NEW BRIEF: Policy Considerations for Enhancing Digital Trade in East Africa

By Lillian Nalwoga |

The East African region is on the cusp of a digital revolution, with significant strides being made in digital trade and payments. This is driven by remarkable growth in internet penetration, mobile money services, and the adoption of emerging technologies like 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Further, initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the East African Community (EAC) e-Commerce Strategy are laying the groundwork for a thriving digital economy. The World Bank projects digital services exports from Africa to reach USD 74 billion by 2040, highlighting the immense opportunity at hand. Despite these strides, there are several key challenges that need to be addressed to fully unlock the region’s digital potential.

In this brief, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) outlines barriers to digital trade and presents key policy recommendations for promoting a human rights-based digital economy in the region.

According to the brief, the key barriers hindering the advancement of digital trade in East Africa include:

  • Limited Digital Infrastructure and Internet Access: While mobile internet penetration is growing, issues like internet subsea cable cuts, network disruptions, low digital literacy, and low affordability persist. Uneven distribution of infrastructure, high deployment costs, and slow adoption of new technologies further exacerbate the digital divide.
  • Fragmented Approaches to Digital Economy Taxation: Differing digital service taxes (DST) across countries create complexities and may impede innovation and cross-border trade. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania all levy DST, with Kenya’s rate being the highest in the region.
  • Data Governance and Privacy Concerns: While some countries have adopted data protection laws, harmonise action is lacking. Issues like data localisation requirements and the need for a comprehensive regional approach to data privacy and management remain.
  • Limited Local Data Centres: The region has a limited number of data centres, which hinders data localisation efforts and the advancement of AI and other data-intensive technologies. Restrictive regulatory frameworks in some countries further complicate the use of cloud solutions.
  • Rising Cybersecurity Threats: Cyber risks are a major concern, with increasing cyber attacks targeting various sectors. Cybercrime laws, while necessary, sometimes contain vague provisions that can be used to curtail online freedoms.

To overcome these challenges and fully leverage the digital economy, the policy brief offers several key recommendations:

  • Embrace Digital Transformation and Connectivity: Invest in robust networks, backup systems, and address single points of failure in internet connectivity.
  • Implement Robust Cybersecurity Frameworks: Prioritise investments in cyber infrastructure, skilling, and awareness.
  • Recognise Data as a Trade Enabler: Ensure trade agreements prevent unnecessary restrictions on data flows and adopt balanced data localisation policies.
  • Harmonise Data Protection Standards: Reduce compliance costs and build trust by harmonising data protection standards across the region.
  • Build Robust Digital Infrastructure: Focus on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), data policy, privacy, and protection.
  • Speed up the Adoption of the EAC Data Governance Policy Framework: Secure resources for its implementation.
  • Assess and Address the Impact of Emerging Technologies: Ensure policies foster innovation while addressing ethical and legal challenges.

The East African region has the potential to become a major player in the global digital economy. By addressing the existing barriers and implementing these recommendations, the region can create a thriving digital ecosystem that benefits all its residents.

Read the full brief here.

The Surveillance Footprint in Africa Threatens Privacy and Data Protection

By Edrine Wanyama 

Digital and physical surveillance by states, private companies that develop technology or supply governments and unscrupulous individuals globally and across Africa is a major threat to the digital civic space and operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), activists, political opposition, government critics and the media. The highly intrusive technology, which is often facilitated by biometric data collection systems such as for processing of national identification documents, voter cards, travel documents, mandatory SIM card registration and the installation of CCTV cameras for “smart cities”, adversely impacts the digital civic space. 

Given these developments, the Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA), a network of CSOs, media, lawyers and tech specialists from across Africa that seeks to champion digital civic space and counter threats to digital rights on the continent, recently held a learning session on “Understanding Surveillance Trends, Threats and Challenges for Civil Society.” The Alliance was created by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) in response to rising digital authoritarianism. It currently has members from more than 12 countries, who collectively conduct research and advocacy and share experiences around navigating digital threats and influencing strategic digital policy reforms in line with the alliance’s outcome declaration

The virtual learning session built capacity among the Alliance members to better understand digital surveillance and the related threats facing democracy actors. Discussions delved into the nature of surveillance, the regulatory environment, and strategies to navigate and counter surveillance risks and threats. The threats and risks include harassment, arbitrary arrests, persecution and prosecution on trumped up charges. 

