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19Aug

Tanzania Entrenches Digital Rights Repression Amidst Covid-19 Denialism and a Looming Election

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By Edrine Wanyama |

On July 17, 2020, the Tanzania government issued new Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 that apply to online content production, hosting and dissemination. The regulations entrench the licencing and taxation of bloggers, online discussion forums, radio and television webcasters, and repress online speech, privacy and access to information.

The passage of the new regulations raises concerns over free speech and access to information as they come into force barely three months before Tanzania holds presidential elections on October 28, 2020, a period when civic engagement and transparency and accountability in governance requires access to a range of information and viewpoints. The regulations also come amidst Covid-19 denialism by President Pombe Magufuli’s government, which has denied citizens access to vital information and undermined efforts to contain the spread of the virus in the east African country.

Tanzania has been widely criticised for its lacklustre response to the Covid-19 pandemic, yet the regulations aim to further stifle access to health information by prohibiting the publication of “content with information with regards to the outbreak of a deadly or contagious disease in the country or elsewhere without the approval of the respective authorities.”

Earlier this year, the communications regulator, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), banned the independent Mwananchi newspaper from publishing online for six months, after accusing it of carrying a false and misleading news report on Covid-19. At the time, TCRA said the publisher had flouted the much-criticised Electronic and Postal Communications (EPOCA) (Online Content) Regulations, 2018, which have been replaced by the new regulations. On July 9, 2020, the TCRA suspended the independent Kwanza Online TV for 11 months, over a report on its Instagram account that cited a health alert issued by the United States embassy in Tanzania, on the Covid-19 situation in the country.

In July 2020, United Nations experts noted that Covid-19 had compounded pre-existing human rights concerns in Tanzania, notably regarding the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information. They added that Tanzania’s government was not meeting its commitments on information sharing and transparency after it stopped releasing statistics on Covid-19 cases at the end of April, and President Magufuli declared the country virus-free in early June.

The new regulations require online content service providers, internet service providers, and application services licensees to pay exorbitant fees for licensing and renewal of licences. Providers of “online content service”, described as “content broadcasting to the public through internet websites, application software, forums, blogs, weblogs, microblogs, public account, instant messaging tools, online live streaming, aggregators and other related platforms”, pay an application fee of Tanzania Shillings (TZS) 100,000 (USD 44); initial licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; annual licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; and a licence renewal fee of USD 440 or USD 220. The higher fees are to be paid by providers of “news and current affairs”; the lower ones by providers of entertainment, educational or religious content.

Radio and television operators that stream content online will pay USD 22 in application fees, USD 88 for the initial license, another USD 88 in annual licence fees, and USD 88 in licence renewal fees. The duration of all licences is three years.

Similar measures have previously been adopted to gag online content providers including broadcasters and bloggers during elections as was in the Broadcasting Services (Content) (The Political Party Elections Broadcasts) Code 2015.

The new regulations introduce a problematic definition of “news related content”, namely “online news information gathering, compiling, editing, publication and broadcasting in a manner similar or that bears a resemblance to traditional media services provision.” This essentially covers all information provided online. Similarly, the definition of an “online forum” has been expanded compared to that in the 2018 regulations, to cover every possible online fora and “online platforms”. These definitions are so vague that their application is potentially boundless in scope. With the past experiences of crackdown on media houses and journalists in Tanzania, these definitions appear to be calculated to target individuals and organisations such as Jamii Forums that champion free expression.

The new regulations raise the requirements for applicants, as well as the obligations of licensees, which could have a chilling effect on digital rights. Under regulation 6(2), applicants must provide certified copies of the certificate of registration, tax identification number, tax clearance certificate (for companies or non-government organisations) and national identity card. Furthermore, the applicant must provide a list of owners and the management team, editorial guidelines (if applying to provide “news and current affairs”) and technical description of facilities to be used. Moreover, under regulation 6(i), the TCRA may require additional documents.

