Senegal Fails to Prioritise Human Rights Online

By Ashnah Kalemera |
Senegal’s diverse media landscape helps it to attain relatively high scores in international press freedom rankings. It is ranked 50 out of 180 countries in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index, up from 79 in 2015. The country’s Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression thus: “Everyone shall have the right to freely express and disseminate his opinions by word, written word or image or peaceful march, provided that the exercise of these rights shall not undermine the honour of and respect due to other persons, nor threaten public order.”
However, freedom of expression online is restricted under various legislation including the Penal Code, 1965, Law No. 14/2017 on the Press Code and Law No. 2011-01 which governs the telecommunications sector. In 2018, the Senegalese government moved to tighten its grip on online communication after parliament passed a law regulating the internet, a move justified as necessary to stem the spread of misinformation. These laws have facilitated the arrest and prosecution of critical journalists and artists, including for content published online.
Meanwhile, although the country has had a privacy and data protection law for over a decade, the enforcement authority – the Commission of Personal Data (CDP) – has not been able to sufficiently fulfill its mandate due to resource limitations. Nonetheless, several private and public actors continue to collect personal data in Senegal without any regulatory enforcement by the CDP. This is the case for mandatory SIM card registration implemented by the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts (ARTP) through mobile telecom operators and linked to the national identity database.
Article 5 of the Press Code provides that journalists and the media have “free access” to information but there are exemptions such as where the information is a “defense secret” or relates to “secret investigations” or regulations applicable to access to some sites or structures. However, Senegal remains without an access to information law to facilitate citizens’ requests for information and proactive disclosures, and there are widespread calls for a law to be passed in order to promote transparency and accountability.
Meanwhile, low affordability and poor quality of service further hinder adoption of technology in an otherwise thriving sector. Mobile telephony, for example, now offers solutions for virtual financial services ranging from banking services to payment services. Further, leading money transfer application WARI, which was founded in Senegal and remains hugely popular, has been adopted in many countries in West Africa. In the agriculture sector, MLouma, which connects sellers and buyers of agricultural products, has grown from 1,000 to 75,000 users since developing a version which allows users without smartphones or the internet to access the service, as well as integrating a payment service.
As a United Nations (UN) member state, Senegal underwent her third cycle human rights assessment under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism during the 31st session of the Human Rights Council in November 2018. Digital rights did not feature explicitly in the 257 recommendations made regarding human rights protection at legal and institutional level. However, up to seven recommendations made by France, Chile, Sweden, Peru and Greece related to media rights and free speech. These recommendations echoed those in previous reviews  that remained largely unimplemented.
As part of Internet Freedom and UPR advocacy efforts at the Human Rights Council, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), Small Media, Jonction Senegal and the Senegal ICT Users Association (ASUTIC) made the following recommendations to UN members to consider putting forward to the Senegal delegation:

Key Issue/s Recommendations
Freedom of Expression
  • Amend Article 28 of the draft Electronic Communications Code to ensure judicial oversight over the regulator’s powers to impose any traffic management measures.
  • Reform press legislation, eliminating tough penalties for press offenses.
  • Uphold citizens’ rights to freedom of expression by discontinuing the practice of arrest and intimidation of critical journalists and artists.
Freedom of information and censorship of content
  • Provisions of the press code infringing freedom of information, notably Article 5, should be amended to provide clear definitions of information exempt from access by journalists. Meanwhile, Article 192 should be repealed.
  • Draft an access to information law in compliance with international human rights standards. The law should be drafted through participatory/consultative processes.
  • Reform the entire legal framework that restricts journalists’ freedom to inform or which promotes censorship, in particular articles 254 (Offense to the Head of State), 255 (False News),  and 258 (Defamation) of the Penal Code.
Equality and barriers to access
  • Take concrete and effective measures to lower barriers to access including extending rural infrastructure and promote a competitive industry to ensure easy and affordable internet access for underserved communities.
  • Enforce licensing obligations on telecommunications operators in order to improve the quality of service offered.
Right to data protection and privacy on the Internet
  • Take concrete measures for the effective implementation of Law No. 2008-12 of 25 January 2008 to ensure the protection of personal data.
  • Allocate sufficient resources (financial, logistical, and personnel) to the Personal Data Commission (CDP) to support fulfilment of its mandate
Freedom of creation and innovation
  • Prioritise funding and subsidies for digital literacy and innovation programmes

