Promoting Effective and Inclusive ICT Policy in Africa

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29Jun

Leveraging the African Union Data Policy Framework to Bolster National Data Governance Practices

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

Earlier this month, stakeholders from around Africa met in Kigali, Rwanda to discuss how to implement the recommendations of the African Union (AU) Data Policy Framework to enable member states to improve their data governance policies and practices, including respect for citizens’ rights. Held on the sidelines of the World Telecommunications Development Conference (WTDC), the convening discussed the prevalent data governance challenges and how the Policy Framework can help to address them.

In 2021, the AU Commission embarked on developing the Policy Framework, which was endorsed by the Executive Council in February this year. The Policy Framework offers guidance to member states on how to derive value from data generated by governments and private entities. Further, it makes the case for policy interventions to optimise cross-border data flows, such as harmonising data governance frameworks. The Policy Framework envisages the creation of a shared data space and standards that regulate data production and use across the continent. In turn, the AU is devising an implementation plan to support the domestication of the Policy Framework by member states and putting in place the necessary mechanisms to enable data flows across the continent.

The continental policy comes at a time when the role of data in powering socio-economic growth is taking centre-stage, but so are various data governance concerns that are undermining more effective usage of data and the uptake of data-based initiatives. In some countries, the data regulation is retrogressive and unduly restricts data flows. Other countries lack data protection laws. 

Prevailing digital rights concerns include increased surveillance, proliferation of regressive laws and regulations that undermine digitalisation efforts, large-scale data collection programmes by governments amidst weak oversight and rampant privacy breaches including by business entities. Many governments in the region are undertaking rapid data collection and digitalisation initiatives, such as digital ID, biometric voters’ cards, drivers’ licences and SIM card registration.

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) was invited to participate at the Kigali convening, specifically to discuss what the Framework means for ordinary citizens and how its implementation can uphold rights, sustain trust and enable data flows that support economic growth and digital transformation.

Speaking at the meeting, CIPESA’s Dr. Wairagala Wakabi indicated that the Framework promises to deliver enhanced data governance in Africa. By providing common benchmarks for states to embrace and be assessed by, it could help engender good policies and practices, which is not the case in some countries currently. However, for this to be realised, common challenges must be addressed. These challenges mostly relate to the security and privacy of data, and the fear by governments that flexible data outflows would undermine local capacity development and job creation and result in revenue losses.

Further, Dr. Wakabi stated that citizens’ trust was “critical to stimulating” the uptake of data-based initiatives. Yet low trust prevailed, mostly due to the lack of public education and awareness among data subjects, little or no information provided on uses of data, and citizens’ previous experiences of data misuse and data breaches by the state or data controllers. To build trust, African countries should institute procedures and systems to ensure data is not breached or abused; enact enabling laws to protect data and rights; conduct adequate education on data handling and usage; grow data controllers’ understanding of the regulatory requirements and ensure they comply with them.

The aspiration of the Framework to increase policy harmonisation and improve data flows across countries holds much promise for economic integration and offers citizens and businesses wider opportunities including for trade beyond national borders. The facilitation of flexible data flows and greater public access to data held by governments and private entities can provide evidence to inform policy and aid the attainment of development objectives such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Similarly, flexible data flows guided by common frameworks that are well defined can serve the public good by enabling innovation, jobs creation and e-services development, and facilitating intra-Africa digital trade. As such, there is a need to address policy measures that restrict data flows across borders and mandatory legal requirements that data be stored or processed in a specific country.

“Many countries have prohibited cross-border transfers of personal data unless authorised by Data Protection Authorities or other designated entity. Common drivers are fears of losing local digital economy jobs, tax revenue and local capacity, for example in data infrastructure, and the need to ensure adequate data security. However, laws and policies are rarely clear on the rationale behind data localisation,” said Dr. Wakabi.

African countries have adopted different approaches to data localisation. Many use laws on financial services (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda), cybersecurity and cybercrimes (Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), telecom (Cameroon, Rwanda and Nigeria) and data protection (Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda) to place restrictions on cross-border data transfer. Some specify data that can not be exported without authorisation. Kenya specifies all public data; Nigeria mentions all government data, subscriber and consumer data; while Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tunisia cite personal information. Sierra Leone prohibits the cross-border transfer of subscribers’ registration information. Other countries have data location requirements related to telecom providers’ data, data of entities operating in sectors of “vital importance”, in e-commerce, and those offering cloud services. 

