Zambia’s Mixed Record on ICT Access and Free Expression Online

By Ashnah Kalemera |
The first-ever Lusaka Internet Forum (LIF17) was hosted in Zambia’s capital on May 10-11 as a platform for discussing the various factors impacting internet use in the country, particularly in driving agricultural sustainability, gender equality and freedom of expression online.
The southern African country presents a mixed record: ICT access is growing (a mobile phone penetration rate of 75% and internet penetration rate of 32%), but is undermined by high data and voice usage costs that entrench the digital divide between men and women and between rural and urban areas. Moreover, while the country is investing in extending services to rural and underserved areas, national laws largely undermine free expression and the communications regulator is criticised for undermining citizens’ rights to free expression.
In the last two decades, Zambia has recorded some firsts on internet use – both positive and negative. In 1996, one of the first documented acts of government censorship of online content in Africa happened when Zambia’s government ordered the take down of content from the online edition of The Post newspaper, after threatening to prosecute the country’s main Internet Service Provider (ISP), Zamnet.


The content was banned under the Preservation of Public Security Act for allegedly containing a report based on leaked documents that revealed secret government plans for a referendum on the adoption of a new constitution. A presidential decree warned the public that anyone caught with the banned edition, including the electronic version, would be liable to prosecution.
Since 1996, a number of interruptions to online communication have been reported. Access to some online news outlets, such as the Zambia Watchdog, has been blocked at different intervals, particularly between 2012 and 2014, over publication of content critical of the government. This alongside physical intimidation, arrests and seizure of devices such as journalists’ laptops and mobile phones. Meanwhile, in August 2016, internet connectivity interruptions were reported during the election period but these could not be verified as deliberately orchestrated by the state or service providers.
Despite these affronts to freedom of expression, in 2014 Zambia was the first African country to implement Facebook’s Free Basics initiative that allows users to access prescribed sites without the need for data. Ongoing initiatives by the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority (ZICTA) to promote access include the establishment of ICT training centres, acquisition of equipment for ICT-based learning and examinations under the education ministry, and the development of a computer assembly plant.
This mixed record on ICT access and internet freedom formed the backdrop of the discussions at LIF17, during which participants cited gender barriers, high illiteracy and poverty levels, and high data costs as undermining internet use in the country.


Some participants stated that the country’s laws appear to target curtailing citizens’ rights, and faulted the regulator for lacking independence and failing to protect users from abuses by service providers and government agencies such as the police. “Let’s use the laws progressively not to block access to information or to [unjustifiably] control how the media work,” said a blogger. He noted that the ICT Act of 2009 does not speak to current realities, with some of its provisions criminalising freedom of expression.
There are also widespread perceptions of unwarranted surveillance of citizens’ online communications. The right to privacy is threatened by the mandatory registration of SIM cards provided for under the ICT Act and the Statutory Instrument on the Registration of Electronic Communication Apparatus of 2011. Registration requires subscribers to provide their personal details and identity cards, in the absence of a data protection and privacy law.
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2009 provides for lawful interception of communications upon issuance of a court order, and online monitoring of information in the public domain. Nearly 15 years since tabling a draft freedom of information bill, it is yet to be enacted.
Meanwhile, activists criticised the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) director general for misusing their extensive powers to curtail media freedom. Last August, the IBA suspended the broadcasting licences for Muvi TV, Komboni Radio and Itezhi Tezhi Radio for “unprofessional conduct posing a risk to national peace and stability”. Activists also reported increasing attacks on individuals who use radio and TV stations to voice opinions critical of the government.
As such, following the LIF17, CIPESA led an ICT policy training workshop for human rights defenders, activists, media and social media enthusiasts to increase their understanding of relevant ICT policies in Zambia and how these affect human rights online. The workshop entailed developing their strategies in advocating for a free, open and secure internet through the innovative use of both traditional and new media.
During the training, participants were taken through mechanisms for policy engagement such as stakeholder submissions, the analysis of bills and continued activism and campaigns online including through documentation and reporting of internet freedom violation incidents.


LIF17 was organised by the Swedish Embassy in Zambia and partners including the Zambia Governance Foundation as a satellite event in the lead up to the Stockholm Internet Forum. Thematic sessions on agriculture, gender, and freedom of expression were hosted by the technology innovation hub Bongo Hive, the Asikana Network, the Swedish Programme for ICT in Developing Regions (Spider) and CIPESA.
Read more about internet freedom in Zambia in CIPESA’s State of Internet Freedom in Zambia 2016 report.
CIPESA’s work in Zambia is supported by AccessNow and the Mozilla Foundation.
 