The regulations expand the obligations of online content service providers and, under regulation 9(g),   require licensees to remove prohibited content immediately upon being ordered by TCRA. This does not provide room for verification or the right to be heard before removal is effected. Further regulation 9(h) and regulation 14 hold the licensee accountable for all information published. This imposes a heavy burden on licensees, including bloggers with no journalistic skills or resources to verify all information before publication, which curtails freedom of expression and denies citizens access to a variety of information. Moreover, for some unexplained reason, regulation 10 bars radio and television stations that hold district or regional license from live streaming content.

Some provisions potentially violate the right to privacy and undermine free expression. The requirement to install cameras in internet cafes and to store images recorded for 12 months has been retained under regulation 13. Further, the requirement to assign static public Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to computers in cafes would discourage usage of circumvention tools, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN), which enable users to bypass network restrictions and to enhance their anonymity.

Furthermore, regulation 6 in as far it requires attachment of a tax identification number certificate, national identity card of the applicant and curriculum vitae, as well as academic qualifications of staff in regulation 12 (b), exposes private data. In the absence of a law on data protection and privacy in Tanzania, there is no guarantee that individuals’ data will be safeguarded against unauthorised access and disclosure.

The new regulations expand the list of prohibited content to a wide and ambiguous scope that  fails to meet the internationally acceptable limitations to freedom of expression. For instance, while para.2 of the Third Schedule protects personal privacy and human dignity, it renders a publisher liable for slander and defamation even where the published information is true. This ignores the widely acceptable defence of truth to defamation. Moreover, it is increasingly recommended globally that defamation should be decriminalised.

Furthermore, para.3 prohibits publication of information on public security, violence and national security, including undefined “news, statements or rumors for the purpose of ridicule, abuse or harming the reputation, prestige or status of Tanzania or its national anthem, symbols and logos.” This prohibition is contrary to freedom of expression guarantees provided for under article 8 of the Constitution of Tanzania. The prohibition of publication of information on demonstrations and marches potentially inhibits freedom of assembly and association, which are also guaranteed by article 20 Tanzania’s Constitution.

Failure by the regulations to clearly define prohibited information, such as that considered a threat to national security or public order in paras. 3(d) and (h), to the national currency or the national economy in para.3(f), or information relating to terrorist attacks, droughts, weather forecasts or occurrence of natural calamities para.8(b), could be used by advantaged authorities to wantonly punish critics of government and its leaders.

Regulation 21 introduces a general penalty for breaching the regulations where no specific punishment has been prescribed: a fine of not less than USD 2,200 or imprisonment for a term of not less than 12 months, or both.

In their current state the regulations will further narrow the already shrinking space for digital rights and freedoms in Tanzania, as they will muzzle freedom of expression, access to information, and individual privacy. Such freedoms are particularly important in times of elections and a pandemic. The government should therefore consider repealing or amending the EPOCA (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 so that they progressively promote the enjoyment of digital rights and freedoms.

18Jun

Countering Nonconsensual Sharing of Intimate Images: How far do Uganda’s Laws Go?

