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13Jan

Uganda's 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

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By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.

12Jan

Trends of Digital Data Operations in Elections in Uganda from 2005 – 2020

Author CIPESA Writer Posted on

Daniel Mwesigwa |

While different countries in Africa and beyond have been rocked by shocking revelations of abuse of user data from popular social networks such as Facebook (re: Cambridge Analytica) and massive advertising exchanges such as Google’s DoubleClick during electoral cycles, Uganda seems to have been spared.

This is not entirely surprising given such information is generally scant, however, it does not imply that Uganda does not or has not used data assets during elections in the past cycles. Neither does it show that Uganda will abstain from digital data operations in future elections, including the 2021 polls. In fact, as we argue in the text below, for long, Ugandan politicians and their political parties have exploited complex traditional systems of monitoring and communication to influence electoral outcomes. They are also using new and modern technologies such as mobile telephony to influence elections.

In particular, the state’s influence on the telecommunications industry has given it uninhibited access to large amounts of user data that could be used beyond state-sanctioned surveillance purposes. It is evident, surveillance is a critical aspect of electoral machinery in Uganda—especially that which is controlled by the incumbency. While Uganda is a multi-party democracy with theoretically coindependent arms of the government i.e. executive, legislature and judiciary, the president’s prominence within the country’s day to day administration including within its security dockets cannot be understated.

The state, through the presidency, has firmly established links within the Local Council (LC) system popular in rural and urban areas and is, indeed, an embodiment of “eyes on the street” phenomenon; a vernacular form of surveillance and monitoring—and care—enabled by the local leaders in local communities. However, with the proliferation of mobile telephony, especially in the urban areas, the surveillance machinery builds on the pre-existing (vernacular) infrastructures of surveillance to advanced technology and data enabled surveillance that has been weaponized, mostly by the state, to steer the electoral process and the probable outcomes.

Meanwhile, it is almost impossible to talk about data and politics in Uganda without situating the
conversation within the broader political history of elections in Uganda. Having attained its
independence from the British colonial masters on October 9, 1962, Uganda’s democratic journey has been characterised by violence and suppression. In fact, Uganda has never had a peaceful transfer of power from one leader to another since independence.

To crudely put it, political transition has often been a matter of life or death. Having ascended to power in January 1986 after a five-year guerrilla war campaign imputed to a rigged 1980 presidential poll, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has been at the helm of the country’s leadership since then. Notably, the president has also overseen arguably the longest period of relative peace and stability, coupled with significant post-1986 socio-economic recovery and growth. Despite these achievements, they seem to be steadily eroding because of increasing oppressive legislation, harassment of critics and opposition, and the impunity of those in power.

In this report, see the changing trends of use of data in electoral cycles in Uganda’s modern history. Crucially, the report looks at the period between 2005 and 2020, a period characterised by the highest use of technology and data assets witnessed in Uganda yet.

11Jan

Policy Brief: A Digital Rights View of the Uganda 2021 General Elections

Author CIPESA Writer Posted on

By Edrine Wanyama |

As Uganda heads to presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2021, digital communications have taken centre-stage and are playing a crucial role in how candidates and parties engage with citizens. The country’s electoral body decreed in June 2020 that, due to social distancing required by COVID-19 standard operating procedures, no physical campaigns would take place so as to ensure a healthy and safe environment for all stakeholders.

Further, Parliament passed the Political Parties and Organisations (Conduct of Meetings and Elections) Regulations 2020, which aim to safeguard public health and safety of political party activities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and, under regulation 5, provide for holding of political meetings through virtual means. The maximum number of persons allowed to attend campaign meetings was later set at 70 and then raised to 200.

The use of the internet and related technologies is growing steadily in Uganda with 18.9 million
subscribers, or 46 internet connections for every 100 Ugandans. However, radio remains the most
widely accessible and usable technology with a penetration of 45%, compared to television at 17%, and computers at 4%.

For the majority of Ugandans, the internet remains out of reach, particularly in rural areas where 75.5% of Ugandans live. The current election guidelines mean that any election process that runs predominantly on the back of technology and minimal physical organising and interaction is wont to come upon considerable challenges. Given Uganda’s history of curtailing usage of digital technologies during elections (including through websites blockage, SMS censorship, mobile money and social media shutdowns), and prosecution of various individuals that published opinions critical of the government, a level playing field for technologically-aided elections cannot be guaranteed.

Will the 2021 elections see government organs leverage incumbency to appropriate the power of
technology to their self-serving interests? Or will they allow fair, meaningful, and transformative use of technology in the elections?

See this brief highlights the likely play-out of Uganda’s so-called “scientific election” – one that is tech-based and honours the COVID-19 standard operating procedures (SOPs), and what it means for electoral democracy in the country

11Jan

Internet Shutdowns Threaten Elections in Uganda

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Access Now |

Amidst a growing crackdown on media, human rights defenders, and opposition politicians, the Republic of Uganda will hold general elections on Thursday, January 14. With a dark history of internet and social media blocking during national events, and alarming reports of disruptions already emerging, Ugandan voters’ rights to access information and express opinion are under threat. The #KeepItOn coalition, via an open letter, is calling on the government to ensure open, accessible, and secure internet access for all throughout the election period and beyond.

