Blog – Page 70 of 164 – Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

21Feb

Malawi's Democracy and Digital Rights Record to be Spotlighted by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations

admin February 21, 2020

By Michael Kaiyatsa and Ashnah Kalemera |

On February 3, 2020 Malawi scored a democracy victory when the Constitutional Court nullified the May 2019 presidential elections and ordered for fresh polls within 150 days. In that time, the country will also undergo its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by the Human Rights Council, scheduled for May 2020. Whereas previous reviews did not receive elections-related recommendations, Malawi’s democratic credentials – freedom of expression, media freedom, and access to information – have come under scrutiny.

At the upcoming review, it is crucial that the country’s democratic credentials are scrutinised and recommendations to the Malawian government reflect explicitly the need to uphold rights and freedoms online and offline, in line with the state’s obligations under Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

In recent years, Malawi has made significant policy and structural reforms in the technology sector. The third Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS III) (2017–2022), recognises Information and Communications Technology (ICT) among the five priority areas in accelerating development. The strategy aims to increase access to ICT services; provide well-developed ICT broadband and infrastructure services; and increase the number of ICT-skilled and industry-ready workforce in public and private sector institutions. Meanwhile, the National ICT Policy, 2013 is dedicated to promoting the use of ICT in the country, and a national fibre optic backbone project was completed in April 2018.

However, the country must commit towards ensuring a conducive environment for privacy and data protection as well as access to and affordability of the internet and related technology as key enablers of social, economic, and political development.

Freedom of expression

Article 35 of the Malawi Constitution guarantees freedom of expression while Article 36 makes provisions for a free press. Despite these enabling constitutional provisions, other legislation places restrictions on citizens’ exercise of the right to freedom of expression.

The Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act of 2016 provides for restrictions on online communications to “protect public order and national security”. The law also penalises “offensive communication” via online platforms with fines of Malawian Kwacha (MWK) 1,000,000 (USD 1,352) or a maximum 12 months prison sentence. Section 4 of the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act, 2012 makes it an offence to “do any act or utter any words or publish or utter any writing calculated to insult, ridicule or to show disrespect” to the President, the national flag, armorial ensigns, the public seal or any other protected emblem or likeness. The Penal Code penalises sedition (punishable with a fine of up to MWK 354, 845 – USD Dollars 480 – and imprisonment of five years for first time offenders and seven years for subsequent offences), and libel (up to two years imprisonment).

In the previous cycle of the UPR (May 2015), the government of Malawi received three recommendations relating to freedom of expression, opinion and the press from the governments of Austria, Ghana, and Tunisia although none explicitly mentioned the online sphere. Austria and Tunisia’s recommendations to “fully investigate all cases of harassment and intimidation of journalists and human rights defenders with a view of bringing the perpetrators to justice” and “issue a standing invitation to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and ensure an enabling environment for the activities of journalists, human rights defenders and other civil society actors”, respectively were supported. However, Ghana’s recommendation to “decriminalise defamation and incorporate this into the Civil Code” was only “noted”.

Since then, there have been various instances of restrictions on freedom of expression online with notable arrests and prosecution for allegedly insulting the President and First Lady on Facebook; speech against a marginalised group; circulating forged documents; and treason. In July 2019, the Minister of Information and Government Spokesperson warned that the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act, 2016 would be used to take punitive action against online speech viewed as denigrating to others. Furthermore, in the run up to the now annulled elections, the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) issued a notice warning the public against disinformation on social media platforms. The notice stated that the regulator would “work with various stakeholders to seek ways of countering the spread of fake news.”

Freedom of information and censorship of content

Citizens’ right of access to information is provided for under Article 37 of the Constitution. The Access to Information Act of 2017 provides for the right of access to information in the custody of public bodies and relevant private bodies, as well as the processes and procedures for obtaining such information.

However the Official Secrets Act under section 4(1) prohibits disclosure of a wide range of information. The Preservation of Public Security Act (1960), under section 3 (Public Security Regulations) makes it an offense to publish anything likely to be “prejudicial to public security; undermine the authority of, or the public confidence in, the government; promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between any sections of classes or races of the inhabitants of Malawi; or promote industrial unrest in the country.” These two outdated laws place restrictions on access to information, in addition to offenses relating to sedition and publication of false information under the Penal Code. Further, Section 46 of the Penal Code empowers the Minister of Justice to prohibit the publication or importation of any publication that he or she considers to be contrary to the public interest.

