#WomenAtWebUg Media Masterclass and Reporting Grant Programme

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is pleased to announce the Women At Web Uganda (#WomenAtWebUg) Masterclass and Reporting Grant Programme. The two-phase programme builds on research conducted and engagements held as part of the Women At Web project of the DW.

The first phase of the programme will see successful applicants participate in a #WomenAtWebUg Masterclass – a workshop on digital rights and digital security. In the second phase, outstanding participants from the Masterclass will receive guided mentorship and a reporting grant aimed at improving the sometimes biased reporting on the violations of women’s online rights in Uganda.  Meanwhile, the mentorship will explore themes such as affordability, digital literacy, data privacy, digital economy, women and elections, women in the media, censorship, and self-censorship, the impact of COVID-19, and much more, through a gendered lens. It will relate these to current laws and the role that the media plays in addressing perceptions, supporting advocacy, and holding the state accountable to its obligations.

It is expected that the Women At Web Uganda Masterclass and Reporting Grant Programme will contribute to the increased visibility of the dynamics faced by Ugandan women online, and improved balance, quality and regularity of reporting.

Compensation: Successful grantees will be expected to create various outputs, which may include print articles such as features, broadcast content, multimedia content (animations and infographics) and social media content. A modest allowance will be provided to cater for expenses related to the production of the outputs as part of the programme.

Eligibility: Applicants should be early to mid-career print, broadcast, online or multi-media journalists. Individuals passionate about media platforms such as bloggers and social media enthusiasts with relevant skills are also welcome to apply. Applicants must be based in Uganda.

Application process

To apply, email [email protected] with a subject line stating #WomenAtWebUg Media Masterclass and Reporting Grant Programme. Submissions should include:

  • Your CV
  • A short statement of interest (maximum 500 words) that mentions the outputs you intend to produce if selected to proceed past the #WomenAtWebUg Masterclass accompanied with an indicative  budget
  • Two samples of your work (written or other)

Timeframes

  • Apply by: Monday October 26, 2020
  • #WomenAtWebUg Masterclass: November 3-4, 2020
  • #WomenAtWebUg Media Mentoring and Reporting Grant: November 10-30, 2020

How Lack of Access to Information and ICTs has fueled Disinformation in Malawi

By Jimmy Kainja |

The spread of false or misleading information online is due to various reasons. A recent BBC study on fake news in Africa found that sharing news online can be socially validating; because “being the first to share a story in your group of friends, showing others you are in the know and provoking discussion make social media users feel good. Sometimes people will rush to share information not knowing if it is true.” The study added: “… most people do not consume their online news in-depth or critically, and many users will share stories based on a headline or image without having digested it in detail themselves.”

In Malawi, the combination of lack of an enabling access to information law and limited access to the internet has left Malawians vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation.

On December 14, 2016, Malawi Parliament passed an Access to Information Bill, 12 years after its drafting. The then President, Peter Mutharika, assented to the bill into law on February 15, 2017. The purpose of the law is to promote transparency and accountability in the country by providing for “the right of access to information in the custody of the public bodies and relevant private bodies; the process and the procedures related to obtaining the information.”

The news of the presidential assent was perfectly timed – as it coincided with a BBC Africa debate on “fake news” at Ryalls Hotel, in Malawi’s Commercial City, Blantyre. In attendance was the Minister of Information and the State President’s Director of Communications. While the President was rightly applauded for assenting to the bill, the timing of the announcement on a live BBC programme appeared to be a government publicity  stunt. Consequently, some analysts warned of a long battle ahead to get the law operationalised.

The long struggle to have the access to information law passed and operationalised is an indication of the resolve of successive political administrations to limit the flow of information held by public institutions. This may be the reason why for a long time the Malawi government has also shown little interest in improving access to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) – which have been proven to broaden information flow and provide platforms for citizens to demand transparency and accountability of duty bearers.

