Covid-19 in Africa: When is Surveillance Necessary and Proportionate?

By CIPESA staff |

As the world grapples to contain the novel coronavirus disease (Covid-19), the role of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to enhance disease surveillance, coordinate response mechanisms, and promote public awareness has become more significant. This role of digital technologies is particularly crucial in sub-Saharan Africa where systemic vulnerabilities such as weak health systems and high levels of illiteracy could slow the response to the pandemic.

As of March 25, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 2,245 confirmed cases of Covid-19 in 44 countries and 58 deaths in 12 countries in Africa. For a continent of 1.2 billion people across 54 countries, these numbers are still relatively  low, but could potentially escalate. The head of the WHO has advised African governments “to prepare for the worst and prepare today.

In order to stem the spread of the coronavirus, several countries across the world have deployed the use of big data, mobile apps and other digital technologies. Austria, Iran, Israel, Italy, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Province of China, and the USA are among the countries using geo-location technology reliant on data from tech platforms and telecom companies in order to contain the spread of the Covid-19. 

In Austria, A1 Telekom has provided the government with real-time data on its subscribers to enable disease surveillance, while Deutsche Telekom is providing anonymised subscriber data to the Robert Koch Institute which is coordinating the German national response to Covid-19. Singapore’s contact tracing app is purportedly privacy conserving and data protection sensitive. Given the urgency of the pandemic and the dire social and economic costs, countries such as the USA and Israel are triggering emergency powers to institute state-level surveillance previously reserved for counter-terrorism operations. 

China’s approach has seen the country leverage its pervasive and sophisticated digital surveillance infrastructure for disease control. Citizens in provinces such as Hubei – the worst hit by the virus – are required to install mobile apps that track travel and medical history and effect ‘digital quarantines’ to control access to subways, malls, and other public spaces. Drones and robots have also been deployed in the affected areas. In Italy, the second hardest-hit country after China, Vodafone has indicated in a statement that it is “providing Italian officials with anonymised customer data to track and analyse population movements in the hard-hit Lombardy region, where people are in lockdown.”

According to Bloomberg, about a dozen countries are testing a disease surveillance tool developed by Israeli spyware firm NSO Group. The software purportedly collects up to two-weeks of mobile tracking data from an infected person and matches it with geo-location data from mobile operators, which identifies individuals who were in close proximity with the infected person. The NSO Group has over the years been at the centre of spyware schemes in authoritarian and repressive governments in Africa and elsewhere. 

The extent to which African countries are conducting technology-based disease surveillance is not fully known. However, according to an unconfirmed report, Kenya is monitoring the mobile phones of individuals who are under self-isolation, to arrest those who violate the restrictions imposed on their movements. Further, the Kenyan government has announced it will launch a contact tracing app for public transport to provide critical contact data that will help trace back the movements of confirmed or suspected cases. In South Africa, telecom companies have agreed to give the government location data to combat Covid-19. In Uganda, where health authorities struggled to locate several individuals who travelled on the same flights as persons who tested positive for the coronavirus, there has been a suggestion to use information from the immigration department and telecom companies to locate those individuals.

While well intentioned, Covid-19 surveillance and data-based tracking interventions have been effected in haste, and with limited precedent and oversight mechanisms. 

See:   Covid-19 in Africa: A Technology and Digital Rights Response

Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic has fuelled debate about the ethics and legality of disease surveillance, echoing arguments around the collection and use of refugee data without consent nor agency. Recently, the chair of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Andrea Jelinek, stated that data protection rules (such as the General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR) do not hinder measures taken in fighting the pandemic, but added that even in these exceptional times, data controllers must ensure the protection of personal data.

According to Jelinek, the GDPR provides the legal grounds to enable employers and competent public health authorities to process personal data in the context of epidemics, without the need to obtain the consent of the data subject. There are separate rules for processing electronic communication data, such as mobile location data. They require public authorities to first aim for processing of location data in an anonymous way, namely, processing data aggregated in a way that it cannot be reversed to personal data. When this is not possible, states may issue enabling legislation provided this is a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society.

