Building a Movement of Digital Rights Advocates in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

By Asimwe John Ishabairu

Digital rights advocacy amidst rapid policy change and an ever-evolving technology sector in Africa is constrained by various challenges. Among them are siloed approaches, limited avenues for stakeholder participation, and a lack of requisite knowledge, skills, and resources for meaningful and sustained engagement. There is also inadequate digital resilience capacity among the most at-risk groups. 

As part of the Greater Internet Freedom (GIF) project, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has for the past three years led engagements to build the advocacy capacity of various actors in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 

The engagements have worked to grow participants’ thematic understanding of key digital rights trends, including disinformation, online gender based violence, legal and policy frameworks, surveillance, the digital economy, access and affordability, digital safety and security, privacy and data protection, digital inclusion and network disruptions, alongside practical skills development in digital rights research methodologies, data driven advocacy, artivism  and impact communications. 

Post-training evaluations indicate a strong appreciation of the relevance of the capacity building, the opportunity to expand networks, retention and application of acquired skills and knowledge. Notably, beneficiaries have become infomediaries within their communities and organisations, through awareness raising exercises, and conducting onward training. 

“As a result of the training, we conducted a workshop with the grassroot women human rights defenders on disinformation and human rights, and developed a digital rights advocacy and communication strategy,” stated one beneficiary from Kenya, whose organisation works across East Africa. 

“I took away an appreciation of the legal environment around digital rights and how to conduct research. As a result of the training, I’ve researched and published a research report in partnership with Global Voices”, said a beneficiary from Zimbabwe. Others point to collaborations with hitherto non-allied groups. “I have been able to approach key stakeholders such as legislators and legal practitioners for my research work and projects,” said another beneficiary from Tanzania.

Another from Zambia stated: “I have been able to influence collaboration between my institution and other like-minded actors through working groups on the government proposed media reforms and implications on digital rights, with a focus on gender perspectives.” 

In total, the capacity building engagements  reached 80 beneficiaries from various stakeholder groups, including governments, academia, civil society, media, and the legal fraternity across the six countries. 

The engagements leveraged expertise from various field practitioners. Among them: the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), Media Convergence, the Tanzania Women’s Media Association (TAMWA), LaunchPad Tanzania, Jamii Forums, Culture and Development East Africa (CDEA), Bloggers of Zambia, the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), Makerere University, the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Bongo Hive, Revolt for Her  and Access now.

Beneficiaries acknowledged that digital rights advocacy was a broad field and the capacity building engagements served as critical entry points. However, they called for continuous engagements and follow-ups in tandem with evolutions in policy and practice.  

“The sessions need to be ongoing,” said a participant from Uganda.

“I think such training should be provided regularly because the world of technology is very dynamic and needs constant updates to stay relevant,” said a participant from Mozambique.

According to CIPESA’s Programme Manager, Ashnah Kalemera, closing the skills, knowledge, and research gaps is crucial to growing the number and strength of actors advancing digital rights in Africa. This is at the core of CIPESA’s interventions, particularly the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), the fellowship programme, capacity-building programmes at both national and regional levels, and stakeholder convenings such as the annual Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica).

Smell The Coffee Kenya, Disinformation Is Brewing!

By CIPESA Writer |

Just over a year ago, Kenya was in the midst of a bitterly contested general election held in August 2022. The electoral period was characterised by hate speech and disinformation, which remain prevalent today. Indeed, recent studies have highlighted a booming disinformation industry in the country, fuelled by political, economic and personal interests with many actors including politicians, content creators, and citizens churning out hate speech and disinformation on social media platforms. 

During the election period, disinformation and hate speech circulated widely as social media personalities and ordinary citizens on various sides of the political divide coordinated and shared inciteful and hateful content. Influencers with a large following on the platforms are often bankrolled by politicians to recruit and coordinate micro-influencers to develop common disinformation and hate narratives and push hashtags which often trend on social media. Further, social media trolls engage through Facebook posts, tweets and WhatsApp groups with targeted hate against ethnic communities such as the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo, the ethnic communities of current president William Ruto, former president Uhuru Kenyatta, and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, respectively. 

Amidst the election-related disinformation blitz, social media platforms seemed to do either too little or nothing to stop the spread of harmful and illegal content. An investigation by Global Witness and Foxglove in June 2022 showed that Facebook failed to detect inflammatory and violent hate speech ads posted on its platforms in Swahili and English. Further, the investigation found that even after putting out a statement in July 2022 on its efforts to combat harmful content, including 37,000 pieces of Kenyan content removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating its hate speech policies, similar hate speech ads were later approved on their platforms. 

