Are Cryptocurrencies the Future of Freedom and Financial Inclusion in Africa?

By Daniel Mwesigwa and Thomas Robertson |

Advances in innovation have ushered in new approaches to digital transformation and financial service provision. With the growth in internet connectivity in sub-Saharan Africa, emerging technologies such as blockchain and cryptocurrencies have the potential to advance financial inclusion. 

Blockchain is the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin, among others. The emergence of cryptocurrencies in Africa is particularly exciting due to the opportunities they provide for Africans in cash-based and informal economies to participate in alternative financial infrastructures. Many traditional financial infrastructures across Africa are often subject to high levels of volatility and ineffective governance. Blockchain financial technology allows for alternative financial infrastructures that increase monetary stability and efficient governance through a decentralised digital financial system.

Exploring the Digital Currencies Landscape in Africa

According to the World Bank, sub-Saharan Africa has one of the highest remittance rates in the world. In 2019, 3.6% of sub-Saharan Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was derived from personal remittances- a figure over three times the global average. However, the region also has the world’s largest unbanked population, with only 42.6% of those above the age of 15 having an account at a financial institution. 

With the bulk of remittances on the continent being peer to peer transfers, cryptocurrencies have the potential to revolutionise remittances between Africa and the rest of the world. Cryptocurrency-based remittances would result in faster transfers, less logistical constraints, and lower transaction costs due to advanced Blockchain technology. Whereas remittances cannot be considered a form of financial inclusion, their potential application to digital currency infrastructures could usher in more inclusive financial infrastructures. 

Indeed, in August 2020, sub-Saharan Africa traded USD 18.3 million of the USD 95 million total worth of Bitcoin traded globally in one week – the second highest peer-to-peer Bitcoin trading volume in the world after North America (at USD 28.7 million). While it is argued that Bitcoin trading significantly increased in sub-Saharan Africa due to the need to hedge against the volatility of local currencies amid the effects of Covid-19 lockdowns on local economies, Bitcoin.com’s analysis shows that 86.3% of the volume was contributed exclusively by the continent’s leading economies –  Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa.

Contrasted against the average weekly mobile money transaction volumes in sub-Saharan Africa of around USD 457 million, Bitcoin’s trading volumes seem dismal. However, it should be noted that since its 2007 debut in Kenya, the M-Pesa mobile money model has been replicated by over 140 mobile money services worldwide. Mobile money itself has positively contributed to financial inclusion on the continent by enabling person-to-person and person-to-business digital transactions, alongside access to savings, credit and investment services via mobile phones. However, it is not without challenges – including high transaction fees and costs associated with interoperability and regulatory gaps. Meanwhile research shows that women are less likely to use mobile apps to conduct financial transactions due to  gender bias in digital financial services (DFS).

Meanwhile, intercontinental financial flows are largely dominated by foreign currencies because Africa’s aspirations for a single currency are often undermined by national currency variations in stability, convertibility, and control. While it is possible to address these issues by pegging unstable national currencies to more stable international currencies, the solution is fraught with structural deficits, as evidenced by the West African CFA franc (Eco), which is pegged to the Euro.

Digital currencies are thus arguably positioned as more appealing and accessible alternatives to the status quo. They attract comparatively lower transaction fees and carry less of the bureaucratic burdens prevalent in existing financial systems, even those between neighboring countries. Further, unlike mobile money and traditional currency, which are prone to interference by authorities, most digital currencies such as Bitcoin are resistant to external suppression because they are not controlled by central banking authorities. For example, during the #EndSARS campaign against police brutality in Nigeria, authorities ordered banks and financial institutions to block donations to the Feminist Coalition, one of the organisations charged with coordinating the protests. The Coalition turned to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to circumvent the blockade. Meanwhile in Kenya, despite calls against virtual currencies by the Central Bank of Kenya, there has been an emergence of community-based initiatives for local cryptocurrencies enthusiastically welcomed by domestic users. 

Tangible Obstacles to Digital Advancements

In Francophone West Africa, activists are calling for stable, regional currencies independent of European financial institutions that impose economic reliance on the West. Some have speculated that the creation of a regional cryptocurrency based on blockchain would finally emancipate their economic systems from unwanted foreign manipulation. Indeed, the establishment of a legally-recognised digital currency in Senegal – the eCFA – demonstrates that feasibility and a framework for digital currency exists. However, this potential is faced with constraints across the region such as internet disruptions as well as gaps in cybercrime and data protection and privacy legislation Nonetheless, the mobilisation of young enterprises around technological innovation in combination with civil society and government-led innovation in digital economic expansion hold some promise that blockchain utilisation can contribute to Africa’s social-economic development on a country or regional needs basis.

