Blog – Page 27 of 170 – Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

07Jul

Health Data Regulation: Lessons from Covid-19 Surveillance in Kenya and Uganda

Brian July 7, 2023July 11, 2023

In today’s highly digitalised society, where large amounts of data are being collected and processed, the need for guidelines on health data governance can not be overemphasised. Health data is profoundly sensitive and breach of privacy can cause significant harm to concerned individuals and affect health outcomes. Such guidelines should regulate how data is collected, how and where it is stored, who can share or process it, and what they can do with the data.

As global interest in the regulation of health data picks pace, it is instructive to revisit how health data collected during massive data collection exercises has been handled in some African countries. This examination is crucial to appreciate the key challenges faced in safeguarding the privacy and security of health-related data. This can provide pointers to the areas that require regulation and strengthening of practices.

In this June 2023 Brief, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) recounts how measures related to tracking and monitoring people’s movements, communications and health data by the Kenyan and Ugandan governments and private entities during the Covid-19 pandemic were deemed to have breached the right to privacy, lacked sufficient oversight, and did not respect data protection principles.

Based on experiences from Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda, the Brief cites recommendations by the Transform Health Coalition, on the need for “common regulatory standards to harness the potential, and manage the risks, of health data sharing within and across borders, ensuring data is used for public good and prioritising equity, whilst protecting individual rights”.

Furthermore, the Brief puts forward pointers on how African governments can balance the responsibility to protect personal health data with the importance and value of sharing it for public good purposes such as research, innovation and health planning:

Develop clear and comprehensive privacy rights-respecting guidelines on health data through consultative processes that involve different private, civil society and public sector actors.

Regional and global cooperation in devising the guidelines is key to share best practices and promote cross-country cooperation and harmonisation of regulations.

The health data regulations should clearly and robustly embed all the high-level data protection principles. For health data specifically, it must only be processed for a period not longer than is necessary to achieve the intended purpose.

The guidelines should provide for assessment by independent bodies of applications and systems that collect health data for their privacy / data protection credentials.

The guidelines should include provisions on data collection, storage, sharing during pandemics and other health emergencies.

Government, private companies and medical facilities should be transparent about what data they hold, who they share it with, how they process and store it, and who accesses it and for what purpose.

Developers of health apps should embrace privacy by design when developing applications that collect, store or process health data. They should also have internal data governance policies that highlight the steps to ensure that the data they collect and process is secure.

Establish accountability mechanisms for apps and health data collectors and ensure data protection authorities proactively enforce them.

Government bodies should be transparent about all public–private partnerships they enter that entail data collection, storage and data sharing.

The regulations should encourage data sharing and reuse at national level, as well as cross-border sharing but provide mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of data that is shared.

Require health data collectors to have privacy policies written in plain language describing their data governance protocols and privacy credentials.

The regulations should require data collectors and processors to implement appropriate, timely and effective measures to demonstrate compliance with personal data processing regulations.

Read the Brief here.

30Jun

Navigating the Threats To Journalism in Uganda

CIPESA June 30, 2023October 30, 2023

By Brian Byaruhanga |

Over the years, journalists in Uganda have confronted a relentless tide of harassment, censorship, and physical violence as they diligently performed their duty. As reported by the Press Freedom Index, compiled by the Human Rights Network of Journalists, incidents of violations and abuse against journalists in Uganda have surged over recent years, climbing from 163 in 2018, to 165 in 2019, peaking at 174 in 2020, and 131 violations in 2021, culminating with Uganda dropping 7 (seven) places to 132 out of 180 countries from the 2021 rankings by the Freedom in the World Report in 2022. These transgressions are primarily orchestrated by regulatory authorities and security agencies. While challenges to journalism in Uganda are not novel, the advent of digital transformation and emergent technologies has infused new complexities into the landscape of press freedom and journalism practice in the country.

The ubiquity of digital technology has afforded journalists the ability to disseminate information rapidly. However, this swiftness has ushered in a suite of challenges to the very essence of journalism. It has engendered a proliferation of misinformation and disinformation, the imposition and acceptance of repressive legal frameworks, and the establishment of intricate content moderation systems.

In 2018, the Ugandan government, ostensibly to counteract the spread of what it pejoratively termed “gossip,” levied a tax on social media. This move was interpreted by critics as an effort to curtail freedom of speech and suppress dissenting viewpoints. Though, after years of resistance, this tax was ultimately overturned, it starkly illuminated the strained relationship between the government and the media.