As of 2019, Malawi’s internet penetration stood at only 13.9%, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Among the primary factors limiting access to the internet in Malawi is the cost, with the average price  beyond the means of citizens. Indeed, a recent study found that the internet in Malawi is among the most expensive in the world.

Print media is also scarce and expensive. With just two leading media groups – Nation Publication Limited (NPL) and The Times Group, Malawi has only two daily newspapers (with a circulation of 9,000 each), two Saturday newspapers and two Sunday newspapers with a combined circulation of 12,000 in a population of 17.5 million. Newspapers are all in English, a language spoken by the minority. The newspapers cost K600 ($0.79), for Sunday to Friday and Saturtuday papers, which has vernacular language cost K700 ($0.92) per copy, which translates to about K14,400 ($5.81) and K2,800 (3.69) monthly, against a national minimum monthly wage of K35,000 (USD 46.82).

Nonetheless, newspapers are very influential in information dissemination; where these newspapers lead, the rest of the local media are likely to follow. Moreso, the newspapers have presence on all major social media platforms where they repost much of the print editions’ content including the front and back-pages of the print editions. A journalist with NPL’s The Nation newspapers said this is done as one way of promoting the print editions.

Misinformation During the Annulled May 2019 Elections

In the period leading up to and immediately after the May 2019 elections, Malawi witnessed an increase in the spread of misinformation.

The results of that election, which saw the incumbent President, Peter Mutharika of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) declared winner with 38.6%,  followed by Malawi Congress Party’s (MCP) Lazarus Chakwera with 35.4% and Saulos Chilima of UTM in third position with 20.2% were annulled by the Constitutional Court after the losing candidates challenged the outcome citing several irregularities including ballot tampering.

During the court proceedings, civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC), joined by the opposition parties and ordinary Malawians took to the streets, demanding resignation of Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) Chairperson, Justice Jane Ansah, for her part in the electoral fraud. Inspite of government attempts to stop the demonstrations, courts upheld citizens’ rights to assembly and association, with  the military at hand to  ensure demonstrations were peaceful.

Alongside the peaceful demonstrations, print, broadcast and social media also provided platforms for mobilisation and engagement. However, the same platforms also proved to be fruitful ground for counterattack and smear campaigns by Peter Mutharika’s sympathisers against the CSOs and opposition parties. Most notable were altered front page headlines in the two leading daily newspapers and their weekend sister papers. The headlines were altered to change the news agenda and narrative on social media.

For instance, The Nation newspaper’s September 26, 2019 edition (below) had a frontpage story titled: “DPP, PROTESTERS CLASH FOIL MARCH”, with subheadings: “HRDC calls for anti-Ansah demo” and “Activist Mayaya, 4 others injured.” Mutharika supporters altered the headline and disseminated the page online reading instead: “ANGRY MALAWIANS BEAT BILLY MAYAYA”, with subheadings: “We are tired of your demos” and “HRDC violence destroyed lives.” Billy Mayaya is a leading member of HRDC, organisers of the demonstrations.

A similar example is of The Sunday Times  edition of October 13, 2019 (below), which featured a story of the then leader of HDRC, Timothy Mtambo surviving an attempt on his life by suspected state operatives. The headline “I SURVIVED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT BY [GOD’S] GRACE – MTAMBO” was altered and disseminated online as “I FAKED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FOR SYMPATHY – MTAMBO.”

It is clear in these cases that the misinformation was created to discredit the CSOs position on MEC and its chairperson, Jane Ansah. Considering the low newspaper circulation and the high reliance on bundled internet for social media access, it is very difficult for the unsuspecting public, without access to newspapers or the Internet outside of data plans, to identify the irregularities in the above newspaper illustrations.

What is to be done?