Central banks could either support or develop the blockchain and technology infrastructure upon which third parties could participate, or  sidestep the burden of  technology infrastructure development and maintenance through designing licensing regimes that allow appropriate third parties to issue digital currencies on behalf of their countries. However, to achieve this,  countries must have adequate financial and technology policy, including legislation that incentivises cryptocurrency development, ensures cybersecurity and protects user data and privacy. Furthermore, universal access to the internet and digital services, quality of service provision and infrastructure investments would go a long way in promoting adoption of digital financial technology.

Date Extended: Applications Now Open for Round Five of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF)

Call for Proposals |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is accepting proposals for the fifth round of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF).

In this round, ADRF seeks to support initiatives in various thematic areas including but not limited to:

  • Access and affordability
  • Access to Information
  • Cybercrime
  • Data protection and privacy
  • Digital economy
  • Digital Identity (ID)
  • Digital security
  • Diversity and inclusion
  • eGovernance
  • Freedom of expression
  • Hate speech
  • Innovation for democratic participation, transparency and accountability (civic and social tech)
  • Misinformation/Disinformation
  • Network disruptions
  • Strategic litigation
  • Surveillance
  • Technology and Covid-19

Grant amounts range between USD 1,000 and USD 20,000, depending on the need and scope of the proposed intervention. The ADRF strongly encourages cost-sharing. The grant period will not exceed 10 months. It is anticipated that around 15 grants will be awarded in this round.

Launched in April 2019, the ADRF supports organisations and networks to implement activities that advance digital rights in Africa, including advocacy, litigation, research, engagement in policy processes, movement building, digital literacy and digital security skills building. 

To-date, the Fund has awarded USD 418,000 to 33 initiatives across the continent. In the inaugural round of ADRF, initiatives with activities spanning 16 African countries received a total of USD 65,000. The second call for applications saw a total of USD 152,000 awarded to 14 initiatives that are advancing digital rights through various projects in 18 African countries. In its third round, the ADRF awarded USD 138,000 to 11 initiatives responding to the digital rights fallout from the fight against the coronavirus disease (Covid-19). The most recent and fourth round awarded USD 63,000 to eight current or previous grantees to deploy six-months policy advocacy campaigns that further the conversation on internet freedom in Africa. 

Grantees have also received technical and institutional capacity building support to further enhance their digital rights efforts and ensure sustainability. In this regard, CIPESA partnered with the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) for capacity building support in impact communications. CIPESA also partnered with Data4Change on data literacy and advocacy support.

Application Guidelines

Geographical Coverage

ADRF is open to organisations/networks based and/or operational in Africa and with interventions covering any country on the continent.

Size of Grants

Grant size shall range from US$1,000 to US$20,000. Cost sharing is strongly encouraged.

Eligible Activities

The activities that are eligible for funding are those that protect and advance digital rights. These may include but are not limited to research, advocacy, engagement in policy processes, litigation, digital literacy and digital security skills building.

Duration

The grant funding shall be for a period not exceeding 10 months.

Eligibility Requirements

  • The Fund is open to organisations and coalitions working to advance digital rights in Africa. This includes but is not limited to human rights defenders, media, activists, think tanks, legal aid groups, and tech hubs. Entities working on women’s rights, or with youths, sexual minorities, refugees, and persons with disabilities are strongly encouraged to apply.
  • The initiatives to be funded will preferably have formal registration in an African country, but in some circumstances organisations and coalitions that do not have formal registration may be considered. Such organisations need to show evidence that they are operational in a particular African country or countries.
  • The activities to be funded must be in/on an African country or countries.

Ineligible Activities

  • The Fund shall not fund any activity that does not directly advance digital rights.
  • The Fund will not support travel to attend conferences or workshops, except in exceptional circumstances where such travel is directly linked to an activity that is eligible.
  • Reimbursements for costs that have already been incurred.
  • The Fund shall not provide scholarships.

Administration

The Fund is administered by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA). An internal and external panel of experts will make decisions on beneficiaries based on the following criteria:

  • If the proposed intervention fits within the Fund’s digital rights priorities.
  • The relevance to the given context/country.
  • Commitment and experience of the applicant in advancing digital rights.
  • Potential impact of the intervention on digital rights policies or practices.

The deadline for submissions is now Friday June 25, 2021.  The application form can be accessed here.

The Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) Awards USD 63,000 in New Advocacy Grants

By Ashnah Kalemera |

Eight current or previous grantees of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) have been awarded grants to scale their digital rights policy advocacy efforts. Across six countries – Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and Somalia – the thematic focus of the advocacy intervention areas includes women’s rights online, digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, social media regulation, and digital entrepreneurship. One initiative, with a continent-wide focus, will explore digital authoritarianism. 

The grants, totalling USD 63,000 were awarded under the fourth round of the ADRF which sought to deploy six-months policy advocacy campaigns that further the conversation on internet freedom in Africa. 

In Somalia, the Women in Media Initiatives in Somalia (WIMISOM) will conduct three roundtable engagements – in Garowe, Mogadishu and a nationwide one – to further raise awareness about women’s digital rights issues and push for policy and practice reforms that contribute to the development of a safe and empowering online environment for women and girls. Targeted stakeholders will include government institutions mandated to address gender inequality and development of women and girls’ rights, ICT ministries and regulatory bodies, women’s associations and networks, social and human rights activists, technologists and innovation hubs, telecommunications operators and digital financial service providers. These efforts will build on previous ADRF-supported advocacy campaigns as well as skills and knowledge building on women’s safety and security online in Somali territories. 

Similarly in Namibia, the local chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC) will run a nationwide campaign on gender-based violence online with the aim to inform the review of the Data Protection and Cybercrime bills, as well as amendments to the Combating Domestic Violence Act 2003. The campaign will feature surveys alongside analysis of the bills, which will feed into multi-media survivor stories, safety and security tips, and a citizens’ call to action/endorsement on the need for safe spaces online. Under the inaugural round of the ADRF, ISOC Namibia was supported to work with women parliamentarians, political activists and various other actors in a campaign to tackle politically motivated gender-based violence online during the November 2019 elections.

In Mozambique, the continued push for digital inclusion through web accessibility campaigns will see  Forum de Organizacoes de Pessoas com Deficiencia (Mozambique Disabled Persons Orgazations Forum) – FAMOD – engage disability rights organisations (DPOs), web developers and the government to create an open source, open access library of reusable code for accessible web components to support online entrepreneurship, eLearning and access to eServices. 

Still on digital inclusion, in Cote d’Ivoire, Action et Humanisme will build on previous ADRF-supported stakeholder dialogues on internet accessibility for persons with disabilities to further engage with DPOs, entrepreneurs, activists, and telecommunications operators to develop policy recommendations on internet accessibility and affordability for persons with disabilities.  The recommendations will be tabled before policy makers and government entities. 

Building on from the success of the “protect our online space” series of dialogues supported by the ADRF under Round 2, Digital Shelter went on to host monthly coffee meet ups to promote engagement on digital rights in Somalia. In continuation, Digital Shelter will engage key stakeholders including journalists, women’s rights groups, ICT ministry officials and the Office of the Prime Minister on the need for legal and regulatory frameworks that promote safety and security online. Specifically, Digital Shelter will advocate for building mechanisms to combat cybercrime including bullying, trolling and harassment. Furthermore, Digital Shelter will engage the Ministry of Trade, innovation hubs and academia on skills and knowledge building in digital rights and digital entrepreneurship targeting youth. 

Despite having in place a Digital Economy Blueprint whose vision is a “digitally empowered citizenry living in a digitally enabled society”, Kenya introduced an inhibitive digital taxation regime in 2020. In this regard, Mzalendo Trust will convene forums on challenges faced in the country’s digital economy. The first forum will bring together key stakeholders from the ICT sector, including private sector alliances and associations, civil society organisations, economic think tanks, the Kenya Revenue Authority, academia, the Ministry of ICT, the Ministry of Trade, and the business community to deliberate on inclusion in the digital economy. 

The second forum will convene policy makers including Committees of Parliament and the recently established Office of the Data Protection Commissioner on policy frameworks for consumer protection in the digital economy. Wider awareness raising within the project will take the form of social media chats, publication of policy briefs and commentaries. 

Many countries on the continent are moving towards social media regulation. The Senegalese government is among those that have initiated steps to put in place a regulatory framework for social media. Jonction Senegal will analyse the draft bill on social media regulation and engage stakeholders through targeted convenings and online campaigns on the proposed law’s provisions on  free speech and censorship. 