In July 2022, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Bill was introduced in the Ugandan Parliament, a piece of legislation that later became law. It outlined a fresh set of offenses, subject to punitive penalties of imprisonment and fines. The bill was devised to “prohibit the sending or sharing of information that promotes hate speech” and “provide for the prohibition of sending or sharing false, malicious, and unsolicited information.” It also sought to define and penalize hate speech.

See this CIPESA analysis of the Computer Misuse Amendment Bill 2022.

According to the bill, “a person shall not write, send or share any information through a computer, which is likely to ridicule, degrade, or demean another person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion or gender; create divisions among persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender; or promote hostility against a person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender.”

Less than three months following its introduction, the Ugandan Computer Misuse Amendment Act of 2022 came into force, receiving the presidential assent of H.E Yoweri Kaguta Museveni on October 14, 2022.

These legislative measures appear to cloak attempts at content moderation under the guise of instilling self-censorship and disseminating fear regarding the sharing of information. Moreover, state surveillance emerges as another potent tool wielded against journalists, perpetuating reports of harassment, arrests, and detentions, often facilitated through state-sanctioned surveillance activities. There have also been allegations of the government employing spyware to target journalists and activists.

In the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 general elections, the Ugandan government implemented stringent surveillance protocols while intensifying existing restrictions on free expression. This crackdown became particularly conspicuous after a cohort of Ugandan investigative journalists received notifications that their devices had been compromised by Pegasus, a spy software enabling operators to extract messages, photos, emails, record calls, and clandestinely activate microphones and cameras. Notably, this software is attributed to the Israeli spyware firm, NSO Group, which officially supplies the Pegasus software to military, law enforcement, and government intelligence agencies for the purpose of targeting criminals and terrorists. However, multiple reports surfaced indicating the use of the software against politicians, journalists, and activists. Investigative journalist Canary Mugume was among the few who received an alert from Apple, signalling that state-sponsored attackers may be targeting his phone.

The escalating adoption of technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning also invokes apprehension. While these technologies have the potential to enhance journalistic work, they also harbor the capacity to manipulate information and undermine the credibility of journalists. A notable example is the use of deepfake technology, capable of crafting persuasive yet fabricated videos or audio recordings, employed to discredit journalists and their work.

To address these threats to journalism in Uganda, it is imperative for journalists to embrace digital resilient practices, safeguarding their sources and their work. Additionally, media organizations should make investments in technologies capable of detecting and countering disinformation and misinformation.

The perils of disinformation and misinformation, state surveillance, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and brutality pose substantial challenges to the function of journalists and the role of media in a democratic society. Overcoming these challenges necessitates concerted efforts by journalists, media organizations, governments, civil society, and international entities to champion a free and independent media that effectively serves the public interest.

It is therefore imperative to acknowledge that journalists operate within an ever-evolving media and digital milieu. And proactive measures must be adopted to ensure their digital security through the implementation of appropriate precautions and the ongoing pursuit of the latest security measures. Specifically, journalists must undertake the following steps to safeguard their well-being while executing their professional responsibilities:

Digital Security Training: Journalists should participate in digital security training to acquire knowledge on how to protect themselves and their sources online. These training programs offer guidance on encrypting communications, securing devices, and maintaining anonymity.

Use of Encryption: Journalists should employ encryption tools like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), encrypted messaging applications, and secure email services to ensure the security of their communications and data, safeguarding them from interception and surveillance.

Secure Data Storage: Journalists should adopt secure data storage practices, including the utilization of encrypted external hard drives, password-protected archives, and encrypted cloud storage services. These measures prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.

Two-Factor Authentication: To fortify their online security, journalists should implement two-factor authentication for their digital accounts. This extra layer of protection safeguards their accounts against unauthorized access.

Caution with Social Media: Journalists must exercise prudence on social media platforms. They should refrain from disseminating sensitive information and limit the extent of personal details shared online, thus mitigating the risk of exposing themselves or their sources to harm.

Practicing Situational Awareness: Maintaining an acute awareness of their surroundings is crucial for journalists, especially when conducting interviews or reporting from the field. This involves steering clear of hazardous areas and being vigilant for potential threats, ensuring their physical safety while pursuing their professional duties.

Use of Secure Networks: Public Wi-Fi networks, often unsecured, are susceptible to interception. Journalists should avoid their use and instead opt for secure networks or establish their own hotspots, reducing the risk of compromising sensitive data.

