The rapid growth in internet access and use in Africa, particularly through the mobile internet, makes it imperative for civil society and for internet companies committed to the free flow of information and freedom of expression to better understand how intermediary liability works (or does not work).
This paper looks at the state of intermediary liability in Uganda. In particular, it explores regulations relevant to the responsibilities of intermediaries. It cites incidences of content takedowns, attempts to block access to internet content, mobile content filtering and media persecutions, and the applicable sections of the law.
Download the full paper here
This Independent research was commissioned by the Association for Progressive Communications and supported by Google Africa.
See Policing the Internet: Intermediary Liability in Africa for further details.
Phone tapping: Uganda Govt seeks 200bn
By Edris Kiggundu
The government is looking for Shs 205bn to purchase equipment and establish systems for the interception of communication and registration of simcards.
This request is contained in the ministerial policy statement for the Office of the Presidency for financial year 2012/2013. The money will be channelled through the Internal Security Organisation, which will work closely with the Office of the President. The statement, tabled before Parliament this week, neither gives details about the nature or type of equipment to be purchased nor a breakdown of how the money will be spent.
All the statement says is that the money will be used to “procure and acquire assorted classified communication equipment.”
The statement says the equipment was supposed to be purchased last year but it was not possible because of financial constraints.
How it works
In July 2010, Parliament passed a bill, seeking to authorise the tapping of telephones and other private communication for security purposes. President Museveni assented to it a couple of months later. Now law, it provides for interception and monitoring of certain communication in the course of transmission. It also allows the monitoring of postal or any other related service or system.
The law stipulates that only a designated judge issues a warrant of interception if there is reasonable ground to believe that the offence might result into a threat to life. A warrant would also be issued if the judge believes that information to be gathered concerns an actual threat to national security, national economic interest, and/or threat to national interest involving the state’s international relations. A warrant shall be valid for only three months.
Reliable sources in intelligence told us yesterday that at the moment government has limited capacity to tap phones. Government, they added, uses equipment it procured from Libya in the early 1990s.
“What is done is to get a printout from the telecommunication companies whereby they can know that phone number X called Y,” one source told us.
Even then, in most cases, security agencies are not in position to know exactly what X told Y. The new equipment is, therefore, expected to bridge this gap. According to various internet sites, there are a number of ways a telephone conversation can be monitored. For instance, Wikipedia says, one of the parties may record the conversation either on a tape or solid-state recording device, or on a computer running call recording software.
The recording, whether overt or covert, may be started manually, automatically by detecting sound on the line (VOX), or automatically whenever the phone is off the hook. As for mobile phones, especially the 3G type, the same website points out that they are harder to monitor because they use digitally-encoded and compressed transmission.
However, they can be tapped with the cooperation of the phone company, something the government has done before. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 July bombings, security agencies working with a major telecom company, were able to track and arrest three suspects – Idris Magondu, 42, Hussein Hassan Agad, 27, and Muhammed Aden Addow, 25 – thanks a phone that had been abandoned at a bar in Makindye.
Using the serial number of the phone, investigators were able to discern records related to calls made or received on the phone. That’s how they got to know that the phone belonged or was at least one time frequently used by Hussein Hassan. The ministerial policy statement notes that regional threats of terrorism have since increased and so has subversion, espionage and politically motivated crime. Therefore, the equipment will help government curtail these vices.
Simon Mulongo, the Bubulo West lawmaker who doubles as Vice Chairman of Parliamentary committee on Internal Affairs, told The Observer that he supported government’s decision to intercept communication provided this was not abused. On the price of the equipment, Mulongo said: “It is something that Parliament will have to crosscheck to establish whether the figure is reasonable.”
This article was published by the The Observer newspaper on July 13, 2012.
Tanzania Should Support Its Netizens
By Lillian Nalwoga
Tanzanian citizens are increasingly using social media networks to share information and, to a lesser extent, demand more transparency in the conduct of public affairs. But there are concerns about the apparent intolerance by Tanzanian authorities of online activity deemed critical of the government.
For over 40 years, Tanzania under the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has enjoyed political stability and national unity more than most of the country’s neighbours. However, the October 2010 election won by incumbent president Jakaya Kikwete saw CCM’s popularity slide from 80.2% of the vote in December 2005 to 61.2%.
This decline seems to have brought with it a worrying intolerance for critical media, both online and offline. Journalists have been intimidated and harassed by state officials for questioning the government’s democratic credentials. Some political and social demonstrations have been repressed. To fight this new authoritarianism, several Tanzanians, including politicians, have resorted to social media to express their views.
The country has laws that seem to improve citizens’ rights to information and the freedom of expression, parts of the legislation are restrictive. Article 18 of the Tanzanian Constitution for instance guarantees the right to freedom of expression, and to seek, receive and impart information. These constitutional guarantees are insufficiently implemented in the Tanzanian domestic legislation. Besides, the government has been implicated in attempts to block websites and weblogs whose content it perceives as a threat.
Despite the above scenario, Tanzanian web forums such as Jamiiforums serve as citizens’ channels to comment on key issues such as corruption. The website editors have been interrogated on numerous occasions over issues that government has considered sensitive information. Unconfirmed reports have also surfaced that the Tanzanian government is attempting to clone these forums to portray information that befits it.
Social media has also played a part in sharing vital information about sensitive topics in Tanzania. Such a case was the Gongo la Mboto blasts that killed over 20 people and injured at least 184 people in the Dar es Salaam army base in February 2011.
Although army officials declined to discuss the cause of the blasts, netizens captured events of the blasts by uploading and sharing photos of victims. Tanzanian twitters using #BombsInDar shared information about the possible causes of the blast while calling on government to investigate their cause. The netizens demanded the resignation of the Minister of Defence, a call supported by the country’s opposition.
This rise in use of social media can perhaps be attributed to the growth in internet penetration from 5% in 2005 to 11% in June 2010 (Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority statistics). In addition, there are 21 million mobile phone subscribers.
The Tanzania government needs to make information more accessible to the public for transparency and accountability, as well as to invest in infrastructure, literacy, policy and regulatory frameworks to boost internet usage in empowering citizens.
Uganda moves to block social networks
By Michael Malakata – IDG News Service
In the face of uprisings meant to force regime change in various African countries, the Ugandan government is moving to shut down social media networks, including Facebook and Twitter.
The closure of social media networks in Uganda comes only a month after the Cameroonian government banned social media. In Swaziland, social media networks were also banned early this month in a bid by the government to quell demonstrations over political reforms and the rising cost of living.
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=1B751884-1A64-67EA-E4B344D7C6F285C7
OECD Estimates Economic Impact of Shutting Down Internet And Mobile Phone Services in Egypt
The current shutdown of internet and communications services in Egypt will have a pronounced economic impact. It is estimated to have incurred direct costs of at minimum USD 90 million in lost revenues due to blocked telecommunications and internet services. However, this amount does not include the secondary economic impacts which resulted from a loss of business in other sectors affected by the shutdown of communication services, such as e-commerce, tourism and call centres. Read more: