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07Sep

The Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2020 (FIFAfrica20) is Open For Registration! 

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FIFAfrica20 |
On September 28-30, 2020, the seventh edition of the annual Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) will be co-hosted by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Paradigm Initiative (PIN).
FIFAfrica20 will be a hybrid event featuring online and offline engagements. In-country satellite events will be hosted in the Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo ), Dakar (Senegal) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania).
We look forward to the lineup of speakers from a diversity of organisations across the world coming together to deliberate on issues such as misinformation, network disruptions, the impact of Covid-19 on digital rights (including on issues such as education, elections, access to information) through to online content moderation, strategic litigation, diversity and inclusivity online, consumer protection, artificial intelligence, and the continued concerns on data privacy.
As has been a constant, the Forum will also feature practical skills and knowledge for human rights defenders, media workers and policy makers on relevant topics. We will also host a digital security hub where participants can directly engage virtually with experts on their digital security concerns and questions.
Meanwhile, in support of digital rights advocacy and research communities of practice, we will host a Digital Rights Networks’ Convention aimed at showcasing and strengthening linkages between collaborative movements on digital rights in Africa.
Register for the Forum here

02Sep

Call for Applications: Level Up Your OrgSec!

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Announcement |

Are you worried about hackers and phishing? Are you an organisation with digital security concerns?  Do you want to pursue activism and advocacy safely and securely? If these descriptions sound like your organisation, then you shouldn’t miss out on joining this exciting and fast-paced program working with human rights technologists to improve your organisational security!

If you are a technologist, trainer, systems auditor, or IT staffer working with communities of human rights defenders and are interested in applying and developing skills for supporting organisations described above, we are looking for you too!

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is seeking activists and human rights defenders in Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania looking to Level Up their organisational and information systems security capacity.

Organisations engaged will be supported to assess the information security standing of their offices, networks, devices, and assets such as accounts, databases, and websites. They will additionally receive support to establish more robust information systems with strong security safeguards. Organisations will additionally be advised on developing IT Security policies and building internal capacity to maintain security in the long-term.

To indicate your interest, fill in the form for organisations here and individuals here by September 13, 2020

25Aug

Niger Passes New Law on Interception of Communications

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By Simone Toussi and Thomas Robertson |

In response to national security challenges related to terrorism, ethnic conflict and organized crime, Niger promulgated a new law on the interception of communications, with surveillance implications that threaten the right to free speech and privacy online.

In April 2020, the Nigerien Council of Ministers tabled a bill aimed at securing a legitimate basis for intercepting electronic communications “in the interest of national security” (Exposé de Motifs). The bill was unanimously adopted on May 29 by the National Assembly as opposition politicians boycotted the vote, arguing that it allows for widespread monitoring of communications “under false pretences other than those related to security and the fight against terrorism.” In spite of the boycott, the bill became law pursuant to Article 58 of the Nigerien Constitution, which states that if a bill receives a majority vote at the National Assembly, it is immediately promulgated except in the case of a presidential veto, which has not occurred.

Regional security context

Niger is part of the Sahel region of West Africa, where misguided counterterrorism schemes have disproportionately led to societal stigmatisation and violence against marginalised Fulani/Peul communities. Since the beginning of 2020, over 150 people, predominantly Fulani men, have disappeared or been the victim of extrajudicial killings by Nigerien security forces. Neighbouring  Burkina Faso has also faced scrutiny for the cruelty with which state-sponsored militias have worked in Fulani areas, including the May 2020 extrajudicial killings of 12 men and the subsequent investigation widely criticised by civil society actors. Though Burkina Faso has not engaged in communication interception, a 2019 law punishes media outlets who criticise Burkinabé defence forces. Meanwhile, Mali, which also shares a border with Niger, passed a cybercrime law in 2019 which permits real-time surveillance through interception of communications. The new law, which grants government access to digital communications data, could further exacerbate the ongoing unwarranted state-sanctioned violence against ethnic groups across the Sahel.