In a recent statement, renowned freedom of expression defenders similarly expressed support for efforts to confront the pandemic. However, they cautioned that it is crucial that the use of surveillance technology to track the spread of the coronavirus be limited in terms of purpose and time, and that individual rights to privacy, non-discrimination, the protection of journalistic sources, and other freedoms, be rigorously protected. They added that the use of such technology ”abide by the strictest protections and only be available according to domestic law that is consistent with international human rights standards.”

In Africa, there is no GDPR equivalent. However, in 2014 the African Union (AU) adopted the Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection which has to-date been signed by only 14 countries and ratified by four countries. Regional blocs have also invested efforts in ensuring that data protection and privacy are prioritised by member states. In 2013, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted a model law on data protection. Also in 2010, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted the Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection Within ECOWAS. The East African Community, in 2008, developed a Framework for Cyberlaws

See: Challenges and Prospects of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Africa

Notwithstanding these efforts, many countries on the continent are still grappling with enacting specific legislation to regulate the collection, storage and processing of individuals’ data. At least 28 African countries had enacted a privacy and data protection law by the end of 2019. But even those with the laws have challenges of implementing them.

Which Way for Data Privacy and Digital Rights?

Undoubtedly, greater availability and processing of data can be instrumental in addressing societal challenges such as the current coronavirus pandemic. However, a study on the use of big data in containing Ebola found plenty of evidence of misuse and abuse of the data and technological tools. It is therefore crucial that a balance is struck between processing data and conducting surveillance for the public good on the one hand, and protecting individuals’ rights on the other. This is essential both in trying times such as these, and in the post-coronavirus era. 

Should governments – and relevant actors such as telecom companies – appropriately navigate the balance between disease surveillance and human rights, it will provide valuable learning on good data governance practices – those that help to solve societal problems and inform policy, while at the same time respecting individuals’ digital rights. The reverse could be true too: If governments abuse data and botch up the coronavirus surveillance effort, they will undermine citizens’ trust in data-based initiatives. This would particularly be true in the African countries where digital rights are under threat, data protection is misunderstood and citizens’ appetite for public participation is low. 

It is therefore important that African governments commit to transparently deal with the use of technology-enabled disease surveillance, with robust legal safeguards and privacy standards. Accordingly, specific data protection principles must be adhered to. For instance, data should be processed for lawful and specific purposes and there must be strict accountability. Similarly, the justifications of public good should not be misused whatsoever, especially in the post-coronavirus era.

Follow the CIPESA (@cipesaug) hashtag #InternetFreedomAfrica which has a Twitter thread on Covid-19 developments from around the continent. 

In Search Of Safe Space Online: Research Summary

By WomenAtWebUg |

Efforts to improve digital rights and digital literacy among more women in Africa should be supported by a thorough understanding of the online and offline social structures that influence the extent to which women can be active participants in the digital arena. This is key to realising Goal five of the Sustainable Development Goals which aims to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, who have historically been in a position of disadvantage for various reasons including cultural norms, lack of economic opportunity, and low literacy.

Across Africa, various discussions continue to reiterate how obstacles such as unequal access to finance, education and tech devices inhibit many women from participating in the digital society. However, beyond governments, additional efforts are required by other stakeholders including civil society, the tech community, academia, and the private sector to address these gaps. It is against this background that the Women At Web Alliance was initiated in October 2017 with an aim to improve digital literacy among African women, with a focus on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. With support from Deutsche Welle (DW) Akademie, in Uganda an alliance of five organisations is working to strengthen the skills of women through digital security workshops, raising awareness on digital rights, and building digital literacy skills. As part of this work, Chapter Four, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), the Defenders Protection Initiative (DPI), Not your Body and Unwanted Witness conducted research into the nature of challenges faced by Ugandan women who are active online, and manifestations of  cyber Violence Against Women (VAW). The results of the study are intended to be used to address these challenges, including through the improvement of digital literacy among more Ugandan women, policy development, and informing responsive safety mechanisms.

Women in Uganda face various challenges that undermine their use of the web and other Information and Communications Technology (ICT). These challenges mirror the impediments which women face in the offline world, be it in access to education and economic opportunities, participation in civic processes, or in claiming their freedom of expression and assembly. 