Lastly, leveraging its wide cross-national network of individual contributors and partners in the journalism, not-for-profit, legal, private sector, academia, tech, policy, innovation and activism spaces in Africa, Global Voices – Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa will convene a design workshop to explore the impact of digital authoritarianism on the African continent and make recommendations that foster an online space that promotes digital rights and an inclusive digital economy. The recommendations will form the basis of a white paper for wider policy advocacy on issues including access, affordability, infrastructure, safety and security online.

The ADRF is an initiative of Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), established in 2019 to offer flexible and rapid response grants to initiatives in Africa to implement activities that advance digital rights, including advocacy, litigation, research, engagement in policy processes, digital literacy and digital security skills building. The ADRF’s supporters have included the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), and the Omidyar Network.

Cartographie du lien entre Désinformation, Coupures d’Internet, Pandémies et Diaspora au Cameroun et en RD Congo

Par Richard Ngamita |

Le phénomène de la désinformation sur les médias sociaux est devenu une source de préoccupation croissante dans la politique mondiale depuis plusieurs années. Bien plus, ledit phénomène explose maintenant en Afrique subsaharienne, où les campagnes de désinformation via les médias sociaux sont de plus en plus déployées par des entités et des gouvernements étrangers pour influencer l’opinion.

Plusieurs facteurs sociopolitiques et Ă©conomiques offrent un terrain propice Ă  la dĂ©sinformation dans les pays africains. L’explosion dĂ©mographique avec prĂ©dominance de jeunes – dont la plupart  se connectent Ă  l’Internet  pour la première fois via les mĂ©dias sociaux, la disponibilitĂ© et l’utilisation croissantes des tĂ©lĂ©phones portables connectĂ©s Ă  Internet, les conflits ethnico-religieux et l’insĂ©curitĂ© sont quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont contribuĂ© Ă  la prolifĂ©ration d’informations accessibles via les mĂ©dias numĂ©riques, fournissant ainsi de nouveaux canaux de diffusion rapide et d’amplification de fausses informations.

Cette montĂ©e de la dĂ©sinformation dans la rĂ©gion constitue un nouveau test de soliditĂ© pour les nouvelles dispositions politiques et lĂ©gislatives en matière d’Internet. Par exemple, en mars 2020, l’Éthiopie a promulguĂ© la loi sur la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du discours de haine et de la dĂ©sinformation, pour lutter contre ces deux phĂ©nomènes qui ont  troublĂ©  le pays par le passĂ©. Cependant, il s’avère selon plusieurs observateurs que cette nouvelle rĂ©glementation gouvernementale, bien que lĂ©gitime pour lutter contre le discours de haine, constitue  en mĂŞme temps une menace pour la libertĂ© d’expression et l’accès Ă  l’information en ligne.

Au Cameroun, en vertu de la loi relative Ă  la cybersĂ©curitĂ© et Ă  la cybercriminalitĂ©, la publication et la propagation d’information en ligne “sans pouvoir en attester la vĂ©racitĂ©” ou justifier qu’il y avait de bonnes raisons de croire en ladite information est correcte constituent un dĂ©lit. Lors d’une confĂ©rence de presse tenue en juillet 2020, RenĂ© Emmanuel Sadi, ministre camerounais de la communication, s’est dit prĂ©occupĂ© par l’utilisation “irresponsable” des mĂ©dias sociaux pour ternir l’image des fonctionnaires ou saboter les actions du gouvernement et a prĂ©venu que ceux qui continueraient Ă  propager de telles informations sur les plateformes de mĂ©dias sociaux s’exposeraient Ă  de lourdes peines prĂ©vues par la loi.

D’autres pays comme le Zimbabwe et la Tanzanie, disposent de lois plus gĂ©nĂ©rales sur les mĂ©dias qui ont Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ©es pour lutter contre les fausses informations. Ces diffĂ©rentes lois ont Ă©tĂ© critiquĂ©es pour la menace qu’elles font peser sur les droits numĂ©riques, en particulier lorsqu’elles sont mises en place pour contrer toute opinion critique ou dĂ©bat contradictoire dans des pays africains prĂ©sentant des dĂ©ficits dĂ©mocratiques.

De nombreux pays africains, dont le Cameroun et la RĂ©publique DĂ©mocratique du Congo (RDC), continuent de se dĂ©battre contre la dĂ©sinformation, par laquelle une mauvaise action   en ligne pourrait causer des dommages hors ligne. Ce rapport examine la situation dans ces pays, oĂą – malgrĂ© des niveaux de connectivitĂ© relativement bas – la dĂ©sinformation reprĂ©sente une prĂ©occupation considĂ©rable.

