Hanging in the Balance: Online and Offline Freedom of the Press in Guinea

By Simone Toussi |

Guinea’s media landscape boasts over 70 media outlets including streaming media, radio, television and print media. Yet still, the country does not score highly on international press freedom indices – it is ranked 107 out of 180 countries in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Nonetheless, the country’s growing internet penetration from 0.4% in 2010 to 33% in 2018 is favourable for the free flow of information through online spaces such as blogs and social networks.

Given the rapid growth of Internet users – from 42,000 users in 2010 to four million users in 2019  – the internet is fast becoming a  primary mode of accessing information for many people in the country. However, the government’s high-handed controls over traditional media are extending into the online sphere, evidenced by a series of arbitrary arrests and detentions, coupled with the persecution and judicial harassment of journalists and bloggers.

 A continuing persecution of journalists and the press outlets

In August 2019, the Guinean government placed two journalists, Lynx FM talk show host Souleymane Diallo and Lynx FM CEO and journalist Boubacar Alghassimou Diallo, under judicial control. The two were accused of “complicity in disseminating data likely to disturb public safety”. The allegations stem from an interactive radio show, during which an auditor accused a Guinean official of embezzling military bonuses related to a mission in Northern Mali. Under judicial control, the two journalists are prohibited from travelling outside of Guinea’s capital Conakry without authorisation from a judge. They are also not allowed to host the radio show in question until further notice, and are required to  appear in court three times per week. In the same month,, several press associations demonstrated against the state- led suffocation of the media.

Earlier in March 2019, Lansana Camara, a journalist with conackrylive.info, was summoned for “defamation by the press” after a complaint by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elements in the Guinean diaspora. Camara was placed in custody for a week on allegations of publishing an article undermining the Guinean government. The article (deleted following his arrest) reported an alleged diversion of two billion Guinean Francs (GNF), equivalent to USD 215,700, that had been budgeted for fuel for the Guinean Department of Foreign Affairs.

Martine Condé, the President of the High Authority of Communication (HAC) –  the national independent media observer and regulator constituted under  Law N° L/2010/002/CNT/ of June 22, 2010 – denounced Camara’s incarceration as a flagrant violation of the law on freedom of the press. A similar press freedom reprimand was issued by the Guinean Association of Online Press (AGUIPEL) back in June 2018 after the arrest and detention of Mamadou Saliou Diallo, founder of Nouveleteeguinee.com, on accusations of “defamation and slander” following a complaint by Cheick Sako, the Minister of Justice.

But the HAC does not always appear to act in the interests of media freedom. In 2017, the HAC took a decision to suspend a private radio station, Espace FM, for seven days, accusing it of disseminating “information likely to undermine the security of the nation, the morale of the armed forces and public order”. HAC’s decision was pursuant to articles 39 and 40 of Law N° L/2010/002/CNT/ of June 22, 2010 on freedom of the press which states: “The High Authority of Communication exercises a right of general control over public, private and community media […]. When the provisions of the law on communication are not respected, [it] can take the following measures: warning, notice of default, suspension, permanent withdrawal.” The same year, a dozen journalists were assaulted by law enforcement officers, with reports of destruction of equipment and torture.

Previously in 2016, the Guinean press was shaken by the assassination of El Hadj Mohamed Diallo, a journalist for the news website Guinee7.com, during a political rally of Guinea’s main opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG). To-date, the case remains unsolved, despite  investigations.

 An inadequate and flouted legislative framework

The Guinean Constitution guarantees  the right to freedom of expression, opinion, belief and thought, as well as freedom of the press as being inviolable, inalienable and imprescriptible. It also guarantees the right of access to public information. According to Article 7, everyone is free “to express, to manifest, to disseminate their ideas and opinions by speech, writing and image, […] to educate and inform themselves from sources that are accessible to all. Freedom of the press is guaranteed and protected. The creation of a press or media outlet for political, economic, social, cultural, sporting, recreational or scientific information is free. The right of access to public information is guaranteed to the citizen.”

However, there are a number of laws and policies that undermine the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.

The Organic Law N ° 002/22/06/2010 on the Freedom of the Press enacted in 2010, sets the conditions for press freedom and the creation of a free and independent media in Guinea. Article 1 explicitly guarantees the freedom of “the written press, the online press, publishing, printing, bookstore, audiovisual, photography, cinema and all other forms of communication”. Offenses by the press or by any other means of communication are outlined under Articles 98-122. The only penalties provided for under the law, upon conviction, are the payment of a fine (the maximum being 20 million GNF, equivalent to USD 2,200), and the suspension or withdrawal of a media outlets’ license, with possibility of appeal before the Supreme Court.

