Promoting Effective and Inclusive ICT Policy in Africa

Category Archives: Blog

  HomeCollaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)  /  Blog  /  Blog
02Feb

Africa Digital Rights Fund Supports Mainstreaming of Online Freedoms in Somali Territories

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Ashnah Kalemera |

The digital landscape of Somalia and the breakaway states of Somaliland and Puntland is largely shaped by the region’s history of terrorism and political turmoil. Website censorship, internet disruptions and crackdowns on the media co-exist in a fast-evolving technology sector, within a regressive policy and regulatory environment. With support from the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), three Somali initiatives are working to positively influence this landscape by raising the visibility of digital rights issues, alongside pushing for policy and practice reforms to ensure effective and inclusive use of technology for socio-economic and political development. 

Combined, the initiatives have skilled 235 human rights defenders, media practitioners and activists in safety and security online, and convened multiple stakeholder forums featuring government authorities, the private sector, civil society and law enforcement to promote wider awareness on digital rights and the need to prioritise rights-respecting technology adoption. The initiatives have also amplified efforts on effective utilisation of technology in Covid-19 response measures and worked to close the digital gender gap, focusing some interventions on addressing barriers to women’s meaningful participation in online spaces.

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2020 report ranks Somaliland as ‘partly free’, citing a “consistent erosion of political rights and civic space” evidenced by numerous arrests and detention of journalists and critics, and suspension of media outlets, among others. Assessed separately, Somalia is ranked as ‘not free’ with “impunity for human rights abuses by both state and nonstate actors” being the norm. As a combined region, Somalia’s press freedom ranking is dismal too – at position 163 out of 180 countries assessed as part of the 2020 World Press Freedom Index.

Somalia’s telecommunications sector, which is largely unregulated, has recorded steady growth, with 2020 figures indicating mobile subscriptions at 48% of the population and 10% internet penetration. Mobile money usage is widespread and, according to GSMA’s Mobile Money Regulatory Index, Somalia is ahead of many regional counterparts, having formalised sector regulations during 2019, allowed non-banks to offer electronic and mobile-based financial services, and permitted international mobile money transfers.

The ADRF’s partners – Digital Shelter, the Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA), and the Women in Media in Somalia (WIMISOM)- recognise that increased use of online platforms has the potential to positively shape political participation, innovation, inclusion and the realisation of human rights in Somalia and its breakaway regions.

In response to arrests and intimidation of several journalists and social media activists by the Somali federal government and federal states, digital attacks, and threats from terrorist groups, Digital Shelter spearheaded the “protect our online space” initiative with ADRF support. Under the initiative, Digital Shelter hosted a groundbreaking dialogue on shrinking online civic space in Mogadishu, which was attended by 80 human rights defenders, journalists, bloggers and artists. The dialogue was followed by two digital security training sessions (hosted over three days each), also held in Mogadishu, benefiting 100 participants (47% female), including women human rights defenders, media practitioners and activists. Besides risk assessment, device security, encryption and circumvention, the training featured sessions on tackling misinformation and disinformation. 

Digital Shelter hosted a second dialogue on digital transformation and the future of online civic space in Mogadishu in partnership with the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and Technology (MPTT). This forum brought together 80 government officials, tech activists, ICT experts, media practitioners, and civil society representatives. Speaking as a panelist at the forum, Abdiaziz Duwane, Director General of MPTT, reiterated the government’s commitment to prioritise the use of technology in private and public sectors, and to improve rural connectivity. 

With the success of the two dialogues, Digital Shelter went on to support Somalia’s Covid-19 response measures by hosting an engagement on misinformation and media coverage around Covid-19. Additionally, since September 2020, it has hosted monthly meet ups on digital rights topics, featuring various guest speakers. 

Recognising the role of media practitioners and digital platforms in promoting peace in conflict regions, the Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA), with ADRF support, equipped 120 journalists (40% female) with skills in innovative content development, safety and security online, and journalism for peace and humanitarianism. In addition, SOLJA organised a multi-stakeholder dialogue aimed at understanding misinformation and fact checking. Speaking at the dialogue, Muna Toosane, the Director of Communication at the Somaliland Ministry of Information and National Awareness, stated that ongoing government interventions were focused on increased adoption of technology, while mindful of emerging concerns over the spread of false and misleading information online. 

The engagements by SOLJA were informed by a knowledge, attitudes and perceptions survey on the impact of online platforms on print and broadcast media in Somaliland. Conducted during February and March 2020, the survey targeted 51 media stakeholders including the Ministry of Information, local print, broadcast and online media agencies, independent media practitioners, academia, human rights  and civil society organisations. The survey found that online platforms were perceived to have had a positive impact on governance and human rights in Somaliland. However, journalists’ use of the platforms was being undermined by limited understanding of online safety and security, pervasive hate speech and misinformation.