En 2017, le Cameroun comptait 19,7 millions d’abonnĂ©s Ă  la tĂ©lĂ©phonie mobile, soit un taux de pĂ©nĂ©tration de 85 %, tandis que la pĂ©nĂ©tration d’Internet Ă©tait de 35,6 %. Parallèlement, la RD Congo avait un taux de pĂ©nĂ©tration d’Internet de 19,2 % en dĂ©cembre 2019, tandis que le taux de pĂ©nĂ©tration de la tĂ©lĂ©phonie mobile Ă©tait de 42 %.

Compréhension des conflits et désinformation

Les citoyens du Cameroun et de la RD Congo recourent Ă  une gamme variĂ©e de sources d’information traditionnelles (notamment la presse Ă©crite et audiovisuelle), ainsi qu’à des sources en ligne pour suivre l’actualitĂ© sociale, Ă©conomique et politique. Cependant, les mĂ©dias sociaux jouent un rĂ´le de plus en plus important comme source d’informations relatives aux conflits, par le fait que les mĂ©dias traditionnels sont censurĂ©s par les gouvernements respectifs.

Au Cameroun, les tensions entre les rĂ©gions anglophones et francophones remontent Ă  l’indĂ©pendance du pays en 1961. Au fil des ans, des violences mortelles et des actions de protestation ont eu lieu contre la “francophonisation” continue et la marginalisation des anglophones qui affirment que le gouvernement central privilĂ©gie la population francophone majoritaire.

En 2015, une vidĂ©o montrant deux femmes et deux enfants abattus par des soldats dans la ville de Zelevet, dans l’extrĂŞme-Nord, a commencĂ© Ă  circuler sur les mĂ©dias sociaux. Selon une enquĂŞte de BBC Africa Eye de juillet 2018, le gouvernement a d’abord rejetĂ© la vidĂ©o la qualifiant de fausse nouvelle. Cependant, Amnesty International a rĂ©vĂ©lĂ© avec des preuves crĂ©dibles que l’armĂ©e camerounaise Ă©tait responsable, ce qui a poussĂ© les autoritĂ©s Ă  se rĂ©tracter et Ă  dĂ©clarer que les 10 soldats reprĂ©sentĂ©s dans la vidĂ©o avaient Ă©tĂ© arrĂŞtĂ©s et seraient poursuivis. Cinq ans après l’incident, un tribunal militaire a dĂ©clarĂ© les soldats coupables et les a condamnĂ©s Ă  des peines d’emprisonnement.

Alors que l’enquĂŞte de BBC Africa Eye sur l’incident de la fusillade a rĂ©vĂ©lĂ© que plusieurs personnes n’aimaient pas diffuser en ligne des discours de haine et des contenus graphiques sur les violences, elles reconnaissaient que ces contenus pourraient parfois rĂ©vĂ©ler des informations utiles Ă  la sĂ©curitĂ© en particulier pour ceux qui vivent dans des zones de conflit.

Source: Twitter

En RD Congo, la succession de conflits armĂ©s a fait des millions de morts et dĂ©stabilisĂ© le pays, avec une violence continue perpĂ©trĂ©e par plusieurs groupes armĂ©s actifs dans la rĂ©gion, notamment les forces dĂ©mocratiques alliĂ©es (ADF : Allied Democratic Forces), les Forces DĂ©mocratiques pour la LibĂ©ration du Rwanda (FDLR) et de nombreuses autres milices. La Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO) opère dans la rĂ©gion depuis 1999 et constitue la plus grande mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies dans le monde.

Lors des Ă©lections tant attendues de 2018, des irrĂ©gularitĂ©s Ă©lectorales gĂ©nĂ©ralisĂ©es ont Ă©tĂ© signalĂ©es, des partis politiques concurrents prĂ©tendaient ĂŞtre en tĂŞte après que les rĂ©sultats de divers comptages non officiels aient commencĂ© Ă  circuler sur les mĂ©dias sociaux. Des contenus sponsorisĂ©s produits sur Google et sur Facebook ont faussement prĂ©tendu qu’Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, dauphin du prĂ©sident sortant Joseph Kabila, avait remportĂ© le scrutin. Ces annonces ont Ă©tĂ© publiĂ©es avant la proclamation officielle des rĂ©sultats par la commission Ă©lectorale, arrivĂ©e tardivement. Il y a eu des coupures d’Internet dans les principales villes du pays, ce qui a davantage compliquĂ© la vĂ©rification de toute information en rapport avec ces Ă©lections.

