Information Integrity as Africa Shapes Digital Platforms Governance

By Lister Namumba |

Moxii Africa, formerly Media Monitoring Africa, participated in the 13th edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) convened by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA). Moxii Africa, represented by Lister Namumba, Program Manager for Monitoring, Research and Analysis, delivered a keynote on the update of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Resolution 630 Draft Guidelines.

The update followed consultations held at the 2025 edition of FIFAfrica in Windhoek, Namibia, where delegates were consulted on what should inform the Guidelines. Moxii Africa supported the ACHPR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, Honourable Commissioner, Ourveena Geereesha Topsy-Sonoo in the development of the Draft Guidelines with support from UNESCO and the European Union (EU). The work was implemented within the framework of the EU-funded project, “Safeguarding Freedom of Expression and Access to Information through the implementation of UNESCO’s Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms.”

The days of Africa simply adopting standards from elsewhere because that is what others are doing are over. As we seek to address our continent’s unique challenges and strengths, it is essential that Africa is a norm-setter for technology governance standards. Further, it is essential that these standards are focused on African human rights principles and values, and are developed drawing on African expertise.

At the Forum, we engaged with different stakeholders across the continent and heard about different languages, different levels of connectivity, different media environments and different experiences of elections, conflict, inequality, discrimination and access to information. We asked what information integrity means in African contexts, while grounding the process in African human-rights principles and values. That is important because we need to utilise our own understanding and context for technology governance standards.

Meanwhile, Moxii Africa has held approximately 30 in-person consultations across the African continent with various stakeholders, including civil society organisations, journalists, human rights defenders, researchers, regulators, technology companies and even young people. The Draft Guidelines were presented to and reviewed by the ACHPR during its 88th Ordinary Session in July 2026. A call for public comment has since been published with the Commission receiving submissions on the Draft Guidelines until 21 December, 2026.

“We encourage anyone with an interest in good governance, human rights, technology and the future of information integrity to go to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights website. Read the Draft Guidelines. Engage with them and participate in the public comment process. If something needs strengthening, tell the Commission. If something does not adequately reflect your country’s reality, tell the Commission. If you have concerns about how information integrity, freedom of expression, platform responsibility or independent fact-checking should work in your context, tell the Commission. Because this is precisely how African standards should be developed, through African participation,” Lister Namumba.

Moxii Africa also participated in several other sessions at the Forum, including a Masterclass on climate change and information integrity. The Masterclass, convened by CIPESA in partnership with UNESCO, explored the climate change information integrity ecosystem, displacements, false narratives and practical tips for documenting and reporting climate change.

Having conducted several media monitoring activities on how climate change is reported by news media in terms of issues prioritised and voices dominating, among others, Moxii Africa shared key findings and stressed the need for issue-based coverage and the need for deliberate sourcing decisions so that experts and affected communities are represented in media coverage.

Moxii Africa also shared its work on building societal resilience to anti-foreigner migrants in South Africa through an initiative implemented in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the South African Department of Basic Education. The initiative aimed at building inclusive communities, equips learners across several South African provinces with practical digital citizenship skills that they can share with their peers and their broader school communities.

A panel discussion on engaging with international frameworks and mechanisms to advocate for women’s digital rights also featured Moxii Africa who responded to questions around structural gaps in existing national human rights institutions, drawing on experience from engagements on the ACHPR Resolution 630 Draft Guidelines. Moxii Africa also shared strategies on how civil society organisations can support the monitoring and implementation of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations, as the session also explored strategies for leveraging the United Nations Human Rights Council’s UPR mechanism.

On the panel discussion titled, “Safeguarding Democracy in the Digital Era: Information Integrity and a Heightened Duty of Care During African Elections,” Moxii Africa shared its broader work on information integrity and tools to safeguard democracy, spotlighting Real411, the official public complaints reporting mechanism for electoral disinformation and other online harms in the South African 2026 Local Government Elections. Moxii Africa also shared work on the Partnership for Information Integrity in Elections (PIIE) as a collaboration framework that can be replicated in other African contexts to safeguard electoral information integrity.

Discussions and initiatives on information integrity and what this looks like, whether around climate disinformation, electoral disinformation, platform accountability and transparency or broader issues around access to information, freedom of expression, and protection of online civic spaces, are taking place across the African continent. Actors from various sectors are shaping platform accountability, safe and inclusive digital online spaces, data governance and sovereignty and Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Africa and this must be supported to ensure an African rights-respecting information ecosystem that holds power to account and empowers the public. All this while ensuring an enabling environment where there are no hindrances to access to information, freedom of expression, among other digital rights.

Moxii Africa is delighted to contribute to these and more efforts to instil and safeguard information integrity.

Building Policies and Practices That Enable Responsible AI Use in Civil Society

By Doreen Elizabeth Namuyanja |

Civil society staff are rapidly embracing Artificial intelligence (AI). They use it to research, draft content, analyse data and write funding proposals. Using it responsibly, without compromising the rights we defend, is the harder part.