During the second cycle of the UPR, the government of Malawi received two recommendations from Norway relating to the freedom of information – “Consolidate the policy gains into legal reforms on issues such as treatment of same-sex relations and access to information” (noted) and “Prioritise public education and information as well as capacity building of state institutions as part of efforts to strengthen implementation of national human rights legislation” (supported).

Since the review, instances of restrictions to access to information online include internet outages on election day in May 2019, with reports suggesting that the disruption was ordered by the government to disrupt information flows and keep citizens un-informed during the election. On censorship of content, amidst concerns over “moral standards, values and aspirations as a nation” within the music industry, in May 2018, the Malawi Censorship Board embarked on a programme to review songs and films with “suspicious moral content” in order to “protect the rights of listeners”. In February 2019, Malawi Police arrested a musician for producing a “blasphemous song”. He was sentenced to two years in jail. According to Freedom House, “several journalists have complained that their articles are sometimes never published online or in print because their editors received directives from officials to refrain from publishing about certain topics”.

Equality and barriers to access

Section 157 of the Communications Act of 2016 mandates MACRA to establish a Universal Service Fund. In October 2019, MACRA announced that it would roll out the Universal Access to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Services Project starting in 2020 to ensure universal coverage in the country, including to rural and under-served areas.

Despite these efforts, ICT adoption in Malawi remains among the lowest in the world – 25.5 mobile broadband subscriptions for every 100 inhabitants as at 2017, the most recent year International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data is available for. The Inclusive Internet Index 2019 which assesses internet availability, affordability, relevance of content and readiness ranks Malawi 98^th out of 100 countries. Malawi is currently ranked 52 out of 61 countries in internet affordability. The average monthly cost of 1GB data is MWK 3,500 (USD 4.8).

The country has maintained a 17.5% value-added tax (VAT) on mobile phones and services, a 16.5% VAT on internet services and an additional 10% excise duty on mobile phone text messages and internet data transfers, introduced in 2015.

In October 2019, the government of Malawi attempted to introduce a 1% withholding tax on mobile money transactions in the 2019/20 National Budget. The proposal was withdrawn following pressure from civil society groups and the private sector.

Data protection and privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 21 of the Constitution of Malawi, which stipulates that “Every person shall have the right to personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to: (a) searches of his or her person, home or property; (b) the seizure of private possessions; or (c) interference with private communications, including mail and all forms of telecommunications”.

Malawi does not have a standalone data protection law. In March 2018, the then Minister of ICT, Nicholas Dausi, announced plans to draft a bill on data protection in response to the changing media and technological landscape. In the meantime, The Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act of 2016 which aims “to put in place mechanisms that safeguard information and communication technology users from fraud, breach of privacy, misuse of information and immoral behaviour brought by the use of information and communication technology” provides some protections. The Act provides for the processing of personal data (section 71); and the rights of data subjects (section 72) while sections 73 and 74 relate to the obligations of a data controller. Under section 84, the Act criminalises unauthorised access, interception, and modification of data with conviction attracting fines of MWK2,000,000 (USD 2,680) and imprisonment for five years. However, article 29 requires service providers to retain data and disclose it when required by courts.

There is also the Communications Act of 2016 which criminalises unlawful interception or interference, and disclosure of electronic communications (section 176), with penalties upon conviction of a fine of MWK 5,000,000 (USD 6,500) and imprisonment for five years.

Section 20(1) of the Access to Information Act of 2017 requires an information holder to notify third parties if information being requested relates to confidential or commercial interest. Third parties are required to respond in writing within 10 working days from the date of receipt of the notice and indicate whether the requested information is considered confidential and provide reasons for non-disclosure. The Act also prohibits information holders from disclosing information whose disclosure would result in the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party (section 29) or which is likely to result in endangering the life, health or safety of a person (section 31). On the other hand, information holders are prohibited from disclosing legally privileged information unless the data subject (patient, client, source or person entitled to the privilege), consents to the release of the information or has waived the privilege or a court order is made to that effect (section 32).

Section 10 of the National Statistics Act, 2013 empowers the National Statistics Organisation (NSO) to collect all types of information, including personal information, nationwide on behalf of the government.