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By African Feminism |
In 2014, when Uganda introduced a law against pornography, few anticipated that it would largely be used to target and prosecute women, and specifically women whose intimate photos have been shared online without their consent. The Anti-Pornography Act, whose enforcement is spearheaded by a 9-member Pornography Control Committee is mandated to “apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of pornography, collect and destroy any pornographic materials and detect the sharing of nude materials on computers, phones and television.”
Pornography, according to the Act is “any representation through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent show, information technology or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or stimulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual excitement.” The Act makes it a crime to produce, traffic in, publish, broadcast, import, export, sell or abet any form of pornography, and anyone found guilty of the offence faces a 10-year jail term.
It is on these grounds that over the years in Uganda, particularly women whose private images have been leaked on the internet without their consent have been arrested by police and tasked to explain how their photos ended up on the internet.
In 2018, a university student was arrested, charged in court and sent to prison for allegedly producing and broadcasting a pornographic video contrary to section 13(1) and (2) of the Anti-Pornography law.
In another famous case, Desire Luzinda, a renowned artiste was forced to make a public apology after the Minister of Ethics and Integrity issued threats to arrest her for engaging in pornography following leakage of her intimate photos on social media by an ex-boyfriend.
The sharing of private nude images, often by jilted lovers and hackers is used as a tool to shame women, blackmail them or extort money from them. Lindsey Kukunda, who runs the online platform Not Your Body, says it is worrying that the law focuses on punishing victims whose images have been leaked rather than the perpetrators of the crime.
“When it comes to non-consensual sharing of intimate images, the law has manipulated the situation so that women can be punished for being women. They don’t try to look for the men. It is always the women that they target,” Kukunda says.
She adds that in many of the documented cases, the photos are leaked to blackmail or extort money from the victims and had nothing to do with pornography.  “The aim is often to cause distress and pain to the victims but the police make no effort to look for the blackmailer. It is easier for them to go for the woman than to carry out investigations and find the culprits who have leaked the images,” she adds.

With a focus on victims and many perpetrators getting away with their actions, this specific kind of online violence against women has been a growing trend in Uganda.

Photo via Shutterstock
 

Gendered Impact Of The Anti-Pornography Law

A recently released research study by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), looked at online safety for women. The findings show that despite having a lesser presence on the internet, more women are likely to face various forms of online violence compared to their male counterparts, further undermining their participation in online spaces.
Figures from the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) show that internet penetration currently stands at 38 per cent among the general population. In another study, the Web Foundation found that only 21 per cent of women compared to 61 per cent of men had accessed the internet in the six months prior to conducting the survey. Education and income levels played an important factor in women’s internet access, where women with some secondary school education are six times more likely to be online than those with primary and no education.
The CIPESA study under the Women At Web project involved interviews with university students, journalists, bloggers, activists, human rights defenders and business owners.
“The absence of laws designed to specifically address the various forms of digital violence such as ‘revenge pornography’, trolling and threats, and the lack of sufficient in-country reporting mechanisms exacerbate these challenges and often result in many women being forced to go offline or resorting to self-censorship,” the study reveals.
Ophelia Kemigisha, a human rights lawyer at Chapter Four Uganda, says what enforcers of the anti-pornography law are doing is simply policing women’s bodies. She says that the violence often meted against women online, as it is offline, has not been taken seriously. Instead, like violence offline, it is usually depicted as a simple misunderstanding between two parties.
“Unless we start to see non-consensual sharing of images of women as violence, we shall continue to see women victims being targeted instead of the perpetrators.”
The vagueness of the law further complicates its implementation. Recourse for Ugandan women, according to Kemigisha could be in the Sexual Offences Bill 2019, which is currently before Parliament. In the proposed law, it would be criminal for a person to send or transmit materials of a sexual nature, with violations attracting a fine or prison term of seven years or both.
By making it a sexual offence, victims would also be able to anonymously report cases without fear of being identified, something that is not possible under the current laws. Legislator Anna Adeke agrees. Cyber violence, she says, has a big gender aspect to it and so the laws must be sensitive as regards to gender because we all suffer differently on cyber platforms.

“Knowing that the media which occupies most of the cyberspace is a very patriarchal arm, it’s important that laws are gender appropriate so that we make it increasingly risky for people to abuse women online,” says Adeke.