While emphasising the need to understand emerging surveillance technologies, ecosystem and deployment tactics, Richard Ngamita, the Team Leader at Thraets, highlighted the huge investment (estimated at USD 1 billion annually) which African governments have made in acquiring surveillance technologies from China, Israel, the United States of America and Europe. Ngamita urged CSOs, HRDs and other actors to build digital security capacity to protect against illegal surveillance.

Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, the Executive Director of Spaces for Change, while referencing the  Proliferation of Dual-Use Surveillance Technologies in Nigeria: Deployment, Risks & Accountability – Spaces for Change report, highlighted weak regulation and unaccountable practices by states that facilitate unlawful surveillance across the continent and their implications on rights. According to the report,

“The greatest concern around surveillance technologies is their potential misuse for political repression and human rights abuses. Surveillance practices also undermine the citizens’ dignity, autonomy, and security, translating to significant reductions in citizens’ agency. Agency reductions are magnified by the state’s power to punish dissent. This creates a chilling effect as citizens self-censor or avoid public engagement for fear of being surveilled or punished. The citizens have little agency to challenge or resist the state’s surveillance because of low digital literacy, poverty and broader limitations in access to justice.”

Michaela Shapiro, the Global Engagement and Advocacy Officer at Article 19, United Kingdom, discussed the governing norms of surveillance globally while paying particular attention to the common gaps that need policy action at the country level in Africa. Recalling the intensification of digital and physical surveillance as part of state responses to curb the spread of Covid-19 in the absence of clear oversight mechanisms, Michaela emphasised the role of CSOs in advocating for data and privacy protection. 

To-date, the leading instrument of data protection on the continent, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection has only 16 ratifications out of 55 states, while only 36 states have enacted specific laws on privacy and data protection rights.

Surveillance in Africa generally poses a major threat to individuals’ data and privacy rights since governments exercise wide access over the data subjects’ rights. National security and the loopholes in the laws are usually exploited to abuse and violate data rights. While there are regional and international standards, these are often overlooked with governments taking measures that are not provided for by the law, rendering them unlawful, arbitrary and disproportionate under human rights law. 

By way of progressive actions, speakers noted and made recommendations to States and non-state actors to the effect that:

States and Governments 

  • Address surveillance and bolster personal data and privacy protections through adopting robust legal and regulatory frameworks and repealing restrictive digital laws and policies.
  • Promote and enhance transparency and accountability through the establishment of independent surveillance oversight boards.
  • Strictly regulate the use of surveillance technologies by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to ensure accountability.
  • Collaborate with other countries to develop harmonised privacy standards within the established regional and international standards to have settled positions on cross-border controls on surveillance.

Civil Society Organisations

  • Build and enhance capacities of HRDs and other players in data governance and accountability to equip them with knowledge to counter common data privacy threats by governments and corporate entities.
  • Push for ethical and responsible use of technology to prevent and minimise technology-related violations. 
  • Challenge all forms of unlawful use of surveillance practices through legal action by, among others, taking legal actions.

Tech Sector

  • Conduct regular audits and impact assessments to address potential privacy breaches and enhance accountability and transparency. 
  • Prioritise privacy and integrate privacy protections into their products and services including data collection minimisation and establish strong security measures for privacy.
  • Prioritise ethical considerations in the development and deployment of new technologies to guarantee strong protections against potential violations.

Kenya’s Digital Crossroads: Surveillance, Activism, and the Urgent Fight for Digital Rights in 2025

Victor Kapiyo |

In East Africa, Kenya has over the years been regarded as a model of excellence in digital rights. However, more recently, the country has been plagued by alarming practices that threaten its standing. These include a heightened crackdown on activism, including the abduction and intimidation of activists and journalists, politically motivated internet censorship, rising disinformation, cyber threats and data breaches, and a media decline. Nonetheless, it has not been all doom and gloom as there are glimmers of hope aided by increasing internet use and a population that has displayed remarkable resilience and pushback against continued threats to digital rights.

In this brief, The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) explores these trends and presents some recommendations for consideration by stakeholders. 

