTANet and the Bloggers Association of Kenya on October 8, 2026, in Nairobi, named vague legislation as one of the most persistent threats to online expression.
Laws such as the CMCA illustrate this pattern. Enacted in 2018, the Act criminalises certain forms of online expression, including false publications. In March 2026, the Court of Appeal struck down two sections of the 2025 Amendment Act for failing the test of constitutional clarity. The ruling prompted Parliament to appeal. The court left the Act’s investigative powers largely intact, while cautioning that courts must act as gatekeepers because those powers can be abused.
Following the court ruling, further amendments to the CMCA introduced new powers for the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee (NC4), including the authority to order the blocking or removal of websites, pages and applications without a court order. In July 2026, the High Court declared two of the new provisions unconstitutional, as the amendments could risk criminalising legitimate speech.
The pattern is consistent: Parliament passes broad provisions, civil society challenges them in court, and courts later narrow their scope or strike them down. Some earlier cases followed a similar course. In 2014, a court rejected an attempt to restrict journalists and bloggers from publishing terror-related content without permission from the national police, holding that laws limiting fundamental rights do not enjoy the usual presumption of constitutionality. In another case, the High Court found the KICA offence of “misusing a telecommunication device” unconstitutionally vague. The court held that any limit on expression must be clear, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate.
The laws used to restrict expression also evolve. The Prevention of Terrorism Act has been used against protesters, and authorities have invoked the CMCA to arrest online critics, some of whom were first abducted. During the 2027 electoral cycle, advocates should watch for existing legal provisions being used in new ways.
Civil society has also shown that early engagement can influence legislation. For instance, it persuaded Parliament to withdraw a proposed KICA amendment on the liability of social media administrators. This calls for proactiveness in policy development processes, ensuring bills are monitored throughout the stages rather than waiting until they have been passed.
- Parliament should publish bills early, allow meaningful public participation, and ensure that restrictions on online expression and access to information are clearly defined and consistent with constitutional rights.
- The Director of Public Prosecutions and the police should refrain from pursuing arbitrary and politically motivated prosecutions, and from misusing or selectively enforcing laws to prosecute protesters, social media users, bloggers and journalists.
- Courts should apply strict scrutiny to search, seizure and surveillance orders, and keep interim protections against internet disruption.
- The Communications Authority and telecom operators should commit publicly not to shut down or throttle the internet and publish transparency reports on government takedown requests.
- The NCIC, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the judiciary, and the MCK should agree on protocols for responding to digital threats during the elections, with clear roles for each.
- Media houses should adopt the MCK election guideline and AI code of conduct, invest in verification and deepfake detection, and strengthen legal support for their journalists.
- Digital platforms should expand election integrity and moderation capacity for Kenya, respond promptly to TFGBV and hate speech reports, clearly label AI-generated or manipulated political content, and publish transparency reports on government requests to remove or restrict content.
- Civil society should track bills at the policy stage through a shared system and pool legal analysis.
- Development partners should fund legal defence for bloggers and journalists, and support strategic litigation, because cases like the CMCA challenge take years to resolve.