Digital authoritarianism

The new law comes into force in the context of a regulatory framework that already infringes upon the free speech of Nigerien citizens. The country’s law on cybercrime adopted in June 2019 criminalises the “dissemination, production and making available to others of data that may disturb public order or threaten human dignity through an information system” (Article 31). This article has been the basis of a crackdown on freedom of expression online, including the arrest of a dozen activists between March and April 2020 after their WhatsApp and Facebook communications featuring criticism of the government were intercepted by the state. In 2016, an activist was convicted of “conspiracy to overthrow a constitutional order” after he used Facebook to criticize Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou’s counterterrorism approach.

The law on the interception of digital communications seeks to “reconcile the exercise of free access to information on the basis of national security in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.” However, it violates democratic principles by granting sweeping powers to the executive branch of government. Under article 2, only the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Customs and Trade have the authority to order an interception of communication. Furthermore, according to article 6, the committee created to oversee the law’s enforcement – the National Commission for Oversight of Communication Interception (CNCIS) – is composed of seven government officials, all of whom are appointed by members of the presidential cabinet.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, Niger had an internet penetration rate of 5.25% in 2018. This is among the lowest penetration rates in the world, and in Africa where access to the internet is only lower in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia.

On the press freedom front, Niger is in dire straits, with a continued crackdown on dissent. Indeed, despite legislative provisions for media freedom under the Press Freedom law, Niger has a negative track record in its treatment of independent media, as highlighted above regarding the implementation of Article 31 of the cybercrime law. Arrest of journalists on politically-motivated charges is commonplace, and COVID-19 has also been the premise of law enforcement action against journalists. For instance, in March 2020, Mamane Kaka Touda, was arrested and detained for three weeks for social media posts about a suspected case of COVID-19 in a Nigerien hospital.

Furthermore, Niger’s 2018 ranking on the Human Development Index was 189th out of the 189 countries surveyed. These metrics arise confusion as to why the Nigerien government focuses its energy on digital surveillance in a country where internet access is already disparate and more immediate socio-economic development issues threaten the Nigerien people.

With the approaching presidential elections scheduled for December 2020, the adoption of restrictive laws related to citizens’ use of technology clearly follows a logic specific to authoritarian African governments, according to a 2019 report on the techno-political dimensions of internet disruptions in Africa.

Privacy under threat

Taken as a whole, the law on the interception of digital communications violates article 29 of the Nigerien Constitution, which guarantees the secrecy of correspondence and communications. Article 2 delimits the scope of interception to “attacks on state security and national unity, attacks on national defence and territorial integrity, prevention and combating of terrorism and transnational organized crime, and prevention of all forms of foreign interference and collusion with the enemy.”  As the specific characteristics and nature of communications falling under these broad categories are not defined, this article potentially exposes Nigerien citizens to persistent surveillance. In addition, articles 24, 32 and 33 require public officials, network operators and service providers to cooperate with interception operations, failure of which may result in imprisonment for a period between one to five years and a fine ranging from two to ten million CFA francs (USD 3,445 to 17,222).

Although the law provides a semblance of oversight, the procedure of interception leaves room for violation of privacy. Article 11 states that records related to interception are destroyed on the president’s order and expire a month after the order for communication interception has been issued, and that investigation reports on the operation of the interception are written. However, article 12 allows the extended storage of interception records for an unspecified period stating that transcriptions of interceptions “must be destroyed as soon as their preservation is no longer necessary” to preserve national security, and that the aforementioned destruction of transcripts is documented.

With this new law and the Cybercrime Act, Niger joins the horde of African countries including Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Tanzania, which use national security as a pretext to introduce legislation that limits freedom of expression and opinion, the right to privacy and other civil liberties. Past abuses on critical voices by the state justify the reservations about its apparent aim of combating criminal activity and terrorism. If maintained, more violations and arrests against dissenting voices can be expected as Niger prepares for the presidential elections this December. Hence the law should be repealed and other countries in Africa should desist from replicating similar regressive policies and legislation.