Peace Oliver Amuge, from Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET), an organisation that supports women’s use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) says based on years of research on technology-related violence against women, for victims, one of the biggest challenges is the mechanism of where to report cases as the Police is often not competent enough to deal with cases.
Jimmy Haguma, the head of cybercrimes unit at the Uganda Police acknowledges that law enforcement officers are not well trained at investigating cases of digital crimes, especially those involving non-consensual sharing of private images.
“One of our biggest challenges in addressing online violence against women is where they can report cases to. The typical police station is not equipped with that. We are trying to devise online methods where people can report cases.”
Apprehending perpetrators, according to Haguma, has also been complicated by the fact cyber-related crimes against women, including the non-consensual sharing of their images, are often carried out by people using stolen phones.
“They use stolen phones to send text messages to their victims to send money through mobile money so that they don’t publish their images. If a person doesn’t make a call, then tracking such a person then becomes difficult,” he said.

Illustration by Charity Atukunda
Illustration by Charity Atukunda
 

New Initiatives Closing The Response Gaps

Without adequate avenues for victims to report cases, innovative platforms such as the Women At Web Portal that is currently under development hopes to fill the void and make it easy for women victims to report cases of violations online and safely. The portal is being spearheaded under the  Women at Web project, an alliance of five organisations, including Chapter Four Uganda, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), the Defenders Protection Initiative (DPI), Not Your Body and Unwanted Witness. The alliance is working to improve digital literacy and security among African women in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda.
Brian Byaruhanga from the Defenders Protection Initiative, which is spearheading the development of the portal says the intention is to be able to acquire evidence based on the violations that women are experiencing online, and also make it easy for victims to report cases anonymously and safely.
“The portal will help us in policy advocacy and improve the protection of women online. As it stands now, there is no proper documentation of these cases and yet for advocacy, you need the data,” says Byaruhanga.
The portal will also be used to generate information on the types of violations, where and how they are happening and which categories of women are most targeted. This data, according to Byaruhanga will subsequently be shared with law enforcement agencies such as the Police,  to ease their investigations and therefore help victims hold perpetrators to account.
Kukunda from Not Your Body says women need to take lead in challenging social conventions for their own sake. “ Women have to rise above the illusion that being sexual is a sign of immorality. It is one of the reasons they feel ashamed to report even to their friends,” adding that public conversations about these issues is what will help improve awareness and acceptance of women as sexual beings not to be demonised for it.
Support is also paramount. While there are organisations that offer free legal advice to those who cannot afford lawyers, Kukunda says women need to take the initiative to study laws such as the Data Protection Act so they can take action into their own hands.
“Women should never go alone to report a case to a police station or be naive about the system. The system is not ready to help women, nor is it interested,” Kukunda adds.
In Malawi and Uganda, non-consensual sharing of private images has yet to be widely recognized and/or acknowledged as a gendered issue. Consequently, it remains below the radar of most activists and prominent gender advocates. Globally, however, there is growing recognition that digital technology such as email, the social media platforms and mobile phone technologies are being used as a tool to harass, intimidate, humiliate, coerce and blackmail.
This article was first published by the African Feminism on June 18, 2020.

09Apr

Centre for Human Rights and CIPESA Conduct Study on Civil Society in the Context of the Digital Age in Africa

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By Center for Human Rights and CIPESA |
The study on Civil society in the digital age in Africa: identifying threats and mounting pushbacks was undertaken by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to explore the extent of state-sponsored digital challenges that the civil society in Africa is faced with. It illustrates the challenges faced by civil society organisations and the importance of digital security measures.
Considering the digital threats contributing to the shrinking civic space on the continent, the study highlights the international and regional framework governing the activities of civil society. It further maps the national legislative and policy threats against civil society in selected African countries: Egypt, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The study shows how these digital threats not only limit the operations and existence of civic society but also impede the enjoyment of human rights such as the freedoms of association, assembly and the right to freedom of expression.
Based on the findings of the study, it is argued that civil society organisations are significant players in the democratic development and protection and promotion of human rights and thus, their operations and rights should be safeguarded. The study, therefore, calls on African governments to respect their obligations under international human rights law and adopt measures that enable civil society to perform their mandate in promoting good governance, accountability and respect of human rights on the continent, especially in the context of the digital age. The study also recommends the civil society to devise methods of countering digital threats. This could be done through the development and implementation of human rights-sensitive organisational data protection, digital security policies and enhanced organisational understanding of how they can harness digital technologies for digital security purposes. Further, the study encourages the private sector and funders to support and complement the efforts by the civil society in advancing digital rights and opening up the civic space.