The laws generally provide similar grounds for when personal data may be sent across borders, with transfers easier to make to countries that offer an equivalent level of protection. However, recognition of equivalence among fellow African countries is limited. For instance, Morocco’s 2015 list of countries with a sufficient level of protection featured no African country, while Tunisia’s 2018 list of 49 countries had just Algeria, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, and Senegal.

Those national data sovereignty moves can hamper regional data sharing, trade, foreign investment, and innovation, and run counter to the AU Policy Framework. They also do not always result in greater protection for data or respect for citizens’ rights. As such, a framework is needed to govern cross-border flows, but it should primarily be enabling and not restrictive as is currently the case with most countries.

In sum, it is crucial to build trust among citizens and governments, including by generating evidence to debunk theories that inform current localisation moves and to demonstrate that data can flow freely across borders without undermining national interests. There is also a need to create awareness among citizens of their data rights and how to protect them, grow awareness among data controllers of their obligations and conduct audits of their performance. This alongside empowering regulators to function independently and with sufficient resources. Finally, it is essential to build the capacity of data collectors, regulators, government departments and data intermediaries to robustly protect the rights of data subjects.

23Jun

Digital Authoritarianism hurting Democratic Participation in Africa

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

By Paul Kimumwe |

Although Africa has registered remarkable growth in digitisation with increased internet penetration and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), the proliferation of ICT and other new and emerging technologies has significantly expanded states’ toolkit for repression and social control, deepening human rights challenges.

Several African governments have embraced digital authoritarianism characterised by aggressive and sophisticated measures that curtail internet freedoms. These have included using digital technologies to surveil, repress and manipulate domestic and foreign populations. Although state surveillance is not new, it has dramatically expanded with the increased digitisation.

Further, surveillance has been digitalised and automated, making mass surveillance possible. Numerous countries across the continent have adopted policies and enacted laws that permit states and their respective agencies, especially security services, to use ICT to conduct surveillance; impose liability on telecommunication intermediaries to facilitate the interception of communication; stipulate the mandatory collection of biometric data; limit the use of encryption; require the localisation of personal data; and grant law enforcement agents broad search and seizure powers.

In this brief CIPESA discusses the key control measures adopted by some African states in enforcing digital authoritarianism and their effect on democratic participation.

The brief notes that the rise of digital authoritarianism has greatly undermined citizens’ rights to enjoy the benefits of digital technology. Several of the tools and control measures that states have employed include the surveillance and interception of communications, poorly regulated collection and processing of personal data including biometrics, as well as the weaponisation of laws that have fundamentally undermined the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Collectively, these controls measures have continued to undermine citizens’ digital rights and democratic participation and cement authoritarians’ hold on political power.

Read the full report here: Digital Authoritarianism And Democratic Participation in Africa  

22Jun

New Report: Disinformation Pathways and Effects on Democracy and Human Rights in Africa

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

By Simone Toussi |

Disinformation is on the rise in Africa, spurred by increased internet connectivity and social media usage. In 2021, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated that 33% of the continent’s population of 1.37 billion had access to the internet, with about 255 million individuals active on Facebook. YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest, Instagram, and LinkedIn are the other platforms with large numbers of users. 

This rapid adoption of online platforms has led to shifts in political discourse, enabling strong public participation, organising, and online protests that have in some cases, such as Sudan and Algeria, contributed to the overthrow of autocratic leaders. Consequently, many governments in the region consider the internet and social media a threat and have unleashed repressive strategies to curtail their use, including retrogressive legislation, internet shutdowns, and disinformation campaigns. 

A new report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) explores the nature, perpetrators, pathways and effects of disinformation in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda and shows how contextual similarities have underpinned the proliferation of disinformation. These countries are classified as ‘Not Free’ or ‘Partly free’ in terms of speech and internet freedom and are largely authoritarian with a penchant for constraining the digital space.

According to the report, elections and armed conflicts are key drivers of disinformation. Yet authoritarianism has played a big part too, as governments have used both disinformation and the response to it to entrench themselves in power, shrink civic space, and target opponents and critics.

The increased use of digital technologies, low media literacy levels, the lucrative nature of disinformation, the fractious politics (Kenya and Uganda), conflict situations (such as in Ethiopia, Cameroon and Nigeria), and the closure of civic space that makes offline speech dangerous (Uganda, Ethiopia, Cameroon) fuel disinformation.