See the full advocacy brief here. French version is also available here.  
On March 14, 2019, Senegal accepted 229 out of the 257 recommendations it received in the  UPR assessment. A full list of the accepted and rejected recommendations is not yet available so it remains unclear whether recommendations accepted prioritise reforms to fully guarantee citizens’ rights – online and offline – to freedom of expression, access to information, and to privacy.
 

Ethiopia’s Digital Rights Record on the Spot at May 2019 Universal Peer Review

By Ashnah Kalemera |
Despite the promises and efforts made by Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, to transform the country after years of political repression and state control of major forms of media, the country is yet to experience substantive change in the state of digital rights.
Restrictions to freedom of expression, privacy, and access to information remain in force including through legislation such as the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information law, the 2009 Anti-Terrorism law, the Computer Crime law of 2016 and the Telecom Fraud Offences law (2012). While the establishment of the Advisory Law Reforms Committee, with a mandate to review existing laws to bring them in line with human rights standards, is a welcome development, pledges to reform problematic legislation are yet to be delivered.
Meanwhile, since November 2015, the Ethiopian government has consistently blocked and initiated national or regional shutdowns during public protest and exams, on grounds of national security. Whereas access to affected regions was restored during reforms in early 2018, there were reports of a shutdown in the eastern part of country in August 2018.   
At its upcoming Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by the Human Rights Council scheduled for May 14, 2019, Ethiopia should be tasked to implement reforms that fundamentally promote and protect citizens’ rights both online and offline.

What is the UPR? It’s a full assessment of a country’s human rights. Every United Nations (UN) member state has its human rights record assessed, and all UN member states are involved in the review process. It happens every four-and-a-half years, for every state.

Such reforms should include the amendment of the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information law, the 2009 Anti-Terrorism law, the Computer Crime law of 2016 and the 2012 Telecom Fraud Offences law to bring them in line with international human rights instruments on freedom of expression. Further, changes should be implemented to curb state surveillance of citizens, including by introducing independent judicial oversight over interception of communications.
In this UPR advocacy brief, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Small Media analyse the state of freedom of expression, freedom of information, the right to equal access and opportunity, as well as data protection and privacy developments in Ethiopia since the previous UPR review in April 2014. We make recommendations for consideration by UN member states at the upcoming review of Ethiopia.
See the full brief. 

CIPESA, Open Net Africa Among 80 Organisations Denouncing Extended Social Media Shutdown in Chad

By Juliet Nanfuka |
March 28, 2019 will mark a year without access to social media platforms for citizens in Chad. The current disruption, which has left internet users in Chad unable to utilise platforms such as Facebook, Whatsapp and Twitter, was initiated after an initial complete internet shutdown in January 2018, which lasted 48 hours.
The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and OpenNet Africa are among 80 organisations from across the world that are petitioning Lawrence Mute, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, and the United Nations Special Rapporteur Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, urging them to take action to help restore social media access in Chad.
The disruptions in Chad have been linked to the use of online platforms by citizens to mobilise, such as  during the January 2018 national trade protest which was followed by protests in March 2018 against constitutional amendments that could enable president Idriss Déby to rule until 2033. Déby has ruled the country for over 28 years.
Chad’s internet use figures are low, with an estimated 6.5% of the population utilising the internet. The country also has among the highest data prices in Africa, with a gigabyte (GB) of data costing an average of USD 13.60. According to a new CIPESA report titled Despots and Disruptions: Five Dimensions of Internet Shutdowns in Africa, Chad is among the authoritarian regimes on the continent which, “regardless of the numbers of their citizens that use the internet, recognise – and fear – the power of the internet in strengthening citizen organising and empowering ordinary people to speak truth to power.”