The major weakness of the current legal and policy framework is the lack of a dedicated data governance framework. This is especially problematic considering ongoing mandatory personal data collection exercises such as SIM card registration and biometric data collection as part of the national identification programme. Meanwhile, the government is reported to have rolled out the Consolidated ICT Regulatory Management System (CIRMS), with perceived surveillance capabilities. In 2017, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an application by Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM), one of the country’s mobile service providers, to stop the implementation of the CIRMS on privacy grounds.

As part of Internet Freedom and UPR advocacy efforts at the Human Rights Council, the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), and Small Media made the following recommendations to UN members to consider putting forward to the Malawi delegation during the upcoming review:

In compliance with international standards and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the ICCPR and section 35 of the Malawi Constitution, guarantee freedom of expression and opinion online as well as offline for media and individuals, including marginalised and discriminated groups by repealing all laws that restrict freedom of expression, including the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act, libel and defamation laws.
Refrain from implementing internet shutdowns or disruptions under any circumstances.
Ensure that the 2017 Access to Information Act is fully implemented and all public bodies are in full compliance in providing their data regularly in accessible formats.
Hasten efforts to provide equal access to technology and communications to all citizens, including disadvantaged and marginalised groups of the population, by removing barriers to access and improving affordability, as well as expanding infrastructure and desisting from internet disruptions.
Approve the legislation on personal data protection and privacy in order to provide safeguards on the use of personal data and to protect the right to privacy online.

21Feb

New Mali Cybercrime Law Potentially Problematic to Digital Rights

admin February 21, 2020

By Simone Toussi |

On December 5, 2019, the president of Mali promulgated L aw n° 2019-056 on the Suppression of Cybercrime. Although timely and relevant, a number of provisions pose potential threats to privacy and freedom of expression online, especially in view of Mali’s democracy deficits and low press freedom ranking.

The new law, applies to “any offence committed by means of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in whole or part on the territory of Mali, to any offence committed in cyberspace and whose effects occur on the national territory” (article 2). It is part of a legislative framework deemed necessary to support reforms in the technology sector, pursuant to the 2000 Mali Telecommunications Sector Policy Declaration.

From Privacy Breaches to Digital Authoritarianism

Mali’s Co nstitution provides for privacy of communications under Article 6 while the Personal Data Protection Act of 2013 under article 5 and the Telecommunications Act, 1999 in article 1 buttress the constitutional provision. Unfortunately, the cybercrime law conflicts with these existing right to privacy guarantees.

The Cybercrime Law in articles 74 to 78 authorises search of computers and seizure of data as part of criminal investigations. Moreover, under article 75, data may be copied and stored where “seizure of the medium seems inappropriate”. The law does not provide for how the copied data should be stored, processed or disposed of upon conclusion of investigations. This undermines the data protection principle laid down in article 7 of the Personal Data Protection Act – that personal data must only be kept for a specified period and purpose.

Further, articles 83 to 86 suggest real-time surveillance through interception of communications. Service providers are required to cooperate with authorities, including through ensuring that they have in place the necessary technical means to facilitate interception of communications. These wide powers double as an addition to those given to authorities under article 4 of the Telecommunications Act. This article which states: “When public security or the defense of the territory of Mali so requires, the Government may, for a limited period, requisition all the telecommunications networks established in the territory of Mali, as well as the equipment connected to it and / or prohibit the provision of telecommunications service.” This article has in the past been evoked when the government ordered social media disruptions in 2016 during public protests and more recently during the 2018 elections when it ordered an internet shutdown.

Furthermore, communications service providers are required to put in place mechanisms to monitor systems for potential illegal activity, with failure to inform authorities of illegal activities being punishable by a prison sentence of between six months and two years, a fine of Central African Francs (CFA) 500,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 830 to 3,318 ) or both (article 25).

Warnings for Freedom of Expression

Although Mali’s constitution guarantees freedom of expression and opinion (article 4), the Law on the Press Regime and Press Offences (2000) is vague as it does not explicitly guarantee freedom of the press or media pluralism, nor does it define press offences. It also does not contain any provisions on online media. This constitutes a vacuum preceding the law on the Suppression of Cybercrime which, for its part, contains provisions which directly affect freedom of expression and opinion.

Articles 20 and 21 of the new law punish threats and insults made through an information system, with penalties ranging from six months to 10 years imprisonment, a fine of CFA 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 CFA (USD 1,680 to 16,800), or both. Without a clear definition and detail of the constituent elements of ‘threat’ or ‘insult’, these provisions are open to interpretation that can hinder freedom of expression. This is all the more critical since these terms are also not defined by the law on the press regime and press offences, in its article 33 on incitement and article 38 on defamation.

