Coalition of Civil Society Groups Launches Tool to Track Responses to Disinformation in Sub Saharan Africa

Press Release |
Today, Global Partners Digital (GPD), ARTICLE 19, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), PROTEGE QV and  the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria jointly launched an interactive map to track and analyse disinformation laws, policies and patterns of enforcement across Sub-Saharan Africa.
The map offers a birds-eye view of trends in state responses to disinformation across the region, as well as in-depth analysis of the state of play in individual countries, using a bespoke framework to assess whether laws, policies and other state responses are human rights-respecting.
Developed against a backdrop of rapidly accelerating state action on COVID-19 related disinformation, the map is an open, iterative product. At the time of launch, it covers 31 countries (see below for the full list), with an aim to expand this in the coming months. All data, analysis and insight on the map has been generated by groups and actors based in Africa.

Countries currently covered by the map: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

For further details, contact [email protected]
Quotes from groups:
Commenting on the launch, Article19 said: “Disinformation constitutes a major threat to the freedom of expression and the right to access information and it is geared to mislead the population and influence their opinions and views. The fight against disinformation requires a multifaceted approach ranging from education, awareness raising, proactive disclosure of public interest information, fact checking; independent regulation and effective self-regulation by legacy media and social media platforms among others. With the COVID19 pandemic, it is more important than ever that collective efforts are made to curb the impact of disinformation on public health and the rights of the public to know.”
“National legislation and policies aimed at countering and responding to disinformation should always strike the right balance between the need to protect people against this practice and the respect of human rights especially freedom of expression. Such measures should not be used to interfere or block divergent opinions and dissident voices. We are pleased to have been part of this joint initiative that has enabled us to work together with sister organisations in and outside the continent to publish this disinformation tracker.
This tracker is a start-up that will usher in more in-depth work analysing laws and policies around the disinformation phenomenon in the region, engaging media and civil society in analysis-based advocacy geared towards governments and intermediaries to protect human rights—particularly freedom of expression—in their disinformation response, to ensure any restriction and penalty are always justifiable, proportionate and compliant with international standards.”
The Centre for Human Rights said: “Disinformation is a global phenomenon whose effects are felt across the political, economic and social spectrum. Efforts being undertaken to counter the scourge of disinformation should respect human rights, especially freedom of expression. In addition, a sustained approach is required and should involve different stakeholders employing  legal and other  internationally set standards. The tracker is an attempt to showcase the nature of state regulation of disinformation in sub-saharan Africa and provides a basis for tackling this scourge.”
CIPESA said: “Speculation, false and misleading information circulating online is a challenge, not only in Africa but across the world. Legislative means against misinformation often undermine free speech and media. The tracker is a great resource for activists, to drive evidence based advocacy, policy engagement and litigation.”
GPD said: “Governments around the world have been grappling with how to respond to disinformation—a challenge given new urgency by the COVID-19 crisis. However, many of their responses pose real risks for freedom of expression. We hope that this tracker will support groups in the Africa region working to promote approaches to the disinformation challenge that protect fundamental human rights.”
PROTEGE QV said: “It is the responsibility of states to protect the security of their citizens, in the online space just as in the offline. Among threats to security online, disinformation has particular prominence, and can carry severe consequences. In seeking to tackle it, governments should balance the need to maintain security by promoting accurate information to citizens with the attendant risk of suppressing legitimate forms of expression. This tracker will serve as a key resource for groups working to ensure citizens have access to timely and accurate information.”

Why Access to Information on Covid-19 is Crucial to Persons with Disabilities in Africa

By Paul Kimumwe |

While the Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) continues to ravage the world, there is growing concern that critical messages about the disease that are disseminated by health authorities, telecom companies, and broadcasters are not reaching persons with visual and hearing impairments.

In order to create public awareness about the pandemic, African governments are using mass media, notably radio and television, as well as Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), particularly  social media and mobile telephony platforms. The countries with confirmed Covid-19 cases, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda, have restricted people’s movements and banned public meetings.

Various telecommunication companies, such as MTN Uganda, Safaricom in Kenya, MTN Ghana, have also removed service charges on mobile money transactions and discounted internet data prices so as to increase accessibility and affordability of the internet.

In South Africa, Vodacom and MTN are “zero-rating” information portals run by the country’s Department of Health, meaning they allow users to access vital information about the disease even when they do not have data bundles. Vodacom customers can get free vital information about the Covid-19 pandemic by visiting the website, www.sacoronavirus.co.za. 