A human rights defender’s testimony. A partner’s financial records. An unpublished research draft. Every civil society organisation (CSO) holds material like this, and it takes a single paste into a free AI tool to put any of it at risk.

Many organisations will recognise the temptation, because AI is already in the room. These tools can strengthen organisational capacity and advocacy. However, their adoption also brings responsibilities, including protecting sensitive information, verifying outputs and ensuring that the technologies organisations use uphold the human rights principles they promote. The real question is whether our safeguards, skills and advocacy can keep pace with how quickly AI is being adopted.

Findings from the Global Index on Responsible AI (GIRAI) 2026, alongside national discussions and comparative analyses, highlight recurring governance gaps, including inadequate investment in AI skills, insufficient worker safeguards and limited oversight. Some countries show progress. Nigeria, for example, combines AI literacy and skills initiatives with legal safeguards for children’s data, while Kenya’s AI strategy recognises local language technologies as a means of promoting linguistic diversity.

Across these contexts, challenges remain in translating policy commitments into effective implementation, multi-stakeholder collaboration and enforceable safeguards. These governance challenges also have implications for civil society, which must navigate evolving regulatory environments while developing its own capacity to use AI safely and hold governments and technology providers accountable.

Adoption of AI remains uneven among civil society actors. A 2025 CIVICUS report, AI and Civil Society: Threats and Obstacles to Deployment and Advocacy, found that 63 of 293 survey respondents said their organisations did not deploy AI. Among those using it, more than half reported limited applications, primarily research, while only 49 respondents reported broader use across six to nine tasks. These findings suggest that civil society’s engagement with AI encompasses different levels of experience and institutional readiness, requiring support that responds to organisations’ actual practices and needs.

Civil society also faces risks from AI deployed by others. Surveillance technologies can threaten activists’ privacy and safety, while content moderation systems and AI-generated disinformation can undermine public communication and civic participation. The CIVICUS report identifies financial and technical constraints that limit organisations’ ability to adopt AI responsibly and engage in accountability efforts. For CSOs, internal capacity development and external advocacy are therefore closely connected.

These interconnected challenges were explored during the workshop on Navigating African Artificial Intelligence Governance: Legal Risks and Safeguards for CSOs, hosted by CIPESA and the Thomson Reuters Foundation at the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) held in Mauritius in September 2026. The engagement supported CSOs to consider how they could build internal capacity to use AI responsibly while strengthening their ability to advocate for ethical governance. Discussions examined practical concerns around privacy, disinformation, bias, human oversight and accountability.

A poll conducted during the workshop found that 19 of the 20 respondents used AI tools weekly. Although the sample was small, the finding illustrates the extent to which AI has entered the everyday working practices of participating CSOs. It also showed that organisations need shared expectations and safeguards, while individual users need the skills and judgement to apply them.

At the organisational level, CIPESA’s own experience offers a useful starting point. To inform the development of its internal AI policy, CIPESA surveyed staff on their knowledge, attitudes, practices and expectations. All respondents reported using AI tools at work, although most did so occasionally. A quarter of the staff did not consider themselves familiar with the tools, and half were not very confident in their ability to fact-check AI-generated content. The findings helped identify the guidance and training needed to support responsible use.

A central element of this approach is a structured framework for identifying, classifying and mitigating AI risks. In organisational practice, a risk-based assessment should consider the purpose of a proposed use, the sensitivity of the information involved, the people who could be affected, and the potential consequences of error or misuse. The level of risk, and the safeguards required, will depend on the nature of the AI application and its potential impact. Summarising a public document requires different safeguards from processing confidential testimony or using AI to support decisions about individuals. The assessment should inform whether to proceed, what controls and human review are needed, or whether the proposed use is unsuitable.

Protecting sensitive information is particularly important. CSOs may hold testimonies from human rights defenders, partner records, personnel files and unpublished research. Before entering such material into an AI platform, staff need to know how the service handles data and whether the people the material concerns have agreed to it being shared. Staff need clear procedures for identifying sensitive information, assessing whether a tool is suitable and seeking guidance when in doubt.

Choosing an AI tool is also a data protection decision. Before approving a service, organisations should find out whether the provider retains prompts and uploaded files, whether it uses them to train its models, where it stores data, and what its terms of service promise. Free versions of popular tools often offer weaker protections than paid versions. Where the answers are unclear, organisations should exclude the tool from the list of those approved for handling sensitive information.

Accountability also extends to the quality of AI-assisted work. Workshop participants raised concerns about generated information being reproduced and eventually treated as fact without adequate verification. For organisations whose advocacy depends on credible evidence, human review must include checking sources, verifying claims and assessing whether interpretations reflect the context. Responsibility for published findings and recommendations remains with the organisation and its authors.

