Ethiopia, one of the world’s last closed telecommunications markets, has been liberalised. On May 22, 2021, the Ethiopian government announced that a new telecommunications license had been awarded to the Global Partnership for Ethiopia – a consortium comprising Kenya’s Safaricom PLC, Vodacom Group, Vodafone Group, the United Kingdom’s development finance institution CDC Group plc, the Japanese-owned Sumitomo Corporation, and the Development Finance Corporation. The award is likely to boost quality of service provision and promote access to information online, in the historically troubled country.
The newly licensed operator will compete with the state-owned Ethio telecom to serve the country’s population of more than 100 million people. Currently, the country has low connectivity rates, with internet penetration standing at 20% and mobile phone penetration at 38.5%. Earlier in May 2021, Ethio telcom launched a mobile phone-based financial service, Telebirr, to boost the digital economy by offering cashless transactions as an alternative to an inefficient banking system. The Huawei built Telebirr is likely to face off with MPesa – the mobile banking system pioneered by Safaricom 14 years ago, whose popularity has seen it being adopted by multiple other countries and has served as a key enabler of increased financial inclusion in Kenya and beyond.
The liberalisation of Ethiopia’s telecommunications sector is part of the country’s ongoing reforms to promote social, political and economic development. Reform efforts under the premiership of Abiy Ahmed have included the release of prisoners and dropping charges against opposition actors and activists. Further, efforts have been made to reconnect mobile and broadband internet services disrupted since 2016, including reinstating access to 246 websites, blogs, and news sites that were inaccessible for an extended period of time.
Abiy was shortlisted for a Nobel Peace Prize within a year of his leadership. He went on to win the prize in October 2019. The commitment to reforms saw Ethiopia jump 40 places up in the World Press Freedom Index in 2019 and the country also hosted the May 2019 commemoration of World Press Freedom Day. A few months later, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology partnered with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to host the 2019 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), a landmark convening of digital rights actors from across the continent and beyond.
However, the various positive strides are marred by actions in response to ongoing ethnic conflict. The Tigray region in the north of the country, which is currently the epicentre of the conflict, has experienced government-initiated blocks on communications, including internet access and voice calls. Meanwhile, prosecution and persecution of the media and human rights activists alongside state-sponsored disinformation propaganda in the context of the conflict is eroding the initial press freedom and governance gains.
On the policy front, in March 2020, Ethiopia enacted a new Proclamation on hate speech and disinformation, which weighs heavily on social media users and intermediaries, with hefty fines and long jail terms for offenders. Critics have argued that the proclamation undermines free speech, especially as it was passed just months before the general election, which was set to take place in August 2020. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the elections were rescheduled to take place in June 2021 and will likely mark a key test for democratic reforms in the country.
Indeed, the autonomy of the newly licensed private operator during the upcoming elections and any periods of public unrest is one to watch. Indications from other parts of the African continent are grim – government overreach in intermediaries operations remains a threat to citizens’ rights, political engagement and economic activity.
Moreover, Ethiopia has traditionally used Ethio telecom to monitor and control citizens’ communications, a scenario it may try to replicate with the new licensee. It remains to be seen whether the new licensee will be ready to resist any illegitimate actions by state agencies to impede citizens’ access to digital information and platforms.
Disinformation on social media has been a growing concern in global politics for several years, and it is now exploding across Sub-Saharan Africa, where social media-based disinformation campaigns are increasingly being deployed by foreign entities and governments to influence narratives.
Several socio-political and economic factors provide fertile ground for disinformation to thrive in African countries. The exploding youth population – with many coming online for the first time through social media – growth in the use and availability of internet-enabled mobile phones, ethno-religious conflicts, and insecurity are some of the factors that have contributed to the large amount of information accessible via digital media and provided new, fast-moving channels for spreading and amplifying false information.
This growth in disinformation in the region has presented a new stress test for emerging internet policy and legislative responses. For instance, in March 2020, Ethiopia enacted the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation to address hate speech and disinformation, which have historically troubled the country. However, it has been argued that whereas government regulation is legitimate to control hate speech, Ethiopia’s new law poses a threat to freedom of expression and access to information online.