However, concern is growing that some persons with disabilities are being left behind in accessing information on Covid-19. This is because, despite the recent expansion in the usage of ICT in the region, a large section of persons with disabilities faces digital exclusion due to lack of access and affordability of the requisite ICT tools and equipment,  as well as failure by broadcasters and telecom operators to provide information and services in disability friendly formats. 

Ms. Judy Okite, a disability rights activist and founder of the Association for Accessibility and Equality, says that in Kenya, it is “once in a while when they [media and government] remember there is a [need for a] sign language interpreter during Covid-19 related press briefing but, it’s very unsatisfactory.” She adds that there are no messages in braille, and for live broadcasts of discussions by national experts leading the fight against Covid-19, there is neither sign language nor captions.

The situation is similar in Ethiopia, according to Awoke Dagnew, who works with the Ethiopian charity organisation Together! He says most persons with disabilities in Ethiopia are being excluded because “most of the messages and platforms are in formats and via [electronic] channels that persons with disabilities have limited access to,” namely, television, radio, social media and telephone messages.

While several African countries have  enacted laws and policies to advance the rights of persons with disabilities, including those on access and use of ICT, these laws have largely remained on paper as key provisions are neither being implemented nor enforced. For example, while broadcasters are required by law in many African countries to have sign language insets or subtitles in newscasts, educational programmes and other programmes covering national events, there is little evidence of this being done. Indeed, some key television broadcasts and public service announcements related to Covid-19 have neither sign language interpretation nor sub-titling.

See: Removing Barriers to ICT Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities in  Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

“In Uganda, [whereas] the Ministry of Health released a video in sign language with general information, still graphics used in most informative materials are not in font types, sizes and colour combinations [optimised] for the visually impaired,” observed Mohamed Kimbugwe, the Digitalization and Human Rights Technical Advisor at the GIZ office in Uganda. Moreover, while major television stations have sign language interpretation on major new bulletins, this is not always the case for other crucial public awareness campaigns, such as press conferences and updates from the national Covid-19 task force.

In Nigeria, sections 24 and 25 of the Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) require public hospitals and the government to ensure that persons with disabilities are given special considerations, including provision of special communication during situations of risk, emergicies (such as Covid-19) and other natural causes.

 In the wake of declaring Covid-19 a global pandemic, the WHO  issued guidelines to mitigate the impact of the outbreak on persons with disabilities. It called upon governments to take action to ensure that persons with disabilities are not left behind in the fight against Covid-19. Regarding Covid-19 public health information and communication,  the WHO urged governments to:

  • Include captioning and, where possible, sign language for all live and recorded events and communications. This includes national addresses, press briefings, and live social media. 
  • Convert public materials into “Easy Read” format so that they are accessible for people with intellectual disability or cognitive impairment. 
  • Develop accessible written information products by using appropriate document formats, (such as “Word”), with structured headings, large print, braille versions and formats for people who are deafblind. 
  • Include captions for images used within documents or on social media. Use images that are inclusive and do not stigmatise disability. 
  • Work with disability organisations, including advocacy bodies and disability service providers to disseminate public health information.

The International Disability Alliance (IDA) has also issued key recommendations towards a disability-inclusive Covid-19 response, including the requirement that persons with disabilities must receive information about infection mitigating tips, public restriction plans, and the services offered, in a diversity of accessible formats with use of accessible technologies.

The implementation of the WHO and IDA guidelines and recommendations need not be treated as a favour, as African governments are obligated under both the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa (ACHPER PD) to provide equal opportunities, accessibility and inclusion of persons with disabilities. Specifically, Article 9(b) of the CRPD requires states to take appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities have access, on an equal basis with others, to information, communications and other services, including electronic services and emergency services.

Additionally, Article 25(b) of the CRPD requires states to take all appropriate measures to ensure access for persons with disabilities to health services (and information) that are gender-sensitive, including health-related rehabilitation.

On the other hand, state are required, under Article 19(2) of the ACHPER PD Protocol to put in place policy, legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure these rights, on the basis of equality, including requiring private entities, such as telecom and television companies, to provide information and services in accessible and usable formats for persons with disabilities.

Re-echoing the WHO guidelines, Okite recommends that governments and other agencies, including telecom and broadcasting companies involved in the design and dissemination of Covid-19 related public information, should ensure that they make all the information accessible to persons with disabilities. “If it’s online content, let it be in an accessible format, in some instances use diagrams, in a live interview /discussion let there be transcriptions or sign language that all persons may get information first-hand to avoid anxiety and fear and misunderstanding.” 

