Empowering Journalists to Deescalate Conflict and Hate Speech at Election Times

By CIPESA Staff |

Elections are an essential democratic process during which citizens need access to a range of credible information in order to participate meaningfully and to make informed choices. But elections can also be highly charged affairs and, with the increasing proliferation of digital technologies, there is always a danger of rising cases of online hate speech.

This scenario requires that the media – particularly in conflict-prone communities – have the skills for conflicting-sensitive reporting, are able to identify and call out hate speech online and offline, counter misinformation, and develop comprehensive plans for election coverage. Yet, the pressures which the Covid-19 pandemic has exerted on the budgets of media houses, and the restrictions some governments have increasingly placed on media freedom, all undermine the ability of the media to play the role of peace mediators, agenda-setters, and watchdogs.

That is where the role of civil society becomes crucial in ensuring the media to play its needed role at such important democratic processes as elections. It is against this background that, ahead of Uganda’s January 2021 elections, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) conducted a series of training workshops to equip journalists with the relevant skills, knowledge and tools to aid them to report on the elections in a more professional and balanced manner.

“In the 2021 general election, since public rallies were limited to a small number of people, or banned altogether in some districts, there was a heavy reliance on the media by the candidates to reach out to the electorates. It is important that media workers are up to the task of delivering information to citizens in a balanced and neutral manner,” said Paul Kimumwe, Senior Program Officer for Research and Advocacy at CIPESA.

Due to the on-going Covid-19 pandemic, the government initially suspended all public gatherings, among other restrictions although these were progressively eased to allow political rallies in some districts provided they did not exceed 200 attendees.

As part of efforts to discourage mass rallies, the communication regulator, Uganda Communication Commission (UCC), in November 2020 issued the Guidelines on the Use of Media during the General Elections and Campaigns 2021. According to the guidelines, all media stations shall not discriminate against any political party or candidate or subject any political party or candidate to any prejudice in the broadcasting of political adverts.

On the other hand, all private media stations are required to ensure that all their advertising space and airtime was not bought out by one party. Yet, leading opposition candidates were barred from accessing some radio stations and campaigning in several towns.

In the lead up to the elections, journalists had fallen victim to arrests and assaults, there was an attempted block to media outlets running online – the state requested Facebook to block mainly opposition owned YouTube channels, reports of denials of accreditation to cover the elections emerged, thus threatening the plurality of the media.

With the media and digital platforms including social media providing key campaign platforms, there were concerns about the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation, and hate speech online. Earlier in March 2020, UCC had issued a public advisory notice against individuals (including journalists) misusing digital platforms to publish, distribute and forward false, unverified, or misleading stories and reports. In September 2020, the regulator issued a renewed order for online publishers and broadcasters to apply for operating licences.

According to Kimumwe,  the training was structured to provide the trainees with both knowledge and skills-based competences to help them cover elections more effectively and professionally.

“The curriculum included topics such as the role of media in electoral democracy, technology and journalism, electoral media-related laws and policies, peace journalism, how to prepare for and cover election day and the post-election period, and how journalists can ensure their safety,” noted Kimumwe.

He said it was important to include conflict-sensitive reporting given Uganda’s past history of a violent election process and the proliferation of hate speech during the campaigns, especially online. “We believe that the media could help in de-escalating the tensions through reporting as well as providing the much needed context and fact-checking certain utterances by politicians on the campaign trail,” he said.

Ahead of the training, there were various incidents of attacks against journalists on the campaign trail by security forces. It was important therefore that the trainees were equipped with safety and security skills as they covered the elections.

The training included editors and reporters from more than 50 media houses in the Acholi, Bukedi, Busoga, Elgon, and Teso  sub-region benefited from the training,  of whom 36% were female.