25Aug

Le Niger Adopte une Nouvelle Loi sur l’Interception des Communications Électroniques

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Par Simone Toussi et Thomas Robertson |
Face aux problèmes de la sécurité nationale liée au terrorisme, au conflit ethnique, et au crime organisée, le Niger a promulgué une nouvelle loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques, avec  des ramifications qui menacent la liberté d’expression  et le droit à la vie privée en ligne.
En avril 2020, le Conseil des Ministres nigérien a déposé un projet de loi visant à sécuriser une base légitime pour «les interceptions des communications émises par voie électronique en vue de la recherche des renseignements intéressant la sécurité nationale» (Exposé de Motifs). Le 29 mai, l’Assemblé nationale a adopté à l’unanimité le projet de loi, alors que l’opposition politique a boycotté le vote, arguant que cette loi autorise la surveillance généralisée de communication «sous de fallacieux prétextes, autres que ceux relatifs à la sécurité et la lutte antiterroriste.» Malgré le boycott, le projet de loi est devenu loi en vertu de l’article 58 de la constitution nigérienne, qui spécifie que si un projet de loi reçoit le vote de la majorité absolue à l’Assemblé nationale, il est promulgué immédiatement sauf dans le cas d’un veto présidentiel, ce qui n’a pas eu lieu. 
Contexte de sécurité régionale
Le Niger fait partie de la région sahélienne d’Afrique de l’ouest, où les programmes de lutte contre le terrorisme malavisés ont disproportionnellement conduit  à la stigmatisation sociale et la violence contre les communautés marginalisées peules. Depuis le début de 2020, plus de 150 personnes, principalement les hommes peuls, ont disparus ou ont été victimes des exécutions extrajudiciaires par les forces de sécurité nigériennes. Le Burkina Faso voisin a été dénoncé aussi pour la cruauté avec laquelle les milices de l’État ont travaillé aux régions peuls, dont l’exécution extrajudiciaire de 12 hommes et l’enquête subséquente que les acteurs de la société civile ont largement critiqué. Bien que le Burkina Faso ne soit pas engagé à l’interception de communication, une loi de 2019 punit les organes de presse qui critiquent les forces de défense burkinabés. Pendant ce temps, le Mali qui partage également une frontière avec Niger, a adopté une loi sur la cybercriminalité en 2019 qui prévoit la surveillance en temps réel par l’interception des communications. Cette loi nouvelle, qui donne l’accès gouvernemental aux données de communication numérique, peut encore aggraver la violence injustifiée actuelle de l’État   contre les communautés ethniques à travers le Sahel.
L’autoritarisme numérique
La nouvelle loi entre en vigueur dans le contexte d’un cadre réglementaire qui déjà empiète sur la liberté d’expression des citoyens nigériens. La loi du pays sur la cybercriminalité adoptée en juin 2019 criminalise «le fait pour une personne de produire, de mettre à la disposition d’autrui ou de diffuser des données de nature à troubler l’ordre public ou à porter atteinte à la dignité humaine par le biais d’un système d’information» (Article 31). Cet article était la base d’une répression sur la liberté d’expression en ligne, dont l’arrestation d’une dizaine d’activistes entre mars et avril 2020 après que  l’Etat ait intercepté leurs communications critiquant le gouvernement sur WhatsApp et Facebook. En 2016, un militant a été condamné de «complot visant à renverser le pouvoir» après avoir utilisé Facebook pour critiquer l’action antiterroriste du président nigérien Mahamadou Issoufou.
La loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques tente «de concilier l’exercice de cette liberté [d’accéder à l’information] avec les impératifs de sécurité nationale dans un contexte de lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée » (Exposé de Motifs). Elle viole cependant les principes démocratiques en accordant des pouvoirs considérables à l’exécutif du gouvernement. En vertu de l’article 2, seuls le Président, le Premier Ministre, le Ministre de la Défense, le Ministre de l’Intérieur, le Ministre de la Justice, et le Ministre des Douanes sont autorisés de commander une interception de communication. Par ailleurs, selon l’article 6, la commission crée pour superviser l’exécution de la loi – la Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Interceptions de Sécurité (CNCIS) – est composée de sept représentants du gouvernement, à tous ceux qui ont désigné par les membres du cabinet présidentiel. 