On June 23, 2020, Malawi held a Constitutional Court-ordered fresh presidential election which was won by Lazarus Chakwera. The new government has promised to undertake a series of public reforms, one of which is to operationalise the access to information law, which has been Gazetted and becomes operational on September 30, 2020. The President said operationalising the law is one way of “[ending] the era of government secrecy”. Likewise, the new Minister of Information, Gospel Kazako – a veteran broadcaster and experienced media manager, appears to be taking calls from CSOs for affordable access to the internet seriously. He has called on telecommunication companies and the sector regulator, Malawi Communication Regulatory Authority, to work on modalities to make the internet more affordable.

If actualised, this would go a long way in addressing the information gap in the country and sustaining democracy.

Meanwhile, NPL and The Times Group have made efforts to promote awareness about misinformation, as in the case of the illustrations below:

Combined efforts of operationalising the access to information law and improving internet affordability by the government, together with sensitisation campaigns by media houses would go a long way in rebuilding trust and legitimacy of both institutions. However, additional efforts in promoting availability of information in local languages would further support verification of information at citizen’s disposal towards enhancing the power of access to information.


Jimmy Kainja is a 2020 CIPESA Fellow focussing on the areas of hate speech and misinformation, data protection, and access to information

The Erosion of Digital Rights in the Fight Against Covid-19 in Kenya

By Victor Kapiyo |

Kenya confirmed its first coronavirus (Covid-19) case on March 12, 2020, and as of August 26, 2020, the country had recorded at least 559 deaths, 32,803 confirmed cases, and 19,055 recoveries, with 429,513 persons tested.

Even before the first case was confirmed in Kenya in February 2020, the government had moved to establish the National Emergency Response Committee on Covid-19 to coordinate its preparedness, prevention and response to Covid-19.

The government subsequently introduced several measures to curb the spread of Covid-19 including suspension of public gatherings and other social distancing requirements; limitation on travel outside the country; imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew under the Public Order Act, 2003; travel bans in and out of the capital, Nairobi, and three other high-risk counties of Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale.

The Ministry of Health has been providing regular updates on the pandemic both online and offline through its various platforms. It has provided routine updates including situation reports; Covid-19 protocols and guidelines; various public awareness messages; and daily press updates on the status of the pandemic. The government also required all broadcasters to air the health ministry’s Public Service Announcements (PSA) at no cost. As at May 10, more than 43,000 Public Service Announcements had been aired.

However, concerns remained over the negative impact of these measures on peoples’ enjoyment of their fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, access to information, privacy and data protection, and freedom of assembly. Meanwhile, a rise in misinformation with respect to covid-19, has been met with responses from the government that have threatened human rights.

While there have not been reports of government efforts to block or filter content or to shut down websites to fight the spread of Covid-19 misinformation, it has used other means, including legal threats and arrests. In a public statement, the Cabinet Secretary for Health, Mutahi Kagwe, issued a warning, stating that “these rumours must stop … but because I know empty appeals will not work, we will proceed and arrest a number of them to prove our point.” Consequently, the government has abused the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act, 2018 to intimidate, arrest, and detain persons, including whistleblowers and critics, in order to censor what it has deemed false information in relation to covid-19.

Following these threats, the government has since arrested four individuals, with two bloggers charged under section 23 of the Act for publishing false information, which carries a penalty of five million shillings or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or both. In March 2020, 23-year old Elijah Kitonyo, a student, was arrested after publishing claims on Twitter that the government was deceiving people regarding the Covid-19 situation in the country. According to the authorities, this contravened the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act.

In the same month, blogger Robert Alai was arrested and charged under section 22(1) of the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act for publishing alarming and false information in a Twitter post that two people had died of Covid-19 in Mombasa. The arrest came a day after the statement by the Cabinet Secretary for Health warning against misinformation about the virus.

Another blogger, Cyprian Nyakundi, was detained the same week for claiming on Twitter that a senior Kenya Revenue Authority official had travelled out of the country and failed to self-quarantine after returning home. These arrests were unnecessary and disproportionate as there was no evidence of an intention to cause harm, or of harm being caused.