“The training helped me acquire skills to report on the elections as well as knowing my role and rights as a journalist” – Julius Wasike, Apex FM reporter, Jinja

“The training awakened my conscience and alertness towards safety and conflict-sensitive reporting” – Gerald Matembu, NBS reporter, Mbale

“I have learnt how to write stories that do not ignite the emotions” – Agnes Aromo, Radio Pacis journalist, Gulu

The campaign period was characterised by high levels of violence, including beatings of journalists, arrests of presidential candidates, and the killing of more than 50 people during a riot. Whereas this created fears that the election day and its aftermath would be marred by violence, the election day and the post-election period have been calm.

Nonetheless, there are allegations that the winning candidate, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, was fraudulently declared winner with 59% of the votes, and the runner-up, Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine, has petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn Museveni’s victory. The blockage of the internet ahead of the elections undermined electoral transparency, severely hindered the work of journalists, and denied citizens’ access to badly needed information.

In November 2020, CIPESA partnered with Media Focus on Africa to bring together 80 key media practitioners and stakeholders including media support organisations, media houses, journalists’ associations, government bodies, independent content producers, civil society, and security organs to deliberate on challenges and opportunities for media during elections in a digital era. Conducted in Kampala, the engagement also gave journalists tips on digital security and fact-checking.

Besides the journalists’ training, CIPESA conducted other engagements that brought together key actors including Members of Parliament, Electoral Commission (EC) officials, election observer groups, and human rights organisations. A December 2020 roundtable saw officials from Facebook and WhatsApp present their efforts to combat cyber violence, harassment,  incitement, bullying, misinformation, fight hate speech and other objectionable content. Political party leaders and the EC officials explained how pivotal digital platforms had become in an election where physical meetings were heavily curtailed.

Register for The Data Privacy Summit 2021

Online Event |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) alongside Article 19, Facebook, FGI Benin are pleased to host the Data Privacy Summit 2021 (#DataPrivacySummit21) in commemoration of Data Privacy Day.

Data Privacy Day was launched by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 26th April 2006, to be celebrated each year on 28th January; the anniversary of the signing of Convention 108 – the first legally binding international treaty on privacy and data protection. Since then, this day has come to represent international efforts to empower individuals and businesses to respect privacy, safeguard data and build trust.

Data Privacy Summit 2021, thus aims to raise awareness on contemporary privacy and data protection issues in Africa and the Middle East, as well as to inspire individuals, policymakers, organisations to take action and adopt best practices that protect privacy while promoting innovation in a manner that mitigates risks in the increasing use of digital technologies.

To see the lineup of sessions and speakers, register here.

Uganda's 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.

Uganda’s 2021 Election: A Textbook Case of Disruption to Democracy and Digital Networks in Authoritarian Countries

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Uganda’s 2021 election, in which a president who has been in power for 35 years is seeking re-election, is a textbook case of how recent polls in authoritarian African countries go: disrupted internet, rampant disinformation campaigns, opposition candidates routinely arrested, peaceful protesters shot dead, and the media and civil society profoundly harassed.

If he wins the election, incumbent Yoweri Museveni, 76, will take his tally as Uganda’s president to 40 years. His main challenger Robert Kyagulanyi, 38, is a popular musician commonly known as Bobi Wine who joined politics in early 2017. Kyagulanyi has regularly been arrested, barred from radio stations and stopped from campaigning in most of the country. Other strong presidential contenders, notably Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), have similarly been harassed.

The blockage of social media and other digital platforms dealt a heavy blow to opposition candidates’ efforts to canvass support. The country is conducting a so-called “scientific election”, one where the media and digital platforms provide the main campaign platforms, with physical meetings largely barred due to Covid-19 social distancing protocols. But the internet disruption also denied citizens access to vital information crucial to their informed decision-making in the poll and undermined electoral transparency in a country where the ruling party is routinely accused of electoral fraud.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348989568951967747