There are no provisions for possible imprisonment of journalists. For instance, the law states that, “defamation, by one of the means set out in Article 98, against the courts, the military and paramilitary bodies, the constituted bodies and the public administrations, is punishable by a fine between 1,000,000 GNF and 5,000,000 GNF (USD 108-540).”

However, the press law and Penal Code (1998) conflict with each other on some  press offences. Article 99 of the press law states that incitement to theft, murder, looting and offenses against the security of the state, with incitement followed by effect, is an offence and “perpetrators are punished as accomplices” in accordance with Articles 271 and 273 of the Penal Code.  Article 271 of the Penal Code provides for prison sentences of between 10-20 years while Article 273 provides for penalties of imprisonment of 16 days to six months, a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 GNF ( (USD 5.5 to USD 10.9) or both. Notably, neither the press law nor the Penal Code are cited during the prosecution of journalists and bloggers. Instead, authorities rely on the cyber security law.

Law No. 037 on cyber security and the protection of personal data was adopted in July 2016, “to define the rules and mechanisms to fight against cybercrime in Guinea and thus create a favourable, conducive and secure environment in cyber space”. However, it is criticised as a threat to democracy and the digital rights of Guinean citizens because it legitimises online censorship and appears to criminalise whistle-blowing. Indeed, it is this law, and not the press law, which is currently being used to persecute journalists. According to Mohamed Traoré, former president of the Guinean Bar Association, the cyber security law is “unenforceable” because it has not been registered and published in the Official Gazette.

Meanwhile, the Bill on Access to Public Information was approved at the Council of Ministers on July 26, 2019, but there has been no further action on it since then. The lack of an access to information framework negatively impacts journalism, and transparency and accountability in governance. Passing the bill into law would facilitate reliable sources of information for investigative reporting, as well as research, and enhance civic participation.

 Which way for a free press in Guinea?

Guinea’s press law reflects the political will to ensure a free, independent and pluralistic media in the country. Further, growing internet penetration has facilitated media diversity. However, persisting acts of repression and intimidation of journalists and bloggers are in total disregard of the Freedom of the Press Act which decriminalises press crimes, and online critics remain exposed to harsh penalties emanating from the cyber security law. In addition, the current inadequacy of the supporting legal framework, and stagnation of the bill on public access to information, limit media’s contribution to democratic governance. For a conducive freedom of expression environment to thrive in Guinea, it is imperative for the government to adopt an adequate legal framework and ensure its enforcement at all levels.

En suspens : la liberté de la presse en ligne et hors ligne en Guinée

Par Simone Toussi

Le paysage médiatique de la Guinée compte plus de 70 médias, y compris les médias en ligne, la radio, la télévision et la presse écrite. Pourtant, le pays ne se classe pas très bien sur les indices internationaux de la liberté de la presse – il est classé 107e sur 180 pays dans l’indice mondial de la liberté de la presse 2019. Néanmoins, sa pénétration croissante d’internet passée de 0,4% en 2010 à 33% en 2018, est favorable à la libre circulation de l’information sur les plateformes en ligne telles que les blogs et les réseaux sociaux. Avec une croissance aussi rapide des utilisateurs, – de 42 000 utilisateurs en 2010 à quatre millions d’utilisateurs en 2019 – l’internet devient rapidement le principal mode d’accès à l’information pour la grande partie de la population guinéenne. Cependant, les contrôles autoritaires exercés par le gouvernement sur les médias traditionnels s’étendent à la sphère de la presse en ligne, comme en témoignent une série d’arrestations et de détentions arbitraires, associées à la persécution et au harcèlement judiciaire des journalistes et des blogueurs.