Despite a large gender disparity in digital access, more women face various forms of online violence than their male counterparts, which has continuously undermined their participation online. The absence of laws designed to specifically address the various forms of digital violence (such as revenge pornography, trolling, and threats) and the lack of sufficient in-country reporting mechanisms, exacerbate these challenges and often result in many women being forced to go offline or resorting to self-censorship. Additional consequences of cyber VAW mentioned included psychological, emotional and the physical abuse.

See the In Search Of Safe Space Online: Research summary.

Togo: #KeepItOn During The Elections

Joint Call |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has joined a call on the Government of Togo to keep digital communications accessible during its upcoming elections.

The country goes to the polls on February 22, 2020, marking the first presidential election since the amendment to the Constitution on term limits. The amendment capped the presidential mandate to two five-year terms. However, it would not apply retrospectively meaning that President Faure Gnassingbe, who succeeded his late father in 2005, can stand for the upcoming election, and again in 2025.  In 2017, internet access was disrupted during protests against the family’s 50-year rule of the country.

Access Now, the #KeepItOn campaign lead states that Togo should follow the footsteps of its neighbors GhanaNigeria, and Senegal who have shown that an open, secure, and accessible internet can foster civic participation during the electioneering processes and beyond, safeguard election results, and promote democracy.

See the full joint call here: English and French.

Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia and Sudan Revoke YouTube Access Throughout 2010s

By Thomas Robertson |

YouTube is an important part of African online space because it offers a platform for both traditional media and independent producers to livestream and broadcast multimedia content. Crucially, YouTube comments provide an important channel for social and political discourse in Africa given the high levels of censorship in traditional media. Indeed, in many African countries, YouTube is the second most popular website.

Under the guise of defending public order and morality, authoritarian governments in Africa have blocked access to YouTube within their borders, with ban lengths ranging from several days to more than one year.

In North Africa, four countries – Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya – are reported to have intermittently blocked YouTube access between 2007 and 2019. The most recent outage was in August 2019 in Algeria, where YouTube and other Google services were blocked in the wake of an online video purportedly encouraging the military to depose then de-facto leader Ahmed Gaid Salah . This followed a consistent pattern of internet disruptions in the country, both before and after the resignation of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Much earlier, Morocco had blocked access to YouTube for five days in 2007 after videos posted endorsed the independence of Western Sahara. Meanwhile, from 2007 to 2011, YouTube users in Tunisia faced intermittent blockages of the site, and when not completely blocked, certain protest videos remained inaccessible from within the country. In similarity, Libya also blocked YouTube from 2010 to 2011 after videos of anti-Gaddafi protests were posted.

In sub-Saharan Africa, YouTube was blocked in Sudan in the wake of its 2010 elections when videos revealed fraud committed by electoral staff, and again in 2012 after the posting of the film The Innocence of Muslims. Both of these events were preceded by widespread protests. In 2011, Eritrea blocked YouTube, and access to the website remains unreliable, but more so due to bandwidth concerns than censorship.

In April 2018, Chad instituted a 15-month ban on social media, including YouTube, that was only lifted in July 2019. This ban was a reaction to waves of protest against constitutional amendments that would allow President Idriss Déby to further extend his rule. Ethiopia intermittently blocked YouTube along with other social media platforms for several days in June 2019 after reports of an attempted coup against the Amhara Regional State Government.

More recently, a YouTube block was documented by the Open Observatory of Network Interference during December 2019 in Burundi without official explanation. With an estimated internet penetration rate of 7.4%, Burundi remains one of the least digitally connected countries in Africa. Nonetheless, President Pierre Nkurunziza’s government habitually restricts media and online expression. Earlier in 2019, the National Communication Council (NCC) banned Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and their correspondents, regardless of nationality, from broadcasting in the country. Leading up to the alleged restriction on YouTube in December 2019, the Burundian government suspended the comment section on the YouTube channel of Nawe, an independent media outlet, and prohibited new channel uploads. Nawe’s website and Twitter, however, remained active.