In navigating the multifaceted threats to journalism in Uganda, journalists must adopt a multifaceted approach encompassing personal digital security measures, collective industry efforts, and international advocacy for press freedom and journalists’ safety. These actions, coupled with unwavering commitment, will enable journalists to continue their indispensable work, promoting transparency, accountability, and democracy, even in the face of mounting challenges in the digital age.

Through the tireless pursuit of these strategies, journalists in Uganda can reinforce their resilience, fortify their commitment to truth-telling, and persevere in upholding the fundamental principles of journalism – principles that serve not only the interests of a free press but also the broader cause of democracy and informed citizenship. In this era of digital transformation, journalism remains an essential pillar of democracy and an indispensable guardian of society’s well-being. In conclusion, navigating the evolving landscape of journalism in Uganda demands not only the adoption of technical safeguards but also unwavering resolve. The challenges faced by journalists serve as a testament to the vitality of their work in safeguarding democratic values. In embracing the digital era, journalists must continue to shine a light on truth, accountability, and justice, thereby preserving the foundations of a vibrant, free, and democratic society.

19Jun

Building a Movement of Digital Rights Advocates in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

CIPESA June 19, 2023July 19, 2023

By Asimwe John Ishabairu

Digital rights advocacy amidst rapid policy change and an ever-evolving technology sector in Africa is constrained by various challenges. Among them are siloed approaches, limited avenues for stakeholder participation, and a lack of requisite knowledge, skills, and resources for meaningful and sustained engagement. There is also inadequate digital resilience capacity among the most at-risk groups.

As part of the Greater Internet Freedom (GIF) project, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has for the past three years led engagements to build the advocacy capacity of various actors in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The engagements have worked to grow participants’ thematic understanding of key digital rights trends, including disinformation, online gender based violence, legal and policy frameworks, surveillance, the digital economy, access and affordability, digital safety and security, privacy and data protection, digital inclusion and network disruptions, alongside practical skills development in digital rights research methodologies, data driven advocacy, artivism and impact communications.

Post-training evaluations indicate a strong appreciation of the relevance of the capacity building, the opportunity to expand networks, retention and application of acquired skills and knowledge. Notably, beneficiaries have become infomediaries within their communities and organisations, through awareness raising exercises, and conducting onward training.

“As a result of the training, we conducted a workshop with the grassroot women human rights defenders on disinformation and human rights, and developed a digital rights advocacy and communication strategy,” stated one beneficiary from Kenya, whose organisation works across East Africa.

“I took away an appreciation of the legal environment around digital rights and how to conduct research. As a result of the training, I’ve researched and published a research report in partnership with Global Voices”, said a beneficiary from Zimbabwe. Others point to collaborations with hitherto non-allied groups. “I have been able to approach key stakeholders such as legislators and legal practitioners for my research work and projects,” said another beneficiary from Tanzania.

Another from Zambia stated: “I have been able to influence collaboration between my institution and other like-minded actors through working groups on the government proposed media reforms and implications on digital rights, with a focus on gender perspectives.”

In total, the capacity building engagements reached 80 beneficiaries from various stakeholder groups, including governments, academia, civil society, media, and the legal fraternity across the six countries.

The engagements leveraged expertise from various field practitioners. Among them: the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), Media Convergence, the Tanzania Women’s Media Association (TAMWA), LaunchPad Tanzania, Jamii Forums, Culture and Development East Africa (CDEA), Bloggers of Zambia, the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), Makerere University, the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Bongo Hive, Revolt for Her and Access now.

Beneficiaries acknowledged that digital rights advocacy was a broad field and the capacity building engagements served as critical entry points. However, they called for continuous engagements and follow-ups in tandem with evolutions in policy and practice.

“The sessions need to be ongoing,” said a participant from Uganda.

“I think such training should be provided regularly because the world of technology is very dynamic and needs constant updates to stay relevant,” said a participant from Mozambique.

According to CIPESA’s Programme Manager, Ashnah Kalemera, closing the skills, knowledge, and research gaps is crucial to growing the number and strength of actors advancing digital rights in Africa. This is at the core of CIPESA’s interventions, particularly the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), the fellowship programme, capacity-building programmes at both national and regional levels, and stakeholder convenings such as the annual Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica).

13Jun

Smell The Coffee Kenya, Disinformation Is Brewing!