Une persécution continue des journalistes et des médias

En août 2019, le gouvernement guinéen a placé sous contrôle judiciaire deux journalistes, l’animateur d’une émission de Lynx FM Souleymane Diallo et le PDG et journaliste de Lynx FM, Boubacar Alghassimou Diallo. Les deux hommes ont été accusés de “complicité dans la diffusion de données susceptibles de troubler la sécurité publique”. Les allégations proviennent d’une émission de radio interactive, au cours de laquelle un auditeur a accusé un haut cadre du gouvernement guinéen d’avoir détourné des primes militaires liées à une mission dans le Nord du Mali. Sous contrôle judiciaire, il est interdit aux deux journalistes de voyager en dehors de la capitale guinéenne, Conakry, sans l’autorisation d’un juré. Ils ne sont également pas autorisés à animer l’émission de radio en question jusqu’à nouvel ordre et doivent comparaître devant le tribunal trois fois par semaine. Au cours du même mois, plusieurs associations de presse ont manifesté contre la répression exercée sur les médias par l’Etat.

Plus tôt en mars 2019, Lansana Camara, journaliste à conakrylive.info, a été convoqué pour «diffamation par voie de presse» à la suite d’une plainte du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Guinéens de l’étranger. Ce journaliste a été placé en garde à vue pendant une semaine sur des allégations de publication d’un article portant atteinte au gouvernement guinéen. L’article (supprimé après son arrestation) fait état d’un détournement présumé de deux milliards de francs guinéens (GNF), équivalant à 215 700 dollars américains (USD), qui avaient été inscrits au budget pour le carburant dudit département ministériel.

Martine Condé, Présidente de la Haute Autorité de la Communication (HAC) – l’observateur et régulateur national indépendant des médias constitué en vertu de la loi N ° L / 2010/002 / CNT / du 22 juin 2010 – a dénoncé l’incarcération du journaliste Lansana Camara comme une violation flagrante de la loi sur la liberté de la presse. Une riposte similaire pour la violation de la liberté de la presse a été émise par l’Association Guinéenne de la Presse en Ligne (AGUIPEL) en juin 2018 après l’arrestation et la détention de Mamadou Saliou Diallo, fondateur de Nouvelledeguinee.com, sur des accusations de «diffamation et calomnie» suite à une plainte du ministre de la Justice, Cheick Sako.

Cependant, la HAC ne semble pas toujours agir dans l’intérêt de la liberté de la presse, car elle a décidé en 2017, de suspendre pendant sept jours une station de radio privée, Espace FM, l’accusant de diffuser «des informations susceptibles de porter atteinte à la sécurité de la Nation, au moral des forces armées et à l’ordre public». Cette décision de la HAC était en application des articles 39 et 40 de la loi N ° L / 2010/002 / CNT / du 22 juin 2010 relative à la liberté de la presse qui prévoit ceci : «La Haute Autorité de la Communication exerce un droit de contrôle général sur les secteurs public, privé et les médias communautaires […]. Lorsque les dispositions de la loi sur la communication ne sont pas respectées, [elle] peut prendre les mesures suivantes: avertissement, mise en demeure, suspension, retrait définitif. » La même année, une dizaine de journalistes agressés par des forces de l’ordre, rapporte avoir subi la destruction de leurs équipements de travail et la torture.

Plus tôt en 2016, la presse guinéenne s’est vue ébranlée par l’assassinat d’El Hadj Mohamed Diallo, journaliste au site d’information Guinee7.com, lors d’un rassemblement politique du principal parti d’opposition guinéen, l’Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG). À ce jour, l’affaire n’est toujours pas résolue, malgré les enquêtes.

Un cadre législatif inadéquat et bafoué

La Constitution guinéenne garantit le droit à la liberté d’expression, d’opinion, de croyance et de pensée, ainsi que la liberté de la presse comme étant inviolables, inaliénables et imprescriptibles. Elle garantit également le droit d’accès à l’information publique. Selon l’article 7, chacun est libre « d’exprimer, de manifester, de diffuser ses idées et ses opinions par la parole, l’écriture et l’image, […] de s’instruire et de s’informer à partir de sources accessibles à tous. La liberté de la presse est garantie et protégée. La création d’une presse ou d’un média d’information politique, économique, sociale, culturelle, sportive, récréative ou scientifique est gratuite. Le droit d’accès à l’information publique est garanti au citoyen. » Cependant, un certain nombre de lois et de politiques portent atteinte à ces droits et libertés garantis par la Constitution.

La loi organique N ° 002/22/06/2010 sur la liberté de la presse promulguée en 2010, fixe les conditions de la liberté de la presse et de la création d’une presse libre et indépendante en Guinée. L’article 1 garantit explicitement la liberté de «la presse écrite, la presse en ligne, l’édition, l’impression, la librairie, l’audiovisuel, la photographie, le cinéma et toutes les autres formes de communication ». Les infractions commises par la presse ou par tout autre moyen de communication sont décrites aux articles 98 à 122. Les seules sanctions prévues par la loi, en cas de condamnation, sont le paiement d’une amende (le maximum étant de 20 millions GNF, équivalent à 2200 USD), et la suspension ou le retrait d’une licence de média, avec possibilité de recours devant la Cour Suprême.