Civil society in the digital age in Africa: identifying threats and mounting pushbacks

English

Civil society in the digital age in Africa identifying threats and mounting pushbacks

This report documents the threats to civil society in the digital age by examining the legislative and regulatory framework, as well as state action in four countries in Africa: Egypt, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The recommendations emanating from the research call for the states to revise and repeal identified restrictive laws and align them with international standards.
Download the full study here.
04Mar

Silencing Critical Voices: Our Online Civic Space is Shrinking

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By Digital Shelter |

Somalia had recorded steady growth in telephone penetration – with 7.6 mobile subscribers. However, internet penetration remains low – 2% as at 2017, according to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The adoption of technology has expanded civic space in the post conflict era, with social media platforms and blogs empowering journalists, activists and human rights defenders to document and report human abuses, mobilize public opinion, campaign for reforms, share relevant content and information, and build networks at national and global level.

However, the past three years have seen a rise in threats against online freedom of expression, such as the arrest and intimidation of several journalists and social media campaigners for comments posted on social media. There are reports of dissenting social media accounts being hacked, while others have deactivated their accounts due to fear of attacks. A culture of censorship prevails, amidst a rise in sponsored trolls spreading misinformation and propaganda to counter factual narrative reported by journalists, human rights defenders and activists online.

It is against this background that Digital Shelter hosted a panel discussion on the shrinking online civic space in Somalia and the growing digital threats faced by media professionals, bloggers and human right defenders in the digital space on February 13, 2020. The event was part of series of activities under the theme “Protect our Online Space”, supported by the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) – an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

Among the panelists was Mohamed Irbad, a prominent blogger and researcher known for his critical writings on governance, human rights, freedom of expression and censorship on social media platforms. In early 2019, after publishing an article titled “Media Censorship In Somalia: A Nation Risk Into Information Darkness” on his personal blog, Mohamed faced serious online and physical threats which forced him to flee the country for six months due to fear for his safety.
“All critical voices, particularly individuals who are based inside Somalia have been silenced with online and physical threats altogether. For instance, when your raise critical issue on Twitter or Facebook you have two options, you either end up battling with anonymous trolls in their hundreds by answering to their toxic comments or you feel intimidated and sacred of writing about certain issues, hence, your remain silenced . And that is exactly what happened to me after writing that article. And therefore, it is fair to stay that we are witnessing the worst shrinking of our online/offline civic and democratic spaces” Mohamed Irbad.
Also speaking at the event was Hassan Ali Osman, a journalist, with the New Humanitarian newsletter. Hassan actively uses Twitter to disseminate local and international news as it breaks for his 90,000 followers. He shared that he has been constantly attacked by trolls merely because of reporting the truth on social media platforms.
Highlighting the issue of online violence against women was Sucdi Dahir Diriye, a passionate community volunteer and member of CaawiWalaal loosely translated as “HelpYourBrother” –  a digital campaign launched three years ago to support local communities affected by droughts in Somalia. As in most of the world, the internet has provided a platform for Somali women to amplify their voices. However, it has also enabled perpetuation of different forms of online violence against women including harassment, doxing, threats, stalking and blackmail, sometimes leading to physical violence. The targets of these attacks are women that are vocal on issues such as gender equality, sexual violence, free expression, or challenging the patriarchal structure of the society. This has created a hostile online environment for women and girls in Somalia, fraught with shaming, intimidation and degrading, leading to withdraw of from the online space.
As part of her work, Sucdi documents cases of online blackmailing and extortion against young girls in Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia. She stated that limited recognition of the existence of online violence and harassment against women in Somalia is allowing the abuse to continue inexorably. Relevant policies to address online violence against women need to be put in place and more women and girls need to be skilled in digital safety and security.
Based on their personal and professional experiences, the panelists stressed the need for counter measures against the prevailing threats. Among the recommendations made was increased digital security skills and knowledge building among activists, bloggers and media professionals. Specialized training on gendered online harassment was encouraged. Panelists also emphasized a dual approach in voice amplification – online and offline to reach wider audiences.  Furthermore, more stakeholder dialogue to raise awareness on online civic space and digital rights, including data protection and privacy inline with Somalia’s growing technology sector. Other recommendations included research undertakings on current digital threats in Somalia, to inform advocacy and policy interventions; and establishment of a solidarity network to support victims of online attacks.
“Digital Shelter is proud to be in a unique position to amplify voices in the most difficult time where the online civic space is shrinking in Somalia”, said Abdifatah, co-founder of Digital Shelter in the closing remarks of the forum.
Digital Shelter continues its “Protect our Online Space” drive during March 2020 with series of trainings on digital security. Digital Shelter is also planning to host other forums on expanding online civic space in Somalia.