In Cameroon, under the Law Relating to Cyber Security and Cyber Criminality, it is an offense to publish and propagate information online “without being able to attest its veracity” or truthfulness. In a July 2020 press conference, Cameroon’s Communication Minister, René Emmanuel Sadi, expressed concerns over “irresponsible” use of social media to tarnish the image of public officials or sabotage government actions and warned that those who continued to propagate such information on social media platforms would face the heavy arm of the law.
Other countries like Zimbabwe and Tanzania have broader media laws that have been used to target fake news. The various laws have been criticised for posing a threat to digital rights, especially when deployed as tools against critical opinion, the media, and dissent in African countries with democratic deficits.
Many African countries, including Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), continue to grapple with disinformation, with a high risk of online activity resulting in offline harm. This report reviews the situation in these countries, where – despite relatively low connectivity levels – disinformation presents a considerable concern.
As of 2017, Cameroon had 19.7 million mobile phone subscribers representing a penetration rate of 85%, while internet penetration was 35.6%. Meanwhile, as of December 2019, the DR Congo had an internet penetration rate of 19.2%, while mobile phone penetration was 42%.
Conflict Awareness and Disinformation
Citizens in Cameroon and the DR Congo rely on a wide range of traditional sources of information (including print and broadcast media), alongside online sources to keep abreast of social, economic and political issues. However, social media has come to play an increasing role on issues related to conflict because mainstream media is censored by their governments.
In Cameroon, tensions between Anglophone and Francophone regions date back to the country’s independence in 1961. Over the years, there have been fatal violence and protest action against the continued “francophonisation” and marginalisation of English speakers who say that the central government privileges the majority French-speaking population.
In 2015, a video showing two women and two children being shot dead by soldiers in the Far North town of Zelevet started to circulate on social media. According to a July 2018 BBC Africa Eye investigation, the government initially dismissed the video as fake news. However, Amnesty International revealed credible evidence that the Cameroon military was responsible, prompting the authorities to retract and state that the 10 soldiers depicted in the video had been arrested and would be prosecuted. Five years after the incident, a military court convicted and sentenced the soldiers to imprisonment.
Whereas the BBC Africa Eye investigation into the shooting incident revealed that several people did not like to spread hate speech and graphic violence content online, sometimes they recognised that such content could include safety information, especially for those who live in conflict areas.
In the DR Congo, a history of armed conflict has left millions dead and the country destabilised, with continued violence perpetrated by several armed groups active in the region, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and numerous militias. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the region since 1999 and is the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world.
During the 2018 elections that had been long awaited, there were reports of widespread election irregularities, with competing political parties claiming to be in the lead as several unofficial tallies started to circulate on social media. Sponsored content from Google and Facebook falsely alleged that former President Joseph Kabila’s surrogate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, had won the elections. The ads were published before the official results announcement by the Electoral Commission, which had been delayed. There were internet shutdowns in key cities, which made it even harder for fact checkers to verify any information related to the elections.
Considering the elections had been postponed from November 2016 to December 2017, and then to April 2018, the circulation of false election results could have prolonged the cycle of instability.
Role of the Diaspora Community
The diaspora community is a huge contributor to the inflaming of tensions online in both countries, often through fake accounts that regularly share hateful and inciting content against rival political factions.
During the 2018 elections in Cameroon, there were several instances of social media posts from the diaspora claiming that long-serving President Paul Biya had died. Biya went on to win the disputed elections, and two years on, social media content, often from the diaspora, continues to fuel political and ethnic tensions.
With the conflict in Anglophone regions leading to calls for a break-away state and separatists actively seeking support from the Cameroonian diaspora, there is an ongoing risk that online content that depicts the Cameroonian government as repressive and violent could result in offline harm.
As for the social media posts falsely claiming that Shadary had won the 2018 presidential election in DR Congo, considering the internet disruption at the time, indications are that the perpetrators of the sponsored ads and admins of the accounts in question were based in the diaspora. Lumumba aime LE CONGO (Lumumba loves Congo), which was among the key propagators of the ads, had been created just before the elections and traded on the likeness of Patrice Lumumba, a famous independence leader. Besides content claiming victory for Shadary, the page also shared posts from several fake domains or news aggregation websites like CongoActu24.com. This was another example in which disinformation had the potential to lead to offline harms within a fragile political environment.