The key trends that the brief highlights include the following:

  1. Increased Internet Usage: Kenya’s internet and social media usage has been on the rise with 22.7 million internet users, of which 13 million are active on social media. Likewise, cellular mobile connections stood at 66 million in 2024. However, digital access remains uneven across the country, with urban areas reporting the highest adoption, and affordability being the main barrier to access.
  2. Growing Crackdowns on Activism: The #OccupyParliament and #RejectFinanceBill2024 protests were met with excessive force, arrests, abductions, and crackdowns on organisers and participants. The government also invoked various laws and deployed sophisticated digital tools to monitor protestors without adequate oversight.
  3. Spiralling Censorship of Online Speech: The government imposed a nationwide internet shutdown during the #RejectFinanceBill2024 protests and later blocked access to Telegram for two weeks to prevent cheating during the national examination period. Further, government officials issued several warnings to the public over the “irresponsible use of social media” and threatened to regulate social media platforms and block websites.
  4. Disinformation Persists: Kenya’s disinformation enterprise remains sophisticated, lucrative and largely funded by political actors that exploit the divisions around ideological, ethnic, economic, and demographic lines while harnessing the power of social media. However, government responses to disinformation through the enforcement of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (2018) continue to raise concerns about censorship due to the misapplication of the law to muzzle legitimate speech.
  5. Gaps in Access to Information: Access to information about key government projects has remained inconsistent, with widespread secrecy, delays or outright refusal characterising projects. However, the delivery of government services online through the eCitizen portal has facilitated enhanced access to information and services even as the digital divide expands.
  6. Growing Data Breaches and Cyber Threats: As the population embraces the digital economy, the number of cyber threats recorded increased in 2024, with the majority being system vulnerabilities, malware and brute force attacks. Also, there are concerns over unchecked state surveillance, and the adequacy of safeguards to protect citizens’ data amidst rising data breaches.
  7. Media under Siege: Kenya’s media rankings have declined, with the Media Council of Kenya reporting a total of 74 cases of press freedom violations in 2024. The violations included cases of harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests of journalists, particularly those reporting on politically sensitive topics such as corruption, protests, and human rights abuses.
  8. Change of Guard at the MoICDE: William Kabogo was appointed as the third Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Information, Communications, and the Digital Economy (MoICDE) in a span of two years. The billionaire politician announced his readiness to regulate social media and shut down the internet if national security is threatened. 

In conclusion, the brief calls for continued vigilance and action to stem the downward spiral. 

Summary of Recommendations:

  1. The government should commit to maintaining free, open and secure internet access by international human rights standards.
  2. The government should take measures to expand ICT infrastructure in rural and underserved areas.
  3. The Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act should be amended to narrow its scope and ensure that response measures comply with the three-part test and the law is not used to censor or suppress digital rights.
  4. The capacity of the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner should be strengthened to ensure compliance of all government online services and digital initiatives to the Data Protection Act.
  5. Kenya should address its cybersecurity constraints.
  6. Stakeholders should work to strengthen legal protections for journalists and media outlets.
  7. The government, including at the county level, should continue to invest in the digitisation of public records and services to facilitate efficiency, transparency and accountability.

Read the full brief here.

Co-Develop & CIPESA Empowering East Africa’s Journalists to Shape the Future of Digital Public Infrastructure Discourse

Partnership |

What if the future of digital public infrastructure (DPI) was shaped not just by policymakers and technologists, but by the stories that journalists tell? At Co-Develop, we believe that the stories told about DPI can drive awareness, accountability, and action. This is why Co-Develop is pleased to announce a new partnership with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to launch a DPI Journalism Fellowship in Eastern Africa. 

Whatever it is, the way you tell your story online can make all the difference.

Building on the success of our West African program, this initiative will equip journalists across Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda with the skills, resources, and networks needed to report on DPI and Digital Public Goods (DPGs) with depth and clarity. By promoting informed public discourse, the program aims to make digital transformation more accessible and transparent to the communities it serves. 

Digital public infrastructure refers to the foundational digital systems, platforms, and services that enable secure, efficient, and inclusive delivery of public and private services. Examples of DPI include digital identity (ID) systems, instant payment platforms, data exchange frameworks, open data platforms, and eGovernment platforms. 