Source : Twitter

Sachant que les Ă©lections avaient Ă©tĂ© reportĂ©es de novembre 2016 Ă  dĂ©cembre 2017, puis Ă  avril 2018, la propagation de faux rĂ©sultats Ă©lectoraux aurait pu prolonger le cycle d’instabilitĂ©.

Le rĂ´le de la diaspora

La communauté de la diaspora contribue énormément à attiser les tensions en ligne dans les deux pays, souvent par le biais de faux comptes qui partagent régulièrement des contenus haineux incitant à la violence contre des factions politiques rivales.

Lors des Ă©lections de 2018 au Cameroun, il y a eu plusieurs cas de publications sur les mĂ©dias sociaux en provenance de la diaspora affirmant que le prĂ©sident de longue date Paul Biya Ă©tait mort. Biya a finalement gagnĂ© lesdites Ă©lections et deux ans plus tard, le contenu des mĂ©dias sociaux, souvent en provenance de la diaspora, continue d’alimenter les tensions politiques et ethniques.

Source:  Facebook

Avec le conflit dans les régions anglophones qui provoque des appels à un État indépendant, et les séparatistes qui recherchent activement le soutien de la diaspora camerounaise, il y a un risque permanent que le contenu en ligne qualifiant le gouvernement camerounais de répressif et violent puisse entraîner des dommages hors ligne.

Source: Facebook

Quant aux messages mensongers sur les mĂ©dias sociaux qui affirmaient que Shadary avait remportĂ© l’Ă©lection prĂ©sidentielle de 2018 en RD Congo, et compte tenu de la coupure de l’Internet Ă  l’Ă©poque, tous les indices montrent que les auteurs des annonces sponsorisĂ©es et les administrateurs des comptes en question Ă©taient des membres de la diaspora. Le compte Lumumba aime LE CONGO qui figurait parmi les principaux propagateurs des annonces, avait Ă©tĂ© créé juste avant les Ă©lections et misait sur l’hĂ©ritage de Patrice Lumumba, cĂ©lèbre hĂ©ros de l’IndĂ©pendance. Outre le contenu revendiquant la victoire de Shadary, la page partageait Ă©galement des messages provenant de plusieurs faux domaines ou sites web d’agrĂ©gation d’informations comme CongoActu24.com. Ceci constitue un autre exemple frappant de dĂ©sinformation en ligne susceptible de causer des dommages hors ligne dans un environnement politique fragile.

Pandémies

Ă€ l’instar d’autres pays africains, le Cameroun et la RD Congo ont connu une recrudescence de la dĂ©sinformation en ligne Ă  propos du Covid-19, en partie liĂ©e aux sensibilitĂ©s culturelles, politiques et religieuses, notamment la promotion de remèdes Ă  base de plantes, de bains de vapeur, de l’alcool, de commentaires contradictoires et spĂ©culatifs sur les traitements et/ou de conseils confus sur les ProcĂ©dures OpĂ©rationnelles NormalisĂ©es (PON).

La propagation de la désinformation autour des maladies peut constituer un danger pour la santé publique, comme cela a été le cas au Cameroun et en RD Congo concernant Ebola et, plus récemment, le Covid-19. La désinformation sur les maladies cultive la méfiance par rapport aux données scientifiques, freine la sensibilisation, politise les actions de santé publique et sème le doute sur les motivations des autorités sanitaires.

La RD Congo n’est pas novice en matière d’épidĂ©mie, puisqu’elle a subi de plein fouet l’Ă©pidĂ©mie d’Ebola entre 2017 et 2019. En mai 2020, France 24 News a fait Ă©tat d’une campagne de dĂ©sinformation sur le Covid-19 en RD Congo. Les rapports de France 24 ont ensuite Ă©tĂ© corroborĂ©s par Facebook et le DFRLab, qui ont trouvĂ© un lien entre le rĂ©seau avec un homme politique appelĂ© HonorĂ© Mvula. Le rĂ©seau a diffusĂ© plusieurs propos sur le Covid-19 faussement attribuĂ©es Ă  des personnalitĂ©s publiques, notamment Ă  l’expert français en maladies infectieuses Didier Raoult, au prĂ©sident français Emmanuel Macron et au prĂ©sident malgache Andry Rajoelina. Ces allĂ©gations ont fait le tour des pages Facebook très suivies en RD Congo. Mvula a niĂ© les accusations portĂ©es contre lui. Facebook a dĂ» supprimer lesdites pages.