Pandemics
Like in other African countries, Cameroon and DR Congo have seen a surge in Covid-19 disinformation online, some of it pegged on cultural, political and religious sensitivities including promotion of herbal remedies, steaming, alcohol, contradictory and speculative reports about treatments and/or confusing guidance about standard operating procedures (SOPs).
The spread of disinformation around diseases can be a public health risk, as has been the case in Cameroon and the DR Congo regarding Ebola and, more recently, Covid-19. Disease disinformation undermines confidence in underlying science, slows down sensitisation, politicises health activities and questions the motives of health officials.
DR Congo is no novice to pandemics, having borne the brunt of the Ebola outbreak between 2017 and 2019. In May 2020, France 24 News reported a Covid-19 fake news campaign in DR Congo. The France 24 reports were later corroborated by Facebook and DFRLab, which linked the network to a politician called Honore Mvula. The network carried several Covid-19 false claims attributed to public figures including French infectious disease expert Didier Raoult, French president Emmanuel Macron and Madagascar president Andry Rajoelina and these made rounds on Congolese Facebook pages, recording a high rate of engagement. Mvula denied the allegations against him. Facebook took down the pages.
Internet Disruption
Cameroon and DR Congo have a history of ordering internet disruptions on multiple occasions during public protests and elections. In January 2017, internet connectivity was restricted in the Anglophone region of Cameroon following dissent and calls for succession from the Francophone region. The disruption, which lasted for over 230 days until March 2018 is recorded as the longest internet shutdown on the continent.
Similarly, in the DR Congo, instability in the country has been continuously characterised by persistent internet shutdowns since December 2011. Following a relatively peaceful voting day on December 30, 2018, the government shut down the internet on December 31 and progressively, broadcast media, and expelled some international journalists reporting on the elections. The official reasons provided by policymakers were “to avoid fake results from circulating”.
According to analysts, the internet shutdown in Cameroon cost the economy USD 1.67 million per day, while the shutdown in DR Congo cost the economy USD 3 million per day.
Internet shutdowns during elections are a common and growing trend of digital repression especially in authoritarian countries in Africa, whose leaders have been in power for many years. When governments impose information blackouts or curtail the free flow of information online through other means, disinformation thrives as fact-checking and the production of counter-narratives are hampered. In the case of Cameroon and DR Congo, that disinformation, much of it originating from the diaspora, propagates hate speech and disinformation that threaten to exacerbate civil strife and undermine electoral integrity. In turn, the shutdowns and the disinformation propagated by state and non-state actors, are eroding technology’s potential to enhance electoral integrity, to civic engagement and the fight against diseases such as Covid-19.
Accounts of targeted messaging during elections have become common, and they are particularly concerning as the content of the messages is often misleading, out-rightly false, or inciting. This recent rise of online campaigning through social media platforms has thus raised further concerns about how the required data is obtained, the extent to which African democracies are vulnerable to foreign interference, the ways in which social media algorithms are prone to manipulation, and the ethics of using African countries as a testing ground for new digital technologies.
Whereas efforts to legislate against disinformation are human rights pressure points, alternative countermeasures, in collaboration with social media platform operators, hold some promise. In 2020, several sub Saharan African governments partnered with social media platforms and other intermediaries to fight Covid-19 disinformation. Earlier in 2018, Cameroon directly engaged with Facebook to explore opportunities for fighting the spread of false and misleading information within the country. Meanwhile, promoting digital literacy skills and fact checking capacity, and creating awareness about what is unacceptable content on platforms and how to report objectionable content, remain key needed actions. Hence efforts and other measures to combat disinformation and other harmful content, including around elections and in the fight against Covid-19, require closer collaboration between governments, civil society and platforms than we have witnessed this far.
Richard Ngamita is a Data Researcher who currently works on human rights, disinformation and espionage. He previously worked at Google with the Spam team. He has also led investigative research across health, agriculture and refugee movements.
Data prices in Malawi have been reduced following recent engagements between the Malawi Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) and telecommunications operators. Under the new rates, the cost of 1GB to 4GB bundles are down by between 10% and 31% across the country’s two leading internet service providers – Airtel and TNM.