Moreover, articles 55 and 56 condemn the “public dissemination” of “all printed matter, all writings, drawings, posters, engravings, paintings, photographs, films or stereotypes, matrices or photographic reproductions, emblems, all objects or images that do not tie with good morality.” The corresponding penalties range from six months to seven years imprisonment, a fine of CFA 500,000 to 10,000,000 (USD 840 to 16,800), or both.

Article 54 of the cybercrime law states that “press offenses, committed through information and communication technologies, with the exception of those committed by the press on the internet, are punishable by ordinary law”. Given that the Press Law does not include provisions for online press, it is unclear what the distinction is between press offences via ICT and press offences via the internet. Furthermore, there is a lack of precision on the determination as to whether an offense falls under the cybercrime law, ordinary law, or press law.

Article 23 provides for a fine of CFA 200,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 332 to 3,318), imprisonment of between six months and one year, or both, for fake reports of illegal activity or content online, “with the aim of obtaining its withdrawal or having it stopped by a public eCommunications service provider”. However, activities and contents considered as illegal are not defined by the law, and therefore subject to denunciation.

Way forward

The law is well intentioned in seeking to ensure safe and secure use of ICT in Mali. However, it comes into effect in a fragile context. Provisions relating to data processing as part of criminal investigations pose significant risk to personal data integrity, security and privacy. Further, the law places a huge burden on telecommunications intermediaries to track and monitor network activity, and holds these intermediaries liable for the actions of their clients. Provisions relating to online press offences are inconsistent with legislating the media in the age of digitalisation. The new law and existing related laws therefore require revisions to safeguard and uphold constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and privacy, online and offline.

21Feb

Togo: #KeepItOn During The Elections

admin February 21, 2020

Joint Call |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has joined a call on the Government of Togo to keep digital communications accessible during its upcoming elections.

The country goes to the polls on February 22, 2020, marking the first presidential election since the amendment to the Constitution on term limits. The amendment capped the presidential mandate to two five-year terms. However, it would not apply retrospectively meaning that President Faure Gnassingbe, who succeeded his late father in 2005, can stand for the upcoming election, and again in 2025. In 2017, internet access was disrupted during protests against the family’s 50-year rule of the country.

Access Now, the #KeepItOn campaign lead states that Togo should follow the footsteps of its neighbors Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal who have shown that an open, secure, and accessible internet can foster civic participation during the electioneering processes and beyond, safeguard election results, and promote democracy.

See the full joint call here: English and French.

21Feb

La nouvelle loi du Mali sur la cybercriminalité potentiellement problématique pour les droits numériques