Selon l’Union international des télécommunications, le taux de pénétration d’internet du Niger était 5,25% en 2018.  Ce taux compte parmi les plus faibles au monde, et en Afrique où l’accès à l’Internet n’est plus faible qu’au Burundi, en République Centrafricaine, en Erythrée, en Guinée-Bissau et en Somalie.
Sur le plan de la liberté de la presse, le Niger est dans une situation grave avec la répression actuelle sur la dissidence. En effet, malgré les dispositions législatives en faveur de la liberté des médias sous la loi portant liberté de la presse (Ordonnance 2010-35), le Niger a des antécédents défavorables quant au traitement des médias indépendants comme souligné ci-dessus concernant l’exécution de l’article 31 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité. L’arrestation des journalistes sur des accusations motivées par des considérations politiques est banal, et le COVID-19 a aussi contribué à l’application de la loi contre les journalistes. Par exemple, en mars 2020, Mamane Kaka Touda a été arrêté et détenu pour trois semaines à cause de ses publications sur les réseaux sociaux au sujet d’un cas suspect de COVID-19 dans un hôpital nigérien.
En outre, le rang du Niger sur l’indice de développement humain 2018 a été 189ème sur les 189 pays examinés. Ces indicateurs amènent à se demander pourquoi le gouvernement nigérien se concentre sur la surveillance numérique alors que l’accès à l’Internet est déjà disparate, et que des problèmes de développement socioéconomique plus immédiats menacent le peuple nigérien. 
Avec les élections présidentielles imminentes fixée pour décembre 2020, en réalité, l’adoption des lois restrictives liées à l’usage  de la technologie par le citoyen suit une logique particulière aux gouvernements autoritaires africains selon un rapport de 2019 sur les dimensions techno-politiques des interruptions d’Internet en Afrique.
La vie privée menacée
La loi sur l’interception des communications électroniques dans son ensemble viole l’article 29 de la constitution nigérienne, qui assure le secret des correspondances et des communications. L’article 2 circonscrit les contours de l’interception: «atteinte à la sûreté de l’Etat et à l’unité nationale, atteinte à la défense nationale et à l’intégrité territoriale, prévention et lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale organisée, et prévention de toute forme d’ingérence étrangère et intelligence avec l’ennemi.» Comme les caractéristiques spécifiques et la nature des communications entrant dans ces  grandes catégories ne sont pas définies, cet article peut exposer les citoyens nigériens à la surveillance permanente. De plus, les articles 24, 32, et 33 exigent aux agents publics, aux operateurs de reseaux et aux fournisseurs de services de coopérer avec les opérations d’interception, dont la défaillance entraînerait l’emprisonnement pour une durée d’un à cinq ans et une amende de deux à dix million francs CFA (USD 3 445 à 17 222).
Bien que la loi prévoit en apparence une surveillance indépendante, l’opération d’interception est susceptible de porter atteinte à la vie privée. L’article 11 spécifie que les enregistrements liés à l’interception sont détruits sur l’ordre du président et expirent un mois après que l’ordre d’intercepter les communications soit donné, et les rapports d’enquête sur l’exploitation de l’interception rédigés. L’article 12 peut cependant permettre la sauvegarde prolongée des enregistrements de l’interception pour une durée indéterminée, spécifiant que «les transcriptions d’interceptions doivent être détruites dès que leur conservation n’est plus indispensable à la réalisation des fins mentionnés à l’article 2 [atteinte à la sûreté d’Etat, etc.]» et «il est dressé procès-verbal de l’opération de destruction.»
Avec cette nouvelle loi et la loi sur la cybercriminalité, le Niger rejoint la horde des pays africains dont le Cameroun, le Tchad, le Nigéria et la Tanzanie qui utilise la sécurité nationale comme prétexte pour introduire les législations qui limitent la liberté d’expression et d’opinion, le droit à la vie privée et bien d’autres libertés civiles. L’ancienne maltraitance des voix critiques par l’Etat justifie les réserves sur son objectif apparent de combattre l’activité criminelle et le terrorisme. Si la loi est maintenue, l’on peut s’attendre à plus de violations et d’arrestations contre les voix dissidentes, du moment où le Niger se prépare pour les élections présidentielles en décembre prochain.