Announcing the reductions, MACRA stated that it was cognisant of affordability concerns raised by citizens and thus worked with telecommunications operators to “review and revise the current data prices more especially the lower volume bundles which are commonly used by the majority of internet users in the country.”
The new rates, which came into effect in April this year, cut across different validity periods – daily, weekly and monthly. In addition, Airtel Malawi has also removed the validity period for its 1GB PaNet NoVa, which is priced at MK3,500 (USD 4.40). Further, the reductions include packages for social media access and weekend access.
Validity
Bundle
Operator
Airtel
TNM
Old rate
New rate
Old rate
New rate
Daily
1GB
MK 1.800 (USD 2.30)
MK 1.500 (USD 1.90)
Weekly
1GB
MK 2.500 (USD 3.14)
MK 2.000 (USD 2.55)
Monthly
1.2GB
MK3.500 (USD 4.40)
MK2.500 (USD 3.14)
1GB
MK3.500 (USD 4.40)
MK2.450 (USD 3.10)
2GB
MK5,000 (USD 6.30)
MK4,000 (USD 5.05)
MK5,000 (USD 6.30)
MK4,200 (USD 5.30)
4GB
MK8,000 (USD 10.05)
MK7,000 (USD 8.80)
Unlimited
1GB
MK3,500 (USD 4.40)
This is the second time in less than a year that data prices have been reduced in Malawi. Last August, telcos reduced data prices in response to a joint statement by the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), and other organisations urging the Malawi government to review the cost of telecommunications services, especially in view of Covid-19 restrictions some of which have led to increased reliance on digital technologies in Malawi and across the world.
At the time, MACRA agreed with CHRR, CIPESA and others that the cost of the internet in Malawi was too high. The regulator committed to engaging with telcos to explore further possibilities for data cost reduction. Since then, the regulator reports having been engaging telcos “to further review the standard volume bundles offered to consumers to align to the cost of providing the services in the country.”
Malawi is currently ranked 174 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index, which measures a country’s average achievement in key dimensions of human development. An estimated 71% of Malawians live in extreme poverty. Malawi has one of the lowest mobile and internet connectivity rates in the world, owing to socioeconomic factors but also due to policy gaps that have contributed to the high cost of the internet and limited investment in critical infrastructure that could spur connectivity, especially in rural areas where the majority of Malawians live.
According to the 2019 National Household Survey on Access and Usage of ICT Services in Malawi, mobile phone ownership at household and individual level was at 36.5% and 43.2% respectively. During the same period, internet penetration stood at 14.6%, of which 40.7% of users were in urban areas while 9.3% were in rural areas. The majority of internet users (96.8%) accessed the internet via mobile phones compared to 11.8% who connected via a laptop or a desktop computer. The survey revealed that poor quality of service, affordability, and literacy were among the factors inhibiting greater access to and use of the internet. Indeed, compared to its regional counterparts, Malawi scores lowly on the 2020 GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, which measures the key enablers of mobile internet adoption in various countries.
The recent reductions are commendable efforts towards improving access to the internet for all citizens including disadvantaged and marginalized groups of the population, by improving affordability. They reinforce the interventions of the Universal Service Fund (USF), whose aims include providing universal access “in areas that are not economically viable or that are marginally viable without subsidies.”
However, other barriers to access such as the prevailing taxation regime need to be addressed in order to more meaningfully enable affordability for the majority of Malawians. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure a competitive environment through quality of service and compliance monitoring of dominant operators and removing barriers for licensing new market entrants. As stated by the GSMA in the Inclusive Internet Index 2020 report, “the country’s efforts to extend internet access are stymied by weak communications market competition [and] high prices for data.”
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius leads in many aspects. It is the only country on the continent categorised as a “full democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2020. Additionally, it has the second highest per capita income (USD 11,099) and one of the highest internet penetration rates in the region (72.2%).
However, the recently published consultation paper on proposed amendments to the country’s Information and Communications Technology (ICT) law, purportedly aimed at curbing abuse and misuse of social media, could place Mauritius among the ranks of regressive states. The proposed establishment of a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) to determine what content is problematic in addition to a Technical Enforcement Unit to oversee the technical enforcement of NDEC’s measures has potential surveillance and censorship implications.