This article was first published by the Digital Shelter on March 04, 2020

21Feb

La nouvelle loi du Mali sur la cybercriminalité potentiellement problématique pour les droits numériques

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Par Simone Toussi |
Le 5 décembre 2019, le président du Mali a promulgué la loi n° 2019-056 portant Répression de la Cybercriminalité. Bien qu’opportune et pertinente, certaines de ses dispositions constituent des menaces potentielles à la vie privée et la liberté d’expression en ligne, en particulier, compte tenu des défaillances démocratiques du Mali et de son faible classement en matière de liberté de la presse.
La nouvelle loi s’applique à « toute infraction commise au moyen des technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) en tout ou partie sur le territoire de la République du Mali, toute infraction commise dans le cyberespace et dont les effets se produisent sur le territoire national » (article 2). Elle fait partie d’un cadre législatif jugé nécessaire pour soutenir les réformes dans le secteur des TIC, conformément à la Déclaration de politique sectorielle des télécommunications du Mali, de l’année 2000.
Des atteintes à la vie privée à l’autoritarisme numérique
La Constitution du Mali garantit la confidentialité des communications en vertu de l’article 6, une disposition qui est renforcée par l’article 5 de la loi portant protection des données à caractère personnel de 2013 l’article 1er de la loi régissant les télécommunications de 1999. La loi sur la cybercriminalité est malheureusement en conflit avec ces prédispositions en faveur du droit à la vie privée.
Les articles 74 à 78 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité autorisent la perquisition et la saisie informatique de données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles. En outre, en vertu de l’article 75, les données peuvent être copiées et stockées lorsque « la saisie du support ne paraît pas appropriée ». La loi ne prévoit pas comment les données copiées doivent être stockées, traitées ou supprimées à l’issue des enquêtes. Cela sape le principe de protection des données énoncé dans l’article 7 de la loi sur la protection des données à caractère personnel – selon lequel les données à caractère personnel ne doivent être conservées que pour une période et un objectif précis.
De plus, les articles 83 à 86 suggèrent une surveillance en temps réel par l’interception des communications. Les prestataires de services sont tenus de coopérer avec les autorités, notamment en veillant à ce qu’ils disposent des moyens techniques nécessaires pour faciliter l’interception des communications. Ces pouvoirs étendus doublent ceux qui sont accordés aux autorités en vertu de l’article 4 de la loi sur les télécommunications. Ce dernier stipule : « Lorsque la sécurité publique ou la défense du territoire du Mali l’exige, le gouvernement peut, pour une durée limitée, réquisitionner tous les réseaux de télécommunications établis sur le territoire du Mali, ainsi que les équipements qui y sont connectés et / ou interdire la fourniture de services de télécommunications. » Cet article a été utilisé par le passé, lorsque le gouvernement a ordonné des perturbations de réseaux sociaux en 2016 lors des manifestations publiques, et plus récemment, une coupure d’Internet lors des élections de 2018.
En outre, les prestataires de services de communication sont tenus de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle des systèmes d’activités illégales potentielles. Tout refus d’informer les autorités de ces activités illégales est passible d’une peine de prison allant de six mois à deux ans, une amende de 500 000 à 2 000 000 francs CFA (830 à 3 318 dollars américain – USD) ou les deux (article 25).
Des alertes pour la liberté d’expression