19Aug

Tanzania Entrenches Digital Rights Repression Amidst Covid-19 Denialism and a Looming Election

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By Edrine Wanyama |

On July 17, 2020, the Tanzania government issued new Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 that apply to online content production, hosting and dissemination. The regulations entrench the licencing and taxation of bloggers, online discussion forums, radio and television webcasters, and repress online speech, privacy and access to information.

The passage of the new regulations raises concerns over free speech and access to information as they come into force barely three months before Tanzania holds presidential elections on October 28, 2020, a period when civic engagement and transparency and accountability in governance requires access to a range of information and viewpoints. The regulations also come amidst Covid-19 denialism by President Pombe Magufuli’s government, which has denied citizens access to vital information and undermined efforts to contain the spread of the virus in the east African country.

Tanzania has been widely criticised for its lacklustre response to the Covid-19 pandemic, yet the regulations aim to further stifle access to health information by prohibiting the publication of “content with information with regards to the outbreak of a deadly or contagious disease in the country or elsewhere without the approval of the respective authorities.”

Earlier this year, the communications regulator, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), banned the independent Mwananchi newspaper from publishing online for six months, after accusing it of carrying a false and misleading news report on Covid-19. At the time, TCRA said the publisher had flouted the much-criticised Electronic and Postal Communications (EPOCA) (Online Content) Regulations, 2018, which have been replaced by the new regulations. On July 9, 2020, the TCRA suspended the independent Kwanza Online TV for 11 months, over a report on its Instagram account that cited a health alert issued by the United States embassy in Tanzania, on the Covid-19 situation in the country.

In July 2020, United Nations experts noted that Covid-19 had compounded pre-existing human rights concerns in Tanzania, notably regarding the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information. They added that Tanzania’s government was not meeting its commitments on information sharing and transparency after it stopped releasing statistics on Covid-19 cases at the end of April, and President Magufuli declared the country virus-free in early June.

The new regulations require online content service providers, internet service providers, and application services licensees to pay exorbitant fees for licensing and renewal of licences. Providers of “online content service”, described as “content broadcasting to the public through internet websites, application software, forums, blogs, weblogs, microblogs, public account, instant messaging tools, online live streaming, aggregators and other related platforms”, pay an application fee of Tanzania Shillings (TZS) 100,000 (USD 44); initial licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; annual licence fee of USD 440 or USD 220; and a licence renewal fee of USD 440 or USD 220. The higher fees are to be paid by providers of “news and current affairs”; the lower ones by providers of entertainment, educational or religious content.

Radio and television operators that stream content online will pay USD 22 in application fees, USD 88 for the initial license, another USD 88 in annual licence fees, and USD 88 in licence renewal fees. The duration of all licences is three years.

Similar measures have previously been adopted to gag online content providers including broadcasters and bloggers during elections as was in the Broadcasting Services (Content) (The Political Party Elections Broadcasts) Code 2015.