Televised programmes that feature experts discussing Covid-19 should have sign language interpreters and transcriptions to enable persons with visual and hearing impairments to benefit from the expert knowledge.

In Uganda, the National Union for Persons with Disability (NUDIPU) has called for the suspension of the social media tax (OTT) whose introduction in 2018 exacerbated the digital exclusion of marginalised populations, to enhance access to information and ease communication for persons with disabilities, especially the deaf.

In designing and disseminating Covid-19 related messages, telecom companies need to ensure that these are in multiple formats – including SMS, audio, visual and in disability friendly formats.

Centre for Human Rights and CIPESA Conduct Study on Civil Society in the Context of the Digital Age in Africa

By Center for Human Rights and CIPESA |
The study on Civil society in the digital age in Africa: identifying threats and mounting pushbacks was undertaken by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to explore the extent of state-sponsored digital challenges that the civil society in Africa is faced with. It illustrates the challenges faced by civil society organisations and the importance of digital security measures.
Considering the digital threats contributing to the shrinking civic space on the continent, the study highlights the international and regional framework governing the activities of civil society. It further maps the national legislative and policy threats against civil society in selected African countries: Egypt, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The study shows how these digital threats not only limit the operations and existence of civic society but also impede the enjoyment of human rights such as the freedoms of association, assembly and the right to freedom of expression.
Based on the findings of the study, it is argued that civil society organisations are significant players in the democratic development and protection and promotion of human rights and thus, their operations and rights should be safeguarded. The study, therefore, calls on African governments to respect their obligations under international human rights law and adopt measures that enable civil society to perform their mandate in promoting good governance, accountability and respect of human rights on the continent, especially in the context of the digital age. The study also recommends the civil society to devise methods of countering digital threats. This could be done through the development and implementation of human rights-sensitive organisational data protection, digital security policies and enhanced organisational understanding of how they can harness digital technologies for digital security purposes. Further, the study encourages the private sector and funders to support and complement the efforts by the civil society in advancing digital rights and opening up the civic space.


Civil society in the digital age in Africa: identifying threats and mounting pushbacks

English

Civil society in the digital age in Africa identifying threats and mounting pushbacks

This report documents the threats to civil society in the digital age by examining the legislative and regulatory framework, as well as state action in four countries in Africa: Egypt, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The recommendations emanating from the research call for the states to revise and repeal identified restrictive laws and align them with international standards.
Download the full study here.

Silencing Critical Voices: Our Online Civic Space is Shrinking

By Digital Shelter |

Somalia had recorded steady growth in telephone penetration – with 7.6 mobile subscribers. However, internet penetration remains low – 2% as at 2017, according to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The adoption of technology has expanded civic space in the post conflict era, with social media platforms and blogs empowering journalists, activists and human rights defenders to document and report human abuses, mobilize public opinioncampaign for reforms, share relevant content and information, and build networks at national and global level.

However, the past three years have seen a rise in threats against online freedom of expression, such as the arrest and intimidation of several journalists and social media campaigners for comments posted on social media. There are reports of dissenting social media accounts being hacked, while others have deactivated their accounts due to fear of attacks. A culture of censorship prevails, amidst a rise in sponsored trolls spreading misinformation and propaganda to counter factual narrative reported by journalists, human rights defenders and activists online.

It is against this background that Digital Shelter hosted a panel discussion on the shrinking online civic space in Somalia and the growing digital threats faced by media professionals, bloggers and human right defenders in the digital space on February 13, 2020. The event was part of series of activities under the theme “Protect our Online Space”, supported by the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) – an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