According to Google’s Transparency Report, more than 11 African governments have made content removal requests relating to YouTube since 2009. During 2012-2013, Google received inquiries and requests from 20 countries relating to YouTube videos that contained clips of the movie “Innocence of Muslims”. From Africa, three governments – Djibouti, Egypt and Libya – requested that the videos be removed. According to Google, “due to difficult circumstances” the videos were temporarily restricted from view. It is unclear what the length of the temporary restriction was.

Earlier in 2010, Libya made 147 requests to remove more than 1,000 YouTube videos. Google removed “portions” of the videos for violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines but did not remove the rest of the videos. Google does not indicate the exact number of video portions which were removed. Since then, Google has gone on to receive content removal requests from eight other African governments – Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

More than 22 governments have conducted internet shutdowns since 2016. They often cite the need to  prevent the use of the internet as a tool to spread false information, and to allegedly fan public disorder and undermine national security. Where complete shutdowns have not occured, more targeted blockages have been sought, particularly of media showing government corruption, civil disobedience, dissenting opinions or contentious statistics that contradict government figures shared on platforms like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp.

Although the various blockages of YouTube in Africa have since ended, the instances documented in this report indicate that blocking YouTube may well be a strategy of internet manipulation and civic suppression, with trends suggesting that such restrictions to online content may continue into the new decade across Africa.

Hanging in the Balance: Online and Offline Freedom of the Press in Guinea

By Simone Toussi |

Guinea’s media landscape boasts over 70 media outlets including streaming media, radio, television and print media. Yet still, the country does not score highly on international press freedom indices – it is ranked 107 out of 180 countries in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Nonetheless, the country’s growing internet penetration from 0.4% in 2010 to 33% in 2018 is favourable for the free flow of information through online spaces such as blogs and social networks.

Given the rapid growth of Internet users – from 42,000 users in 2010 to four million users in 2019  – the internet is fast becoming a  primary mode of accessing information for many people in the country. However, the government’s high-handed controls over traditional media are extending into the online sphere, evidenced by a series of arbitrary arrests and detentions, coupled with the persecution and judicial harassment of journalists and bloggers.

 A continuing persecution of journalists and the press outlets

In August 2019, the Guinean government placed two journalists, Lynx FM talk show host Souleymane Diallo and Lynx FM CEO and journalist Boubacar Alghassimou Diallo, under judicial control. The two were accused of “complicity in disseminating data likely to disturb public safety”. The allegations stem from an interactive radio show, during which an auditor accused a Guinean official of embezzling military bonuses related to a mission in Northern Mali. Under judicial control, the two journalists are prohibited from travelling outside of Guinea’s capital Conakry without authorisation from a judge. They are also not allowed to host the radio show in question until further notice, and are required to  appear in court three times per week. In the same month,, several press associations demonstrated against the state- led suffocation of the media.

Earlier in March 2019, Lansana Camara, a journalist with conackrylive.info, was summoned for “defamation by the press” after a complaint by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elements in the Guinean diaspora. Camara was placed in custody for a week on allegations of publishing an article undermining the Guinean government. The article (deleted following his arrest) reported an alleged diversion of two billion Guinean Francs (GNF), equivalent to USD 215,700, that had been budgeted for fuel for the Guinean Department of Foreign Affairs.

Martine Condé, the President of the High Authority of Communication (HAC) –  the national independent media observer and regulator constituted under  Law N° L/2010/002/CNT/ of June 22, 2010 – denounced Camara’s incarceration as a flagrant violation of the law on freedom of the press. A similar press freedom reprimand was issued by the Guinean Association of Online Press (AGUIPEL) back in June 2018 after the arrest and detention of Mamadou Saliou Diallo, founder of Nouveleteeguinee.com, on accusations of “defamation and slander” following a complaint by Cheick Sako, the Minister of Justice.

But the HAC does not always appear to act in the interests of media freedom. In 2017, the HAC took a decision to suspend a private radio station, Espace FM, for seven days, accusing it of disseminating “information likely to undermine the security of the nation, the morale of the armed forces and public order”. HAC’s decision was pursuant to articles 39 and 40 of Law N° L/2010/002/CNT/ of June 22, 2010 on freedom of the press which states: “The High Authority of Communication exercises a right of general control over public, private and community media […]. When the provisions of the law on communication are not respected, [it] can take the following measures: warning, notice of default, suspension, permanent withdrawal.” The same year, a dozen journalists were assaulted by law enforcement officers, with reports of destruction of equipment and torture.