The government has also been accused of clamping down on freedom of association and assembly by restricting movement and mass gatherings during the pandemic period. In April 2020, the Law Society of Kenya challenged the curfew issued under the Legal Notice No. 36 – The Public Order (State Curfew) Order, 2020 under the Public Order Act, Cap. 56 as being unconstitutional. It also complained over the unconstitutionality of the use of unreasonable force by the police in enforcing the curfew.

In its ruling, the High Court found that the use of unreasonable force in enforcing the Order was unconstitutional. Undeterred, in July 2020, police stopped a public demonstration to commemorate the 30-year anniversary of the Saba Saba movement, whose origins date back to 1990 with calls for free elections and multiparty democracy. At least 50 people were arrested as police lobbed teargas at protesters, claiming the protest was illegal since the organisers lacked a permit, yet public gatherings were outlawed during the Covid-19 period.

Another critical aspect is the mass surveillance measures that have been quickly adopted to curb the spread of the virus. Massive data collection continues with collection of telephone numbers, personal information, residential addresses, details of people contacted, body temperatures, as well as location tracking. It is worth noting that all licensed telecom service providers are required to register all SIM cards issued with corresponding subscribers’ details. Also problematic is the development and use of various unproven technologies and mobile applications to support contact tracing. These increase the potential for abuse and present a risk for repurposing the technologies for mass surveillance after the pandemic.

Whereas Kenya has enshrined the right to privacy under Article 31 of the Constitution, and adopted a Data Protection Act in November 2019, the Data Commissioner is yet to be appointed. The contact tracing measures are questionable and potentially violate privacy rights. They lack clear or any legal oversight, and there are no documented safeguards in case of any breaches. Further, there is widespread ignorance regarding the application of the law to the government’s contact tracing programmes. Moreso, it is not manifestly clear how personal data from contact tracing will be collected, stored, and shared.

Civil society organisations have also raised concern regarding the independence of the Judiciary. This follows delayed funding for the Judiciary and recent Covid-19 budget cuts reducing the judiciary’s budget from KES 18.05 billion (USD 171 million) the previous financial year by KES 1.35 billion (USD 12.5 million), leading to suspension of key development programmes; suspension of judicial services during the Covid-19 period from March 2020, with limited court activity since; and the refusal of the President to appoint 41 Judges nominated by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in July 2019, despite court orders. Courts remain a critical point of call for those who seek constitutional remedies. Viewed collectively, these developments threaten access to justice and may affect the capacity of the Judiciary to effectively respond to and efficiently deliver justice to those whose rights may be violated during this period.

Meanwhile, the pandemic has led many to work from home, creating increased demand for internet services, and highlighting the ever-rising digital divide. Not all Kenyans have access to fast, and affordable internet, yet access to the internet and digital public services is increasingly being seen as essential for a dignified living.

According to the Communications Authority, internet subscriptions as of March 2020 stood at 39.3 million, while mobile SIM card penetration stood at 116%. While some companies such as Safaricom doubled the bandwidth allocation to their home fibre subscribers, the cost of accessing the internet remains a barrier for most of the population. Working and studying online also means that the public is at a higher risk of cyber incidents. Internet users can be exposed to hacking on online meeting tools, online banking fraud, surveillance, phishing and other email scams. According to the Communications Authority, the Kenya National Computer Incident Response Team detected 34.6 million cyber threats, comprising malware, distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks, web application attacks and system vulnerabilities between January and March 2020, a rise from the 11.2 million attacks reported during a similar period in 2019.

Nonetheless, a number of positive measures have been adopted. In March 2020, the Central Bank of Kenya announced emergency measures to promote the use of mobile money for a three month period. These included the elimination of charges for transactions below KES 1,000 (USD 9.2); increase of daily transaction limits to KES 300,000 (USD 2,763); elimination of charges for transfers between mobile money wallets and bank accounts.

In conclusion, digital technologies have proven to be a key part of the solution to the current Covid-19 crisis. However, the rapid adoption of technologies could lead to decisions without consideration of the complex and long-term human rights impact, especially with regards to transparency and accountability.