The new regulations introduce a problematic definition of “news related content”, namely “online news information gathering, compiling, editing, publication and broadcasting in a manner similar or that bears a resemblance to traditional media services provision.” This essentially covers all information provided online. Similarly, the definition of an “online forum” has been expanded compared to that in the 2018 regulations, to cover every possible online fora and “online platforms”. These definitions are so vague that their application is potentially boundless in scope. With the past experiences of crackdown on media houses and journalists in Tanzania, these definitions appear to be calculated to target individuals and organisations such as Jamii Forums that champion free expression.

The new regulations raise the requirements for applicants, as well as the obligations of licensees, which could have a chilling effect on digital rights. Under regulation 6(2), applicants must provide certified copies of the certificate of registration, tax identification number, tax clearance certificate (for companies or non-government organisations) and national identity card. Furthermore, the applicant must provide a list of owners and the management team, editorial guidelines (if applying to provide “news and current affairs”) and technical description of facilities to be used. Moreover, under regulation 6(i), the TCRA may require additional documents.

The regulations expand the obligations of online content service providers and, under regulation 9(g),   require licensees to remove prohibited content immediately upon being ordered by TCRA. This does not provide room for verification or the right to be heard before removal is effected. Further regulation 9(h) and regulation 14 hold the licensee accountable for all information published. This imposes a heavy burden on licensees, including bloggers with no journalistic skills or resources to verify all information before publication, which curtails freedom of expression and denies citizens access to a variety of information. Moreover, for some unexplained reason, regulation 10 bars radio and television stations that hold district or regional license from live streaming content.

Some provisions potentially violate the right to privacy and undermine free expression. The requirement to install cameras in internet cafes and to store images recorded for 12 months has been retained under regulation 13. Further, the requirement to assign static public Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to computers in cafes would discourage usage of circumvention tools, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN), which enable users to bypass network restrictions and to enhance their anonymity.

Furthermore, regulation 6 in as far it requires attachment of a tax identification number certificate, national identity card of the applicant and curriculum vitae, as well as academic qualifications of staff in regulation 12 (b), exposes private data. In the absence of a law on data protection and privacy in Tanzania, there is no guarantee that individuals’ data will be safeguarded against unauthorised access and disclosure.

The new regulations expand the list of prohibited content to a wide and ambiguous scope that  fails to meet the internationally acceptable limitations to freedom of expression. For instance, while para.2 of the Third Schedule protects personal privacy and human dignity, it renders a publisher liable for slander and defamation even where the published information is true. This ignores the widely acceptable defence of truth to defamation. Moreover, it is increasingly recommended globally that defamation should be decriminalised.

Furthermore, para.3 prohibits publication of information on public security, violence and national security, including undefined “news, statements or rumors for the purpose of ridicule, abuse or harming the reputation, prestige or status of Tanzania or its national anthem, symbols and logos.” This prohibition is contrary to freedom of expression guarantees provided for under article 8 of the Constitution of Tanzania. The prohibition of publication of information on demonstrations and marches potentially inhibits freedom of assembly and association, which are also guaranteed by article 20 Tanzania’s Constitution.

Failure by the regulations to clearly define prohibited information, such as that considered a threat to national security or public order in paras. 3(d) and (h), to the national currency or the national economy in para.3(f), or information relating to terrorist attacks, droughts, weather forecasts or occurrence of natural calamities para.8(b), could be used by advantaged authorities to wantonly punish critics of government and its leaders.

Regulation 21 introduces a general penalty for breaching the regulations where no specific punishment has been prescribed: a fine of not less than USD 2,200 or imprisonment for a term of not less than 12 months, or both.

In their current state the regulations will further narrow the already shrinking space for digital rights and freedoms in Tanzania, as they will muzzle freedom of expression, access to information, and individual privacy. Such freedoms are particularly important in times of elections and a pandemic. The government should therefore consider repealing or amending the EPOCA (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 so that they progressively promote the enjoyment of digital rights and freedoms.

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