Previously in 2016, the Guinean press was shaken by the assassination of El Hadj Mohamed Diallo, a journalist for the news website Guinee7.com, during a political rally of Guinea’s main opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG). To-date, the case remains unsolved, despite  investigations.

 An inadequate and flouted legislative framework

The Guinean Constitution guarantees  the right to freedom of expression, opinion, belief and thought, as well as freedom of the press as being inviolable, inalienable and imprescriptible. It also guarantees the right of access to public information. According to Article 7, everyone is free “to express, to manifest, to disseminate their ideas and opinions by speech, writing and image, […] to educate and inform themselves from sources that are accessible to all. Freedom of the press is guaranteed and protected. The creation of a press or media outlet for political, economic, social, cultural, sporting, recreational or scientific information is free. The right of access to public information is guaranteed to the citizen.”

However, there are a number of laws and policies that undermine the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.

The Organic Law N ° 002/22/06/2010 on the Freedom of the Press enacted in 2010, sets the conditions for press freedom and the creation of a free and independent media in Guinea. Article 1 explicitly guarantees the freedom of “the written press, the online press, publishing, printing, bookstore, audiovisual, photography, cinema and all other forms of communication”. Offenses by the press or by any other means of communication are outlined under Articles 98-122. The only penalties provided for under the law, upon conviction, are the payment of a fine (the maximum being 20 million GNF, equivalent to USD 2,200), and the suspension or withdrawal of a media outlets’ license, with possibility of appeal before the Supreme Court.

There are no provisions for possible imprisonment of journalists. For instance, the law states that, “defamation, by one of the means set out in Article 98, against the courts, the military and paramilitary bodies, the constituted bodies and the public administrations, is punishable by a fine between 1,000,000 GNF and 5,000,000 GNF (USD 108-540).”

However, the press law and Penal Code (1998) conflict with each other on some  press offences. Article 99 of the press law states that incitement to theft, murder, looting and offenses against the security of the state, with incitement followed by effect, is an offence and “perpetrators are punished as accomplices” in accordance with Articles 271 and 273 of the Penal Code.  Article 271 of the Penal Code provides for prison sentences of between 10-20 years while Article 273 provides for penalties of imprisonment of 16 days to six months, a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 GNF ( (USD 5.5 to USD 10.9) or both. Notably, neither the press law nor the Penal Code are cited during the prosecution of journalists and bloggers. Instead, authorities rely on the cyber security law.

Law No. 037 on cyber security and the protection of personal data was adopted in July 2016, “to define the rules and mechanisms to fight against cybercrime in Guinea and thus create a favourable, conducive and secure environment in cyber space”. However, it is criticised as a threat to democracy and the digital rights of Guinean citizens because it legitimises online censorship and appears to criminalise whistle-blowing. Indeed, it is this law, and not the press law, which is currently being used to persecute journalists. According to Mohamed Traoré, former president of the Guinean Bar Association, the cyber security law is “unenforceable” because it has not been registered and published in the Official Gazette.

Meanwhile, the Bill on Access to Public Information was approved at the Council of Ministers on July 26, 2019, but there has been no further action on it since then. The lack of an access to information framework negatively impacts journalism, and transparency and accountability in governance. Passing the bill into law would facilitate reliable sources of information for investigative reporting, as well as research, and enhance civic participation.

 Which way for a free press in Guinea?

Guinea’s press law reflects the political will to ensure a free, independent and pluralistic media in the country. Further, growing internet penetration has facilitated media diversity. However, persisting acts of repression and intimidation of journalists and bloggers are in total disregard of the Freedom of the Press Act which decriminalises press crimes, and online critics remain exposed to harsh penalties emanating from the cyber security law. In addition, the current inadequacy of the supporting legal framework, and stagnation of the bill on public access to information, limit media’s contribution to democratic governance. For a conducive freedom of expression environment to thrive in Guinea, it is imperative for the government to adopt an adequate legal framework and ensure its enforcement at all levels.