According to the petition, the disruption of communications in Chad is a flagrant violation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Resolution 362 (LIX) of 2016 which recognises the “importance of the internet in advancing human and people’s rights in Africa, particularly the right to freedom of information and expression.” Further, the use of network disruptions to deny citizens of Chad their freedom of expression rights contravenes Article 27 of the country’s national constitution.
The petition states that network disruptions have proven to limit the ability of journalists to report safely and for citizens to access information or communicate with their families, friends and colleagues online. It adds: “The social media blackout is also incongruent with the economic, social and personal wellbeing and aspirations of the citizenry. Businesses, schools and other institutions which rely on the internet for their operations are forced to resort to the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which comes at an extra cost.”
 


The true impact of the disruptions to social media platforms on the livelihoods of citizens remains largely unquantifiable. However, the Cost of Internet Shutdowns Tool (COST) estimates the economic impact of the disruption to Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp for 365 days to be USD 175 million – a significant amount given Chad’s broader socio-economic and political concerns. According to the World Bank, given the current economic and financial development crisis in the country, the absolute number of people living in poverty is projected to rise from 4.7 million to 6.3 million between 2012 and 2019. Meanwhile, Chad is ranked at 186 out of 188 countries on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), a measure of achievement in the basic dimensions of human development including life expectancy, education and gross national income.
The goal of the petition is thus to urge the two Special Rapporteurs to exercise their powers to publicly denounce the social media blackout in Chad and put pressure on President Idriss Déby to respond to calls from rights groups and restore access to all social media platforms throughout the country.
The campaign was led by the Africa Freedom of Expression Exchange (AFEX) who submitted the petitions to the Special Rapporteurs David Kaye and Lawrence Mute
 
 

Dictateurs et restrictions : cinq dimensions des coupures d’Internet en Afrique

Nouveau Rapport |
Au cours des quatre dernières années, pas moins 22 gouvernements africains ont ordonné des coupures du réseau Internet. Depuis le début de l’année 2019, six pays africains dont l’Algérie, la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), le Tchad, le Gabon, le Soudan et le Zimbabwe ont déjà connu des coupures d’Internet.
Un nouveau rapport produit par le CIPESA (The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa) intitulé «Dictateurs et restrictions : cinq dimensions des coupures d’Internet en Afrique» souligne cependant que ces coupures d’Internet sont exclusivement opérées par les Etats les plus despotiques d’Afrique.
Selon ce rapport, 77% des pays où les coupures d’Internet ont été opérées au cours des cinq dernières années sont classés comme autoritaires sur l’indice de démocratie produit par le service de renseignement économique de l’Economist (Economist Intelligence Unit). Hormis ceux-là, tous les autres pays africains qui ont procédé aux coupures de services de communications sont classés dans la catégorie des régimes hybrides, ce qui signifie qu’ils ont certains éléments de démocratie combinés à de fortes doses d’autoritarisme.
Les régimes autoritaires qui ont ordonné des coupures du réseau sont l’Algérie, le Burundi, la République Centrafricaine (RCA), le Cameroun, le Tchad, la RDC, le Congo (Brazzaville), l’Egypte, la Guinée équatoriale, le Gabon, l’Ethiopie, la Libye, la Mauritanie, le Niger, le Togo, le Soudan, et le Zimbabwe. Les régimes hybrides qui ont procédé à des coupures d’Internet comprennent la Gambie, le Mali, le Maroc, la Sierra Léone et l’Ouganda.
Quant aux pays classés comme autoritaires mais qui n’ont pas effectué de telles coupures, le rapport indique qu’il est probable que «l’Etat autoritaire soit si brutal et terrifiant  que la société civile ou tout mouvement d’opposition ou de protestation – en ligne et hors ligne- soit étouffé dans l’œuf » ou alors que «les mesures de surveillance d’Internet en place rendent toute coupure inutile». Ces pays comprennent Djibouti, l’Erythrée et le Rwanda.
Le rapport note également que les pays dont les dirigeants sont au pouvoir depuis plusieurs années sont plus enclins à ordonner des coupures d’Internet. En janvier 2019, 79% des 14 dirigeants africains qui avaient été au pouvoir depuis 13 ans ou plus avaient ordonné des coupures, principalement pendant les  périodes électorales et les protestations publiques contre des politiques gouvernementales.
Il s’agit notamment de Teodoro Obiang Nguema en Guinée équatoriale (39 ans); de Paul Biya au Cameroun (36); de Denis Sassou Nguesso au Congo Brazaville (34); de Yoweri Museveni en Ouganda (33); d’Omar El Bashir au Soudan (30); d’Idriss Déby au Tchad (29); d’Abdelaziz Bouteflika en Algérie (19); de Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz en Mauritanie (19); de Joseph Kabila en RDC (17); de Faure Gnassingbé au Togo (15); et de Pierre Nkurunziza au Burundi (13).