Further, SOLJA monitored Covid-19 coverage by five public and private media entities during April and May 2020. The assessment of Geeska Afrika, Jamhuuriya, Radio Hargeisa, Horn Cable TV and Saab TV, found that briefings from the Ministry of Health, the activities of the national response committee and prevention measures were the leading topics of reporting. However, messaging was often repetitive with little on societal and behavioural change. The report also found cases of misinformation on social media being reproduced in print and broadcast stories, as well as limited inclusion of women’s voices.

SOLJA has since gone on to engage Somaliland Members of Parliament, legal and religious leaders and the Deputy General Secretary of Somaliland parliament on a draft media bill to replace the Press Law 24/2004.

Digital Shelter and SOLJA’s interventions set the foundation for the third ADRF Somali grantee – Women in Media Initiative Somalia (WIMISOM) – whose work during 2020/2021 is focused on building the digital security skills and knowledge of women journalists (print, broadcast and online) and women-led media organisations in Puntland, Somalia and Somaliland as a means of combating threats against female journalists and their sources. 

Towards the end of 2020, WIMISON conducted a three days training of trainers (ToT) in Puntland, which was launched by a representative from the Puntland Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs (MOWDAFA). The 15 trained trainers are due to support regional training during January and February 2021. In commemoration of the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-based Violence, WIMISOM organised a roundtable discussion on the challenges facing women in journalism and their role in fighting gender-based violence. 

The July 2020 profiling of Digital Shelter’s work by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is testament to the need for continued elevation of digital rights advocacy and network building within wider efforts to advance human rights in Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland – a need that ADRF is proud to have set the pace for by supporting Digital Shelter, SOLJA and WIMISOM.

The ADRF is an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) with support from the Omidyar Network, Ford Foundation, the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

01Feb

Empowering Journalists to Deescalate Conflict and Hate Speech at Election Times

Author CIPESA Posted on

By CIPESA Staff |

Elections are an essential democratic process during which citizens need access to a range of credible information in order to participate meaningfully and to make informed choices. But elections can also be highly charged affairs and, with the increasing proliferation of digital technologies, there is always a danger of rising cases of online hate speech.

This scenario requires that the media – particularly in conflict-prone communities – have the skills for conflicting-sensitive reporting, are able to identify and call out hate speech online and offline, counter misinformation, and develop comprehensive plans for election coverage. Yet, the pressures which the Covid-19 pandemic has exerted on the budgets of media houses, and the restrictions some governments have increasingly placed on media freedom, all undermine the ability of the media to play the role of peace mediators, agenda-setters, and watchdogs.

That is where the role of civil society becomes crucial in ensuring the media to play its needed role at such important democratic processes as elections. It is against this background that, ahead of Uganda’s January 2021 elections, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) conducted a series of training workshops to equip journalists with the relevant skills, knowledge and tools to aid them to report on the elections in a more professional and balanced manner.

“In the 2021 general election, since public rallies were limited to a small number of people, or banned altogether in some districts, there was a heavy reliance on the media by the candidates to reach out to the electorates. It is important that media workers are up to the task of delivering information to citizens in a balanced and neutral manner,” said Paul Kimumwe, Senior Program Officer for Research and Advocacy at CIPESA.

Due to the on-going Covid-19 pandemic, the government initially suspended all public gatherings, among other restrictions although these were progressively eased to allow political rallies in some districts provided they did not exceed 200 attendees.

As part of efforts to discourage mass rallies, the communication regulator, Uganda Communication Commission (UCC), in November 2020 issued the Guidelines on the Use of Media during the General Elections and Campaigns 2021. According to the guidelines, all media stations shall not discriminate against any political party or candidate or subject any political party or candidate to any prejudice in the broadcasting of political adverts.

On the other hand, all private media stations are required to ensure that all their advertising space and airtime was not bought out by one party. Yet, leading opposition candidates were barred from accessing some radio stations and campaigning in several towns.

In the lead up to the elections, journalists had fallen victim to arrests and assaults, there was an attempted block to media outlets running online – the state requested Facebook to block mainly opposition owned YouTube channels, reports of denials of accreditation to cover the elections emerged, thus threatening the plurality of the media.

With the media and digital platforms including social media providing key campaign platforms, there were concerns about the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation, and hate speech online. Earlier in March 2020, UCC had issued a public advisory notice against individuals (including journalists) misusing digital platforms to publish, distribute and forward false, unverified, or misleading stories and reports. In September 2020, the regulator issued a renewed order for online publishers and broadcasters to apply for operating licences.

According to Kimumwe,  the training was structured to provide the trainees with both knowledge and skills-based competences to help them cover elections more effectively and professionally.