According to the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, the post-Covid-19 world is expected to be more digital than before. Therefore, it will be essential for all stakeholders to ensure the respect for privacy, freedom of speech, transparency, participation, accessibility and accountability, including in the digital domain. There will also be a need for continued efforts to build trust and ensure fairness in the use of digital technologies, and bridge the digital divide across the country, to ensure marginalised and excluded groups are included to benefit from digitalisation.

Le Niger Adopte une Nouvelle Loi sur l’Interception des Communications Électroniques

Par Simone Toussi et Thomas Robertson |
Face aux problèmes de la sécurité nationale liée au terrorisme, au conflit ethnique, et au crime organisée, le Niger a promulgué une nouvelle loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques, avec  des ramifications qui menacent la liberté d’expression  et le droit à la vie privée en ligne.
En avril 2020, le Conseil des Ministres nigérien a déposé un projet de loi visant à sécuriser une base légitime pour «les interceptions des communications émises par voie électronique en vue de la recherche des renseignements intéressant la sécurité nationale» (Exposé de Motifs). Le 29 mai, l’Assemblé nationale a adopté à l’unanimité le projet de loi, alors que l’opposition politique a boycotté le vote, arguant que cette loi autorise la surveillance généralisée de communication «sous de fallacieux prétextes, autres que ceux relatifs à la sécurité et la lutte antiterroriste.» Malgré le boycott, le projet de loi est devenu loi en vertu de l’article 58 de la constitution nigérienne, qui spécifie que si un projet de loi reçoit le vote de la majorité absolue à l’Assemblé nationale, il est promulgué immédiatement sauf dans le cas d’un veto présidentiel, ce qui n’a pas eu lieu. 
Contexte de sécurité régionale
Le Niger fait partie de la région sahélienne d’Afrique de l’ouest, où les programmes de lutte contre le terrorisme malavisés ont disproportionnellement conduit  à la stigmatisation sociale et la violence contre les communautés marginalisées peules. Depuis le début de 2020, plus de 150 personnes, principalement les hommes peuls, ont disparus ou ont été victimes des exécutions extrajudiciaires par les forces de sécurité nigériennes. Le Burkina Faso voisin a été dénoncé aussi pour la cruauté avec laquelle les milices de l’État ont travaillé aux régions peuls, dont l’exécution extrajudiciaire de 12 hommes et l’enquête subséquente que les acteurs de la société civile ont largement critiqué. Bien que le Burkina Faso ne soit pas engagé à l’interception de communication, une loi de 2019 punit les organes de presse qui critiquent les forces de défense burkinabés. Pendant ce temps, le Mali qui partage également une frontière avec Niger, a adopté une loi sur la cybercriminalité en 2019 qui prévoit la surveillance en temps réel par l’interception des communications. Cette loi nouvelle, qui donne l’accès gouvernemental aux données de communication numérique, peut encore aggraver la violence injustifiée actuelle de l’État   contre les communautés ethniques à travers le Sahel.
L’autoritarisme numérique
La nouvelle loi entre en vigueur dans le contexte d’un cadre réglementaire qui déjà empiète sur la liberté d’expression des citoyens nigériens. La loi du pays sur la cybercriminalité adoptée en juin 2019 criminalise «le fait pour une personne de produire, de mettre à la disposition d’autrui ou de diffuser des données de nature à troubler l’ordre public ou à porter atteinte à la dignité humaine par le biais d’un système d’information» (Article 31). Cet article était la base d’une répression sur la liberté d’expression en ligne, dont l’arrestation d’une dizaine d’activistes entre mars et avril 2020 après que  l’Etat ait intercepté leurs communications critiquant le gouvernement sur WhatsApp et Facebook. En 2016, un militant a été condamné de «complot visant à renverser le pouvoir» après avoir utilisé Facebook pour critiquer l’action antiterroriste du président nigérien Mahamadou Issoufou.
La loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques tente «de concilier l’exercice de cette liberté [d’accéder à l’information] avec les impératifs de sécurité nationale dans un contexte de lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée » (Exposé de Motifs). Elle viole cependant les principes démocratiques en accordant des pouvoirs considérables à l’exécutif du gouvernement. En vertu de l’article 2, seuls le Président, le Premier Ministre, le Ministre de la Défense, le Ministre de l’Intérieur, le Ministre de la Justice, et le Ministre des Douanes sont autorisés de commander une interception de communication. Par ailleurs, selon l’article 6, la commission crée pour superviser l’exécution de la loi – la Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Interceptions de Sécurité (CNCIS) – est composée de sept représentants du gouvernement, à tous ceux qui ont désigné par les membres du cabinet présidentiel. 
