By Edrine Wanyama |
It is anticipated that by 2025, there will be at least 5.9 billion mobile subscribers accounting for 71% of the world’s population. As of 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had a mobile subscription rate of 44% which is projected to reach 52% by 2025. Further, SSA’s mobile internet penetration by 2017 stood at 21% and is anticipated to increase to 40% by 2025. However, the region has registered the largest number of cases of mandatory SIM card registration yet it suffers some of biggest challenges in personal data protection and privacy.
The benefits of SIM card registration include facilitation of citizens’ access to e-Government services, easy identification of an individual’s mobile number and number portability when switching networks. In addition, it aids combating cybercrime including terrorism by limiting covert communication and promotes good relations between consumers and service providers by simplifying identification of consumers and their use of SIM services. Accordingly, many governments argue that mandatory SIM card registration is for purposes of safeguarding digital and physical security. However, critics argue that when SIM card registration is effected without due safeguards, it poses a threat to privacy and freedom of expression.
Indeed, in 2013 Mexico repealed its policies on SIM card registration “after a policy assessment showed that it had not helped with the prevention, investigation and/or prosecution of associated crimes.” Finland has not enforced compulsory SIM card registration and nonetheless, through voluntary mobile signatures, service providers has succeeded in facilitating user’s access to relevant retail, banking and e-Government services.
Globally, over 90 countries conduct compulsory SIM card registration yet some remain without clear policy on its implementation. Amidst criticisms that mandatory registration does not necessary combat cybercrime, as criminals take the necessary precautions to avoid being detected and circumvent mandatory SIM card registration, African countries continue to proactively enforce SIM card registration. Among the prevailing challenges on the continent is the difficulty in validating identity documents in an environment with a wide range of service providers who create room for potential circumvention.
Mandatory registration has negatively affected access and usage of mobile telecommunication services due to the tedious process which entails the production of documentation such as passports and national identity cards prior to registration, which sometimes results in failure to attain a SIM card, disconnection, or deactivation of SIM cards.
Additionally, there have been repetitive calls for registration of SIM cards in countries such as Uganda and Nigeria with personal data being collected more than once. In Uganda, despite government explanation that SIM card verification is aimed at ensuring secure and safer communications, citizens have unanswered questions on the exercise. Suspicion arises due to a fresh validation of SIM card registration using national identity cards subsequent to registration which was initially done using valid documents such as students’ identity cards, driving permits and passports.
Double collection of personal data may partly imply collection of data beyond what is necessary for the purpose contrary to the internationally established data protection principles such as those set out in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Data Protection Principles. Further, there is no guarantee of individual privacy as most of the African countries do not have data protection laws. Moreover, most of the existing data protection laws do not meet internationally recognised standards considered sufficient to guarantee personal data protection and are therefore regarded as offering moderate or limited protection.
Meanwhile, efforts to buttress data protection in Africa have not yielded much. Out of 54 countries on the continent, only 14 have data protection laws (Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe). A few others such as Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Niger have Bills. Regional efforts have also not yielded much. The Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection which was adopted by the African Union in 2014 has registered only 10 signatories (Benin, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe, Zambia and Comoros) and one ratification by Senegal.
Ultimately, there is need to reconcile state interests with citizens’ personal data and privacy rights. Mandatory registration, especially in the absence of clear registration guidelines and the lack of data protection laws, puts personal data at risk. African governments need to learn from other jurisdictions such as Europe with regards to processing of personal data as part of SIM card registration. In enforcing SIM card registration, there should be a clear set registration timelines, clear and unambiguous registration requirements.
Uganda’s Social Media Tax Threatens Internet Access, Affordability
By Juliet Nanfuka |
Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni has directed the finance ministry to introduce taxes on the use of social media platforms. According to him, the tax would curb gossip on networks such as WhatsApp, Skype, Viber and Twitter and potentially raise up to Uganda Shillings (UGX) 400 billion (USD 108 million) annually for the national treasury. The ministry has already proposed amendments to the Uganda Excise Duty Act, 2014 to introduce taxation of “over-the-top” (OTT) services, and raise taxes on other telecommunications services.
Section 4 of the Excise Duty (Amendment) Bill 2018, a copy of which was obtained by CIPESA, states: “A telecommunication service operator providing data used for accessing over the top services is liable to account and pay excise duty on the access to over the top services.” The amendment defines such services as the “transmission or receipt of voice or message over the internet protocol network and includes access to virtual network; but does not include educational or research sites which shall be gazetted by the Minister.”
