One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa's Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.

One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa’s Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.

Investigation Finds More than 700,000 Barriers Limiting Website Accessibility in Mozambique

By Staff Writer |

In a pioneering data-driven investigation, the Mozambican Disabled Person’s Organisation Forum (FAMOD) has teamed up with UK-based non-profit Data4Change to run automated accessibility testing on 90 of the most important and useful websites in Mozambique.

The result is a publicly-available dataset of 722,053 instances of accessibility ‘violations’. Each violation represents a barrier preventing someone with a visual, hearing, physical or cognitive impairment from fully engaging with the web page.

The investigation revealed that just five types of accessibility violations accounted for nearly 90% of all the violations found. These top five violations were low colour contrast (37% of violations found), lack of landmarks to identify regions of a page (33%), links that aren’t made apparent (11%), no descriptive text for interactive elements (3%) and no ‘alt text’ for images (2%). The violations were defined according to international standards for web accessibility as described under the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 and 2.1 (WCAG 2.0 and 2.1).

Cantol Alexandre Pondja, President at FAMOD noted that access to ICT is essential for persons with disabilities, adding that, “It is clear from the results of our investigation that the majority of websites, including those providing public and essential services, remain largely inaccessible for persons with disabilities. As a result, FAMOD plans to strengthen the advocacy work in this area and we look forward to working with political authorities, the private sector, and donors as part of this effort.”

Some of the worst-performing websites include a job ads site, a large telecoms provider and a government tax authority. One screen reader user told FAMOD, “In most websites there comes a stage when it is not possible to use. I finished my studies recently and when I went to the job website, I was not able to apply for a job, because when I get to the end of the first page of jobs I can’t move onto the next. I end up giving up.”

The www.a11y.co.mz platform provides more information about the investigation and invites Mozambican web content creators, designers, and developers to test their existing knowledge with an accessibility quiz; pledge to uphold accessible and inclusive design principles in their work as well as access a free ‘digital toolkit’ containing resources to help with writing, designing and developing more accessible websites.

Bronwen Roberston, Director of Data4Change which works on data-driven projects aimed at solving issues affecting underrepresented and marginalised groups stated that, “a11y.co.mz proves that there’s a long way to go to ensure the internet is accessible for people with disabilities in Mozambique, but that there are some easy and concrete steps that can be taken to improve the current situation.”

The investigation was carried out in the context of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) which is an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA). According to CIPESA’s Programmes Manager, Ashnah Kalemera, Mozambique, like many other African countries, ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which places significant obligations on state parties for equal opportunities and inclusion of persons with disabilities. “a11y indicates that these obligations remain largely unimplemented and, as a result, a large section of persons with disabilities continue to face digital exclusion. CIPESA is really proud to partner with FAMOD in raising awareness of disability rights issues as they intersect with technology and access to information in Mozambique,” said Kalemera.

In November 2020, CIPESA alongside, FAMOD, Small Media, and the Associação de Cegos e Amblíopes de Moçambique made a joint stakeholder submission on digital rights in Mozambique which in April 2021, will be assessed under the Universal Peer Review (UPR) process at the United Nations Human Rights Council. Indeed, among the recommendations made was a call to the government to implement measures that promote inclusive access for marginalised and vulnerable groups including women, rural communities, and persons with disabilities, with funding from the Universal Service Fund.

Africa Digital Rights Fund Supports Mainstreaming of Online Freedoms in Somali Territories

By Ashnah Kalemera |

The digital landscape of Somalia and the breakaway states of Somaliland and Puntland is largely shaped by the region’s history of terrorism and political turmoil. Website censorship, internet disruptions and crackdowns on the media co-exist in a fast-evolving technology sector, within a regressive policy and regulatory environment. With support from the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), three Somali initiatives are working to positively influence this landscape by raising the visibility of digital rights issues, alongside pushing for policy and practice reforms to ensure effective and inclusive use of technology for socio-economic and political development. 

Combined, the initiatives have skilled 235 human rights defenders, media practitioners and activists in safety and security online, and convened multiple stakeholder forums featuring government authorities, the private sector, civil society and law enforcement to promote wider awareness on digital rights and the need to prioritise rights-respecting technology adoption. The initiatives have also amplified efforts on effective utilisation of technology in Covid-19 response measures and worked to close the digital gender gap, focusing some interventions on addressing barriers to women’s meaningful participation in online spaces.

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2020 report ranks Somaliland as ‘partly free’, citing a “consistent erosion of political rights and civic space” evidenced by numerous arrests and detention of journalists and critics, and suspension of media outlets, among others. Assessed separately, Somalia is ranked as ‘not free’ with “impunity for human rights abuses by both state and nonstate actors” being the norm. As a combined region, Somalia’s press freedom ranking is dismal too – at position 163 out of 180 countries assessed as part of the 2020 World Press Freedom Index.