Common tactics used by disinformation actors include mass sharing, which leverages the viral power of social media and the lucrative nature of disinformation for “influencers for hire”. There is also a significant rise in political astroturfing, mass brigading and the use of fake and pseudonymous social media accounts. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) on Facebook and Twitter is prevalent too, and between 2019 and 2021, Facebook dismantled several such schemes, some of which perpetuated disinformation, with many linked to French and Russian actors. 

The main disinformation instigators are political actors including governments, ruling parties and opposition parties, while key spreaders are social media “gurus” or digital “influencers” that are often paid to create or spread disinformation.

Weaponising Disinformation Laws

In the countries studied, governments have weaponised disinformation laws to silence critical voices. Rather than serving to counter the ills of disinformation, related laws have in most cases been used to target political critics while government officials complicit in promoting disinformation are protected. 

Moreover, the retrogressive laws enacted to combat disinformation have been used to further stifle legitimate expression while hampering access to critical and pluralistic information. Instructively, some of these laws are vague and ambiguous and fail to distinguish between disinformation or falsified information, often making their enforcement open to the subjective interpretation of law enforcement agencies, who become the arbiters of the truth. The laws have been used to arrest, charge and prosecute individuals, thereby promoting censorship and undermining legitimate speech.

Cameroon’s Law on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime and the law governing electronic communications are often cited in actions against spreaders of “false news”, while Nigeria has employed the Criminal Code Act and the Cybercrimes Act 2015. Ethiopia enacted the problematic Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation in 2020. Without a specific disinformation law, Uganda relies on the Penal Code Act, the Computer Misuse Act of 2011 and the Communications Act of 2013 to target “false news”. Kenya relies on the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act 2018, the Kenya Information and Communications Act, 2013 (KICA) and the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008. 

Impact of Disinformation on Democracy and Human Rights

Disinformation erodes trust in democratic institutions, hampers citizens’ ability to make informed decisions, and affects the right of citizens to hold individual opinions without interference. Disinformation can therefore hijack the political discourse and undermine elections by limiting access to credible, factual and pluralistic information about candidates, parties, and issues, in order to make informed choices. 

When it occurs in an election context, disinformation affects electoral processes by fuelling politically motivated violence and preventing citizens and democracy actors from accessing credible, timely, and reliable information. In times of socio-economic or political crises, disinformation uses existing ethnic divisions to further divide, and perpetuates tribal antagonisms through hate speech. 

The existence of countermeasures such as unclear legal provisions further creates a climate of fear that leads to self-censorship, in the same way that internet shutdowns and content takedowns ordered by governments to limit the spread of false information instead limit access to pluralistic information. In turn, these counter-measures further restrict the participation of many citizens in online political discourse and limit their ability to express themselves without fear of retaliatory attacks. 

Across all the five study countries, platforms’ remedial measures to tackle misinformation and disinformation remain ineffective and inadequate.

Recommendations

Governments:

  • Desist from selectively applying laws on countering disinformation to targeting critics, media, the political opposition and human rights groups. 
  • Repeal repressive laws and amend existing ones such as Kenya’s Computer Misuse Act, Uganda’s Communications Act, Ethiopia’s Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation, and Cameroon’s Law on Cyber Security and Cybercrime, to provide clear definitions of disinformation and ensure they conform to international human rights standards. 
  • Train law enforcement agencies as to what constitutes disinformation and how to combat it without stifling citizens’ rights.

Intermediaries:

  • Deepen collaboration with local media and civil society groups in African countries to identify, debunk and moderate disinformation. 
  • Work to reduce the processing and response times for complaints regarding disinformation content reported to encourage reporting and to minimise the circulation of disinformation.
  • Increase transparency in content moderation measures and conduct periodic reviews of policies with broad public consultations.

Media:

  • Build the capacity of journalists and editors on fact-checking and countering disinformation online. 
  • Work closely with fact-checkers to identify and expose disinformation.
  • Institute in-house systems to enhance fact-checking and information verification.

Civil Society:

  • Undertake strategic litigation to challenge retrogressive laws and practices that undermine access to the internet and digital rights under the guise of fighting disinformation. 
  • Advocate against laws and practices that hamper the ability of journalists to provide accurate information, and hamper citizens’ rights to information and free expression. 
  • Monitor, report and hold states accountable for their violations of international human rights principles including restrictions on the enjoyment of digital rights.

Read the full report: Disinformation Pathways and Effects: Case Studies from Five African Countries. 