“The curriculum included topics such as the role of media in electoral democracy, technology and journalism, electoral media-related laws and policies, peace journalism, how to prepare for and cover election day and the post-election period, and how journalists can ensure their safety,” noted Kimumwe.

He said it was important to include conflict-sensitive reporting given Uganda’s past history of a violent election process and the proliferation of hate speech during the campaigns, especially online. “We believe that the media could help in de-escalating the tensions through reporting as well as providing the much needed context and fact-checking certain utterances by politicians on the campaign trail,” he said.

Ahead of the training, there were various incidents of attacks against journalists on the campaign trail by security forces. It was important therefore that the trainees were equipped with safety and security skills as they covered the elections.

The training included editors and reporters from more than 50 media houses in the Acholi, Bukedi, Busoga, Elgon, and Teso  sub-region benefited from the training,  of whom 36% were female.

“The training helped me acquire skills to report on the elections as well as knowing my role and rights as a journalist” – Julius Wasike, Apex FM reporter, Jinja

“The training awakened my conscience and alertness towards safety and conflict-sensitive reporting” – Gerald Matembu, NBS reporter, Mbale

“I have learnt how to write stories that do not ignite the emotions” – Agnes Aromo, Radio Pacis journalist, Gulu

The campaign period was characterised by high levels of violence, including beatings of journalists, arrests of presidential candidates, and the killing of more than 50 people during a riot. Whereas this created fears that the election day and its aftermath would be marred by violence, the election day and the post-election period have been calm.

Nonetheless, there are allegations that the winning candidate, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, was fraudulently declared winner with 59% of the votes, and the runner-up, Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine, has petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn Museveni’s victory. The blockage of the internet ahead of the elections undermined electoral transparency, severely hindered the work of journalists, and denied citizens’ access to badly needed information.

In November 2020, CIPESA partnered with Media Focus on Africa to bring together 80 key media practitioners and stakeholders including media support organisations, media houses, journalists’ associations, government bodies, independent content producers, civil society, and security organs to deliberate on challenges and opportunities for media during elections in a digital era. Conducted in Kampala, the engagement also gave journalists tips on digital security and fact-checking.

Besides the journalists’ training, CIPESA conducted other engagements that brought together key actors including Members of Parliament, Electoral Commission (EC) officials, election observer groups, and human rights organisations. A December 2020 roundtable saw officials from Facebook and WhatsApp present their efforts to combat cyber violence, harassment,  incitement, bullying, misinformation, fight hate speech and other objectionable content. Political party leaders and the EC officials explained how pivotal digital platforms had become in an election where physical meetings were heavily curtailed.

13Jan

Uganda’s 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

Author CIPESA Writer Posted on

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348989568951967747

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348954155394740227

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1347789536521293826

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1343152881927655425

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.

13Jan

Uganda's 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

Author admin Posted on

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.

11Jan

Internet Shutdowns Threaten Elections in Uganda

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Access Now |

Amidst a growing crackdown on media, human rights defenders, and opposition politicians, the Republic of Uganda will hold general elections on Thursday, January 14. With a dark history of internet and social media blocking during national events, and alarming reports of disruptions already emerging, Ugandan voters’ rights to access information and express opinion are under threat. The #KeepItOn coalition, via an open letter, is calling on the government to ensure open, accessible, and secure internet access for all throughout the election period and beyond.

“Shutting down or blocking the internet while reports of state violence and oppression are emerging is incredibly worrisome,” said Felicia Anthonio, Campaigner and #KeepItOn Lead at Access Now.“Uganda disconnected voters during the 2016 elections, and the #KeepItOn coalition is imploring authorities to set a new standard in 2021 by ensuring reliable, accessible internet to all — during this critical time, and hereafter.”

Access to the internet and social media platforms during the elections in Uganda will help foster transparency around the democratic process and promote active citizen participation. Access Now and 55 other organizations are urging the government of Uganda to:

  • Ensure that the internet, including social media and other digital communication platforms, remains open, accessible, and secure across Uganda throughout the election;
  • Ensure that mobile money, banking, and other financial avenues for transactions remain accessible and secure;
  • Order internet service providers to provide everyone with high-quality, secure, and unrestricted internet access; and
  • Order internet service providers to inform internet users of any potential disruptions and to take all reasonable steps to fix any identified disruptions likely to impact the quality of service they receive.

Internet shutdowns and blockings were a go-to tool for authorities during national events and protests in 2020, including in Myanmar, Burundi, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Belarus, and many other countries. The Ugandan general election will be the African continent’s first in the new decade, and has the potential to set the stage for all other national events that follow.

1 … 41 42 43 44 45 … 70