Selon l’Union international des télécommunications, le taux de pénétration d’internet du Niger était 5,25% en 2018.  Ce taux compte parmi les plus faibles au monde, et en Afrique où l’accès à l’Internet n’est plus faible qu’au Burundi, en République Centrafricaine, en Erythrée, en Guinée-Bissau et en Somalie.
Sur le plan de la liberté de la presse, le Niger est dans une situation grave avec la répression actuelle sur la dissidence. En effet, malgré les dispositions législatives en faveur de la liberté des médias sous la loi portant liberté de la presse (Ordonnance 2010-35), le Niger a des antécédents défavorables quant au traitement des médias indépendants comme souligné ci-dessus concernant l’exécution de l’article 31 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité. L’arrestation des journalistes sur des accusations motivées par des considérations politiques est banal, et le COVID-19 a aussi contribué à l’application de la loi contre les journalistes. Par exemple, en mars 2020, Mamane Kaka Touda a été arrêté et détenu pour trois semaines à cause de ses publications sur les réseaux sociaux au sujet d’un cas suspect de COVID-19 dans un hôpital nigérien.
En outre, le rang du Niger sur l’indice de développement humain 2018 a été 189ème sur les 189 pays examinés. Ces indicateurs amènent à se demander pourquoi le gouvernement nigérien se concentre sur la surveillance numérique alors que l’accès à l’Internet est déjà disparate, et que des problèmes de développement socioéconomique plus immédiats menacent le peuple nigérien. 
Avec les élections présidentielles imminentes fixée pour décembre 2020, en réalité, l’adoption des lois restrictives liées à l’usage  de la technologie par le citoyen suit une logique particulière aux gouvernements autoritaires africains selon un rapport de 2019 sur les dimensions techno-politiques des interruptions d’Internet en Afrique.
La vie privée menacée
La loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques dans son ensemble viole l’article 29 de la constitution nigérienne, qui assure le secret des correspondances et des communications. L’article 2 circonscrit les contours de l’interception: «atteinte à la sûreté de l’Etat et à l’unité nationale, atteinte à la défense nationale et à l’intégrité territoriale, prévention et lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale organisée, et prévention de toute forme d’ingérence étrangère et intelligence avec l’ennemi.» Comme les caractéristiques spécifiques et la nature des communications entrant dans ces  grandes catégories ne sont pas définies, cet article peut exposer les citoyens nigériens à la surveillance permanente. De plus, les articles 24, 32, et 33 exigent aux agents publics, aux operateurs de reseaux et aux fournisseurs de services de coopérer avec les opérations d’interception, dont la défaillance entraînerait l’emprisonnement pour une durée d’un à cinq ans et une amende de deux à dix million francs CFA (USD 3 445 à 17 222).
Bien que la loi prévoit en apparence une surveillance indépendante, l’opération d’interception est susceptible de porter atteinte à la vie privée. L’article 11 spécifie que les enregistrements liés à l’interception sont détruits sur l’ordre du président et expirent un mois après que l’ordre d’intercepter les communications soit donné, et les rapports d’enquête sur l’exploitation de l’interception rédigés. L’article 12 peut cependant permettre la sauvegarde prolongée des enregistrements de l’interception pour une durée indéterminée, spécifiant que «les transcriptions d’interceptions doivent être détruites dès que leur conservation n’est plus indispensable à la réalisation des fins mentionnés à l’article 2 [atteinte à la sûreté d’Etat, etc.]» et «il est dressé procès-verbal de l’opération de destruction.»
Avec cette nouvelle loi et la loi sur la cybercriminalité, le Niger rejoint la horde des pays africains dont le Cameroun, le Tchad, le Nigéria et la Tanzanie qui utilise la sécurité nationale comme prétexte pour introduire les législations qui limitent la liberté d’expression et d’opinion, le droit à la vie privée et bien d’autres libertés civiles. L’ancienne maltraitance des voix critiques par l’Etat justifie les réserves sur son objectif apparent de combattre l’activité criminelle et le terrorisme. Si la loi est maintenue, l’on peut s’attendre à plus de violations et d’arrestations contre les voix dissidentes, du moment où le Niger se prépare pour les élections présidentielles en décembre prochain.

