The Future of Work in Uganda: Challenges and Prospects in the Context of the Digital Economy

By Nadhifah Muhammad |

The digital economy has re-shaped labour across the globe. Disruptive digital technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain and robotics have become a big influence on various sectors including business, media, health, education, transportation and agriculture. These technologies have significantly impacted the world of work, upending many long-standing employment norms and practices.

Uganda is no exception to this shift, as many sectors embrace and navigate the digital tide. The thirst for more profits and the competition to dominate markets has led many businesses to innovate and craft more online services. The country’s vision to embrace technology is anchored in the Digital Transformation Roadmap which seeks to attain 90% household connectivity, 90% broadband coverage by geography, and 90% citizens accessing e-services online, by 2040. 

As of 2024, approximately 18 digital labour and hybrid platforms were operating in Uganda, with a relatively even distribution of international and local operators. They included FLIP Africa, Market Garden App, SafeBoda, Uber, Bolt, Speshotaxi, Diva Taxi, Faras, Jumia, Glovo, Fiverr, Upwork, Le Gourmet Delicatessen, Uncle Bob, Kikuubo Online, Jiji and Whatsapp business. These platforms operate in sectors such as ride-hailing, delivery, freelance work, medical consultations, and e-commerce. 

Workplace culture has also undergone a groundbreaking shift in recent years, from a temporary response during the Covid-19 pandemic to reshaping the corporate sector, organisational structures and employee interactions. 

Similarly, the agricultural sector has adopted digital technologies such as the use of mobile applications to access information on crop management and market prices, and the use of digital financial services.

Despite this progress, there are persistent gaps in the digital revolution, including the digital divide laced with digital inequalities, gaps in labour regulatory frameworks, high internet costs, and low digital uptake among the public.

In this May 2025 brief, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) explores emerging digital trends and their influence on the future of work in Uganda. The brief offers recommendations for harnessing the digital dividend for both formal and informal businesses, including: 

  • Investing in digital literacy
  • Upskilling the workforce across all sectors
  • Advocacy for affordable internet connectivity
  • Bridging the digital divide
  • Enforcement of laws that support digitisation and recognition of the gig economy.

Access the full brief here.

CIPESA at the 2025 African Internet Governance Forum (AfIGF)

By CIPESA Writer |

From May 29-31, the African Internet Governance Forum (AfIGF) will be held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Under the theme “Empowering Africa’s Digital Future”, AfIGF serves to foster inclusive dialogue, collaboration, and innovation to shape the future of the Internet across Africa.

The AfIGF feeds into the annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF), convened by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General as a global multistakeholder platform that facilitates discussions on Internet and digital public policy issues. This year, Norway will host the 20th IGF 2025 from June 23-27 in Oslo under the overarching theme “Building Digital Governance Together”.

As a key platform for dialogue on the internet governance landscape in Africa, the Africa IGF presents a unique platform for the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to contribute insights and to shape policy in line with its continued commitment to promoting inclusive and effective use of ICT in Africa for improved governance and livelihoods.

May 28 | By invitation

The Road to WSIS+20: Key Stakeholder Perspectives in the Twenty-Year Review of the World Summit on the Information Society (Pre-event)

Hosts:  Civil Society Alliances for Digital Empowerment (CADE), CIPESA, Global Partners Digital and  Global Network Initiative (GNI)

This workshop assembles various stakeholders to inform civil society advocacy strategies and government engagement in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process. The engagement will equip government representatives with a clearer understanding of national positions and their involvement in the WSIS+20 process, while civil society entities and representatives will be better prepared to develop their advocacy strategies that feed into the process.

May 29 | Workshop room 1 | 09:00-10:00 (EAT)

Strengthening information integrity: African stakeholder Roundtable

Hosts: Research ICT Africa (RIA) and International Media Support (IMS)

This session aims to identify and map the key disinformation threats to electoral integrity in Africa, and to foster multi-stakeholder collaboration to address them. It will explore how media coalitions, fact-checkers, civil society, and researchers can work together to strengthen information integrity, especially during elections. This session forms part of RIA and IMS’s participatory research on effective media coalitions during elections, employing threat identification mapping similar to successful work during the recent Ghanaian elections. It will contribute to developing coordinated responses, raising awareness, and forming networks to mitigate information disorders across the continent.