CIPESA June 13, 2023April 29, 2024

By Juliet Nanfuka |

Just over a year ago, Kenya was in the midst of a bitterly contested general election held in August 2022. The electoral period was characterised by hate speech and disinformation, which remain prevalent today. Indeed, recent studies have highlighted a booming disinformation industry in the country, fuelled by political, economic and personal interests with many actors including politicians, content creators, and citizens churning out hate speech and disinformation on social media platforms.

During the election period, disinformation and hate speech circulated widely as social media personalities and ordinary citizens on various sides of the political divide coordinated and shared inciteful and hateful content. Influencers with a large following on the platforms are often bankrolled by politicians to recruit and coordinate micro-influencers to develop common disinformation and hate narratives and push hashtags which often trend on social media. Further, social media trolls engage through Facebook posts, tweets and WhatsApp groups with targeted hate against ethnic communities such as the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo, the ethnic communities of current president William Ruto, former president Uhuru Kenyatta, and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, respectively.

Amidst the election-related disinformation blitz, social media platforms seemed to do either too little or nothing to stop the spread of harmful and illegal content. An investigation by Global Witness and Foxglove in June 2022 showed that Facebook failed to detect inflammatory and violent hate speech ads posted on its platforms in Swahili and English. Further, the investigation found that even after putting out a statement in July 2022 on its efforts to combat harmful content, including 37,000 pieces of Kenyan content removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating its hate speech policies, similar hate speech ads were later approved on their platforms.

Likewise, in July 2022 Twitter was blamed by local actors for profiting from its negligence by allowing its trending topic section to be exploited through paid influencers to amplify malicious, coordinated, inauthentic attacks to silence Kenya’s civil society, muddy their reputations and stifle the reach of their messaging. In September 2021, Twitter suspended 100 accounts from Kenya for violating the platform’s manipulations and spam policy after being found to have been tweeting pre-determined hashtags meant to misinform the public and attack certain personalities. In June 2022, the company suspended 41 accounts promoting the hashtag #ChebukatiCannotBeTrusted, which suggested that the then Chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was supporting one of the presidential candidates.

TikTok, which has gained popularity among younger audiences, has also come under scrutiny after disinformation and hate content was found on its platform ahead of the August 2022 election. A study by Mozilla found 132 videos that had been viewed collectively over four million times, which were spreading hate speech and inciting violence against some ethnic communities. Some also featured synthetic and manipulated content couched as Netflix documentaries, news stories and fake opinion polls or fake tweets aimed at triggering violence, fear and violence as was witnessed during the 2007 post-election period. According to the report, TikTok suffered context bias and its content moderation practices were not robust enough to tackle the spread of such content on its platform. TikTok has since removed the videos highlighted in the report.

According to Kenya’s hate speech watchdog, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), hate speech content is most prevalent on Facebook and Twitter. In July 2022, the NCIC ordered Meta to address hate speech and incitement on its Facebook platform within a week or face a suspension of its operations in the country. In August 2022, the Commission also found an increase in hate content on TikTok. Some of the hate and disinformation hashtags it identified on the various platforms included #RejectRailaOdinga, #Riggagy and #RutoMalizaUfungwe, which propagated falsehoods against candidates in the presidential election.

Some critics have argued that social media platforms have shown a consistent failure to adequately moderate content in Kenya. Furthermore, the platforms’ attempts at content moderation are implemented in a lacklustre, under-funded and opaque system that is neither participatory nor rights-respecting. Other studies have also shown that platforms continue to inconsistently enforce their own rules through flawed content moderation practices and in essence permit the spread of extreme, divisive and polarising content partly due to their lack of understanding of Kenya’s cultural context and local languages and slang.

The government’s attempts at legislating on disinformation and hate speech have not been without setbacks. In 2018, the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018 was adopted, imposing punitive fines and prison terms on the publication of false information and false, misleading and fictitious data. Unfortunately, these provisions have been unjustly used to target bloggers for exposing corruption or seeking state accountability.

A case by the Bloggers Association of Kenya challenging the constitutionality of the law remains pending an appeal of the decision by the High Court in February 2020 allowing the enforcement of the law. Section 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act constricts the definition of hate speech to “ethnic hatred” and fails to capture the constitutional limitations under Article 31, which include propaganda for war, incitement to violence, hate speech, and advocacy of hatred. This means various hate speech content remains lawful in the absence of a clear criminal prohibition.

Moreover, the NCIC, which was formed following the 2007 post-election violence, has been plagued by numerous challenges in its attempt to fight hate and promote peace and national cohesion. The commission for most of its active life has been underfunded, thus hindering its ability and capacity to monitor hate speech online, investigate incidents and conduct public awareness and engagements. Further, political interference with its work means that it has been incapable of enforcing the law to get successful convictions of offenders who are mostly the political elite.