Aucune disposition de cette loi ne prévoit l’emprisonnement éventuel de journalistes. Par exemple, la loi stipule que «la diffamation, par l’un des moyens énoncés à l’article 98, envers les cours, les tribunaux, les corps militaires et paramilitaires, les corps constitués et les administrations publiques, est punie d’une amende de 1 000 000 GNF à 5 000 000 GNF (108-540 USD). ”

Cependant, la loi sur la presse et le Code pénal (1998) entrent en conflit pour certains délits de presse. L’article 99 de la loi sur la presse prévoit que l’incitation au vol, au meurtre, au pillage et aux atteintes à la sécurité de l’État, est une infraction punie d’une amende ; et si l’incitation est suivie d’effet, « les auteurs sont punis comme complices » conformément aux articles 271 et 273 du Code pénal. L’article 271 du Code pénal prévoit des peines de prison allant de 10 à 20 ans tandis que l’article 273 prévoit des peines d’emprisonnement de 16 jours à six mois, une amende de 50 000 à 100 000 GNF ((5,5 USD à 10,9 USD) ou les deux. Notamment, ni la loi sur la presse ni le code pénal ne sont cités lors des poursuites judiciaires à l’encontre des journalistes et des blogueurs. Au lieu de cela, les autorités se basent sur la loi sur la cybersécurité et la protection des données personnelles.

La loi n ° 037 sur la cybersécurité et la protection des données personnelles a été adoptée en juillet 2016, « pour définir les règles et mécanismes visant à lutter contre la cybercriminalité et créer ainsi un environnement favorable, propice et sécuritaire dans le cyberespace». Cependant, elle est critiquée comme une menace pour la démocratie et les droits numériques des citoyens Guinéens car elle légitime la censure en ligne et semble criminaliser les lanceurs d’alertes. En effet, c’est cette loi, et non la loi sur la presse, qui est actuellement utilisée pour persécuter les journalistes. Selon Mohamed Traoré, ancien président de l’Association du barreau guinéen, la loi sur la cybersécurité est « inapplicable » car elle n’a pas été enregistrée et publiée au Journal officiel de la Guinée.

Entre-temps, le projet de loi sur l’accès à l’information publique a été approuvé par le Conseil des ministres le 26 juillet 2019, mais aucune autre mesure n’a été prise depuis lors. L’absence d’un cadre d’accès à l’information a un impact négatif sur le journalisme, la transparence et la gouvernance responsable. L’adoption du projet de loi faciliterait la mise en place de sources d’information fiables aussi bien pour le journalisme d’investigation que pour la recherche, et améliorerait la participation civique.

Quelle voie pour une presse libre en Guinée?

La loi sur la liberté de la presse et le délit de presse en Guinée reflète la volonté politique de garantir des médias libres, indépendants et pluralistes dans le pays. De plus, la pénétration croissante de l’internet a facilité la diversité médiatique. Cependant, les actes de répression et d’intimidation persistants à l’encontre des journalistes et des blogueurs méprisent entièrement les dispositions de la loi sur la liberté de la presse qui dépénalise les délits de presse, et les critiques en ligne restent exposés à des sanctions sévères émanant de la loi sur la cybersécurité. En outre, l’insuffisance actuelle du cadre juridique de soutien et la stagnation du projet de loi sur l’accès à l’information publique limitent la contribution des médias à la gouvernance démocratique. Pour assurer le déploiement d’un environnement propice à la liberté d’expression en Guinée, il est impératif que le gouvernement adopte un cadre juridique adéquat et garantisse son application à tous les niveaux.