The social media regulation proposals by Mauritius are made in light of increasing calls for accountability of technology platforms such as Google and Facebook by western countries. Indeed, the consultation paper cites Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (colloquially known as the Facebook Act), which requires social media platforms to remove “illegal content” from their platforms within 24 hours of notice by users and complaint bodies. Non-compliance penalties are large – with fines ranging between five million and 50 million euros.
The paper states that, unlike in Germany and other countries like France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, complaints by Mauritian local authorities to social media platforms “remain unattended to or not addressed in a timely manner”. Moreover, it adds, cooperation under the auspices of domestic laws and regulations is only effective in countries where technology companies have local offices, which is not the case in Mauritius. As such, according to the Authority, “the only practical solution in the local context would be the implementation of a regulatory and operational framework which not only provides for a legal solution to the problem of harmful and illegal online content but also provides for the necessary technical enforcement measures required to handle this issue effectively in a fair, expeditious, autonomous and independent manner.”
However, the Authority’s claims of powerlessness appear unfounded. According to Facebook’s Transparency report, Mauritius made two requests for preservation of five user accounts pending receipt of formal legal processes in 2017. In 2019, Mauritius made one request to Facebook for preservation of two accounts. Similarly, the country has barely made any requests for content take down to Google, with only a total of 13 since 2009. The country has never made a user information or content takedown request to Twitter. In comparison, South Africa made two requests to Facebook for preservation of 14 user accounts in 2017 and 16 requests for preservation of 68 user accounts in 2019. To Google, South Africa has made a total of 33 requests for 130 items for removal since 2009 while to Twitter, it has made six legal demands between 2012 and 2020.
Broad and Ambiguous Definitions
According to section 18(m) of Mauritius’ Information and Communication Technologies Act (2001, amended multiple times including in 2020), the ICT Authority shall “take steps to regulate or curtail the harmful and illegal content on the Internet and other information and communication services”.
Although the consultation paper states that the Authority has previously fulfilled this mandate in the fight against child pornography, it concedes that it has not fulfilled the part of curtailing illegal content as it is not currently vested with investigative powers under the Act. The consultation paper thus proposes to operationalise section 18(m) through an operational framework that empowers the Authority “to carry out investigations without the need to rely on the request for technical data from social media administrators.”
The amendments to the ICT Act will relate to defining a two-pronged operational framework with the setting up of: i) a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) as the decision making body on illegal and harmful content; and ii) a Technical Enforcement Unit to enforce the technical measures as directed by the NDEC.
However, neither the existing Act nor the consultation paper define what constitutes “illegal content”. Whereas the consultation paper indicates that the Chairperson and members of NDEC would be “independent, and persons of high calibre and good repute” in order to ensure transparency and public confidence in its functions, the selection criteria and appointing Authority are not specified, nor are recourse mechanisms for fair hearing and appeals against the decisions of the proposed entity.
An Authoritarian Approach to Internet Architecture
Through a technical toolset (a proxy server), proposed under section 11, the regulator will be able to identify social media traffic which will then be automatically decrypted, archived, and analysed. For instance, the technical toolset would undermine HTTPS in order to inspect internet traffic. This means that information of all social media users pertaining to device specifics, content type, location, among others, would be available to the authorities. The regulator expects that once a complaint regarding social media is received, they will be able to block the implicated web page or profile without necessarily needing the intervention of social media platforms.
Additionally, the Authority expects social media users to accept installation of a one-time digital certificate on their internet-enabled devices to facilitate the re-encryption of traffic before it is transferred to the social networking sites. In other words, the Authority wants internet users in Mauritius to replace their own padlocks used for their home security with ones given to them by the Authority, which it has open and unfettered access to.
On the other hand, Mauritius’ commitments to freedom of expression, data protection and privacy potentially collide with these social media regulation proposals. In particular, Mauritius’ Data Protection Act (2017) requires informed consent of users, prohibits disproportionate collection of user data, and mandates fair and lawful processing of user data. The Data Protection Act was enacted to align with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In March 2018, Mauritius also ratified the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, although the Convention is yet to be enforced due to lack of quorum. Moreover, in September 2020, Mauritius signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data.