Museveni’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) accuses Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Platform (NUP) supporters of fomenting violence and flouting electoral regulations that bar large campaign crowds so as to prevent the spread of Covid-19. But critics say Covid-19 handed the government a ready excuse to trample citizens’ rights and hinder civic engagement and mobilisation by its opponents. They also accuse police and the Electoral Commission (EC) of cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates’ breach of Covid-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Much like the police, the communications regulator, Uganda Commissions Commission (UCC), has been faulted for treating Museveni’s challengers partially and unfairly. Before ordering this week’s blockage of social media and other digital services, the commission had ordered all content producers (including live streaming channels and bloggers) to seek its authorisation in order to operate. That move cast a chill on free expression, as it promoted self-censorship and restricted the engagement of citizens in online platforms.

In another move that cast doubt on the independence of the communications regulator, last month it asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi. The UCC said the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence. The commission’s decision to single out only opposition-leaning channels was questionable. The UCC had argued that these channels were used to mobilise protests last November that left more than 50 people dead. However, it is through these channels that repeated cases of blatant police and army brutality were documented and reported. Google declined to consider the blockage request since it was not accompanied by a court order.

Now, it turns out that the order to block social media was not the result of an independent assessment by the UCC, but a directive handed to it by the NRM, and possibly by President Museveni. In a January 12 television address, Museveni said the blockage was in retaliation for Facebook banning accounts of his supporters. “We can not tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad,” Museveni said of Facebook.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1348954155394740227

On January 11, Facebook suspended the accounts of a number of government officials and NRM party officials for what it described as Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) aimed at manipulating public debate ahead of key elections. Twitter also suspended similar accounts.

The decisions by Facebook and Twitter were backed by an investigation by the DFRLab that uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour, including posting verbatim messages supporting the Ugandan government and damaging to the opposition. Facebook’s internal investigation attributed the network to a group within Uganda’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

While both platforms are currently embroiled in global debates which include their roles in content moderation and deplatforming, they have publicly supported their actions in Uganda, with Facebook stating that, “Given the impending election in Uganda, we moved quickly to investigate and take down this network.”

For its part, Twitter stated: “Earlier this week, in close coordination with our peers, we suspended a number of accounts targeting the election in Uganda.” Twitter added, “If we can attribute any of this activity to state-backed actors, we will disclose to our archive of information operations.” During the 2016 elections, research showed that the NRM had deployed up to 5,000 Twitter bots to influence online discourse on the election in favour of Museveni.

The process of disrupting digital communications commenced on January 9 with applications download platforms like Google Play and Apple’s App Store being affected, and by January 11,  social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Whatsapp also started being blocked.  While rising numbers of users are relying on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to stay connected, the government is understood to have ordered that several VPN providers be blocked too.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1347789536521293826

 Over the years, Uganda has made it a habit to disrupt communications during elections.  Often, the protection of national security and public order has been cited as the basis for disruptions to digital communications. In 2006, Uganda blocked websites critical of Museveni. In 2011, it censored short message service (SMS) and blocked social media during the post-election #WalkToWork protests. In 2016, it blocked social media and mobile money services on election day and again during Museveni’s swearing in (only social media).

While Uganda is categorised as a hybrid regime – one that has democratic and authoritarian tendencies –  CIPESA research has shown that the less democratic credentials a government possesses, the higher the likelihood that it will order internet disruptions. It has also shown a correlation between a leader’s longevity in power and the likelihood of ordering network disruptions.

In recent weeks, the government has increasingly been hostile to dissenting opinions and cracked down on the political opposition, civil society, and the media.

Earlier this month, the Inspector-General of the Uganda Police stated in a public address that the police would continue to assault journalists for “their own safety”. The statement came in the wake of increased police brutality against journalists covering opposition candidates. On December 27, at least three journalists were injured by the police, one of them seriously; and earlier that month police beat up six journalists who were covering Kyagulanyi in Lira town in northern Uganda.

https://twitter.com/cipesaug/status/1343152881927655425

The assault on media freedom was further highlighted when the state-backed Uganda Media Council issued a directive in December for journalists to register with the council in order to cover the elections – and threatened criminal charges against any media houses, both local and international, including freelance journalists, who failed to register. Some argued that the cost (UGX 200,000/USD 54) associated with the registration was an extra limitation for poorly paid journalists in addition to the suspicious timing of the directive just weeks to the election, which appeared like a means to curtail press freedom.