Building Digital Literacy and Security Capacity of Women Refugees in Uganda

By Ashnah Kalemera |
Statistics on the prevalence of cyber harassment of women in Africa remain scanty. Where some reports of cyber harassment of women in the region are available, the extent to which it affects women in marginalised communities is also not well known. Indeed, the growing proliferation of technology is reported to be facilitating online harassment of women by enabling the anonymity of the perpetrators who could be located anywhere and without physical contact with the victim. In many instances, cases of cyber harassment go unreported and victims have limited legal recourse or resources to  seek justice.
Figures show that in Europe, one in 10 women have been victims of cyber harassment, including having received unwanted, offensive sexually explicit emails or SMS messages, or unwarranted inappropriate advances on social networking sites. While contexts differ, it is possible that women in Africa who use digital communications technologies face similar or greater levels of harassment, given the low levels of digital literacy and poor mechanisms to fight online violence against women.
Interviews conducted in August 2019 with 35 women refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan, who are living in Uganda, showed that three in four of the respondents had experienced some form of cyber harassment including abuse, stalking, unwarranted sexual advances and hacking of social media accounts. The perpetrators included anonymous individuals, security agents in their home countries, known friends and ex-partners. 
The interviews were carried out as part of the digital literacy and security training for refugee rights defenders. Hosted in Kampala, Uganda by Access for All, the two days training engaged 80 participants and also covered aspects of digital activism and women’s participation in the information society. 
“Due to the rampant online harassment of women in Uganda, we believe that such a project would considerably benefit our members, for whom digital literacy and creative approaches to digital activism are vital in their everyday work and long-term development,” said Asan Juma, the Executive Director of Access for All. 
These online affronts against women refugees in Uganda run in parallel to gender-based violence in refugee camps, at border crossings and resettlement communities. According to the United Nations University (UNU), women refugees are often under threat of physical and sexual violence not only at the hands of fellow refugees and human traffickers but also national immigration administration, security forces and humanitarian staff. In these situations, UNU reports that access to justice and reparation for women refugees is limited.
Indeed, only a quarter of the refugee women interviewed who had experienced cyber harassment went on to report the cases to authorities. Among the reasons put forward for not reporting  was “unawareness of the existing laws that prohibit online harassment” and “distrust of the police.” The mistrust of law enforcement authorities stemmed from self consciousness over their nationality or refugee status, previous bad experiences with authorities in home countries and the perception that “police case handling is often in favour of nationals rather than refugees”. 
Those who did not report the cases of cyber harassment to law enforcement officials coped through support from friends or counselling. A few others stated that they “ignored” the incidents. In one instance where the harassment was perpetrated by a friend, the respondent indicated that rather than reporting the incident to the police, they “talked to the person and settled the matter.”
Other measures taken included blocking the perpetrators on social media platforms or reporting them to platform administrators for violation of user policies. One respondent confirmed that the account of the perpetrator was taken down by platform administrators following an abuse report. 
Beyond online harassment, other digital threats that the participants reported to have experienced included fraud, identity theft online, loss of devices, viruses and malware on their devices. Whereas the engagement provided digital safety skills and knowledge, physical security threats also remain a challenge. Beneficiaries called for more coordinated digital rights advocacy efforts focused on the needs and challenges of refugee communities, targeting both the refugees as beneficiaries but also key stakeholders in the realisation of these rights.  
Access For All was founded in South Sudan in 2016 with an aim to promote the rights of sexual minorities. In the same year, the organisation was shut down by the government. The founders fled South Sudan and sought asylum in Uganda, where they worked on health rights and dignity of urban refugee sexual minorities. 
As part of its work in Uganda, Access for All recognised that urban refugees faced heightened gender-based violence risks due to unmet multiple and complex social, economic and medical needs as well as intersecting oppressions based on race, ethnicity, nationality, language, sexual orientation and gender identity. Moreover, humanitarian programmes were found to focus less on serving refugees in urban areas and even less so on sexual minority refugees.
With a grant from the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) that is managed by CIPESA, Access for All was among the inaugural grantees in 2019 and carried out the bi-lingual (English and Arabic) interviews and training workshop, which  explored prevailing digital security/protection concerns among urban refugees in Uganda and mechanisms to address them.
 

Africa in the Crosshairs of New Disinformation and Surveillance Schemes That Undermine Democracy

By Daniel Mwesigwa |

A range of spyware vendors including Italian Hacking Team, the Anglo-German Gamma Group, and Israeli’s NSO Group, have found a ready market in authoritarian and repressive governments in Africa and elsewhere. Similarly, systematic propaganda campaigns designed by meddlesome actors – including government agents and ambitious data analytics companies such as Cambridge Analytica working on behalf of state and non-state actors – are becoming conspicuous in Africa, especially during electoral periods. 