May 29 | 09:45 – 10:30 (By Invitation Only)

Parliamentary Session:  Safeguarding Democracy in the Digital Age: Legislative Priorities and Policy Pathways in Africa

Host: UN Internet Governance Forum Secretariat (IGF)

Citizens need to have confidence in the system and institutions of democracy, including electoral processes. However, trust is deteriorating with the rapid spread of misinformation through digital technologies. This session brings together legislators from all African regions to exchange good practices on strengthening institutional resilience against misinformation and lessons learned from diverse regulatory approaches to preserve information integrity.

May 30 | 14:00-15:30 (EAT)

Host: African Union Commission

Toward a Trusted Pan-African Data Space: Aligning Regional Frameworks for Cross-Border Governance

As Africa advances toward a digital single market, this session explores how Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are implementing the African Union Data Policy Framework (AU DPF) to build trusted, interoperable, and rights-based data ecosystems. Representatives from the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), alongside the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and civil society, will discuss regional efforts to harmonise data governance through new strategies, updated legislation, and alignment with digital trade protocols. The session aims to spotlight how REC-led initiatives can reduce policy fragmentation, promote innovation, and safeguard rights, ultimately contributing to a unified and inclusive pan-African data space.

 May 31 | 09:00 – 10:00 (EAT)

Securing African Sovereignty through Digital Public Infrastructure in the Era of Trade Barriers and Tariffs

Host: African Union Development Agency – NEPAD

This panel discussion will explore how Africa can harness its existing digital public infrastructure alongside the strategic development of new continental digital platforms to assert digital sovereignty amidst rising global digital trade barriers and tariffs. This provides a foundation to discuss the need to promote sovereignty across key digital ecosystems and platforms, such as the mobile app ecosystem, payment solutions, e-hauling solutions, corporate solutions, server infrastructure, social media platforms, and data sharing platforms. The discussion directly supports the objectives of the African Union (AU) Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of ensuring that the ICT infrastructure being developed is complemented by sovereign digital capabilities.

May 31 |  15:00 (EAT)

National and Regional IGFs in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities, and the Way Forward

Host: NRIs

The session aligns with the broader theme of the AfIGF, focusing on enhancing internet governance mechanisms in Africa. It will explore the critical role of national and regional IGFs in shaping inclusive, sustainable, and people-centered digital policies across the continent.
National and Regional IGFs are essential platforms for multi-stakeholder dialogue on IG issues.

Africa’s Digital Dilemma: Platform Regulation Vs Internet Freedom

By Brian Byaruhanga |

Imagine waking up to find Facebook and Instagram inaccessible on your phone – not due to a network disruption, but because the platforms pulled their services out of your country. This scenario now looms over Nigeria, as Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, may shut down its services in Nigeria over nearly USD 290 million in regulatory fines. The fines stem from allegations of anti-competitive practices, data privacy violations, and unregulated advertising content contrary to the national laws. Nigerian authorities insist the company must comply with national laws, especially those governing user data and competition. 

While this standoff centres on Nigeria, it signals a deeper struggle across Africa as governments assert digital sovereignty over global tech platforms. At the same time, millions of citizens rely on these platforms for communication, activism, access to health and education, economic livelihood, and self-expression. Striking a balance between regulation and rights in Africa’s evolving digital landscape has never been more urgent.

Meta versus Nigeria: Not Just One Country’s Battle

The tension between Meta and Nigeria is not new, nor is it unique. Similar dynamics have played out elsewhere on the continent:

  • Uganda (2021–Present): The Ugandan government blocked Facebook after the platform removed accounts linked to state actors during the 2021 elections. The block remains in place, effectively cutting off millions from a critical social media service unless they use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent the blockage.
  • Senegal (2023): TikTok was suspended amid political unrest, with authorities citing the app’s use for spreading misinformation and hate speech.
  • Ethiopia (2022): Facebook and Twitter were accused of amplifying hate speech during internal conflicts, prompting pressure for tighter oversight.
  • South Africa (2025): In a February 2025 report, the Competition Commission found that freedom of expression, plurality and diversity of media in South Africa had been severely infringed upon by platforms including Google and Facebook. 