The West African fellowship trained 20 journalists who produced over 115 impactful stories, leading to policy debates and meaningful reforms—such as the digitization of birth certificates in Nigeria following a corruption exposé. Inspired by this success, we are excited to bring this model to Eastern Africa, where digital transformation is rapidly advancing, yet public engagement remains limited.

Despite significant DPI developments, many citizens remain unaware of their implications. The media plays a critical role in bridging this gap. The new journalism fellowship will empower journalists to report on DPI in ways that highlight its benefits, challenges, and impact on everyday lives.

Through a structured program of training, reporting grants, and collaborations with regional media houses, the fellowship will amplify DPI narratives, encourage investigative journalism, and promote greater transparency and accountability. Drawing from insights gained in West Africa, we aim to build a scalable and sustainable model that strengthens public understanding of DPI, ensuring it is not just a policy conversation but a lived reality for millions. 

“We welcome this timely initiative, which will strengthen the role of journalism in shaping the future of DPI in Eastern Africa and we look forward to seeing the transformative impact of this collaboration”, said Dr. Wairagala Wakabi, the CIPESA Executive Director. “As digital transformation accelerates, journalists can play a vital role in ensuring that the public remains informed about the opportunities and challenges associated with DPI.”

He added that the fellowship will help bridge the gap between policymakers and the public, enhancing transparency and accountability in digital governance.

We look forward to seeing the transformative impact of this collaboration.

“This fellowship aligns with CIPESA’s commitment to promoting and protecting digital rights, the digital economy, and inclusive digital societies across Africa,” Dr. Wakabi said. “We expect this program to produce a new cadre of investigative journalists who will drive meaningful public discourse on DPI and DPGs. We hope that this will in turn contribute to policies and practices that ensure digital public infrastructure serves all citizens equitably while remaining rights-respecting.” 

This article was first published on the Co-Develop Website

CIPESA and Partners Advocate for Inclusion of Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence in Uganda’s Sexual Offences Bill

By Ainembabazi Patricia |

On February 18, 2025, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) alongside Pollicy and the Gender Tech Initiative appeared before Members of Uganda’s Parliament to advocate for the inclusion of Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) in the Sexual Offences Bill 2024.

The rapid evolution of digital technologies has reshaped societal interactions, leading to increased perpetration of online violence. In Uganda, online users increasingly face digital forms of abuse that often mirror or escalate offline sexual offences, yet efforts to combat gender-based violence are met with both legal and practical challenges.

The Sexual Offences Bill aims to address sexual offences by providing for the effectual prevention of sexual violence, enhancement of the punishment of sexual offenders, providing for the protection of victims during trial of sexual offences, and providing for extra-territorial application of the law.

In the presentation to Committee of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Committee on Gender, Labour, and Social Development, CIPESA and partners emphasised the necessity of closing the policy gap between digital and physical sexual offenses in the Bill, to ensure that Uganda’s legal system is responsive to the realities of technology advancements and related violence. We argued that while the Bill is timely and presents real issues of sexual violence especially against women, there are some pertinent aspects that have been left out and should be included.

According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), TFGBV is “an act of violence perpetrated by one or more individuals that is committed, assisted, aggravated, and amplified in part or fully by the use of information and communication technologies or digital media, against a person on the basis of their gender.” It includes cyberstalking, doxing, non-consensual sharing of intimate images, cyberbullying, and other forms of online harassment.

In Uganda, TFGBV is not addressed by the existing laws including the Penal Code Act and the Computer Misuse Act. Adding TFGBV to the bill will provide an opportunity to bridge this legal gap by explicitly incorporating TFGBV as a prosecutable offence.

CIPESA and partners’ recommendations to the Committees were to:

1. Include and Explicitly Define TFGBV

Under Part I (Preliminary), the Bill provides definitions for various terms related to sexual offences, including references to digital and online platforms. However, it does not explicitly define TFGBV or recognise its various manifestations. This omission limits the Bill’s effectiveness in addressing emerging forms of online sexual offences.

We propose an introduction of a new clause under Part I defining TFGBV, to ensure the Bill adequately addresses offences committed via digital means. The definition should align with international standards, such as the UNFPA’s definition of TFGBV, and should ensure consistency with Uganda’s digital policy frameworks, including the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, the Data Protection and Privacy Act, 2019, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2022, Penal Code Act Cap 120, and the Uganda Communications Act 2013.