According to the proposals, which could take effect on July 1, 2018, OTT services that commonly include messaging and voice calls via Whatsapp, Facebook, Skype and Viber will attract a tax duty of UGX 200 (USD 0.05) per user per day of access. In his letter, Museveni said the government needed resources “to cope with the consequences” of social media users’ “opinions, prejudices [and] insults”. He proposed a levy of UGX 100 (USD 0.025) per day per OTT user. Prime Minister Ruhakana Rugunda supported the suggestion as did the ICT minister, who stated that the taxes were meant to increase local content production and app innovation in Uganda.
If implemented, the proposed tax will be the latest in a series of government actions that threaten citizens’ access to the internet. Last month, the communications regulator issued a directive calling for registration of online content providers and also released tough restrictions on registration of SIM cards. At the USD 0.05 per day suggested by the finance ministry, a Ugandan user would need to fork out USD 1.5 per in monthly fees to access the OTT services. That would be hugely prohibitive since the average revenue per user (ARPU) of telecom services in Uganda stands at a lowly USD 2.5 per month.
According to the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), in the 2016-2017 financial year, Uganda’s telecommunications sector contributed UGX 523 billion (USD 141.2 million) to national tax revenue, an increase of 14.3% from the previous year’s UGX 458 billion (USD 123.6 million).
As of September 2017, Uganda had an internet penetration rate of 48% while the mobile subscription stood at 65 lines per 100 persons. Research shows that at least one in nine internet users in the country is signed up for a social networking site, with Facebook and WhatsApp the most popular.
Indeed, social media and by extension OTT services, are key avenues for public discourse, service delivery and political engagement. As per the recently released results of the national IT survey 2017/18, 92% of MDAs have a social media presence with most using Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp as their primary platforms for information dissemination and engagement with citizens. Meanwhile, telecommunications companies have tapped into the popularity of OTTs by offering competitive social media data packages, resulting in what was popularly referred to as “data price wars.”
The amendment bill also proposes a 12% tax for airtime on cellular, landline and public payphones. The latter two previously attracted a 5% tax. The tax on mobile money transfers has been increased from 10% to 15%, while a 1% tax has been introduced to the value of mobile money transactions of receiving and withdrawals.
The proposed taxes do little to support internet affordability in Uganda, which already scores poorly on the Affordability Drivers Index (ADI) that annually assesses communications infrastructure, access and affordability indicators. Currently, 1GB of mobile prepaid data in Uganda costs more than 15% of the average Ugandan’s monthly income. This is much higher than the recommended no more than 2% in order to enable all income groups to afford a basic broadband connection.
The proposed taxes have also raised considerable debate among members of civil society and the business sector, who are concerned that consumers will inevitably be economically affected, while the legal fraternity has called the move unconstitutional. In a country where two social media shutdowns were ordered in a space of three months during 2016, and where some social media users have been prosecuted or arrested over opinions expressed on Facebook and Twitter critical of public officials, these developments are particularly worrying. Already, the perceived high level of surveillance has forced many Ugandans including the media, into self-censorship, turning them away from discussing “sensitive” matters of community or national importance.
The increasing popularity of social media enabled OTT services, brings new regulatory challenges for governments, as many of these services have not required a licence or been required to pay any licensing fee according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). However, the regulation of OTT platforms and services may in some cases adversely affect user rights.
On the financial inclusion front, the proposed taxes are also likely to affect mobile money subscriptions and the cost of doing business. In Uganda and across Africa, mobile money has become the primary means of financial transactions, offering new opportunities for productivity and efficiency gains to governments, businesses and individuals.
Feature photo by GotCredit
Tanzania Issues Regressive Online Content Regulations
By Ashnah Kalemera |
Tanzania has issued online content regulations that oblige bloggers, owners of discussion forums, as well as radio and television streaming services to register with the communications regulator and to pay hefty licensing and annual fees.
There are three types of licences. A license for provision of online content services comes at an initial cost of TZShs 1.1 million (USD 484) comprised of an application fee of USD44 and an initial licencing fee of USD 440. In addition, there is an annual licence fee of USD440, and a similar amount has to paid for licence renewal after three years.