Likewise, in July 2022 Twitter was blamed by local actors for profiting from its negligence by allowing its trending topic section to be exploited through paid influencers to amplify malicious, coordinated, inauthentic attacks to silence Kenya’s civil society, muddy their reputations and stifle the reach of their messaging. In September 2021, Twitter suspended 100 accounts from Kenya for violating the platform’s manipulations and spam policy after being found to have been tweeting pre-determined hashtags meant to misinform the public and attack certain personalities. In June 2022, the company suspended 41 accounts promoting the hashtag #ChebukatiCannotBeTrusted, which suggested that the then Chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was supporting one of the presidential candidates. 

TikTok, which has gained popularity among younger audiences, has also come under scrutiny after disinformation and hate content was found on its platform ahead of the August 2022 election. A study by Mozilla found 132 videos that had been viewed collectively over four million times, which were spreading hate speech and inciting violence against some ethnic communities. Some also featured synthetic and manipulated content couched as Netflix documentaries, news stories and fake opinion polls or fake tweets aimed at triggering violence, fear and violence as was witnessed during the 2007 post-election period. According to the report, TikTok suffered context bias and its content moderation practices were not robust enough to tackle the spread of such content on its platform. TikTok has since removed the videos highlighted in the report. 

According to Kenya’s hate speech watchdog, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), hate speech content is most prevalent on Facebook and Twitter. In July 2022, the NCIC ordered Meta to address hate speech and incitement on its Facebook platform within a week or face a suspension of its operations in the country. In August 2022, the Commission also found an increase in hate content on TikTok. Some of the hate and disinformation hashtags it identified on the various platforms included #RejectRailaOdinga, #Riggagy and #RutoMalizaUfungwe, which propagated falsehoods against candidates in the presidential election.

Some critics have argued that social media platforms have shown a consistent failure to adequately moderate content in Kenya. Furthermore, the platforms’ attempts at content moderation are implemented in a lacklustre, under-funded and opaque system that is neither participatory nor rights-respecting. Other studies have also shown that platforms continue to inconsistently enforce their own rules through flawed content moderation practices and in essence permit the spread of extreme, divisive and polarising content partly due to their lack of understanding of Kenya’s cultural context and local languages and slang.

The government’s attempts at legislating on disinformation and hate speech have not been without setbacks. In 2018, the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018 was adopted, imposing punitive fines and prison terms on the publication of false information and false, misleading and fictitious data. Unfortunately, these provisions have been unjustly used to target bloggers for exposing corruption or seeking state accountability. 

A case by the Bloggers Association of Kenya challenging the constitutionality of the law remains pending an appeal of the decision by the High Court in February 2020 allowing the enforcement of the law. Section 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act constricts the definition of hate speech to “ethnic hatred” and fails to capture the constitutional limitations under Article 31, which include propaganda for war, incitement to violence, hate speech, and advocacy of hatred. This means various hate speech content remains lawful in the absence of a clear criminal prohibition.

Moreover, the NCIC, which was formed following the 2007 post-election violence, has been plagued by numerous challenges in its attempt to fight hate and promote peace and national cohesion. The commission for most of its active life has been underfunded, thus hindering its ability and capacity to monitor hate speech online, investigate incidents and conduct public awareness and engagements. Further, political interference with its work means that it has been incapable of enforcing the law to get successful convictions of offenders who are mostly the political elite

More importantly, successive government administrations have failed to implement the recommendations of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report to address the drivers of hate and disinformation. The report identified those drivers as Kenya’s historical inter-ethnic tensions that are systemic and deep-rooted in its social, cultural, religious, economic and political fabric. Disinformation and hate speech in Kenya thrive on these unresolved historical tensions around political ideology, ethnicity, economics, and demography.  

Today, a majority of social media users in Kenya are aware of and fuel hate speech and disinformation on social media. To some, it is all fun and games, as they assume no feelings get hurt. To many, however, disinformation triggers pain, fear, tension and hate. Last year, a local politician advised Kenyans to put matters of politics in their lungs, not their hearts. This attitude is also a problem, as such views may breed a level of acceptance and normalisation of disinformation and hate speech in the country by encouraging people to grow a ‘thick skin’ instead of objectively addressing the root causes of the vice. People, including Kenyans, are known to act on their feelings. As we have seen in neighbouring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Sudan, hate speech and disinformation can drive violence with devastating consequences. 