Tanzania Entrenches Digital Rights Repression Amidst Covid-19 Denialism and a Looming Election

By Edrine Wanyama |

On July 17, 2020, the Tanzania government issued new Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 that apply to online content production, hosting and dissemination. The regulations entrench the licencing and taxation of bloggers, online discussion forums, radio and television webcasters, and repress online speech, privacy and access to information.

The passage of the new regulations raises concerns over free speech and access to information as they come into force barely three months before Tanzania holds presidential elections on October 28, 2020, a period when civic engagement and transparency and accountability in governance requires access to a range of information and viewpoints. The regulations also come amidst Covid-19 denialism by President Pombe Magufuli’s government, which has denied citizens access to vital information and undermined efforts to contain the spread of the virus in the east African country.

Tanzania has been widely criticised for its lacklustre response to the Covid-19 pandemic, yet the regulations aim to further stifle access to health information by prohibiting the publication of “content with information with regards to the outbreak of a deadly or contagious disease in the country or elsewhere without the approval of the respective authorities.”

Earlier this year, the communications regulator, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), banned the independent Mwananchi newspaper from publishing online for six months, after accusing it of carrying a false and misleading news report on Covid-19. At the time, TCRA said the publisher had flouted the much-criticised Electronic and Postal Communications (EPOCA) (Online Content) Regulations, 2018, which have been replaced by the new regulations. On July 9, 2020, the TCRA suspended the independent Kwanza Online TV for 11 months, over a report on its Instagram account that cited a health alert issued by the United States embassy in Tanzania, on the Covid-19 situation in the country.

In July 2020, United Nations experts noted that Covid-19 had compounded pre-existing human rights concerns in Tanzania, notably regarding the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information. They added that Tanzania’s government was not meeting its commitments on information sharing and transparency after it stopped releasing statistics on Covid-19 cases at the end of April, and President Magufuli declared the country virus-free in early June.

The new regulations require online content service providers, internet service providers, and application services licensees to pay exorbitant fees for licensing and renewal of licences. Providers of “online content service”, described as “content broadcasting to the public through internet websites, application software, forums, blogs, weblogs, microblogs, public account, instant messaging tools, online live streaming, aggregators and other related platforms”, pay an application fee of Tanzania Shillings (TZS) 100,000 (USD 44); initial licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; annual licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; and a licence renewal fee of USD 440 or USD 220. The higher fees are to be paid by providers of “news and current affairs”; the lower ones by providers of entertainment, educational or religious content.

Radio and television operators that stream content online will pay USD 22 in application fees, USD 88 for the initial license, another USD 88 in annual licence fees, and USD 88 in licence renewal fees. The duration of all licences is three years.

Similar measures have previously been adopted to gag online content providers including broadcasters and bloggers during elections as was in the Broadcasting Services (Content) (The Political Party Elections Broadcasts) Code 2015.