Bien que la constitution du Mali garantisse la liberté d’expression et d’opinion (article 4), la loi portant régime de la presse et délit de presse (2000) est vague car elle ne garantit pas explicitement la liberté de la presse ou le pluralisme médiatique, ni ne définit les délits de presse. Elle ne contient pas non plus des dispositions sur les médias en ligne. Cela constitue un vide qui précède la loi sur la répression de la cybercriminalité qui, pour sa part, contient des dispositions qui affectent directement la liberté d’expression et d’opinion.
Les articles 20 et 21 de la nouvelle loi punissent les menaces et les insultes faites par le biais d’un système d’information, avec des sanctions allant de six mois à 10 ans d’emprisonnement, et une amende de 1 000 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (1 680 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux. Sans définir ni clairement détailler les éléments constitutifs de la « menace » ou de l ‘ « insulte », ces dispositions sont sujettes à des interprétations pouvant entraver la liberté d’expression. Cela est d’autant plus critique que ces termes ne sont pas non plus définis par la loi portant régime de presse et délit de presse, dans son article 33 sur l’incitation et l’article 38 sur la diffamation.
De plus, les articles 55 et 56 condamnent la « diffusion publique » de « tous imprimés, tous écrits, dessins, affiches, gravures, peintures, photographies, films ou clichés, matrices ou reproductions photographiques, emblèmes, tous objets ou images contraires aux bonnes mœurs. » Les sanctions correspondantes vont de six mois à sept ans d’emprisonnement, une amende de 500 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (840 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux.
L’article 54 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité stipule que les infractions de presse, commises par le biais des technologies de l’information et de la communication, à l’exception de celles commises par la presse sur Internet, sont punies par les peines de droit commun ». Étant donné que la loi sur la presse ne comporte pas de disposition pour la presse en ligne, la distinction entre les délits de presse via les TIC et les délits de presse via internet n’est pas claire. En outre, il y a un manque de précision quant à déterminer si une infraction relève de la loi sur la cybercriminalité, du droit commun ou de la loi sur la presse.
L’article 23 prévoit une amende de 200 000 à 2 000 000 CFA (de 332 à 3 318 dollars américain), une peine d’emprisonnement de six mois à un an, ou les deux, pour les faux signalements d’activités ou contenus illicites, « dans le but d’en obtenir le retrait ou d’en faire cesser la diffusion par un prestataire de services de communications au public par voie électronique ». Cependant, les activités et contenus considérés comme illicites et donc soumis à dénonciation, ne sont pas définis par la loi.
Les mesures à prendre
La loi est bien orientée pour garantir une utilisation sûre et sécurisée des TIC au Mali. Elle entre cependant en vigueur dans un contexte fragile. Les dispositions relatives au traitement des données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles présentent un risque important pour l’intégrité, la sécurité et la confidentialité des données personnelles. En outre, la loi impose une lourde charge aux intermédiaires de télécommunications pour suivre et surveiller l’activité du réseau, et tient ces intermédiaires responsables des actes de leurs clients. Les dispositions relatives aux délits de presse en ligne sont incompatibles avec la législation sur les médias à l’ère du numérique. La nouvelle loi et les lois connexes existantes nécessitent donc des révisions pour sauvegarder et faire respecter les garanties constitutionnelles de la liberté d’expression et de la vie privée, en ligne et hors ligne.

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