The failure to resolve Kenya’s underlying tensions means the country risks further social division and fragmentation of society as well as diminished progress due to a continuation of governance policies and practices that further entrench discrimination and exclusion in accessing opportunities, resources and essential services. The hate that arises from the effects of such policies and practices, and the disinformation deployed to justify and perpetuate them, affects people’s mental health and emotional well-being. Moreover, they cement long-held historical fears, suspicions and animosity that continue to undermine the ability of Kenyans to trust each other or the government and could inhibit the willingness of sections of the public to cooperate in nation-building for the common good. 

Be that as it may, there are some promising efforts, such as the recently launched local coalition on freedom of expression and content moderation and the draft guidelines for regulating digital platforms spearheaded by UNESCO that seek to promote engagement and tackle content that potentially damages human rights and democracy. The multistakeholder coalition is an initiative of UNESCO and ARTICLE 19 that aims to bridge the gap between local stakeholders and social media companies and to improve content moderation practices, including supporting regulatory reform, building the capacity of state and non-state actors, and raising awareness on the ethical use of digital platforms. While these twin initiatives are new and largely untested, they present an opportunity to ensure more rights-respecting content moderation practices, the application of common norms based on human rights standards and stronger multistakeholder engagement in the content moderation process.

Finally, it may be easy to blame social media companies for the weaknesses in their content moderation systems, and by all means they need to be held to account. However, better algorithms alone cannot fix our society or our social norms. Kenyans must wake up and smell the coffee. Leaders need to drop the divisive acts and work together with stakeholders and citizens to address historical tensions and foster a culture of inclusion, tolerance, respect and understanding. While at it, they should promote responsible social media use, fact-checking, and media literacy in order to counter the negative impact of hate speech and disinformation and ultimately build a more just, harmonious, democratic and equitable society.

Submit Your Session Proposal or Travel Support Application to the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2023 (FIFAfrica23)

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) invites interested parties to submit session proposals to the 2023 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica23). Successful submissions will help to shape the agenda of the event, which will gather hundreds of policymakers, regulators, human rights defenders, journalists, academics, private sector players, global information intermediaries, bloggers, and developers.

FIFAfrica23, which is set to take place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on September 27-29, 2023, offers a platform for deliberation on gaps and opportunities for advancing privacy, free expression, inclusion, free flow of information, civic participation, and innovation online. This year will mark a decade of hosting the landmark event in various African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.

As part of the registration, we invite session proposals including panel discussions, lightning talks, exhibitions, and skills workshops to shape the FIFAfrica23 agenda. 

CIPESA is committed to ensuring diversity of voices, backgrounds and viewpoints in attendance and as organisers and speakers at panels at FIFAfrica. In line with this, there is limited funding to support travel for participation at FIFAfrica23. Preference will be given to applicants who can partially support their attendance and those who organise sessions.

Submissions close at 18.00 (East Africa Time) on July 14, 2023. Successful session proposals and travel support applicants will be directly notified by August 14, 2023.

The session proposal and travel support form can be accessed here.

NOTE: All data collected as part of the registration and session proposal exercise will only be used for purposes of the FIFAfrica event management.   

Follow @cipesaug on Twitter and on the dedicated FIFAfrica website for regular updates on the Forum.

Sudan Conflict Affects Digital Communications and Critical Services Delivery

By CIPESA Writer |

Sudan descended into a brutal armed conflict on April 15, 2023. The conflict pits the transitional government under the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). At least 600 people have been killed, 5,000 injured, 700,000 internally displaced, and 100,000 have fled the country. Also, various essential services, including telecommunications, print and broadcast media, have been disrupted. 

The current power struggle between the SAF and RSF is a major setback to the fragile country’s  attempt to transition to democratic and civilian rule after the 2019 ouster of former dictator Omar al Bashir. Ideological differences over the future direction of the country, and factors such as religion, ethnicity, political and economic interests, are key drivers of the conflict. At the centre is the internet, which has been used to spread information and propaganda, recruit and mobilise fighters, and coordinate attacks. The internet has also allowed disparate actors to document the conflict, provide humanitarian assistance, and coordinate protests. 

Internet disruptions

On April 16, the second day of the conflict, telecom operator MTN Sudan received an order from the telecommunications regulator to shut down the internet. Within hours, the operator reportedly received another order to restore access to the internet. The Telecommunication and Postal Regulation Authority (TPRA) regulates the telecommunications sector in Sudan. It remains unclear whether the TPRA issued shutdown orders to other Internet Service Providers such as Zain Sudan and Sudatel, as only MTN Sudan admitted to receiving the order. Most internet measurement tools did not indicate a disruption, but Cloudflare confirmed a drop in internet traffic in Sudan on April 15.