The new regulations introduce a problematic definition of “news related content”, namely online news information gathering, compiling, editing, publication and broadcasting in a manner similar or that bears a resemblance to traditional media services provision. This essentially covers all information provided online. Similarly, the definition of an “online forum” has been expanded compared to that in the 2018 regulations, to cover every possible online fora and “online platforms”. These definitions are so vague that their application is potentially boundless in scope. With the past experiences of crackdown on media houses and journalists in Tanzania, these definitions appear to be calculated to target individuals and organisations such as Jamii Forums that champion free expression.

The new regulations raise the requirements for applicants, as well as the obligations of licensees, which could have a chilling effect on digital rights. Under regulation 6(2), applicants must provide certified copies of the certificate of registration, tax identification number, tax clearance certificate (for companies or non-government organisations) and national identity card. Furthermore, the applicant must provide a list of owners and the management team, editorial guidelines (if applying to provide “news and current affairs”) and technical description of facilities to be used. Moreover, under regulation 6(i), the TCRA may require additional documents.

The regulations expand the obligations of online content service providers and, under regulation 9(g),   require licensees to remove prohibited content immediately upon being ordered by TCRA. This does not provide room for verification or the right to be heard before removal is effected. Further regulation 9(h) and regulation 14 hold the licensee accountable for all information published. This imposes a heavy burden on licensees, including bloggers with no journalistic skills or resources to verify all information before publication, which curtails freedom of expression and denies citizens access to a variety of information. Moreover, for some unexplained reason, regulation 10 bars radio and television stations that hold district or regional license from live streaming content.

Some provisions potentially violate the right to privacy and undermine free expression. The requirement to install cameras in internet cafes and to store images recorded for 12 months has been retained under regulation 13. Further, the requirement to assign static public Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to computers in cafes would discourage usage of circumvention tools, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN), which enable users to bypass network restrictions and to enhance their anonymity.

Furthermore, regulation 6 in as far it requires attachment of a tax identification number certificate, national identity card of the applicant and curriculum vitae, as well as academic qualifications of staff in regulation 12 (b), exposes private data. In the absence of a law on data protection and privacy in Tanzania, there is no guarantee that individuals’ data will be safeguarded against unauthorised access and disclosure.

The new regulations expand the list of prohibited content to a wide and ambiguous scope that  fails to meet the internationally acceptable limitations to freedom of expression. For instance, while para.2 of the Third Schedule protects personal privacy and human dignity, it renders a publisher liable for slander and defamation even where the published information is true. This ignores the widely acceptable defence of truth to defamation. Moreover, it is increasingly recommended globally that defamation should be decriminalised.

Furthermore, para.3 prohibits publication of information on public security, violence and national security, including undefined “news, statements or rumors for the purpose of ridicule, abuse or harming the reputation, prestige or status of Tanzania or its national anthem, symbols and logos.” This prohibition is contrary to freedom of expression guarantees provided for under article 8 of the Constitution of Tanzania. The prohibition of publication of information on demonstrations and marches potentially inhibits freedom of assembly and association, which are also guaranteed by article 20 Tanzania’s Constitution.

Failure by the regulations to clearly define prohibited information, such as that considered a threat to national security or public order in paras. 3(d) and (h), to the national currency or the national economy in para.3(f), or information relating to terrorist attacks, droughts, weather forecasts or occurrence of natural calamities para.8(b), could be used by advantaged authorities to wantonly punish critics of government and its leaders.

Regulation 21 introduces a general penalty for breaching the regulations where no specific punishment has been prescribed: a fine of not less than USD 2,200 or imprisonment for a term of not less than 12 months, or both.

In their current state the regulations will further narrow the already shrinking space for digital rights and freedoms in Tanzania, as they will muzzle freedom of expression, access to information, and individual privacy. Such freedoms are particularly important in times of elections and a pandemic. The government should therefore consider repealing or amending the EPOCA (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 so that they progressively promote the enjoyment of digital rights and freedoms.