A licence to stream radio or television content on the internet costs TZShs 250,000 (USD110), with annual licence fees set at USD 88. This licence also has to be renewed after three years at a cost of USD 88.
The Electronic and Postal Communications (EPOCA) (Online Content) Regulations, 2018, which were issued on March 13, 2018, join a catalogue of legislation related to online content in Tanzania that threatens citizens’ constitutionally guaranteed rights to privacy and freedom of expression. The regulations are also likely to negatively impact on an already fragile intermediary liability landscape in a country fraught with increasing media repression and persecution of government critics.
When the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) initially published the draft regulations last September, they did not have the requirement to apply for online content service licences as set out in Regulation 14 of the enacted regulations. It states: “Any person who wishes to provide online content services shall fill in an application form as prescribed in the First Schedule and pay fees as set out in the Second Schedule to these Regulations.”
Applicants are required to provide their company details including physical address, shareholding, citizenship of shareholders/directors and tax registration. The communications regulator, TCRA, has the right to cancel licences over non-compliance.
The regulations that have been issued are more regressive than the draft which the regulator issued in September 2017 for public comment.
See CIPESA’s full analysis of the draft EPOCA Content Regulations, 2017 – available in English and Swahili.
Under obligations of internet cafes, the final regulations introduced two clauses that threaten user privacy. Under regulation 9, café owners are required “to ensure that all computers used for public internet access are assigned public static IP addresses”. This could inhibit the use of circumvention tools such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) that rely on dynamic IP address protocols, and which citizens resorted to using in neighbouring Uganda during state-initiated interruptions to communications.
Further, the regulations extend café owners’ obligations to install camera equipment to include registration of users “upon showing a recognised identity card”. Pursuant to regulation 9(2), recorded surveillance and the user register “shall be kept for a period of twelve months.”
Several regressive provisions from the draft version were also passed. Regulation 6(1) requires licenced service providers who provide online content or facilitate online content production to terminate or suspend subscriber accounts and remove content if found in contravention of the regulations, within 12 hours from the time of notification by TCRA or by an affected person. This requirement places a heavy technical and human resource burden on content hosts and providers to have in place competencies to handle complaints within 12 hours.
Swift content restriction or removal is also required of online content hosts under regulation 8(b) and content providers and users under regulation 5(1)(g). As we argued in an earlier brief, while content such as revenge pornography and that which promotes violent extremism may be justifiably removed promptly, there is a danger that the regulations may be applied unjustifiably to content such as that relating to exposure of corruption or human rights violations.
Whereas regulation 16 provides for a complaints handling procedure, the regulations do not provide for the process nor mechanisms for legal recourse over contested content.
Regulation 5(1)(e) requires content providers to “have in place mechanisms to identify source of content”. This obligation poses a threat to the right to anonymity and whistleblowing and may lead to self-censorship.
Moreover, Regulation 12 on content prohibited from publication lists restrictions with broad definitions and which have potential to limit freedom of expression. In terms of scope, it includes unspecified content that “causes annoyance”; “uses disparaging or abusive words which is calculated to offend an individual or a group of persons”; and is “crude”, “obscene” or “profane” including in local languages.
Regulation 12 also prohibits publication of “false content which is likely to mislead or deceive the public except where it is clearly pre-stated that the content is i) satire and parody ii) fiction; and iii) where it is preceded by a statement that the content is not factual.”
Nonetheless, the regulations have some positive elements, among them regulation 10(b) which requires users to use device passwords to ensure that unscrupulous and unauthorized persons do not access their social media accounts.
The requirement for provision of easily accessible user terms and conditions by licensed service providers, adoption of a code of conduct for content hosting, and publication of a safe internet use policy for internet cafes, are also commendable in promoting user awareness of platform policies. The regulations also provide important safeguards for child protection online, such as regulation 13 which prohibits children’s to access to prohibited content online.
In a boost to privacy and data protection, regulation 11 prohibits unauthorised disclosure of “any information received or obtained” under the provisions of the regulations, except where the information is required for law enforcement purposes. Furthermore, regulation 11 restricts use of information only to the “extent” that is “necessary for the proper performance of official duties.” Nonetheless, in the absence of data protection and privacy legislation in Tanzania, these safeguards could be rendered of little value and hence prone to abuse.