The order to restore MTN Sudan services did little to enable access as disruptions to the national grid left the country without electricity supply. Indeed, on May 5, MTN Sudan announced that its network had been disrupted by power outages. The operator also said its teams were unable to deliver fuel to generators as a result of the ongoing fighting in the city. 

Measurements from Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) confirmed MTN’s outage.

Similarly, state-owned Sudatel Mobile, commonly known as Sudani, on May 5, 2023 announced network disruptions due to unreliable power supply and the inability to fuel generators. Earlier on April 23, the Sudani network, which is the main government service provider, was disrupted after fighters of the RSF seized one of its two data centres in Khartoum.

Meanwhile, Netblocks, another internet measurement organisation, reported that the services of privately owned Canar Telecommunications Company had collapsed amidst the conflict. 

Disruptions to internet access in Sudan are commonplace, with authorities justifying them as necessary to ensure “national security and emergency state”. The longest shut down was reported in December 2018 lasting up to 68 days, followed by another in June 2019, lasting 37 days and in October 2021, lasting 25 days. The country was ranked as Not Free in the 2022 Freedom on the Net report, given its record of imposing obstacles to internet access, limitations on accessing online content, and violating rights of internet users.

The June 2019 shutdown was initiated amidst protests that saw more than 100 protestors killed while the October 2021 shutdown was initiated during a SAF coup. In the aftermath of the coup, there were four incidents of internet disruptions including to control protests, avoid cheating in exams and curb tribal conflict. 

Enabling Legislation

Sudan has a history of using the 2018 Telecommunications and Postal Regulation Act (TPRA), the 1997 law of Emergency and Public Safety, and the 2007 Armed Forces Act (amended in 2019) to block digital communications. The authorities depend on these using vague terms such as “national security” and “public safety” as a justification for the orders.

Previously, the TPRA has relied on articles 6(J), 7.1, and 7.2(A) of the TPRA law of 2018, to justify the shutdown, such as the one of October 2021. These articles assign the TPRA the responsibility of “defending the national security and the higher interests of Sudan,” and “the state’s obligations and requirements in the field of national security and defence, and national, regional and international policies.” The term “national security” is vague, which enables the authorities to misuse it in their interests. 

Sudan has ratified key international human rights instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which guarantee the right to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and the right to receive, impart and disseminate information. The various disruptions to communications which the country has instituted appear to violate the provisions of these international instruments.

Meanwhile, the National Security Law 2020 gives state authorities sweeping powers to intercept, search and seize communications for purposes of national security. Military forces that staged the October 2021 coup appeared to use the 2020 law to search individuals’ phones to delete documentation of human rights violations that were perpetuated. 

In the current crisis, some citizens have reported that RSF forces are inspecting the content of citizens’ devices to verify if they are supporters of the SAF or they provide information to the group. The Emergency Lawyers Committee has previously revealed that there was widespread surveillance by authorities. Recent reports also point to acquisition of spyware technology by the RSF.  In 2012, the Sudanese Intelligence reportedly purchased spyware from the Hacking Team – apparatus that is likely still in use in the country. 

Propaganda war 

Whereas internet penetration in Sudan stands at only 28.4 percent, the network disruptions create an information vacuum. When fighting broke out, the RSF seized control of state broadcasters and ceased transmission. Hours later, Sudan TV restored broadcasting via satellite, while Omdurman FM – the national radio – started broadcasting again but through AM transmissions. Both radio and television stations are primarily broadcasting SAF news and propaganda that has translated into risks of real life harm. For instance, false news of territories under SAF control has led citizens to flee to those territories, only to find them under the control of RSF, which, according to Human Rights Watch, has a history of committing war crimes.

As the conflict continues it is crucial that the warring factions and telecommunications actors keep communication networks on as disruptions limit citizens’ access to information and undermine media freedom and freedom of expression. Furthermore, the disruptions limit the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts and hamper citizens’ access to essential services and safe havens.

Tackling Threats to Media Freedom and Safety in The Digital Age

By Ashnah Kalemera | 

The proliferation of technology has created new opportunities for journalists and journalism in Africa, but it has also come with threats. For civil society, academia, media development practitioners, activists and development partners, it is critical to understand the key issues related to freedom of expression and the internet and possible ways to address them as part of programming and strategic intervention. 