Among the panelists was Mohamed Irbad, a prominent blogger and researcher known for his critical writings on governance, human rights, freedom of expression and censorship on social media platforms. In early 2019, after publishing an article titled “Media Censorship In Somalia: A Nation Risk Into Information Darkness” on his personal blog, Mohamed faced serious online and physical threats which forced him to flee the country for six months due to fear for his safety.
“All critical voices, particularly individuals who are based inside Somalia have been silenced with online and physical threats altogether. For instance, when your raise critical issue on Twitter or Facebook you have two options, you either end up battling with anonymous trolls in their hundreds by answering to their toxic comments or you feel intimidated and sacred of writing about certain issues, hence, your remain silenced . And that is exactly what happened to me after writing that article. And therefore, it is fair to stay that we are witnessing the worst shrinking of our online/offline civic and democratic spaces” Mohamed Irbad.
Also speaking at the event was Hassan Ali Osman, a journalist, with the New Humanitarian newsletter. Hassan actively uses Twitter to disseminate local and international news as it breaks for his 90,000 followers. He shared that he has been constantly attacked by trolls merely because of reporting the truth on social media platforms.
Highlighting the issue of online violence against women was Sucdi Dahir Diriye, a passionate community volunteer and member of CaawiWalaal loosely translated as “HelpYourBrother” –  a digital campaign launched three years ago to support local communities affected by droughts in Somalia. As in most of the world, the internet has provided a platform for Somali women to amplify their voices. However, it has also enabled perpetuation of different forms of online violence against women including harassment, doxing, threats, stalking and blackmail, sometimes leading to physical violence. The targets of these attacks are women that are vocal on issues such as gender equality, sexual violence, free expression, or challenging the patriarchal structure of the society. This has created a hostile online environment for women and girls in Somalia, fraught with shaming, intimidation and degrading, leading to withdraw of from the online space.
As part of her work, Sucdi documents cases of online blackmailing and extortion against young girls in Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia. She stated that limited recognition of the existence of online violence and harassment against women in Somalia is allowing the abuse to continue inexorably. Relevant policies to address online violence against women need to be put in place and more women and girls need to be skilled in digital safety and security.
Based on their personal and professional experiences, the panelists stressed the need for counter measures against the prevailing threats. Among the recommendations made was increased digital security skills and knowledge building among activists, bloggers and media professionals. Specialized training on gendered online harassment was encouraged. Panelists also emphasized a dual approach in voice amplification – online and offline to reach wider audiences.  Furthermore, more stakeholder dialogue to raise awareness on online civic space and digital rights, including data protection and privacy inline with Somalia’s growing technology sector. Other recommendations included research undertakings on current digital threats in Somalia, to inform advocacy and policy interventions; and establishment of a solidarity network to support victims of online attacks.
“Digital Shelter is proud to be in a unique position to amplify voices in the most difficult time where the online civic space is shrinking in Somalia”, said Abdifatah, co-founder of Digital Shelter in the closing remarks of the forum.
Digital Shelter continues its “Protect our Online Space” drive during March 2020 with series of trainings on digital security. Digital Shelter is also planning to host other forums on expanding online civic space in Somalia.

This article was first published by the Digital Shelter on March 04, 2020

La nouvelle loi du Mali sur la cybercriminalité potentiellement problématique pour les droits numériques