The Double-Edged Sword of Regulation

Governments have legitimate reasons to demand transparency, data protection, and content moderation. Today, over two-thirds of African countries have legislation to protect personal data, and regulators are becoming more assertive. Nigeria’s Data Protection Commission (NDPC), created by a 2023 law, wasted little time in taking on a behemoth like Meta. Kenya also has an active Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, which has investigated and fined companies for data breaches. 

South Africa’s Information Regulator has been especially bold, issuing an enforcement notice to WhatsApp to comply with privacy standards after finding that the messaging service’s privacy policy in South Africa was different to that in the European Union. These actions send a clear message that privacy is a universal right, and Africans should not have weaker safeguards.

These regulatory institutions aim to ensure that citizens’ data is not exploited and that tech companies operate responsibly. Yet, in practice, digital regulation in Africa often walks a thin line between protecting rights and suppressing them.

While governments deserve scrutiny, platforms like Meta, TikTok, and X are not blameless. They often delay to respond to harmful content that fuels violence or division. Their algorithms can amplify hate, misinformation, and sensationalism, while opaque data harvesting practices continue to exploit users. For instance, Branch, a San Francisco-based microlending app operating in Kenya and Nigeria, collects extensive personal data such as handset details, SMS logs, GPS data, call records, and contact lists in exchange for small loans, sometimes for as little as USD 2. This exploitative business model capitalises on vulnerable socio-economic conditions, effectively forcing users to trade sensitive personal data for minimal financial relief.

Many African regulators are pushing back by demanding localisation of data, adherence to national laws, and greater responsiveness, but platform threats to exit rather than comply raise concerns of digital neo-colonialism where African countries are expected to accept second-tier treatment or risk exclusion.

Beyond privacy, African regulators are increasingly addressing monopolistic behaviour and unfair practices by Big Tech as part of a broader push for digital sovereignty. Nigeria’s USD 290 million fine against Meta is not just about data protection and privacy, but also fair competition, consumer rights, and the country’s authority to govern its digital space. Countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya are asserting their right to regulate digital platforms within their borders, challenging the long-standing dominance of global tech firms. The actions taken against Meta highlight the growing complexity of balancing national interests with the transnational influence of tech giants. 

While Meta’s threat to exit may signal its discomfort with what it views as restrictive regulation, it also exposes the real struggle governments face in asserting control over digital infrastructure that often operates beyond state jurisdiction. Similarly, in other parts of Africa, there are inquiries and new policies targeting the market power of tech giants. For instance, South Africa’s competition authorities have looked at requiring Google and Facebook to compensate news publishers  (similar to the News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code in Australia). These moves reflect a broader global concern that a few platforms have too much control over markets and need checks to ensure fairness.

The Cost of Disruption: Economic and Social Impacts

When platforms go dark, the consequences are swift:

  • Businesses and entrepreneurs lose access to vital marketing and sales tools.
  • Creators and influencers face income loss and audience disconnection.
  • Activists and journalists find their voices limited, especially during politically charged periods.
  • Citizens are excluded from conversations and accessing information that could help them make critical decisions that affect their livelihoods.
  • Students and educators experience setbacks in remote learning, particularly in under-resourced communities that rely on social media or messaging apps to coordinate learning.
  • Access to public services is disrupted, from health services to government updates and emergency communications.

A 2023 GSMA report showed that more than 50% of small businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa use social media for customer engagement. In countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya or South Africa, Facebook and Instagram are lifelines. Losing access even temporarily sets back innovation, erodes trust, and impacts livelihoods.

A Call for Continental Solutions

Africa’s digital future must not hinge on the whims of a single government or a foreign tech giant. Both states and companies should be accountable for protecting rights in digital contexts, ensuring that development and digitisation do not trample on dignity and equity. This requires:

  • Harmonised continental policies on data protection, content regulation, and digital trade.
  • Regional norm-setting mechanisms (like the African Union) to enforce accountability for both governments and corporations.
  • Investments in African tech platforms to offer resilient alternatives.
  • Public education on digital rights to empower users against abuse from both state and corporate actors.
  • Pan-African contextualised business and human rights frameworks to ensure that digital governance aligns with both local realities and global human rights standards. This includes the operationalisation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, following the examples of countries like Kenya, South Africa and Uganda, which have developed national action plans to embed human rights in corporate practice.