Selon ce rapport, l’année 2019 pourrait connaitre un nombre record de coupures du réseau, car au moins 20 Etats africains tiendront diverses formes d’élections, qu’elles soient locales, législatives, générales ou présidentielles.
Au fil des ans, de nombreuses perturbations du réseau se sont généralement produites dans les pays africains autocratiques autour de périodes électorales, et parmi les Etats qui ont prévu la tenue d’élections durant cette année, certains avaient déjà effectué diverses formes de coupures au cours de périodes électorales précédentes (comme la Guinée équatoriale), de manifestations publiques (Cameroun, Togo) ou à l’occasion d’examens scolaires nationaux (Algérie, Ethiopie).
Autres faits saillants du rapport «Dictateurs et restrictions : cinq dimensions des coupures d’Internet en Afrique» :
Le rapport note que les gouvernements qui ordonnent des coupures et les fournisseurs de services Internet (FSI) qui les mettent en œuvre, assument de plus en plus ouvertement ces actions. Les gouvernements se justifient en disant que les technologies numériques sont de plus en plus utilisées pour diffuser de fausses informations, propager des discours de haine et, prétendument, pour attiser le désordre public et compromettre la sécurité nationale.
De leur côté, de plus en plus de FSIs et d’opérateurs de plateformes de communication rendent publiques leurs réponses aux injonctions de coupure, aux requêtes reçues pour fournir des données personnelles des utilisateurs et aux demandes d’interception émanant des gouvernements grâce aux rapports de transparence. Une telle évolution pourrait conduire à une banalisation des coupures. Comme conséquence, un nombre croissant de gouvernements n’auraient plus honte d’assumer ouvertement les ordres de coupure. Des éléments positifs sont à noter cependant, dans la mesure où cela pourrait servir de base pour l’ouverture d’un procès ou faire avancer le plaidoyer.
Le rapport réaffirme que les coupures d’Internet, même de courte durée, affectent de nombreux pans de l’économie nationale et que leurs impacts persistent bien au-delà des périodes durant lesquelles l’accès a été perturbé. «Même si seuls cinq des pays qui ont déjà coupé l’accès à Internet et qui tiendront des élections refont ce genre d’action durant l’année en cours, notamment la limitation d’accès aux applications telles que Twitter, Facebook et WhatsApp au niveau national pendant cinq jours chacun, le rapport estime que les pertes économiques s’élèveraient à plus de 65,6 millions de dollars américains».
En outre, le rapport note que certains pays qui coupent l’accès à Internet ont des taux d’utilisation d’Internet les plus bas, et des coûts de paquets de données les plus élevés d’Afrique. La logique  pourrait suggérer que les pays à faible consommation d’Internet soient les moins enclins à couper l’accès à Internet, du fait que la population en ligne soit trop insignifiante pour menacer «l’ordre public» ou «la sécurité nationale», ou même constituer une entrave sérieuse contre le pouvoir en place. Paradoxalement, le rapport trouve que les gouvernements africains les moins démocratiques, indépendamment du nombre de leurs citoyens qui utilisent internet, craignent la capacité de cet outil à renforcer la participation citoyenne et le franc-parler des citoyens ordinaires face au pouvoir.
Ce rapport peut être téléchargé sur CIPESA.
 