“Shutting down or blocking the internet while reports of state violence and oppression are emerging is incredibly worrisome,” said Felicia Anthonio, Campaigner and #KeepItOn Lead at Access Now.“Uganda disconnected voters during the 2016 elections, and the #KeepItOn coalition is imploring authorities to set a new standard in 2021 by ensuring reliable, accessible internet to all — during this critical time, and hereafter.”

Access to the internet and social media platforms during the elections in Uganda will help foster transparency around the democratic process and promote active citizen participation. Access Now and 55 other organizations are urging the government of Uganda to:

  • Ensure that the internet, including social media and other digital communication platforms, remains open, accessible, and secure across Uganda throughout the election;
  • Ensure that mobile money, banking, and other financial avenues for transactions remain accessible and secure;
  • Order internet service providers to provide everyone with high-quality, secure, and unrestricted internet access; and
  • Order internet service providers to inform internet users of any potential disruptions and to take all reasonable steps to fix any identified disruptions likely to impact the quality of service they receive.

Internet shutdowns and blockings were a go-to tool for authorities during national events and protests in 2020, including in Myanmar, Burundi, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Belarus, and many other countries. The Ugandan general election will be the African continent’s first in the new decade, and has the potential to set the stage for all other national events that follow.

07Dec

Vodacom Outshines MTN in Efforts to Serve Persons With Disabilities in South Africa

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By CIPESA Writer |

South Africa has a national disability prevalence rate of about 7.5%, which represents approximately 2.87 million persons with disability. According to the Marginalised Groups Indicator Report of 2018, the bulk of this population resides in Gauteng province and the least in the Northern Cape, with the most affected age groups being 5-14 and 15-24 years. Women have a higher chance of being disabled than men and are more likely to receive less schooling. 

While households of persons with disabilities have a 90% likelihood of having access to electricity, their access to technological devices is far lower, in major part due to failure by telecom operators to provide accessible services and devices to this often marginalised population.

See this report: Access Denied: How Telecom Operators in Africa are Failing Persons With Disabilities 

The telecommunication industry plays a critical role in providing information and communication services to the public. However, many telecom operators are failing to provide accessible information and services to large sections of persons with disabilities.

A study conducted among 10 telecom companies in five African countries sought to understand this digital access and service gap within the telecom industry in promoting digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, in particular visual and auditory disabilities. In South Africa, the main market share holders, MTN (28%) and Vodacom (42%), were the focus of the study. The study found that both operators offered affordable accessible handsets, but such handsets were not available in all outlets. 

This inconsistent product availability was accompanied by limited staff knowledge of any special offerings for persons with disabilities (such as call, SMS, data or discounted rates) and low skills in serving members of this community. Moreover, neither Vodacom nor MTN availed information about their services in Braille. 

However, Vodacom had an upper hand over MTN in creating awareness about accessibility products and services (including through alliances with the South African Audiology Association and South African Speech, Language and Hearing Association) and in developing accessibility applications.  

Vodacom also supported the development of HearZA app, a smartphone-based national hearing test app, developed in partnership with the University of Pretoria to help with early detection of hearing problems. In addition, in April 2018 Vodacom launched the free (082 112) SMS Emergency Service for hearing and speech impaired customers, which enabled registered customers to request emergency services such as police, ambulance, fire, and sea rescue by sending an SMS to the Emergency Service Contact Centre. The research shows that MTN had no tailor-made applications for persons with disabilities.

Earlier in 2016, Vodacom partnered with the South African National Council for the Blind (SANCB) to provide an easier and more accessible avenue to bring mobile communication closer to the visually impaired by installing a mobile service kiosk at SANCB’s premises in Pretoria. The aim of this partnership was to provide training and to empower the SANCB staff on how to use accessible smartphones and to train their members.

Further, Vodacom has been offering Apple and Android smart devices that come with built-in text-to-speech applications (Apple – VoiceOver and Android – TalkBack) that convert text to audio, allowing visually impaired customers to listen to information such as SMS. In-store activation, an assisted step-by-step guide, and training on using the accessibility features, are additional services the company could offer. 

Integrating the needs of persons with disabilities at company policy level is also indicative of its commitment to inclusion. According to the research, Vodacom had a guiding procurement policy as part of the group’s inclusion strategy to promote accessibility, while MTN had a wide business-focused procurement policy with no specific information on devices for persons with disabilities.

Across the 10 telecom companies assessed, only Vodacom had discounted rates for persons with disabilities, and for hearing-impaired customers, special contract phone deals that consisted of data and SMS were provided. Vodacom was also the only operator in the study that had emergency communications designed specifically for persons with disabilities. 

A Code of Conduct for Persons with Disabilities Regulations was issued by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) in 2007 and a review was undertaken in  2019, with inputs and commitments of support to the review effort from operators Cell-C, MTN, and Vodacom. Proposals received during the review included to revise the code of conduct to include subtitling for all TV programmes; large print and braille billing statements to be issued by operators; a need for universal design of handsets at affordable prices; cheaper hearing aids to be made available; airtime vouchers to be printed in braille; and Jaws (a screen reading software) to be installed in smartphones.

For persons with disabilities to realise technology’s transformative potential, their rights must be provided for in national laws and policies, and countries must take deliberate steps to ensure that they have unfettered access to quality information and ICT, and are protected from all forms of discrimination. South Africa’s telecom operators need to follow Vodacom’s examples to proactively support the needs of persons with disabilities, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) pledge to leave no one behind. 

See more about how South Africa’s telecom operators compare to those in other countries in the provision of services and devices to persons with disabilities.

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