Coupures d’Internet

Le Cameroun et la RD Congo ont l’habitude d’ordonner des coupures d’accès Ă  l’Internet Ă  de multiples occasions lors de protestations publiques et d’Ă©lections. En janvier 2017, la connectivitĂ© Ă  Internet a Ă©tĂ© coupĂ©e dans la rĂ©gion anglophone du Cameroun suite Ă  des appels Ă  sa sĂ©cession de la rĂ©gion francophone. Cette interruption qui a durĂ© plus de 230 jours jusqu’en mars 2018, est connue comme la plus longue coupure d’Internet sur le continent.

De la mĂŞme manière, l’instabilitĂ© en RD Congo a Ă©tĂ© continuellement caractĂ©risĂ©e par des coupures rĂ©pĂ©titives d’Internet depuis dĂ©cembre 2011. Après la journĂ©e Ă©lectorale relativement calme du 30 dĂ©cembre 2018, le gouvernement a coupĂ© l’accès Ă  Internet le 31 dĂ©cembre, puis a progressivement fermĂ© les mĂ©dias audiovisuels, tout en expulsant certains journalistes internationaux qui couvraient les Ă©lections. Les raisons officielles fournies par les responsables politiques Ă©taient “afin d’Ă©viter la diffusion de faux rĂ©sultats”.

D’après des analystes, la coupure d’Internet au Cameroun a coĂ»tĂ© Ă  l’Ă©conomie 1,67 million de dollars par jour, tandis que celle de la RD Congo coutait 3 millions de dollars par jour.

Source: Twitter

Les coupures d’Internet pendant les Ă©lections sont une tendance courante et croissante de la rĂ©pression numĂ©rique, en particulier dans les pays autoritaires d’Afrique, dont les dirigeants sont au pouvoir depuis de nombreuses annĂ©es. Lorsque les gouvernements imposent des blackouts mĂ©diatiques ou restreignent la libre circulation de l’information en ligne par d’autres moyens, la dĂ©sinformation se dĂ©veloppe car la vĂ©rification des faits et le dĂ©bat contradictoire sont entravĂ©s. Dans le cas du Cameroun et de la RD Congo, cette dĂ©sinformation, provenait en grande partie de la diaspora qui propageait un discours de haine et de fausses informations risquant d’exacerber les conflits civils et de compromettre l’intĂ©gritĂ© Ă©lectorale. Ă€ leur tour, les coupures d’accès Ă  Internet et la dĂ©sinformation propagĂ©es par des acteurs Ă©tatiques et non Ă©tatiques Ă©rodent le potentiel de la technologie pour amĂ©liorer l’intĂ©gritĂ© Ă©lectorale, l’engagement civique et la lutte contre des maladies telles que le Covid-19.

Source: Twitter

Venir à bout de la désinformation

La crĂ©ation de comptes de messagerie visant uniquement les  pĂ©riodes Ă©lectorales est devenue monnaie courante, et ils sont particulièrement inquiĂ©tants du fait que leur contenu est souvent mensonger, carrĂ©ment faux ou incitatif. Cette rĂ©cente Ă©mergence de campagnes en ligne via les plateformes de mĂ©dias sociaux a donc soulevĂ© d’autres prĂ©occupations quant Ă  la manière dont les donnĂ©es requises sont obtenues, au niveau de vulnĂ©rabilitĂ© des dĂ©mocraties africaines face Ă  l’ingĂ©rence Ă©trangère, Ă  la façon dont les algorithmes des mĂ©dias sociaux sont enclins Ă  la manipulation, et Ă  l’éthique du fait que des pays africains soient utilisĂ©s comme terrain d’essai pour de nouvelles technologies numĂ©riques.

Alors que les efforts visant Ă  lĂ©gifĂ©rer contre la dĂ©sinformation deviennent des points de pression sur les droits humains, des mesures alternatives prises en collaboration avec les opĂ©rateurs de plateformes de mĂ©dias sociaux s’avèrent prometteuses. En 2020, plusieurs gouvernements d’Afrique subsaharienne ont Ă©tabli des partenariats avec des plateformes de mĂ©dias sociaux et d’autres intermĂ©diaires pour lutter contre la dĂ©sinformation en rapport avec le Covid-19. Plus tĂ´t en 2018, le Cameroun a directement travaillĂ© avec Facebook pour explorer les moyens de lutte contre la diffusion d’informations fausses et mensongères dans le pays. Entre-temps, la promotion du renforcement des capacitĂ©s dans le domaine de l’utilisation du numĂ©rique et de la capacitĂ© de vĂ©rification des faits, ainsi que la sensibilisation sur ce qui constitue un contenu inacceptable sur les plateformes et Ă  la manière de signaler un contenu rĂ©prĂ©hensible, restent des actions clĂ©s nĂ©cessaires. Par consĂ©quent, les efforts et les autres mesures pour lutter contre la dĂ©sinformation et autres contenus prĂ©judiciables, notamment durant les pĂ©riodes Ă©lectorales et la lutte contre le Covid-19, nĂ©cessitent une collaboration plus Ă©troite par rapport Ă  celle dont nous avons Ă©tĂ© tĂ©moins jusqu’ici, entre les gouvernements, la sociĂ©tĂ© civile et les plateformes.