At the Africa Media Convention (AMC), which was held in Lusaka, Zambia on May 11-13, 2023, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) convened a session that explored threats to media freedom and journalists safety in the digital age and comprehensive measures to tackle them.

During the session, which brought together over 40 stakeholders from across Africa, it was acknowledged that technology had enabled groundbreaking journalism, ease of reach to diverse audiences which has also enabled active engagement, and more accessible content production avenues. With this evolution, new actors have joined the sector and new regulation and economic sustainability models have been witnessed, all with implications for the future of media freedom and democracy. 

However, the digital era has also seen an exponential increase in online harassment of journalists, criminalisation of aspects of journalism, surveillance of journalists, and the orchestration of disinformation campaigns. These threats have translated into offline risks of physical violence, thereby undermining the safety and independence of journalists, while also eroding freedom of expression. 

According to Kamufisa Manchishi, a lecturer in the Faculty of Journalism and Public Relations at Zambia’s Mulungushi University, digitalisation in the media had created several “crises”. One of them was an identity crisis, whereby journalists and media houses are struggling to balance their online presence with upholding journalistic principles and ethics. Linked to the identity crisis was a financial crisis of generating revenue and sustaining operations. “This has caused clickbait journalism and led to compromise of ethics,” said Manchishi. 

Manchishi added that fears of being surveilled by the state and private actors had led to increased self censorship. He said: “Journalists do not want to talk about controversial issues on phone or virtual platforms. They are worried someone is listening and are opting to conduct interviews and investigations physically.” 

Meanwhile, misinformation and disinformation continue to proliferate on legacy media as well as on social and digital media. CIPESA research indicates that disinformation from online platforms is often amplified through traditional print and broadcast media. Soren Johannsen, BBC Media Action’s Zambia Country Director, called for more innovative approaches to promoting digital literacy. 

Whilst applauding various stakeholders’ efforts in debunking and fact-checking, Johannsen advocated for more interventions designed around pre-bunking as an inoculation theory for behavioural change. “We shouldn’t try to just correct and verify but help users understand where false information is coming from, the motivation and the consequences,” he said. Such efforts should be complemented with more research to help understand the originators, flows and uptake of misinformation and disinformation. 

Disinformation Pathways and Effects: Case Studies from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda.

Understanding the Information Disorder in Tunisia, Algeria and Libya .

As disinformation and misinformation threaten democracy, public security, and social cohesion, there has been an increase in legislative responses including the enactment of laws on cybercrime, computer misuse, hate speech and “false news”. However, many of such laws in place are vague and broadly criminalise “false news” or “offensive publications online” without, for instance, distinguishing between misinformation and disinformation, and have been weaponised against critics, journalists and media houses. 

Citing various examples from West Africa, Dora Mawutor, the Programme Manager at the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), said the determination of what qualifies as false news lies with the state and its “self-serving purposes”. She called for more solidarity among the media fraternity to push back against the selective application of such laws through increased coverage of legislative developments and  of attacks against journalists. Mawutor also called for advocacy for review or repeal of such repressive laws. 

Echoing Mawutor’s sentiments, Alfred Bulakali, the Regional Director of Article19 West Africa, stated that laws across Africa that govern  freedom of expression and media freedom often come with heavy sanctions against offenders yet they fall short of the three part test under international human rights standards. He noted that media freedom advocates around Africa had scored successes in securing the decriminalisation of libel and defamation provisions in traditional press laws. However, added Bulakali, “technology has given them [the decriminalised provisions] an opportunity to come back” through laws and regulations being developed to govern media and freedom of expression online. He called for renewed efforts in decriminalising libel and defamation online and offline and limiting the power of law enforcers to interpret the laws.

On online harassment, Cecilia Maundu, a Kenyan broadcast journalist, digital rights researcher and digital security trainer, stated that online gender-based violence is under-reported, even though some newsrooms have dedicated gender desks. Meanwhile, newsroom policies are also weak or non-existent, putting women journalists at increased risk. As a result, there was limited visibility of online gender-based violence in mainstream media and inadequate support for survivors. This calls for more response measures and programming that not only focus on newsroom policies and safety mechanisms, but also on psychological support. 

The joint responsibility alluded to by the various speakers at the session around advocacy, movement building, institutional capacity building, skills and knowledge development as well research and documentation  are key planks of CIPESA’s programming and engagement at national, regional and international levels to advance access to information, privacy and data protection, and free expression online as enablers of citizen participation, resisting authoritarianism, protecting women’s or other marginalised groups’ rights, amplifying people’s voices, and engendering accountability.