It remains to be seen how the new regulations will be enforced and how they will impact on citizens’ rights online. However, given Tanzania’s history of predatory action against internet users following the enactment of the Cybercrime Act, 2015, the new regulations are likely to be utilised to further undermine the internet freedom situation in the country.
Uganda Moves to Register Online Content Providers
By Daniel Mwesigwa |
Uganda has become the latest East African country to threaten access to information and free speech online by putting in place measures that require the registration of online content providers. In a notice issued earlier this month, the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) called for online publishers, news platforms, radio and television operators to “apply and obtain authorization” for provision of services.
Without specifying the requirements necessary for application, the UCC indicates that within a month of issuance of the notice, measures will be enforced against non-compliant service providers and this “may entail directing Internet Service Providers (ISP) to block access to such websites and/or streams.”
The UCC is mandated under Section 5 of the Uganda Communications Act 2013 (UCC Act) to monitor, inspect, license, supervise, control and regulate all communications services. This mandate extends to audio, visual or data content production or dissemination through traditional broadcast media as well as internet based platforms.
According to the notice, registration of the various operators which the UCC classifies as “online data communication and broadcast content providers”, is within the regulator’s mandate to set standards and enforce compliance relating to content.
Over the years, UCC’s regulatory role has come under criticism over its lack of independence. Its establishing Act gives powers to the minister in charge of ICT to appoint the commission’s executive director and board members and to approve its budgets. In April 2017, the parliament of Uganda passed the Uganda Communications (Amendment) Bill (2016) which further gave the minister the power to single handedly make regulations for the sector without parliamentary oversight.
More recently, UCC instructed telecommunications service providers to enforce two social media shutdowns during the presidential elections in 2016, and in September 2017 barred live broadcasts of parliamentary proceedings on the Presidential age limit amendment bill. National security and public safety have been cited as the grounds for the various directives.
There are an estimated 24 million mobile subscriptions and 18.1 million internet users in Uganda, reflecting an internet penetration rate of 48%. The country has licensed over 40 TV and 300 FM radio stations, many of which maintain online presences through live streaming on platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.
Meanwhile, licensed print operators maintain online portals whilst there is a growing number of independent online news publishers and bloggers. Growing media convergence has seen traditional media maintain a dominance online as was witnessed during the Uganda Presidential debate in 2016, where the television stations NTV and NBS TV influenced narrative according to a Twitter sentiment analysis.
However, without regulations in place to guide the proposed registration, it remains to be seen what obligations will be put forth for online content providers and the resultant impact that the registration will have on the country’s growing media landscape as well as the rights of users. Nonetheless, the move is a regressive development for digital rights in the country. It reflects a growing trend in neighbouring countries that are seeking to regulate online content through requirements for registration of users and service providers as well as accreditation to practice journalism.
In 2017, Tanzania published draft regulations on Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content). The proposed regulations confer powers upon the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) to regulate online content, including through registration of users and platforms, and taking action against non-compliance with the obligations, such as ordering the removal of “prohibited content.”
A more targeted avenue has been used in Burundi, through the Press Law of 2015 which calls for all media practitioners to be accredited, including those operational purely in the online domain. A similar stance exists in Rwanda where even social media posts are theoretically regulated by the country’s National Communication Council (CNC).
The move by Uganda, proposed measures in Tanzania and existing practices in Burundi and Rwanda restrict the number of content providers online and thus inhibit the diversity and wider availability of information online. Furthermore, there is the potential for such practices to engender censorship to legitimate content which might be critical of public officials and bodies.
Building Collaborations in Research for Internet Policy Advocacy in Africa
By Juliet Nanfuka |
Many African countries are caught between developing policies that support the unfettered use of the internet as a tool for social, economic and political growth, and laws that threaten citizens’ rights and use of digital technologies. Often, this is partly due to limited evidence upon which to base policies and decision-making, which results from the scant availability of relevant in-depth research.
As the need for internet policy advocacy that is informed by research grows, it is essential to increase the amount and depth of research originating from Africa. It is equally necessary to expand the methods used beyond the traditional to more contemporary ones such as network measurements, social network analysis and data mining. This has led to the need to train, connect, and build collaboration between researchers, policy makers and internet freedom advocates across the region and formed the basis of an intensive training on internet policy research methods.