Richard Ngamita est un chercheur dans le domaine du traitement de donnĂ©es qui travaille actuellement sur les droits de l’homme, la dĂ©sinformation et l’espionnage. Il a prĂ©cĂ©demment travaillĂ© chez Google au sein de l’Ă©quipe contre les pourriels. Il a Ă©galement menĂ© des recherches d’investigation dans le domaine de la santĂ©, l’agriculture et les mouvements de rĂ©fugiĂ©s.

Ethiopia’s New Telecommunications Operator Could Be Bogged Down By Old Habits

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Ethiopia, one of the world’s last closed telecommunications markets, has been liberalised. On May 22, 2021, the Ethiopian government announced that a new telecommunications license had been awarded to the Global Partnership for Ethiopia –  a consortium comprising Kenya’s Safaricom PLC, Vodacom Group, Vodafone Group, the United Kingdom’s development finance institution CDC Group plc, the Japanese-owned Sumitomo Corporation, and the Development Finance Corporation. The award is likely to boost quality of service provision and promote access to information online, in the historically troubled country. 

The newly licensed operator will compete with the state-owned Ethio telecom to serve the country’s population of more than 100 million people. Currently,  the country has low connectivity rates, with internet penetration standing at 20% and mobile phone penetration at  38.5%. Earlier in May 2021, Ethio telcom launched a mobile phone-based financial service, Telebirr, to boost the digital economy by offering cashless transactions as an alternative to an inefficient banking system. The Huawei built Telebirr is likely to face off with MPesa – the mobile banking system pioneered by Safaricom 14 years ago, whose popularity has seen it being adopted by multiple other countries and has served as a key enabler of increased financial inclusion in Kenya and beyond.

The liberalisation of Ethiopia’s telecommunications sector is part of the country’s ongoing reforms to promote social, political and economic development. Reform efforts under the premiership of Abiy Ahmed have included the release of prisoners and dropping charges against opposition actors and activists. Further, efforts have been made to reconnect mobile and broadband internet services disrupted since 2016, including reinstating access to 246 websites, blogs, and news sites that were inaccessible for an extended period of time.

Abiy was shortlisted for a Nobel Peace Prize within a year of his leadership. He went  on to win the prize in October 2019. The commitment to reforms saw Ethiopia jump 40 places up in the World Press Freedom Index in 2019 and the country also hosted the May 2019 commemoration of World Press Freedom Day. A few months later, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology partnered with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to host the 2019 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), a landmark convening of digital rights actors from across the continent and beyond.

However, the various positive strides are marred by actions in response to ongoing ethnic conflict. The Tigray region in the north of the country, which is currently the epicentre of the conflict, has experienced government-initiated blocks on communications, including internet access and voice calls. Meanwhile, prosecution and persecution of the media and human rights activists alongside state-sponsored disinformation propaganda in the context of the conflict is eroding the initial press freedom and governance gains.

On the policy front, in March 2020, Ethiopia enacted a new Proclamation on hate speech and disinformation, which weighs heavily on social media users and intermediaries, with hefty fines and long jail terms for offenders. Critics have argued that the proclamation undermines free speech, especially as it was passed just months before the general election, which was set to take place in August 2020. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the elections were rescheduled to take place in June 2021 and will likely mark a key test for democratic reforms in the country.

Indeed, the autonomy of the newly licensed private operator during the upcoming elections and any periods of public unrest is one to watch. Indications from other parts of the African continent are grim – government overreach in intermediaries operations remains a threat to citizens’ rights, political engagement and economic activity. 

See this State of Internet Freedom in Ethiopia report which mapped 20 years of Government internet controls in the country.

Moreover, Ethiopia has traditionally used Ethio telecom to monitor and control citizens’ communications, a scenario it may try to replicate with the new licensee. It remains to be seen whether the new licensee will be ready to resist any illegitimate actions by state agencies to impede citizens’ access to digital information and platforms.