Indeed, the Authority is aware of the potential infractions of the proposed technical measures on basic freedoms — stating in the paper that “the proposed statutory framework will undoubtedly interfere with the Mauritian people’s fundamental rights and liberties in particular their rights to privacy and confidentiality and freedom of expression”. Its seeking views and suggestions of “an alternative technical toolset of a less intrusive nature” may very well be an open solicitation for more surreptitious ways of monitoring social media data, with fundamental rights still at stake.
Democracy and Local Investment
While Mauritius runs a multiparty system of government, its human rights record has been steadily deteriorating, according to the United States Department of State’s Human Rights Report 2020. Moreover, basic freedoms such as freedom of expression are being curtailed through digital taxation and clampdown on social media dissent. Recently, Twitter cited stability and democracy as the key reasons for the opening of its first Africa offices in Ghana. Although Mauritius is strategically placed as a regional and economic hub in Africa, and has been positioning itself as a “Cyber Island”, legal frameworks such as the proposed ICT law amendments and mixed rankings on democracy alongside high rankings on internet access and ease of doing business may likely undermine the country’s international competitiveness and internet freedom standing.
Accordingly, the Authority would do well to immediately discontinue these plans to employ technical measures to monitor social media and internet traffic as they would amount to multiple breaches of fundamental freedoms. The proposals also run counter to the Data Protection Act which prioritises minimisation of data collected and informed user consent. Moreover, the technical proposal would promote self-censorship and undermine the basic workings of the institutions of democracy.
Further, although social media regulation could be paved by good intentions such as the need to stamp out inflammatory content, it could be more beneficial to explore alternative options with a range of stakeholders to promote more fair and transparent content moderation practices in line with international human rights law. Mauritius has already proved that aligning domestic and international laws and practices is necessary by fashioning its data protection law along the lines of the GDPR. Additionally, Mauritius could leverage existing partnerships with other countries of regional economic blocs such as The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to form a coalition of fact-checkers that have direct access to social media platforms.
Finally, the Authority could collaborate with technology platforms such as Facebook to support Creole language human moderators. This could be a necessary step to enhancing content moderation through automated decisions and more so for “low resource” groups of languages including Mauritian Creole.
In an increasingly digitised world, safeguarding data rights has become central to protecting individuals’ rights to access and share information, express themselves, and associate using the internet and related platforms.
Advances in technology, alongside growth in mobile subscriptions and increased use of smartphones have pushed individuals online to shop, interact, share and search for information, learn, and work, alongside digitalisation of more sectors of economies and public services. As a result, there is increased collection, processing and sharing of personal data. With many users of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) not aware of the implications of their use of digital technologies and how their rights are compromised, the potential for the data to be manipulated and abused by individuals, private companies and governments is ever-present.
At the end of 2019, 477 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa were subscribed to mobile services, accounting for 45% of the region’s population. According to the GSMA, the group that represents the interests of mobile operators worldwide, smartphone adoption continues to rise rapidly in the region, reaching 50% of total connections in 2020. Meanwhile, as of 2019, there were 469 million registered mobile money accounts in Sub-Saharan Africa, a figure that was expected to reach half a billion in 2020.
From the provision of eServices, to digital identity (or digital ID), voters registration, drivers’ license applications and issuance, through to mobile phone SIM card registration, public and private service bodies including immigration authorities, law and security enforcement, health service providers, telecom operators, and digital financial service providers are among the big collectors and processors of personal data in Africa. Increasingly, the nature of personal data being collected is expanding, to include biometric data such as facial images or fingerprints.
What is Personal Data?
Personal data refers to information that relates to an identified or identifiable natural person by which that person can be identified, “in particular by reference to an identification or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”
Upholding individuals’ data rights implies their personal data must be kept private and should not be known,stored, or used by unauthorised parties. Upholding data rights is then a central pillar of the long-recognised right to privacy, which national laws and international human rights frameworks such as the international bill of rights guarantee. Notably, the right to privacy is pivotal in a democratic society as it is both an enabler and reliant on the enjoyment of other rights, such as freedom of expression, information and association.
As businesses, governments, and civil society organisations seek to maximise value of increased data flows, the dangers of cyberthreats, cybercrimes, surveillance, and general data misuse pose threats that require national, regional, and international action to address. At the same time, excessive restrictions on the flow of data between countries can undermine regional economic benefits if no best practices are adopted on how data should flow, be stored, protected, and disposed –Building an Enabling Environment for Inclusive Digital Transformation in Africa.