13Jun

Disinformation in Africa: Promoting Rights-Respecting Responses

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

By Evelyn Lirri |

In June 2020, a coalition of civil society groups launched an interactive portal to track and analyse disinformation laws, policies and patterns of enforcement across Africa. The portal was developed against a backdrop of rapidly accelerating state action on COVID-19 disinformation.

Two years on, as online disinformation is increasingly becoming prevalent, spurred by the growth in access to the internet and social media platforms, more African governments have devised new ways of countering and responding to disinformation, which are often in conflict with international human rights standards.  In an effort to continue keeping track of regulatory approaches and policy responses to disinformation on the continent and serve as a reference tool for human rights advocates, a revamped portal with dynamic features and multilingual data has been launched. The revamped platform is dubbed Lexota – Laws on Expression Online: Tracker and Analysis. 

Speaking at Lexota’s launch on May 10, 2022, Jacqueline Rowe, Policy Officer at Global Partners Digital, noted that it is crucial for civil society organisations, internet freedom actors, and human rights defenders in the region to have up-to-date and accurate information on disinformation laws and policies to inform effective advocacy against problematic restrictions with implications on human rights. 

In her keynote address at the launch, Julie Owono, the Executive Director of Internet Sans Frontières, noted that governments across the world are increasingly responding to the spread of disinformation online through legal restrictions, increased surveillance, and internet shutdowns – all of which pose risks for individual human rights. Owono stated that these trends are particularly noticeable in Sub-Saharan Africa where nearly every country has a vague law or policy that includes restrictions on sharing or publishing false information online. Indeed, recent research shows that given the broad definitions of what constitutes disinformation in various laws, provisions had been weaponised to silence critics, shrink civic space, and hand authoritarian governments an excuse to assert greater power over the digital sphere. 

The impact of disinformation on journalism was highlighted by Muthoni Mumo, the Sub-Saharan Africa representative at the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). “Disinformation laws have been weaponised to arrest and prosecute journalists arbitrarily in the guise of fighting fake news and propaganda,” said Mumo. She cited a recent case in Somaliland – a breakaway state in Somalia – where a number of journalists were arrested in April 2022 for reporting on a prison riot. Although some of the journalists have since been released, three remained in jail for allegedly posting propaganda and reporting false news.    

According to Edrine Wanyama, the Legal Officer at the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), Lexota provides a comparative understanding of the disparities in the disinformation legal landscape in Africa, including legitimate and illegitimate measures and responses. Similarly, Sylvie Siyam from PROTÉGÉ QV stated that beyond being used as a source of information and research, Lexota will be a critical advocacy tool for policymaking and sharing of best practices with regard to combating disinformation while upholding human rights.

Lexota’s launch called for more skills development in digital literacy and fact-checking for citizens and government officials. Owono stated that government officials were “some of the biggest purveyors of disinformation and they should be educated to know that buying into any disinformation campaign will not win an election. Restoring trust with citizens can help that.” The launch also called for increased stakeholder participation in policy processes as well as strategic litigation to challenge regressive laws. 

Lexota partners – Article 19 West Africa, CIPESA, Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, Global Partners Digital, and Protege QV – are undertaking capacity building, national and regional advocacy on disinformation and freedom of expression across Africa. To date, CIPESA has conducted training on disinformation and human rights advocacy in Arusha, Tanzania, and Mbarara, Uganda benefiting over 45 individuals, including journalists, civil society actors, lawyers, and academia. 

In addition, CIPESA delivered a lecture on disinformation and electoral processes as part of the Association of World Election Bodies (AWEB) capacity-building programme on elections and media. The lecture explored current trends, aspects of disinformation, and their impact on elections; existing responses to disinformation threats and their effectiveness; and good practices to combat the spread of disinformation. Further, it explored the roles and strategies of election management bodies to counter disinformation; as well as media monitoring and oversight. The engagements build on past regional skilling efforts by CIPESA and Global Partners Digital.

12Jun

Le Forum sur la liberté d’Internet en Afrique (FIFAfrica) 2022 se tiendra à Lusaka, en Zambie

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

Annonce |

La Collaboration sur les Politiques Internationales des TIC pour l’Afrique orientale et australe (CIPESA) est heureuse d’annoncer le retour en présentiel de la neuvième édition du Forum annuel sur la liberté d’Internet en Afrique (FIFAfrica22). L’événement historique, qui réunit un éventail de parties prenantes de tous les domaines de la gouvernance de l’internet et des droits numériques en Afrique et au-delà, aura lieu à Lusaka, en Zambie, du 26 au 29 septembre 2022.