Somalia’s telecommunications sector, which is largely unregulated, has recorded steady growth, with 2020 figures indicating mobile subscriptions at 48% of the population and 10% internet penetration. Mobile money usage is widespread and, according to GSMA’s Mobile Money Regulatory Index, Somalia is ahead of many regional counterparts, having formalised sector regulations during 2019, allowed non-banks to offer electronic and mobile-based financial services, and permitted international mobile money transfers.

The ADRF’s partners – Digital Shelter, the Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA), and the Women in Media in Somalia (WIMISOM)- recognise that increased use of online platforms has the potential to positively shape political participation, innovation, inclusion and the realisation of human rights in Somalia and its breakaway regions.

In response to arrests and intimidation of several journalists and social media activists by the Somali federal government and federal states, digital attacks, and threats from terrorist groups, Digital Shelter spearheaded the “protect our online space” initiative with ADRF support. Under the initiative, Digital Shelter hosted a groundbreaking dialogue on shrinking online civic space in Mogadishu, which was attended by 80 human rights defenders, journalists, bloggers and artists. The dialogue was followed by two digital security training sessions (hosted over three days each), also held in Mogadishu, benefiting 100 participants (47% female), including women human rights defenders, media practitioners and activists. Besides risk assessment, device security, encryption and circumvention, the training featured sessions on tackling misinformation and disinformation. 

Digital Shelter hosted a second dialogue on digital transformation and the future of online civic space in Mogadishu in partnership with the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and Technology (MPTT). This forum brought together 80 government officials, tech activists, ICT experts, media practitioners, and civil society representatives. Speaking as a panelist at the forum, Abdiaziz Duwane, Director General of MPTT, reiterated the government’s commitment to prioritise the use of technology in private and public sectors, and to improve rural connectivity. 

With the success of the two dialogues, Digital Shelter went on to support Somalia’s Covid-19 response measures by hosting an engagement on misinformation and media coverage around Covid-19. Additionally, since September 2020, it has hosted monthly meet ups on digital rights topics, featuring various guest speakers. 

Recognising the role of media practitioners and digital platforms in promoting peace in conflict regions, the Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA), with ADRF support, equipped 120 journalists (40% female) with skills in innovative content development, safety and security online, and journalism for peace and humanitarianism. In addition, SOLJA organised a multi-stakeholder dialogue aimed at understanding misinformation and fact checking. Speaking at the dialogue, Muna Toosane, the Director of Communication at the Somaliland Ministry of Information and National Awareness, stated that ongoing government interventions were focused on increased adoption of technology, while mindful of emerging concerns over the spread of false and misleading information online. 

The engagements by SOLJA were informed by a knowledge, attitudes and perceptions survey on the impact of online platforms on print and broadcast media in Somaliland. Conducted during February and March 2020, the survey targeted 51 media stakeholders including the Ministry of Information, local print, broadcast and online media agencies, independent media practitioners, academia, human rights  and civil society organisations. The survey found that online platforms were perceived to have had a positive impact on governance and human rights in Somaliland. However, journalists’ use of the platforms was being undermined by limited understanding of online safety and security, pervasive hate speech and misinformation.

Further, SOLJA monitored Covid-19 coverage by five public and private media entities during April and May 2020. The assessment of Geeska Afrika, Jamhuuriya, Radio Hargeisa, Horn Cable TV and Saab TV, found that briefings from the Ministry of Health, the activities of the national response committee and prevention measures were the leading topics of reporting. However, messaging was often repetitive with little on societal and behavioural change. The report also found cases of misinformation on social media being reproduced in print and broadcast stories, as well as limited inclusion of women’s voices.

SOLJA has since gone on to engage Somaliland Members of Parliament, legal and religious leaders and the Deputy General Secretary of Somaliland parliament on a draft media bill to replace the Press Law 24/2004.

Digital Shelter and SOLJA’s interventions set the foundation for the third ADRF Somali grantee – Women in Media Initiative Somalia (WIMISOM) – whose work during 2020/2021 is focused on building the digital security skills and knowledge of women journalists (print, broadcast and online) and women-led media organisations in Puntland, Somalia and Somaliland as a means of combating threats against female journalists and their sources. 

Towards the end of 2020, WIMISON conducted a three days training of trainers (ToT) in Puntland, which was launched by a representative from the Puntland Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs (MOWDAFA). The 15 trained trainers are due to support regional training during January and February 2021. In commemoration of the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-based Violence, WIMISOM organised a roundtable discussion on the challenges facing women in journalism and their role in fighting gender-based violence. 

The July 2020 profiling of Digital Shelter’s work by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is testament to the need for continued elevation of digital rights advocacy and network building within wider efforts to advance human rights in Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland – a need that ADRF is proud to have set the pace for by supporting Digital Shelter, SOLJA and WIMISOM.

The ADRF is an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) with support from the Omidyar Network, Ford Foundation, the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

Uganda’s 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348989568951967747

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348954155394740227

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1347789536521293826

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1343152881927655425

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.