South Africa to host Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa

Save The Date Announcement |
The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and the Association for Progressive Communication (APC) are happy to announce the date and location for the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) 2017.
This year’s edition of the Forum will held be in Johannesburg, South Africa, on September 27-29, 2017,  thus expanding the physical footprint of the Forum which has since inception in 2014 been held in Kampala, Uganda.
This landmark event convenes various stakeholders from the internet governance and online rights arenas in Africa and beyond to deliberate on gaps, concerns and opportunities for advancing privacy, access to information, free expression, non-discrimination and the free flow of information online.
The Forum brings together human rights defenders, journalists, government officials, private sector players, global information intermediaries, bloggers, developers, the arts community, law enforcers and regulators – all of whom have a role to play in advancing internet freedom in Africa.
Highlights at FIFAfrica include the launch of the annual State of Internet Freedom in Africa research report as well the commemoration of the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI) that falls on September 28.
In the coming weeks, we will release more details of the Forum, including how to participate and to suggest topics for inclusion in the event programme.
Visit the Forum page for more information on previous Forums and updates over the coming weeks.
You can also contribute thoughts and ideas through the #InternetFreedomAfrica hashtag.
If you would like to support FIFAfrica17 please get in touch:
Send an email to Wakabi ([email protected]), Ashnah ([email protected]) or Sekoetlane ([email protected]) and ([email protected]) with any queries.
 

Tanzania Court Deals a Blow to Intermediary Liability Rules

By Ashnah Kalemera |
A court in Tanzania has dealt a blow to the rules governing the country’s internet intermediaries, after ruling that requests for disclosure of user information for law enforcement purposes pursuant to the Cybercrimes Act (2015) are not arbitrary. In a March 8, 2017 ruling, three judges of the court in Dar es Salaam also ruled that the absence of regulations to govern the enforcement of the Act did not render the controversial law unconstitutional.
The ruling dismissed a petition filed by Jamii Media, proprietors of the popular Jamii Forums discussion platform, who argued that Section 32 of the Cybercrimes Act was arbitrary and contrary to citizens’ right to privacy guaranteed by article 16 (1) of the country’s constitution. Jamii filed the petition last April, after receiving three notices from police demanding that it discloses the personal details of up to four users who had posted on the forum information on political tensions among members of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi, and scandals in one of the country’s leading banking institutions.
The notices, issued during January and February 2016 pursuant to Section 32 of the Act, demanded disclosure of the names of the users, their emails and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Last December, Jamii Forums founder Maxence Melo was charged with obstruction of investigations under Section 22 of the Cybercrimes Act for failure to comply with the disclosure notices.

Section 32 of the Cybercrimes Act provides:
(1) Where the disclosure of data is required for the purposes of a criminal investigation or the prosecution of an offence, a police officer in charge of a police station or a law enforcement officer of a similar rank may issue an order to any person in possession of such data compelling him to disclose such data.
(2) The order issued under subsection (1) shall be granted to a law enforcement officer who shall serve the order to the person in possession of the data.
(3) Where the disclosure of data cannot be done under subsection (1), the law enforcement officer may apply to the court for an order compelling:
(a) a person to submit specified data that is in that person’s possession or control; or
(b) a service provider offering its services to submit subscriber information in relation to such services in that service provider’s possession or control.
(4) Where any material to which an investigation relates consists of data stored in a computer system or device, the request shall be deemed to require the person to produce or give access to it in a form in which it is legible and can be taken away.

In its petition, Jamii Media argued that no procedures were in place to enforce Section 32 as required under Section 39 (2) of the Act to govern the circumstances and procedure of disclosure by intermediaries. Section 39 (2) states that the Minister for Information and Communication Technology shall “prescribe the procedures for service providers to avail competent authorities, at their request, with information enabling the identification of recipients of their services”.
However, the judges noted that, often, for laws that provide for putting in place regulations by the Ministers responsible, “it takes a while before the said regulations are formulated.” This implied that intermediaries were obliged to honour disclosure notices in the absence of the regulations.
In their defense, the Tanzania Police argued that they had the duty to carry out investigations and prosecution of offences and maintained that the disclosure notices issued to Jamii Media were “justified”. According to the state attorney, the disclosure notices did not infringe upon citizens’ right to privacy because they were “intended to obtain the names of people who have published information that may turn out to be relevant to some offences under investigation”. The state attorney added that the Cybercrimes Act did not require the police to disclose to the recipient of the disclosure notices the offences under investigation.
Meanwhile, Jamii Media also argued that under sub-section 32 (4), the 2015 Act confers powers upon authorities to require the surrender of devices on which information is contained, without any safeguards. “If an investigator takes away one such device in order to access one piece of information relevant to a particular investigation, there is no guarantee that by taking the same, the investigation will not access other pieces of information contained in the same device and [which are] irrelevant to the matter being investigated,” it argued.
Judges ruled that Section 32 (4) did not empower the police to take away the devices as contended. “Our understanding of that section is that the person to whom the request has been made, like the petitioner in this case, may print the information such that it can be read and/or taken away by the investigators in printed form,” the judges stated.
Citing jurisprudence including provisions under Article 19 (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the judges considered that Section 32 of the Cybercrimes Act was “proportional” for balancing individual human rights on the one hand and public interest on the other.
Lawyers representing Melo in the ongoing case plan to file submissions for police to seek court’s intervention for mandatory disclosure pursuant to provisions of the Act and dismiss the obstruction charges.
For more on the government’s tactics to stifle citizens’ digital rights in Tanzania see the State of Internet Freedom in Tanzania 2016 report.
 