The stakes are high in the confrontation between Nigeria and Meta. If mismanaged, this tension could lead to fragmentation, exclusion, and setbacks for internet freedom, with ordinary users across the continent paying the price. To avoid this, the way forward must be grounded in the multistakeholder model of internet governance which aims for governments to regulate wisely and transparently, and for tech companies to respect local laws and communities, and for civil society to be actively engaged and vigilant. This will contribute to a future where the internet is open, secure, and inclusive and where innovation and justice thrive. 

Tanzania Should Restore Access to X and Desist from Further Internet Disruptions

Statement |

Tanzania’s government should urgently restore access to X (formerly Twitter) as its current blockage denies citizens the right to access information and express themselves, while also undermining economic livelihoods and the delivery of social services.

The blockage was effected amidst a flurry of arrests and deportations of Kenyan and Ugandan human rights activists by the Tanzanian government. The activists were in Tanzania to monitor the trial of opposition leader Tundu Lisu, who was jailed in April 2025 and is on trial for treason and publishing false information. The deportations drew widespread criticism of President Samia Suhulu’s government over its increasingly authoritarian stance and saw the X accounts of the Tanzania Police and the state-backed Airtel taken over by hackers who published anti-government information.

Lisu emerged second in Tanzania’s last presidential elections in 2020, during which the government blocked access to social media. He survived an assasination attempt back in 2017, and has been arrested numerous times since then. However, amidst calls for boycotting the upcoming October 2025 polls, he was arrested earlier this year, and disqualified from standing as a candidate.

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) condemns the Tanzanian government’s heavy-handed crackdown on critics and its illegal detention and deportations of Kenyan and Ugandan citizens who criticised its deteriorating human rights credentials. Below is our joint statement condemning the blockage of Twitter and urging its urgent restoration.

The Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) is deeply concerned by the restriction on access to X by the Tanzanian government. The move is part of a series of regressive measures to limit the civic space and enjoyment of digital rights as it constitutes a blatant violation of the fundamental freedom of expression and access to information.

Tanzania’s blockage of X not only stifles important public opinions but also promotes self-censorship inspite of Tanzania’s several national, regional and international commitments to protect and promote freedom of expression, such as the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania in Article 18 and the Access to Information Act 2016, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 9), Principle 38 of the African Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Articles 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Internet and social media disruptions stifle citizens’ right to organise, express themselves, and access information. Disruptions also undermine electoral transparency and accountability and may perpetuate political instabilities since they breed distrust in the credibility of elections. Furthermore, they have significant economic implications as they disrupt businesses and impede financial transactions and other economic activities that rely on digital platforms.

Given the current development involving Tanzania’s arrest, detention and deportation of human rights activists from the East African region and the upcoming general elections, the restriction is part of the wide measures to keep people in the dark, which is contrary to democratic values and impairs citizen participation. It is a deliberate attack on digital rights enjoyment and impairs the underpinnings of open, accountable and participatory democracy.

We reiterate the call of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in the Resolution on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa (ACHPR Res. 580 (LXXVIII) 2024) on states to refrain from ordering the interruption of telecommunications services, shutting down the internet, or disrupting access to any other digital communication platforms before, during or after elections.

We call on the government of the United Republic of Tanzania to:

  1. Immediately lift the restriction on X and restore unfettered access.
  2. Adhere to the rule of law and human rights principles including the observance of judicial oversight before any service suspension are imposed in the future.
  3. Refrain from imposing onerous orders on telecommunication companies and other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to shutdown the internet.
  4. Ensure consultation with all stakeholders including private sector and civil society to determine appropriate steps for addressing emerging concerns in public interest without disrupting internet and platform access.

Zambia’s Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Laws Raise Alarms for Digital Rights

By Edrine Wanyma |

In April 2025, the Zambian Parliament enacted two laws – the Cyber Security Act, 2025, and the Cyber Crimes Act, 2025 – which pose significant threats to digital rights and civil liberties in the country.

Despite significant concerns raised by civil society and digital rights advocates, including the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Bloggers of Zambia, the two laws were passed with minimal revisions, leaving intact several provisions that undermine fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy, freedom of expression, access to information, assembly and association.

Last December, CIPESA and Bloggers of Zambia submitted to the parliament a detailed analysis highlighting critical human rights concerns with the two proposed laws. The concerns include the overly broad surveillance powers and the weak oversight mechanisms that provide latitude for wantonly interfering with individuals’ rights.