Meanwhile, in a press statement the police warned that journalists who had not registered with the Media Council would be blocked from covering campaigns and other electoral activities.  Civic actors described this as a “move by the government to manage information about election campaigns that have been marred by violence against leading opposition candidates and their supporters.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, citizens in Uganda are increasingly reliant on digital technologies  for information crucial to their health, education, economic livelihoods, and political participation. Disrupting digital communications as Uganda has done not only raises concerns about its commitment to democracy and transparency during this critical time but also has far-reaching repercussions for the developing country’s economy and the lives of ordinary citizens.

Viewed together with the violence that state agents meted out on opposition supporters, the media and civic actors, and the partiality of regulatory agencies such as UCC and the EC, Uganda’s 2021 election is likely to have lasting effects on the social, economic and political arena of the country.

Trends of Digital Data Operations in Elections in Uganda from 2005 – 2020

Daniel Mwesigwa |

While different countries in Africa and beyond have been rocked by shocking revelations of abuse of user data from popular social networks such as Facebook (re: Cambridge Analytica) and massive advertising exchanges such as Google’s DoubleClick during electoral cycles, Uganda seems to have been spared.

This is not entirely surprising given such information is generally scant, however, it does not imply that Uganda does not or has not used data assets during elections in the past cycles. Neither does it show that Uganda will abstain from digital data operations in future elections, including the 2021 polls. In fact, as we argue in the text below, for long, Ugandan politicians and their political parties have exploited complex traditional systems of monitoring and communication to influence electoral outcomes. They are also using new and modern technologies such as mobile telephony to influence elections.

In particular, the state’s influence on the telecommunications industry has given it uninhibited access to large amounts of user data that could be used beyond state-sanctioned surveillance purposes. It is evident, surveillance is a critical aspect of electoral machinery in Uganda—especially that which is controlled by the incumbency. While Uganda is a multi-party democracy with theoretically coindependent arms of the government i.e. executive, legislature and judiciary, the president’s prominence within the country’s day to day administration including within its security dockets cannot be understated.

The state, through the presidency, has firmly established links within the Local Council (LC) system popular in rural and urban areas and is, indeed, an embodiment of “eyes on the street” phenomenon; a vernacular form of surveillance and monitoring—and care—enabled by the local leaders in local communities. However, with the proliferation of mobile telephony, especially in the urban areas, the surveillance machinery builds on the pre-existing (vernacular) infrastructures of surveillance to advanced technology and data enabled surveillance that has been weaponized, mostly by the state, to steer the electoral process and the probable outcomes.

Meanwhile, it is almost impossible to talk about data and politics in Uganda without situating the
conversation within the broader political history of elections in Uganda. Having attained its
independence from the British colonial masters on October 9, 1962, Uganda’s democratic journey has been characterised by violence and suppression. In fact, Uganda has never had a peaceful transfer of power from one leader to another since independence.

To crudely put it, political transition has often been a matter of life or death. Having ascended to power in January 1986 after a five-year guerrilla war campaign imputed to a rigged 1980 presidential poll, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has been at the helm of the country’s leadership since then. Notably, the president has also overseen arguably the longest period of relative peace and stability, coupled with significant post-1986 socio-economic recovery and growth. Despite these achievements, they seem to be steadily eroding because of increasing oppressive legislation, harassment of critics and opposition, and the impunity of those in power.

In this report, see the changing trends of use of data in electoral cycles in Uganda’s modern history. Crucially, the report looks at the period between 2005 and 2020, a period characterised by the highest use of technology and data assets witnessed in Uganda yet.