Recent Developments in Telecoms Regulation Threaten Online Rights in Uganda

By Edrine Wanyama |
In April 2017, the parliament of Uganda gave the minister in charge of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) powers to single-handedly make regulations that govern the telecommunications sector. Hitherto, regulations proposed by the minister had to receive parliamentary approval.
The Uganda Communications (Amendment) Bill (2016), which parliament passed on April 6, 2017, means that making regulations for the telecommunications sector is in the sole preserve of the minister. Among others, such regulations are related to licensing and fees, operator obligations, competition, consumer rights and protection. It is for this reason that the newly passed law, which was gazzetted back in February 2016 when still a bill faced criticism from civil society.

The Minister may, after consultation with the Commission and with the approval of Parliament, by statutory instrument, make regulations for better carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.” Section 93(1) of the Uganda Communications Act 2013

  “The Minister may, after consultation with the Commission, by statutory instrument, make regulations for better carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.” Section 93(1) of the Uganda Communications (Amendment) Bill (2016)

The authority, Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), was set up in 1997 by the now repealed Communications Act, Cap. 106 (section 3) and now established by the Uganda Communications Act, 2013 (section 4) (the Act)  as the regulator of the communications sector but has since inception faced criticism over lack of independence from the government. The Act gives extensive powers to the minister of ICT, including to appoint the commission’s executive director and board members and to approve its budgets.

Meanwhile, there are growing concerns about mass surveillance particularly in the absence of a data protection and privacy  law to safeguard citizen data collected by the state and private parties. These are further aggravated by the haphazard implementation of laws which have an impact on citizens’ communications.
On April 12, 2017, the telecom industry regulator Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) announced a seven-day deadline for subscribers to update their registration details using national identity (ID) cards in a move reportedly to address cybercrime. Mandatory SIM card registration has been in force since March 2012. At the time of the original deadline for conclusion of the exercise in August 2013, the commission reported that 92% of SIM cards were registered. However, investigations into past and recent crimes have revealed the continued existence and use of unregistered SIM cards.
The April 12 directive raised concerns about the conflicting requirements for the validation of SIM cards, with subscribers pointing out that various other forms of identification other than a national ID should be recognised. Pursuant to the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010, Section 9(1), SIM card registration requires the subscriber’s full name, residential address, business address, postal address and identity number as contained in an identity document. Other forms of identification  that have previously been used by subscribers have included employer identity cards, driving licenses, students’ identity cards and passports.
However, following an interim order as well as public statements by the Uganda Law Society and other stakeholders, the Prime Minister issued a directive extending the SIM card verification and validation deadline for a month to May 19, 2017.
The SIM card registration exercise has attracted criticisms from human rights defenders who claim it violates freedom of expression and goes against Article 27 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to privacy by possibly enabling mass surveillance of communications. Further, the absence of a data protection and privacy law continues to expose citizens’ data which is increasingly and now repeatedly being collected by the state. There is accordingly no guarantee that personal data will not be unlawfully processes and used.
Over the past year, national security has been cited as the basis for directives by the UCC including instructions given to telecommunications service providers to enforce two social media shutdowns during 2016.
Although Uganda has signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and also fully subscribes to the international bill of rights, specifically the Universal Declaration for Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights there are repeated affronts to the rights enshrined in these instruments.
It is for this reason that the Collaboration on International Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) calls for the following actions to be taken:

  1. The Government should adopt a multistakeholder approach in decisions affecting the ICT industry in Uganda. Decisions that affect the rights of citizens should be evidence-based and reached in consultation with other stakeholders including academia, civil society, media and the private sector.
  2. The Parliament should immediately pass the Data Protection and Privacy Bill, 2015 subject to the proposed amendments from the citizenry.
  3. Government should harmonise the implementation of laws pertaining to registration of data of citizens, refugees and non-citizens in Uganda, including the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act (2010) and the Registration of Persons Act (2015).
  4. There is a need to reinstate the oversight role of the Parliament over the Minister for ICT in making regulations for the ICT sector. Failure to do so will leave excessive powers within the ambit of the minister and resultantly, lead to abuse.