Par Simone Toussi |
Le 5 décembre 2019, le président du Mali a promulgué la loi n° 2019-056 portant Répression de la Cybercriminalité. Bien qu’opportune et pertinente, certaines de ses dispositions constituent des menaces potentielles à la vie privée et la liberté d’expression en ligne, en particulier, compte tenu des défaillances démocratiques du Mali et de son faible classement en matière de liberté de la presse.
La nouvelle loi s’applique à « toute infraction commise au moyen des technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) en tout ou partie sur le territoire de la République du Mali, toute infraction commise dans le cyberespace et dont les effets se produisent sur le territoire national » (article 2). Elle fait partie d’un cadre législatif jugé nécessaire pour soutenir les réformes dans le secteur des TIC, conformément à la Déclaration de politique sectorielle des télécommunications du Mali, de l’année 2000.
Des atteintes à la vie privée à l’autoritarisme numérique
La Constitution du Mali garantit la confidentialité des communications en vertu de l’article 6, une disposition qui est renforcée par l’article 5 de la loi portant protection des données à caractère personnel de 2013 l’article 1er de la loi régissant les télécommunications de 1999. La loi sur la cybercriminalité est malheureusement en conflit avec ces prédispositions en faveur du droit à la vie privée.
Les articles 74 à 78 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité autorisent la perquisition et la saisie informatique de données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles. En outre, en vertu de l’article 75, les données peuvent être copiées et stockées lorsque « la saisie du support ne paraît pas appropriée ». La loi ne prévoit pas comment les données copiées doivent être stockées, traitées ou supprimées à l’issue des enquêtes. Cela sape le principe de protection des données énoncé dans l’article 7 de la loi sur la protection des données à caractère personnel – selon lequel les données à caractère personnel ne doivent être conservées que pour une période et un objectif précis.
De plus, les articles 83 à 86 suggèrent une surveillance en temps réel par l’interception des communications. Les prestataires de services sont tenus de coopérer avec les autorités, notamment en veillant à ce qu’ils disposent des moyens techniques nécessaires pour faciliter l’interception des communications. Ces pouvoirs étendus doublent ceux qui sont accordés aux autorités en vertu de l’article 4 de la loi sur les télécommunications. Ce dernier stipule : « Lorsque la sécurité publique ou la défense du territoire du Mali l’exige, le gouvernement peut, pour une durée limitée, réquisitionner tous les réseaux de télécommunications établis sur le territoire du Mali, ainsi que les équipements qui y sont connectés et / ou interdire la fourniture de services de télécommunications. » Cet article a été utilisé par le passé, lorsque le gouvernement a ordonné des perturbations de réseaux sociaux en 2016 lors des manifestations publiques, et plus récemment, une coupure d’Internet lors des élections de 2018.
En outre, les prestataires de services de communication sont tenus de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle des systèmes d’activités illégales potentielles. Tout refus d’informer les autorités de ces activités illégales est passible d’une peine de prison allant de six mois à deux ans, une amende de 500 000 à 2 000 000 francs CFA (830 à 3 318 dollars américain – USD) ou les deux (article 25).
Des alertes pour la liberté d’expression
Bien que la constitution du Mali garantisse la liberté d’expression et d’opinion (article 4), la loi portant régime de la presse et délit de presse (2000) est vague car elle ne garantit pas explicitement la liberté de la presse ou le pluralisme médiatique, ni ne définit les délits de presse. Elle ne contient pas non plus des dispositions sur les médias en ligne. Cela constitue un vide qui précède la loi sur la répression de la cybercriminalité qui, pour sa part, contient des dispositions qui affectent directement la liberté d’expression et d’opinion.
Les articles 20 et 21 de la nouvelle loi punissent les menaces et les insultes faites par le biais d’un système d’information, avec des sanctions allant de six mois à 10 ans d’emprisonnement, et une amende de 1 000 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (1 680 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux. Sans définir ni clairement détailler les éléments constitutifs de la « menace » ou de l ‘ « insulte », ces dispositions sont sujettes à des interprétations pouvant entraver la liberté d’expression. Cela est d’autant plus critique que ces termes ne sont pas non plus définis par la loi portant régime de presse et délit de presse, dans son article 33 sur l’incitation et l’article 38 sur la diffamation.
De plus, les articles 55 et 56 condamnent la « diffusion publique » de « tous imprimés, tous écrits, dessins, affiches, gravures, peintures, photographies, films ou clichés, matrices ou reproductions photographiques, emblèmes, tous objets ou images contraires aux bonnes mœurs. » Les sanctions correspondantes vont de six mois à sept ans d’emprisonnement, une amende de 500 000 à 10 000 000 CFA (840 à 16 800 USD), ou les deux.
L’article 54 de la loi sur la cybercriminalité stipule que les infractions de presse, commises par le biais des technologies de l’information et de la communication, à l’exception de celles commises par la presse sur Internet, sont punies par les peines de droit commun ». Étant donné que la loi sur la presse ne comporte pas de disposition pour la presse en ligne, la distinction entre les délits de presse via les TIC et les délits de presse via internet n’est pas claire. En outre, il y a un manque de précision quant à déterminer si une infraction relève de la loi sur la cybercriminalité, du droit commun ou de la loi sur la presse.
L’article 23 prévoit une amende de 200 000 à 2 000 000 CFA (de 332 à 3 318 dollars américain), une peine d’emprisonnement de six mois à un an, ou les deux, pour les faux signalements d’activités ou contenus illicites, « dans le but d’en obtenir le retrait ou d’en faire cesser la diffusion par un prestataire de services de communications au public par voie électronique ». Cependant, les activités et contenus considérés comme illicites et donc soumis à dénonciation, ne sont pas définis par la loi.
Les mesures à prendre
La loi est bien orientée pour garantir une utilisation sûre et sécurisée des TIC au Mali. Elle entre cependant en vigueur dans un contexte fragile. Les dispositions relatives au traitement des données dans les procédures d’enquêtes criminelles présentent un risque important pour l’intégrité, la sécurité et la confidentialité des données personnelles. En outre, la loi impose une lourde charge aux intermédiaires de télécommunications pour suivre et surveiller l’activité du réseau, et tient ces intermédiaires responsables des actes de leurs clients. Les dispositions relatives aux délits de presse en ligne sont incompatibles avec la législation sur les médias à l’ère du numérique. La nouvelle loi et les lois connexes existantes nécessitent donc des révisions pour sauvegarder et faire respecter les garanties constitutionnelles de la liberté d’expression et de la vie privée, en ligne et hors ligne.