The tools and tactics of these operators, who are mostly non-African, are increasingly undermining democracy and respect for human rights in Africa, as they enable mass surveillance and disinformation that manipulates and undermines political discourse. 

For example, Chinese tech giant Huawei and its technicians were implicated in an August 15, 2019 exposé by The Wall Street Journal that detailed how the company’s staff had helped the Uganda Police to hack into the encrypted communications of an opposition figure. As a result, the security officers were able to thwart the opposition leader’s mobilisation plans. The article also stated that technicians from Huawei had helped Zambian authorities to access the phones and social media pages of a group of opposition bloggers who were tracked and arrested. 

Through security vulnerabilities, spyware tools and products give governments, notably intelligence and law enforcement authorities, super powers to surveil using covert intrusion systems across major mobile platforms and operating systems. In 2016, the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary lab working at the intersection of global affairs and technology at the University of Toronto, uncovered Pegasus – a sophisticated malware developed by the NSO Group that is injected into a target’s phone via text or WhatsApp, a popular messaging tool in Africa. The Citizen Lab has since identified Pegasus operations in over 45 countries including Algeria, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. But NSO has reportedly bragged time and again how it can penetrate various operating systems and applications irrespective of the security patches.

According to the 2019 State of Internet Freedom in Africa Report, the “surveillance state” in Africa gained notoriety at the turn of the decade, after the infamous Arab Spring that swept across North Africa in 2011, allegedly amplified by dissident voices on social media. The report documents how repressive states such as Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Botswana, and Rwanda have since boosted their surveillance capabilities through procurement of advanced spyware. In 2015, it was revealed that Uganda and Tanzania had procured Hacking Team’s premium Remote Control System (RCS) for intrusion into systems across major mobile platforms and operating systems. 

More recently, the Financial Times reported that Rwanda paid up to USD 10 million to the NSO Group to spy on government critics and dissidents through WhatsApp – an allegation Rwanda president Paul Kagame denied in a presidential press briefing held on November 8, 2019, only acknowledging that they spy on “our enemies” using “human intelligence”. He added, “I wouldn’t spend my money over a nobody [Rwandan exiles] yet we have sectors like education to spend such money”. 

But Kagame’s denial is to be taken with a pinch of salt. In 2016, a Rwandan court sentenced a popular singer, Kizito Mihigo, to 10 years in prison on allegations of conspiracy to overthrow the government, based on hacked private WhatsApp and Skype messages exchanged with alleged dissidents in exile. 

The alleged Rwanda cases appear to be linked to others of NSO infiltrating the WhatsApp accounts of journalists, human rights activists, political dissidents, prominent female leaders, and other members of civil society in up to 20 countries, which prompted Facebook (the owners of WhatsApp) to sue NSO in October 2019. The lawsuit brought by Facebook in the U.S Federal Court accuses the spyware maker of hacking into the WhatsApp accounts of 1,400 users worldwide. While there are scanty details on the exact identities of the affected, it is reported that 174 are lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and religious leaders.

According to the Financial Times, those targeted in Rwanda, six of whom it interviewed and they confirmed being alerted by WhatsApp about the possible NSO-enabled surveillance of their communications. These included a journalist living in exile in Uganda, who had petitioned the Uganda government “to help protect Rwandans in the country from assassination”; South Africa and UK-based senior members of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), an opposition group in exile; an army officer who fled Rwanda  in 2008 and testified against members of the Rwandan government in a French court in 2017; and a Belgium-based member of the FDU-Inkingi opposition party.

Meanwhile, some foreign powers are purportedly testing, as New York Times recently reported, “New Disinformation Tactics in Africa to Expand Influence”. The report detailed how the Wagner Group founded by businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who allegedly has close ties to the Russian government, has over the last couple of years been running aggressive disinformation campaigns on Facebook. 

It is reported that Prigozhin’s campaign used locally-opened Facebook accounts to disguise behaviour and also used sham news networks that regularly reposted articles from Russia’s state-owned Sputnik news organisation to promote Russian policies while undermining US and French policies in Africa. On October 31, 2019, Facebook reportedly removed these accounts that were influencing operations “in the domestic politics” of eight African countries – Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan.

Earlier in 2019, Facebook reportedly shut down a separate “fake news” operation targeting elections in African countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Angola, and Tunisia, propagated by “inauthentic” accounts on Facebook and Instagram run by Israeli commercial firm, Archimedes Group.  Between 2013 to 2017, governments such as Kenya and Nigeria reportedly hired Cambridge Analytica to manipulate their electorate in a bid to win presidential elections for the incumbents.

Besides the disinformation campaigns linked to Russian actors, and the Israel-made spyware, there are also facial recognition surveillance programmes such as the Huawei’s “Smart Cities”, which has been deployed in 12 African countries. This phenomenon is referred to by some as an export of digital authoritarianism. 

It is now evident that governments and non-state actors face an uphill task of combatting the governance challenges caused by this phenomenon. Accordingly, governments, with the help of tech platforms, need to understand what legislation and policies, including oversight and enforcement mechanisms, are necessary to strengthen the protection of democracy and human rights in the rapidly changing digital world.

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda Must Do More to Improve Access to ICT for Persons with Disabilities

By Paul Kimumwe |

On the occasion of the International Day of Persons with Disabilities (IDPD) 2019, the Collaboration of International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is calling upon governments and communication services providers in East Africa to take decisive steps to enable meaningful usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for persons with disabilities.

In a new policy brief, CIPESA highlights Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’s obligations on enabling digital accessibility for persons with disabilities and challenges the three countries to live up to their commitments, as contained in national laws and policies, as well as international instruments they are party to.

Although recent advances have made an ever-greater number of people use ICT for a growing range of tasks, persons with disabilities in East Africa still find it hard to access and use digital technologies and thus continue to miss out on the benefits that the technologies bring.

While Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have enacted various laws and policies to advance the rights of persons with disabilities, including those on access to and use of ICT, these have largely remained on paper with key provisions not being implemented. As a result, a large section of persons with disabilities continue to face digital exclusion.

The situation is exacerbated by the high cost of assistive technologies, low literacy levels among persons with disabilities, and lack of investments in supportive infrastructure by public and private entities.

According to national census data, the percentage of persons with disabilities in Tanzania is 8% of the total population, 3.5% in Kenya, and 14% in Uganda. However, the lack of comprehensive disaggregated data, including the specific challenges that persons with different types of disabilities face in accessing information and using ICT, also undermines the design and implementation of interventions that would improve their access.

The provision of accessible information to persons with disabilities is essential to enable them to exercise their fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this regard, one of the pillars of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), is the pledge to leave no one behind, including in the use of ICT.

Besides endorsing the SDGs, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the first international human rights treaty requiring that ICT tools and systems should be accessible as a necessary condition for persons with disabilities to fully enjoy their fundamental rights without discrimination.

Yet, while these governments are increasingly offering e-services, and in some instances have developed guidelines for managing government websites that set out requirements for accessibility for audio, visual and speech-impaired users, as well as compatibility with assistive technologies and devices, these guidelines remain unimplemented and unenforced. Moreover, in the three countries, majority of people that need assistive technologies lack them, because of prohibitive cost and low awareness of such technologies and their functionalities.

The CIPESA brief notes that the countries have sufficient laws and policies, but the weakest link is the lack of their implementation and enforcement. For example, Tanzania’s National ICT Policy 2003 calls for provision of special attention to providing new learning and ICT access opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including persons with disabilities, in order to address social inequities. Kenya’s National ICT Policy of 2016 outlines, under article 13, strategies for “an accessible ICT environment in the country in order to enable persons with disabilities to take full advantage of ICTs.”

In Uganda, Section 21 of the Persons with Disability Act mandates the government to develop and use sign language, tactile, and sign language interpreters in all public institutions and at public functions; and to braille public information such as government documents and government newspapers. It also obligates television stations to provide sign language inset or subtitles.

Many of the challenges faced by persons with disabilities in accessing information can be mitigated through equitable access to ICT, meaningful implementation of the laws, and innovative investments in technologies that support inclusion of persons with disabilities.

Accordingly, CIPESA is calling upon governments to take decisive steps in this direction, for instance:

  • Promote access to affordable assistive devices and technologies beyond tax exemptions and relying on donations.
  • Ensure that all e-government, e-services and emergency services comply with international web accessibility standards and are accessible for persons with disabilities.
  • Ensure that communication service providers have accessible handsets and other mobile devices embedded with accessibility features for persons with different kinds of disabilities within their sales outlets.
  • Ensure that licensed television service providers deliver accessible services such as audio description, audio subtitles, closed captions and signage language interpretation in their programmes to ensure access for persons with disabilities.

Find the brief on Removing Barriers to ICT Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda here.