More importantly, successive government administrations have failed to implement the recommendations of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report to address the drivers of hate and disinformation. The report identified those drivers as Kenya’s historical inter-ethnic tensions that are systemic and deep-rooted in its social, cultural, religious, economic and political fabric. Disinformation and hate speech in Kenya thrive on these unresolved historical tensions around political ideology, ethnicity, economics, and demography.

Today, a majority of social media users in Kenya are aware of and fuel hate speech and disinformation on social media. To some, it is all fun and games, as they assume no feelings get hurt. To many, however, disinformation triggers pain, fear, tension and hate. Last year, a local politician advised Kenyans to put matters of politics in their lungs, not their hearts. This attitude is also a problem, as such views may breed a level of acceptance and normalisation of disinformation and hate speech in the country by encouraging people to grow a ‘thick skin’ instead of objectively addressing the root causes of the vice. People, including Kenyans, are known to act on their feelings. As we have seen in neighbouring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Sudan, hate speech and disinformation can drive violence with devastating consequences.

The failure to resolve Kenya’s underlying tensions means the country risks further social division and fragmentation of society as well as diminished progress due to a continuation of governance policies and practices that further entrench discrimination and exclusion in accessing opportunities, resources and essential services. The hate that arises from the effects of such policies and practices, and the disinformation deployed to justify and perpetuate them, affects people’s mental health and emotional well-being. Moreover, they cement long-held historical fears, suspicions and animosity that continue to undermine the ability of Kenyans to trust each other or the government and could inhibit the willingness of sections of the public to cooperate in nation-building for the common good.

Be that as it may, there are some promising efforts, such as the recently launched local coalition on freedom of expression and content moderation and the draft guidelines for regulating digital platforms spearheaded by UNESCO that seek to promote engagement and tackle content that potentially damages human rights and democracy. The multistakeholder coalition is an initiative of UNESCO and ARTICLE 19 that aims to bridge the gap between local stakeholders and social media companies and to improve content moderation practices, including supporting regulatory reform, building the capacity of state and non-state actors, and raising awareness on the ethical use of digital platforms. While these twin initiatives are new and largely untested, they present an opportunity to ensure more rights-respecting content moderation practices, the application of common norms based on human rights standards and stronger multistakeholder engagement in the content moderation process.

Finally, it may be easy to blame social media companies for the weaknesses in their content moderation systems, and by all means they need to be held to account. However, better algorithms alone cannot fix our society or our social norms. Kenyans must wake up and smell the coffee. Leaders need to drop the divisive acts and work together with stakeholders and citizens to address historical tensions and foster a culture of inclusion, tolerance, respect and understanding. While at it, they should promote responsible social media use, fact-checking, and media literacy in order to counter the negative impact of hate speech and disinformation and ultimately build a more just, harmonious, democratic and equitable society.

12Jun

Submit Your Session Proposal or Travel Support Application to the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2023 (FIFAfrica23)

CIPESA June 12, 2023June 19, 2023

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) invites interested parties to submit session proposals to the 2023 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica23). Successful submissions will help to shape the agenda of the event, which will gather hundreds of policymakers, regulators, human rights defenders, journalists, academics, private sector players, global information intermediaries, bloggers, and developers.

FIFAfrica23, which is set to take place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on September 27-29, 2023, offers a platform for deliberation on gaps and opportunities for advancing privacy, free expression, inclusion, free flow of information, civic participation, and innovation online. This year will mark a decade of hosting the landmark event in various African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.

As part of the registration, we invite session proposals including panel discussions, lightning talks, exhibitions, and skills workshops to shape the FIFAfrica23 agenda.

CIPESA is committed to ensuring diversity of voices, backgrounds and viewpoints in attendance and as organisers and speakers at panels at FIFAfrica. In line with this, there is limited funding to support travel for participation at FIFAfrica23. Preference will be given to applicants who can partially support their attendance and those who organise sessions.

Submissions close at 18.00 (East Africa Time) on July 14, 2023. Successful session proposals and travel support applicants will be directly notified by August 14, 2023.

The session proposal and travel support form can be accessed here.

NOTE: All data collected as part of the registration and session proposal exercise will only be used for purposes of the FIFAfrica event management.

Follow @cipesaug on Twitter and on the dedicated FIFAfrica website for regular updates on the Forum.

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