admin February 21, 2020

Par Simone Toussi |
Le 5 décembre 2019, le président du Mali a promulgué la loi n° 2019-056 portant Répression de la Cybercriminalité. Bien qu’opportune et pertinente, certaines de ses dispositions constituent des menaces potentielles à la vie privée et la liberté d’expression en ligne, en particulier, compte tenu des défaillances démocratiques du Mali et de son faible classement en matière de liberté de la presse.
La nouvelle loi s’applique à « toute infraction commise au moyen des technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) en tout ou partie sur le territoire de la République du Mali, toute infraction commise dans le cyberespace et dont les effets se produisent sur le territoire national » (article 2). Elle fait partie d’un cadre législatif jugé nécessaire pour soutenir les réformes dans le secteur des TIC, conformément à la Déclaration de politique sectorielle des télécommunications du Mali, de l’année 2000.
Des atteintes à la vie privée à l’autoritarisme numérique
La Constitution du Mali garantit la confidentialité des communications en vertu de l’article 6, une disposition qui est renforcée par l’article 5 de la loi portant protection des données à caractère personnel de 2013 l’article 1^er de la loi régissant les télécommunications de 1999. La loi sur la cybercriminalité est malheureusement en conflit avec ces prédispositions en faveur du droit à la vie privée.
Les articles 74 à 78 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité autorisent la perquisition et la saisie informatique de données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles. En outre, en vertu de l’article 75, les données peuvent être copiées et stockées lorsque « la saisie du support ne paraît pas appropriée ». La loi ne prévoit pas comment les données copiées doivent être stockées, traitées ou supprimées à l’issue des enquêtes. Cela sape le principe de protection des données énoncé dans l’article 7 de la loi sur la protection des données à caractère personnel – selon lequel les données à caractère personnel ne doivent être conservées que pour une période et un objectif précis.
De plus, les articles 83 à 86 suggèrent une surveillance en temps réel par l’interception des communications. Les prestataires de services sont tenus de coopérer avec les autorités, notamment en veillant à ce qu’ils disposent des moyens techniques nécessaires pour faciliter l’interception des communications. Ces pouvoirs étendus doublent ceux qui sont accordés aux autorités en vertu de l’article 4 de la loi sur les télécommunications. Ce dernier stipule : « Lorsque la sécurité publique ou la défense du territoire du Mali l’exige, le gouvernement peut, pour une durée limitée, réquisitionner tous les réseaux de télécommunications établis sur le territoire du Mali, ainsi que les équipements qui y sont connectés et / ou interdire la fourniture de services de télécommunications. » Cet article a été utilisé par le passé, lorsque le gouvernement a ordonné des perturbations de réseaux sociaux en 2016 lors des manifestations publiques, et plus récemment, une coupure d’Internet lors des élections de 2018.
En outre, les prestataires de services de communication sont tenus de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle des systèmes d’activités illégales potentielles. Tout refus d’informer les autorités de ces activités illégales est passible d’une peine de prison allant de six mois à deux ans, une amende de 500 000 à 2 000 000 francs CFA (830 à 3 318 dollars américain – USD) ou les deux (article 25).
Des alertes pour la liberté d’expression
Bien que la constitution du Mali garantisse la liberté d’expression et d’opinion (article 4), la loi portant régime de la presse et délit de presse (2000) est vague car elle ne garantit pas explicitement la liberté de la presse ou le pluralisme médiatique, ni ne définit les délits de presse. Elle ne contient pas non plus des dispositions sur les médias en ligne. Cela constitue un vide qui précède la loi sur la répression de la cybercriminalité qui, pour sa part, contient des dispositions qui affectent directement la liberté d’expression et d’opinion.
Les articles 20 et 21 de la nouvelle loi punissent les menaces et les insultes faites par le biais d’un système d’information, avec des sanctions allant de six mois à 10 ans d’emprisonnement, et une amende de 1 000 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (1 680 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux. Sans définir ni clairement détailler les éléments constitutifs de la « menace » ou de l ‘ « insulte », ces dispositions sont sujettes à des interprétations pouvant entraver la liberté d’expression. Cela est d’autant plus critique que ces termes ne sont pas non plus définis par la loi portant régime de presse et délit de presse, dans son article 33 sur l’incitation et l’article 38 sur la diffamation.
De plus, les articles 55 et 56 condamnent la « diffusion publique » de « tous imprimés, tous écrits, dessins, affiches, gravures, peintures, photographies, films ou clichés, matrices ou reproductions photographiques, emblèmes, tous objets ou images contraires aux bonnes mœurs. » Les sanctions correspondantes vont de six mois à sept ans d’emprisonnement, une amende de 500 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (840 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux.
L’article 54 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité stipule que les infractions de presse, commises par le biais des technologies de l’information et de la communication, à l’exception de celles commises par la presse sur Internet, sont punies par les peines de droit commun ». Étant donné que la loi sur la presse ne comporte pas de disposition pour la presse en ligne, la distinction entre les délits de presse via les TIC et les délits de presse via internet n’est pas claire. En outre, il y a un manque de précision quant à déterminer si une infraction relève de la loi sur la cybercriminalité, du droit commun ou de la loi sur la presse.
L’article 23 prévoit une amende de 200 000 à 2 000 000 CFA (de 332 à 3 318 dollars américain), une peine d’emprisonnement de six mois à un an, ou les deux, pour les faux signalements d’activités ou contenus illicites, « dans le but d’en obtenir le retrait ou d’en faire cesser la diffusion par un prestataire de services de communications au public par voie électronique ». Cependant, les activités et contenus considérés comme illicites et donc soumis à dénonciation, ne sont pas définis par la loi.
Les mesures à prendre
La loi est bien orientée pour garantir une utilisation sûre et sécurisée des TIC au Mali. Elle entre cependant en vigueur dans un contexte fragile. Les dispositions relatives au traitement des données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles présentent un risque important pour l’intégrité, la sécurité et la confidentialité des données personnelles. En outre, la loi impose une lourde charge aux intermédiaires de télécommunications pour suivre et surveiller l’activité du réseau, et tient ces intermédiaires responsables des actes de leurs clients. Les dispositions relatives aux délits de presse en ligne sont incompatibles avec la législation sur les médias à l’ère du numérique. La nouvelle loi et les lois connexes existantes nécessitent donc des révisions pour sauvegarder et faire respecter les garanties constitutionnelles de la liberté d’expression et de la vie privée, en ligne et hors ligne.