2. Recognising Various Forms of TFGBV

Clause 7 of the Bill provides for the penalisation of Indecent Communication or transmission of sexual content without consent. It criminalises the sharing of unsolicited material of a sexual nature, including the unauthorised distribution of nude images or videos. However, the provision does not explicitly mention cyber harassment, online grooming, sextortion, or non-consensual intimate image sharing (commonly known as “revenge porn”).  As such, we recommended the expansion of Clause 7 to explicitly recognise and define offences such as Cyber harassment, Non-consensual intimate image sharing, Online grooming, and Sextortion. This addition will clarify legal pathways for victims and broaden the scope of protection against digital sexual exploitation. 

3. Replacing “Online Platform” with “Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence”

In clause 1 the Bill defines “on-line platform” as any computer-based technology that facilitates the sharing of information, ideas, or other forms of expression. This encompasses social media sites, websites, and other digital communication tools. Clause 6 addresses the offense of indecent exposure, criminalising the intentional display of one’s sexual organs in public or through electronic means, including online platforms and clause 7 pertains to the non-consensual sharing of intimate content. However, these provisions do not comprehensively categorise TFGBV as a distinct form of sexual offences. Accordingly, “Online Platform” should be replaced with “Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence” to ensure the Bill adequately captures all digital gender-based offences, including deepfake pornography, cyberstalking, and sexual exploitation through content generated by artificial intelligence.

4. Criminalising Voyeurism

The Bill does not explicitly criminalise voyeurism, which refers to the act of secretly observing, recording, or distributing images or videos of individuals in private settings without their consent, often for sexual gratification. Thee is increasing prevalence of voyeurism through hidden cameras, non-consensual recordings, and live-streamed sexual abuse.  Voyeurism should be criminalised with a clear definition provided under clause 1 and the scope and penalty defined under Part II of the Bill.

5. Strengthening Accountability for Technology Platforms

The Bill does not impose specific responsibilities on digital platforms and service providers in cases of TFGBV. We argued for the addition of a new clause under Part III (Procedures and Evidential Provisions) mandating digital platforms and service providers to cooperate in investigations related to TFGBV, and provide relevant data and evidence upon request by law enforcement. Similarly,  the provision should expand into the obligation to ensure data protection compliance and  implementation of proactive measures to detect, remove, and report sexual exploitation content.  This provision will enhance accountability and facilitate the prosecution of perpetrators. 

6. Aligning Uganda’s Legislation with Regional and International Frameworks

The Bill does not explicitly state its alignment with regional and international human rights instruments addressing sexual violence and digital rights.  We recommend an addition of a new clause under Part I (Preliminaries) stating that the Bill shall be interpreted in a manner that aligns with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Resolution 522 (2022) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This will reinforce Uganda’s commitment to and application of international best practices in combating sexual offences. 

7. Enhancing Legal Remedies for Survivors

Clause 42 (Settlement in Capital Sexual Offences) prohibits compromise settlements in cases of rape, aggravated rape, and defilement, prescribing a 10-year prison sentence for offenders who attempt to settle such cases outside court. However, the Bill does not provide civil remedies for victims of TFGBV-related crimes, nor does it ensure access to psycho-social support.  We recommend an expansion of Clause 42 to include  civil remedies, including compensation for victims of TFGBV, psychosocial and legal support, ensuring survivors receive necessary rehabilitation, and mandatory reporting obligations for online platforms hosting TFGBV-related content. 

The inclusion of TFGBV in the Sexual Offences Bill 2024 will not only strengthen the fight against gender-based violence but also ensure that survivors access justice. The proposed legislative changes will reinforce Uganda’s commitment to upholding digital rights and gender equality in the digital age. The country will also join the ranks of pioneers such as South Africa who have taken legislative steps to criminalise online gender-based violence.

By incorporating the proposed provisions and amendments, the Sexual Offences Bill, 2024 will clearly define online-based sexual offenses, bring perpetrators of online violence to book and provide protection for survivors of digital sexual offences. It will also contribute to the building and strengthening of accountability for technology platforms. Once enacted, the law will also go strides in ensuring that Uganda’s legal framework aligns with regional and international human rights standards on protection of survivors while guaranteeing effective prosecution of offenders of technology-facilitated sexual offences.

Download the Full report here