Ce sera la première fois depuis 2019 que FIFAfrica se tiendra physiquement. Sous l’ombre de la COVID-19, les éditions 2020 et 2021 de FIFAfrica ont adopté une approche hybride. Le retour en présentiel est une réponse au succès mondial dans le contrôle de la propagation du coronavirus et à la levée des restrictions qui en résulte par divers pays.

En outre, le retour en présentiel est une reconnaissance des défis techniques inhérents aux approches virtuelles et hybrides, et de leur incapacité commune à offrir un niveau équivalent de mise en réseau, d’engagement avec des acteurs clés tels que les décideurs politiques et une plate-forme d’engagement pour le renforcement des capacités et les interactions physiques. Les précédentes éditions physiques de FIFAfrica ont eu lieu à Kampala, en Ouganda ; Johannesbourg, Afrique du Sud ; Accra, Ghana ; et Addis-Abeba, Éthiopie.

L’accueil du premier FIFAfrica en personne à la suite de COVID-19 en Zambie est une reconnaissance du rôle central du pays dans la décolonisation et la démocratisation de l’Afrique, ainsi que de ses efforts pour faire avancer la transformation numérique pour le développement durable. La Zambie a longtemps été un bastion de stabilité caractérisé par des élections régulières et un transfert pacifique du pouvoir. De plus, le pays a toujours été un courtier de la paix sur le continent et un hôte de mouvements anticoloniaux. Le premier président de la Zambie, Kenneth Kaunda, était un membre fondateur du Mulungushi Club, une formation d’États africains nouvellement indépendants pour instiguer la libération totale du continent. Le club était une pierre angulaire de l’intégration régionale.

En 2021, la Zambie comptait environ 20 millions d’abonnés au téléphone mobile et 10 millions d’abonnés à Internet mobile, ce qui représente des taux de pénétration de 110% et 50% respectivement. Le gouvernement, par l’intermédiaire de l’Autorité zambienne des technologies de l’information et de la communication (ZICTA), entreprend diverses initiatives pour stimuler l’accès à Internet et son utilisation abordable dans divers secteurs. La Zambie a une loi sur la protection des données et la vie privée et, en mai 2022, fait partie des 13 pays à avoir ratifié la Convention de l’Union africaine sur la cybersécurité et la protection des données à caractère personnel.

Bien qu’elle ait connu une certaine régression ces dernières années, la Zambie occupe toujours un rang élevé en matière de liberté et de gouvernance par rapport à la plupart des pays de la région. Par exemple, sur l’indice de la démocratie, la Zambie est classée comme un régime hybride (seuls sept pays africains sont mieux classés comme démocraties complètes ou imparfaites, tandis que 23 pays sont classés comme autoritaires). Dans les indices « Liberté dans le Monde » (Freedom in the World) et « Liberté sur Internet » (Freedom on the Net), il est classé comme partiellement libre, alors qu’un grand nombre de pays africains sont classés comme non libres.

Le gouvernement précédent a restreint l’accès à certains médias en ligne, arrêté des journalistes et des dirigeants de l’opposition pour leurs publications sur les réseaux sociaux, principalement sur des allégations de diffamation contre l’ancien président Edgar Lungu, et aurait mené une surveillance de masse. Lors des élections de 2021 qui ont chassé le président Lungu du pouvoir, la Zambie a rejoint la ligue des pays qui ont initié des perturbations du réseau. Le nouveau gouvernement zambien qui a remporté les élections d’août 2021 a mis un terme à la tendance régressive du président Lungu, mais le nouveau président réformiste a lui-même rencontré quelques difficultés.

Au moment où le continent connaît une inquiétante régression de la démocratie, la Zambie se place ainsi en posture avantageuse pour faire le point sur l’état des droits et de la démocratie numériques et construire une solidarité et des partenariats entre les principales parties prenantes afin de faire progresser les droits de l’homme en ligne, en particulier les droits à l’accès à l’information, à la vie privée et à la liberté d’expression sur le continent.

Pendant quatre jours, l’agenda de FIFAfrica22 proposera des panels, des ateliers, des expositions et des présentations. Toutes les interactions maintiendront et respecteront les procédures opérationnelles standard (POS) COVID-19 nationales.

L’inscription et l’appel à propositions de session ouvriront plus tard ce mois-ci. Pour les dernières nouvelles sur le Forum, suivez @cipesaug. Les hashtags de l’événement sont #FIFAfrica22 et #InternetFreedomAfrica.

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