20Feb

Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia and Sudan Revoke YouTube Access Throughout 2010s

admin February 20, 2020

By Thomas Robertson |

YouTube is an important part of African online space because it offers a platform for both traditional media and independent producers to livestream and broadcast multimedia content. Crucially, YouTube comments provide an important channel for social and political discourse in Africa given the high levels of censorship in traditional media. Indeed, in many African countries, YouTube is the second most popular website.

Under the guise of defending public order and morality, authoritarian governments in Africa have blocked access to YouTube within their borders, with ban lengths ranging from several days to more than one year.

In North Africa, four countries – Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya – are reported to have intermittently blocked YouTube access between 2007 and 2019. The most recent outage was in August 2019 in Algeria, where YouTube and other Google services were blocked in the wake of an online video purportedly encouraging the military to depose then de-facto leader Ahmed Gaid Salah . This followed a consistent pattern of internet disruptions in the country, both before and after the resignation of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Much earlier, Morocco had blocked access to YouTube for five days in 2007 after videos posted endorsed the independence of Western Sahara. Meanwhile, from 2007 to 2011, YouTube users in Tunisia faced intermittent blockages of the site, and when not completely blocked, certain protest videos remained inaccessible from within the country. In similarity, Libya also blocked YouTube from 2010 to 2011 after videos of anti-Gaddafi protests were posted.

In sub-Saharan Africa, YouTube was blocked in Sudan in the wake of its 2010 elections when videos revealed fraud committed by electoral staff, and again in 2012 after the posting of the film The Innocence of Muslims. Both of these events were preceded by widespread protests. In 2011, Eritrea blocked YouTube, and access to the website remains unreliable, but more so due to bandwidth concerns than censorship.

In April 2018, Chad instituted a 15-month ban on social media, including YouTube, that was only lifted in July 2019. This ban was a reaction to waves of protest against constitutional amendments that would allow President Idriss Déby to further extend his rule. Ethiopia intermittently blocked YouTube along with other social media platforms for several days in June 2019 after reports of an attempted coup against the Amhara Regional State Government.

More recently, a YouTube block was documented by the Open Observatory of Network Interference during December 2019 in Burundi without official explanation. With an estimated internet penetration rate of 7.4%, Burundi remains one of the least digitally connected countries in Africa. Nonetheless, President Pierre Nkurunziza’s government habitually restricts media and online expression. Earlier in 2019, the National Communication Council (NCC) banned Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and their correspondents, regardless of nationality, from broadcasting in the country. Leading up to the alleged restriction on YouTube in December 2019, the Burundian government suspended the comment section on the YouTube channel of Nawe, an independent media outlet, and prohibited new channel uploads. Nawe’s website and Twitter, however, remained active.

According to Google’s Transparency Report, more than 11 African governments have made content removal requests relating to YouTube since 2009. During 2012-2013, Google received inquiries and requests from 20 countries relating to YouTube videos that contained clips of the movie “Innocence of Muslims”. From Africa, three governments – Djibouti, Egypt and Libya – requested that the videos be removed. According to Google, “due to difficult circumstances” the videos were temporarily restricted from view. It is unclear what the length of the temporary restriction was.

Earlier in 2010, Libya made 147 requests to remove more than 1,000 YouTube videos. Google removed “portions” of the videos for violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines but did not remove the rest of the videos. Google does not indicate the exact number of video portions which were removed. Since then, Google has gone on to receive content removal requests from eight other African governments – Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

More than 22 governments have conducted internet shutdowns since 2016. They often cite the need to prevent the use of the internet as a tool to spread false information, and to allegedly fan public disorder and undermine national security. Where complete shutdowns have not occured, more targeted blockages have been sought, particularly of media showing government corruption, civil disobedience, dissenting opinions or contentious statistics that contradict government figures shared on platforms like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp.

Although the various blockages of YouTube in Africa have since ended, the instances documented in this report indicate that blocking YouTube may well be a strategy of internet manipulation and civic suppression, with trends suggesting that such restrictions to online content may continue into the new decade across Africa.

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