Broadly Worded and Vague Definitions

The laws are riddled with broadly worded and vague definitions. Terms such as “law enforcement officer,” “critical information,” “critical information infrastructure,” “internet connection record,” and “call-related information” are so vague that they risk being interpreted to serve the interests of those in power. There is also a high risk they could be weaponised to target government opponents, critics, journalists and online activists.

For instance, the expansive definition of “critical information” refers to computer data that relates to a broad range of areas, including public safety, public health, economic stability, national security, international stability and the sustainability and restoration of critical cyberspace, providing authorities with a carte blanche to monitor and control information flow.

Similarly, the definition of “law enforcement officer” extends beyond traditional roles to include officers from the Anti-Corruption Commission, Drug Enforcement Commission and even individuals designated by the President. This expansion raises concerns about accountability, particularly as these officers can apply for communication interception orders ex parte (without notifying the target), thereby denying affected parties the right to contest such actions. This dangerously expands the scope of surveillance without meaningful judicial oversight or accountability.

Oversight and Accountability Concerns

Section 4 of the Cyber Security Act establishes the Zambia Cyber Security Agency under the general direction of the President. This arrangement can undermine the agency’s independence and increase the risk of political interference in its operations. The agency’s mandate, which includes regulating service providers, coordinating cybersecurity responses, and auditing information systems, requires robust oversight mechanisms, which are glaringly absent in the law. 

Similarly, the establishment of the Central Monitoring and Coordination Centre under section 21 (Part V) of the Cyber Security Act, with powers to lawfully intercept communications, raises red flags. Section 21 grants this body sweeping authority without creating adequate checks and balances. The lack of robust judicial oversight and transparency mechanisms raises alarms about privacy violations, which would contravene Zambia’s constitution and international human rights instruments.

Risk of Abuse and Shrinking Civic Space

The two new laws are an addition to a catalogue of restrictive laws, regulations and policies that control the enjoyment of civil liberties in online spaces. For instance, in 2021, the government ordered restrictions on social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram during the general elections. With general elections due in August 2026, the passage of these laws fuels fears of heightened controls, intensified censorship, surveillance, and clampdowns on civic actors.

Section 39 of the Cyber Security Act requires electronic communications service providers to install systems that can facilitate real-time interception of communications. These provisions can enable real-time surveillance of individuals’ private communication. Such provisions can be misused by the government, unscrupulous individuals and other unauthorised persons to snoop on individuals’  private communications, particularly since the laws do not provide for adequate oversight over surveillance.

Section 22 of the Cyber Crimes Act criminalises vague offences such as the use of digital platforms for harassment or humiliation, terms that are open to subjective interpretation and could be used to suppress legitimate speech, including criticism of public officials. It also reintroduces aspects of defamation which have attracted wide calls for decriminalisation, including by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 2022, Zambia had shown progress when plans to decriminalise defamation were revealed. Defamation has been widely employed to arrest and prosecute government critics  and opponents in the country.

The enactment of these laws highlights a disturbing trend across Africa, where cyber laws are increasingly being used to curtail democratic participation rather than protect citizens from cyber threats. The overreach seen in Zambia’s laws mirrors similar patterns in other countries, where digital regulation is co-opted for political control.

The history of elections in Africa has further shown the elevation of controls over the civic space, including online spaces, to curtail speech, engagements and participation for civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), journalists, bloggers and other online activists including through enhanced surveillance. The developments in Zambia raise fears of similar occurrences of high-handed control.

Zambia’s parliament should get back on the drafting table and ensure that the two new laws are aligned with regional and international human rights standards, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Personal Data Protection, and the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa.

  • Overbroad criminal provisions should be expunged from the laws or narrowed.
  • Oversight mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure independence and accountability in surveillance activities.
  • All responsible parties, including enforcement and judicial officials, should be trained and their capacities built to ensure application of the laws within the acceptable human rights standards including legality and proportionality.
  • Zambia should ensure compliance with data protection and privacy standards in implementation of the laws to avoid overlaps and wanton infringements.

As Zambia prepares for its 2026 general elections, it is vital that cybersecurity and cybercrime measures do not become tools for political repression. Instead, they should serve to protect users, enhance trust in digital systems, and uphold the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all.