The training workshop, which was held between February 27 and March 3, 2018, was organised by the Annenberg School for Communication’s Internet Policy Observatory and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), alongside several partners from across Africa. A total of 40 participants from 17 countries attended the training in Kampala, Uganda. They included journalists, lawyers, technologists, academics, telecom regulators, government officials, and digital rights advocates.
The six days’ intensive curriculum covering various topics including on policy research, legal analysis, survey methods, social network analysis, strategic communication, data visualization, and network measurement was led by experts in the field, including faculty from Makerere University, University of San Francisco, the University of Pennsylvania, as well as various think tanks and civil society organisations.
The workshop emphasised the need to embrace more collaborative push back efforts such as strategic litigation, the deployment of tools such as the Ooni probe that monitor internet speed and performance, accompanied by social network analysis, data visualisation and data scraping which can reflect patterns of online narrative. It was also stressed that these methodologies, coupled with traditional research approaches through physical interactions such as focus group discussions and key informant interviews would support more multidisciplinary collaborations and versatile communication strategy for internet policy advocacy in Africa.
Indeed, evidence-based advocacy is fundamental today perhaps more than ever, as the affronts to citizen’s rights online continuously evolve, including at a technological infrastructure level (internet throttling, internet shutdowns, surveillance and data breaches), as well as laws and regulations that increasingly criminalise internet use. More recently, financial affronts to online content production and dissemination have been witnessed in Tanzania and Uganda.
The workshop alumni join a cohort of others from the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America equipped with the skills needed to collaborate across disciplinary and professional silos for progressive internet policy and practice at national, regional and global levels.
Below are some tweets shared from the workshop:
Less than 10% of local news sites in Africa are hosted locally. Exceptions include South Africa, Swaziland & Djibouti says @EnricoCalandro & @JosiahChavula . What are the implications for local news when it is not locally hosted? #InternetPolicyAfrica @cipesaug @InternetPolicyO
— Christopher Ali (@Ali_Christopher) February 28, 2018
https://twitter.com/kudathove/status/969500199486984192
Ooni: to understand what is blocked, how it’s being blocked and who is blocking it- it’s not just the data, but the interpretation and use of the data: “we need lawyers… we need policy makers… we need activists” @OpenObservatory @agrabeli_ #InternetPolicyAfrica @cipesaug pic.twitter.com/Ip8fGhTNx7
— Laura Schwartz-Henderson 🙃 (@LauraSHendo) February 28, 2018
https://twitter.com/kudathove/status/969125256911781889
#InternetPolicyAfrica via NodeXL https://t.co/9fqeWOk0xe@cipesaug@natabaalo
@internetpolicyo@elig_safrica@bashmutumba@afrosms@d_kandeh@kudathove@simply_omhle@ngamitaTop hashtags:#internetpolicyafrica#internetfreedomafrica#internetfreedom#uganda
— NodeXL Project (@nodexl) March 1, 2018
Data is not useful unless used as part of an action: policy makers, lawyers, journalists can analyze @OpenObservatory data to interpret socio-political developments. #InternetPolicyAfrica
— Digital Society Africa (@digisocAfrica) February 28, 2018
An interesting point being driven by @Mose_Karanja during the @OpenObservatory session is that http/https could make a difference in what's being blocked or not and by who. #InternetPolicyAfrica pic.twitter.com/DQ8zwgLDw8
— Ese (she/her) (@EseoheOjo) February 28, 2018
Internet measurement: 85% of local news websites are located outside of their respective countries (mostly Europe and US). #Africa #LocalContent #InternetPolicyAfrica pic.twitter.com/jPbSFoCEyL
— Blaise Ndola (@BlaiseNdola) February 28, 2018
https://twitter.com/NHLAKANHLANHLA/status/968457060424781824
Even if your strategic litigation efforts do not result in a significant societal/institutional change it is also a victory to spark dialogue and draw attention to your cause #InternetPolicyAfrica
— ELIG S.Africa (@ELIG_SAfrica) February 27, 2018
https://twitter.com/kudathove/status/968095031763652610
Understanding likely sources of justification for internet disruption in Zambia with @Mose_Karanja @OpenObservatory. A plug for mixed methods work drawing on measurements and legal research! #InternetPolicyAfrica @cipesaug pic.twitter.com/m4OTzue3bl
— Laura Schwartz-Henderson 🙃 (@LauraSHendo) February 27, 2018