Despots and Disruptions: Five Dimensions of Internet Shutdowns in Africa

Report |
Up to 22 African governments have ordered network disruptions in the last four years and since the start of 2019, six African countries – Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Chad, Gabon, Sudan and Zimbabwe – have experienced internet shutdowns.
A new report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) titled Despots and Disruptions: Five Dimensions of Internet Shutdowns in Africa notes, however, that internet shutdowns remain the preserve of Africa’s most despotic states.
According to the report, 77% of the countries where internet shutdowns have been ordered in the last five years are categorised as authoritarian under the Democracy Index produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit. All the other African countries that have disrupted communications are categorised as hybrid regimes, meaning they have some elements of democracy with strong doses of authoritarianism.
The authoritarian regimes that have ordered network disruptions include Algeria, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,  Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Hybrid regimes that have ordered internet shutdowns include the Gambia, Mali, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.
For countries that are classified as authoritarian but have not ordered shutdowns, the report states that it is likely that “the authoritarian state is so brutal or commanding that civil society or opposition organising and protests – online and offline – are unfathomable” or “internet control measures in place render ordering overt internet disruptions unnecessary.” These countries include Djibouti, Eritrea and Rwanda.
The report also notes that countries whose leaders have been in power for several years are more likely to order internet shutdowns. As of January 2019, of the 14 African leaders who had been in power for 13 years or more, 79% had ordered shutdowns, mostly during election periods and public protests against government policies.
These included Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema (39 years); Cameroon’s Paul Biya (36); Congo Brazaville’s Denis Sassou Nguesso (34); Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni (33); Sudan’s Omar El Bashir (30); Chad’s Edris Deby (29); Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika (19); Mauritania’s Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (19); DR Congo’s Joseph Kabila (17); Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé (15); and Burundi’s Pierrie Nkurunziza (13).

The report says 2019 could see a record number of network disruptions since at least 20 African states will hold various forms of elections including local, legislative, general or presidential.
Over the years, many network disruptions have typically occurred in autocratic African countries around election times, and among the states scheduled to conduct polls this year are those which have previously initiated various forms of shutdowns during elections periods (such as Equatorial Guinea), public protests (Cameroon, Togo), and national school exams (Algeria, Ethiopia).
Other highlights from the Despots and Disruptions: Five Dimensions of Internet Shutdowns in Africa report:
The report notes that governments that order disruptions and the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that implement them now more openly acknowledged the disruptions. Governments often cite digital technologies’ increasing usage to spread disinformation, propagate hate speech, and to allegedly fan public disorder and undermine national security.
For their part, more ISPs and platform operators are making public their responses to shutdown directives as and to user information and interception requests from governments through transparency reports. This openness could represent the normalisation of shutdowns, implying that a growing number of governments feel no shame in openly acknowledging ordering shutdowns. However, it has positive elements too, as it can be the basis of litigation and push back advocacy.
The report reiterates that internet disruptions, however short-lived, affect many facets of the national economy and tend to persist far beyond the days on which access is disrupted. “If just five of the countries that have previously disrupted internet access and who are going to the polls this year disrupted access to internet including apps such as Twitter, Facebook and Whatsapp at a nationwide level for five days each, the estimated economic cost would be more than USD 65.6 million,” the report states.
Further, the report notes that the countries that disrupt internet access have some of the lowest internet usage figures and highest data prices in Africa. Conventional wisdom might suggest that low-internet usage countries would be the last to disrupt internet access as they might consider the population online too small to threaten “public order” or “national security” or to threaten the regime’s hold on power. On the contrary, says the report, it appears that African governments with democracy deficits, regardless of the numbers of their citizens that use the internet, fear the power of the internet in enabling citizen organising and empowering ordinary people to speak truth to power.
The report can be downloaded here.