Read more on the State of Internet Freedom Uganda 2016.
 

The Evolution of Internet Shutdowns in DR Congo

By Arsene Tungali |
In the past seven years, citizens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have experienced a series of intentional interruptions to online communications, affecting the exercise of rights to freedom of expression and information as well as access to services.
The first shutdown of digital communications reported in DRC was in December 2011. The shutdown affected SMS, and lasted 25 days. At the time, few people appreciated the magnitude of this state-initiated act or knew how to respond to it.
The SMS shutdown came in the aftermath of the general elections but just before the announcement of the election results. One of the reasons cited by the government for blocking communication was to prevent the spread of fake results over the internet before the electoral commission announced official results. This SMS communications shutdown went largely unnoticed by the global community who had been captivated earlier in the year by the January 2011 Egyptian internet shutdown.
Three years later in January 2015, the Congolese government again ordered telecommunications companies to block access not only to SMS but also the internet. This shutdown came on the backdrop of protests against a proposed electoral bill. Whereas banks and government agencies were granted access to the internet four days after the shutdown, the general public did not regain access until after three weeks.
The most recent Internet shutdown in DRC occurred on December 19, 2016 – the day President Joseph Kabila was supposed to step down as head of state. There were a lot of planned protests across the country against the president’s stay in office beyond the two term limit, in response to which the government ordered telecom operators to block to social media sites as an attempt to thwart mobilising by protestors.
Recent statistics show that for a population of over 70 million, only 4% of the inhabitants are connected to the Internet due to limited infrastructure and high access costs. Nonetheless, those with access are exploiting various online tools for communication, discourse on governance and activism. According to the State of Internet Freedom in DRC 2016 report, political parties maintain WhatsApp groups for strategic planning of campaign rallies. Meanwhile, through trending hashtags on social media, activists and ordinary citizens create public awareness on issues such as arbitrary arrests and other human rights concerns.
Government actions such as shutdowns, alongside surveillance and censorship practices as documented in the 2016 report, undermine the development of inclusive internet society in the central African country.

“There should be more effort towards developing infrastructure, progressive legislations, private sector investment, local content in local languages and more trainings in digital rights and digital security.”  State of Internet Freedom in DRC 2016

As internet users have become more conscientious of their online rights, many activists and Internet users have turned to the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to circumvent internet blockages. Many more are interested in taking digital security trainings, which explore topics like encryption, mitigating surveillance and tools for safe online communication.

“We knew nothing about VPNs until Internet was blocked in the DRC.” DRC Journalist

The trend of governments initiating internet shutdowns, not only in DRC, has attracted global condemnation. In many cases, these calls have gone unanswered by government officials and communication regulators, leading many to believe that this trend is likely to continue. In the spirit of the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance, other actors (not only government) should continue to play active roles to counter this practice or to support initiatives aimed at promoting more access and affordability in developing countries.

  1. Continued pressure on governments: Stakeholders should keep on applying pressure to those governments that shut down the internet. They should also increase awareness of the implication of a shutdown including the economic losses suffered at a national and micro level. However, this should be supplemented with more research on the economic impact of Internet shutdowns.
  2. The Autonomy of Service Providers: Telecommunications companies often receive orders from governments to block internet access. Clauses in their license agreements force them to comply when such orders are issued, failure of which could result in termination of licences. Nonetheless, telecom companies and ISPs should more actively release details of government information requests, takedown and shutdown notices in a bid to support the transparency of processes and accountability of oversight bodies.
  3. Civil society organisations and awareness: CSOs are among the most vocal groups condemning internet shutdowns in alliance with end-users, activists, journalists, and even private sector. They should also increase the number of trainings and capacity building programs on digital security and inform more people of their digital rights in order to be in a position to demand these rights.
  4. Development of Progressive Policy: In DRC there is a pressing need for new laws that cover the ICT sector. Apart from the constitution, there are only two legislations (the first on Telecommunications and the other establishing the Regulator) both from 2002. The existing legislative and policy framework need to be updated and reframed to provide more clarity on the role of all players in DR Congo’s ICT arena and to provide for online privacy and freedom of expression.