Poor or missing legal protections for personal data, abuse of existing laws by state agencies including security agencies and by private companies, and poor digital security practices by citizens, are exacerbating the erosion of many African citizens’ data rights. With increased data collection has come increased state surveillance and data privacy breaches. Worryingly, many African states are increasingly using data to undermine citizens’ digital freedoms, such as by conducting real-time monitoring, surveillance of citizens’ social media and intercepting telephone communications. In some instances, this has led to arbitrary arrests and prosecutions of individuals.
Moreover, telecoms and internet service providers are required by law to comply with user information requests or requests for assistance from the government, including the common requirement to install software to facilitate the state’s conduct of surveillance and monitoring of citizens’ communications. Many governments are indeed accessing subscribers’ data from telecom companies with limited oversight and hardly any transparency. Even where service providers feel constrained about regulator directives, they are often overcome by the need to continue operations and agree to restrict data rights.
In such countries, digital rights are under threat and, resultantly, citizens are losing the appetite to participate in public affairs, and they often practice self-censorship in their engagements over digital platforms. This undermines the philosophy of a free and open internet that drives innovation, enables the enjoyment of rights and improvement of livelihoods.
In many countries, the digital rights situation worsened during the Covid-19 pandemic, as governments suspended respect for several rights, collected lots of private data and conducted surveillance without sufficient oversight, safeguards, or transparency.
The State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020 Report found that the fight against Covid-19 has had a fundamental impact on digital rights and freedoms including freedom of expression, access to information, privacy, assembly and association. It has also undermined civic participation and, in many countries, deepened the democracy deficit.
In responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, countries across the continent adopted a series of Covid-19 regulations and practices, including deploying surveillance technologies and untested applications, to enable them conduct lawful collection and processing of personal data for purposes of tracing, contacting, isolating and treating those found to be positive or their contacts. These measures were quickly adopted and the collection of personal information continues, and in some cases without adequate regulation or oversight – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020: Resetting Digital Rights Amidst the Covid-19 Fallout
In several African countries, there are inadequate safeguards and limited oversight to guard against potential violations of digital rights arising out of the implementation of laws, regulations, systems, and practices imposed to fight Covid-19. According to the United Nations, the use of emergency powers and tools of surveillance technology to track the spread of Covid-19 must be non-intrusive, limited in time and purpose and abide to the strictest protections and international human rights standards governing privacy and personal data.
Concerns over data handling during the fight against Covid-19 and how that harmed digital rights informed the formation of the #RestoreDataRights movement, that is promoted by a group of African and international civil society, academic and philanthropic partners. Launched at the end of 2020, it is premised on the convictionthat our fundamental human rights – including those exercised in cyberspace and over our personal and sensitive data – should be respected and upheld during and after the Covid-19 public health emergency. Furthermore, decision-making processes around how sensitive data are collected, shared and used to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa should betransparent, inclusive and accountable.
There has also been a proliferation of retrogressive laws, procedures and practices such as the systematic criminalisation of online communication and dissent, the arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, flawed prosecution and excessive punishment of government critics. On a continent where digital authoritarianism is rising, the legitimisation of surveillance, censorship, and breaches in the rule of law during the coronavirus crisis could create a new normal that erodes internet freedom for years to come.
There is therefore a need to have strong data protection laws; to educate citizens to protect their data and to demand their digital rights; and to have strong, well-resourced and independent data protection authorities. It is also crucial to establish clear and well-publicised complaint mechanisms in cases of data privacy breaches. Meanwhile, private companies should institute stringent measures to protect data privacy and integrate ‘privacy by design’ in any applications they develop, partner with civic actors and public officials to promote digital rights, and be transparent about their data handling practices.
These measures would enable accountable data governance that respects citizens’ data rights and advances wider internet freedoms in Africa. Further, they would enable robust protection of digital rights and data rights, while providing scope for data openness that enables harnessing of data to serve the legitimate public interest.
Arabic
Chinese (Simplified)
Dutch
English
French
German
Italian
Korean
Portuguese
Russian
Spanish
Swahili
Xhosa
Zulu