Putting this guidance into practice requires staff training, clear responsibility for implementation and opportunities to discuss emerging concerns. Policies should be reviewed as tools and working practices change. This allows organisations to benefit from useful applications while maintaining the safeguards and professional judgement on which their credibility depends.

Priorities for strengthening responsible AI use in civil society

  1. Develop an AI Policy with the involvement of staff across functions, defining acceptable uses, approved tools, limits on sensitive information, how AI-assisted work is checked, and when its use should be disclosed. Tie the policy to your existing research, publications, data protection and safeguarding procedures.
  2. Train staff to understand the limitations of AI tools, identify bias, verify AI-generated claims and assess privacy risks, using exercises drawn from everyday tasks.
  3. Assign clear responsibility for reviewing AI-assisted work, especially research, public communications and decisions affecting people. Designate someone to coordinate the guidance, provide staff channels to raise concerns, and review safeguards regularly as AI tools change.
  4. Funders and capacity building partners should support staff training, technical advice, suitable tools and information security. Expecting responsible use without providing the necessary resources leaves small, stretched teams behind.
  5. Document the benefits, limits and risks encountered, and share lessons without exposing sensitive information. Combined with evidence from affected communities, these experiences can strengthen the case for transparency, independent oversight, meaningful participation and remedies when AI causes harm.

Every organisation holds something worth protecting, and AI is already within reach of much of it. The test for civil society is whether our safeguards, skills, and advocacy keep pace. That will require sustained support beyond any single workshop: peer learning, practical guidance, and follow-up support that turn these priorities into daily practice and strengthen civil society’s contribution to rights-respecting AI governance across Africa.

CIPESA Backs Call for African Court Advisory Opinion on Restrictive NGO Laws

By Patricia Ainembabazi |

Across Africa, increasingly restrictive laws governing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continue to threaten civic space and undermine fundamental freedoms. From burdensome registration requirements and excessive fees to restrictions on foreign funding, advocacy and political participation, these measures are limiting civil society’s ability to operate independently, mobilise communities and hold governments accountable.

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) recognises that a free and enabling civic space is fundamental to protecting digital rights and freedoms. Extensive research on digital civic space, internet freedom, freedom of expression, association and assembly, reveals the continued need to advocate for legal and policy environments that enable civil society organisations to organise, participate in governance processes and exercise their rights both online and offline. Thus, restrictions on NGO operations, funding, and advocacy directly undermine the ability of civil society to advance digital rights, engage in public policy processes, monitor government actions, and demand accountability.

Against this backdrop, the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU) is seeking an Advisory Opinion from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to clarify the compatibility of restrictive NGO laws with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The request seeks guidance on the limits of legitimate state regulation, particularly concerning freedom of association, assembly, expression, non-discrimination and participation in public affairs. It also seeks clarification on the legality, necessity and proportionality of restrictions imposed on civil society organisations.

CIPESA joins ARTICLE 19 West Africa, the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, MENA Rights Group and the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) in supporting this initiative. The proposed Advisory Opinion presents an opportunity to establish continent-wide legal standards that protect civic space, strengthen accountability and safeguard the ability of civil society to operate freely and independently, including in advancing digital rights and democratic participation.

Read the full statement here

Uganda’s Climate Change Knowledge and Accountability Gap is Fuelling Disinformation

By Frank Kisakye |

Uganda’s climate change situation came to the fore this month – a troubling
 knowledge
and accountability gap.

Deputy speaker of Parliament Thomas Tayebwa told the plenary on October 20, 2026, that the committee on climate change had not presented a single report during the five-year term of the 11th parliament, despite receiving and utilising public funds.

For starters, parliamentary committees are expected to scrutinise government programmes, assess policy implementation and hold public institutions accountable. Now, at a time when climate-related misinformation and disinformation are gaining ground, the absence of parliamentary scrutiny risks weakening public trust, undermining policy implementation and leaving vulnerable communities further exposed.

The 39-member committee failed to adequately scrutinise the implementation of Uganda’s National Climate Change Policy, the National Climate Change Act, 2021, and the country’s climate finance commitments.

The National Climate Change Policy was inaugurated in 2018 and provides the framework for coordinating climate action, including adaptation, mitigation, public awareness and resilience in vulnerable sectors.

Meanwhile, the National Climate Change Act establishes responsibilities for coordinating climate action, monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, preparing climate plans, mobilising finance and reporting on progress.

Uganda has also developed climate finance instruments, including the National Climate Finance Strategy and the Green Taxonomy, intended to improve how climate finance is mobilised, tracked and reported, and to identify activities that qualify as environmentally sustainable.

These are not merely documents for government shelves. They should guide decisions on how Uganda prepares for floods, droughts, food insecurity and other climate-related risks. Parliamentary scrutiny is essential to establishing whether the commitments translate into tangible benefits for citizens.

Without committee reports, parliament has less evidence on which to base debate, question government priorities or demand corrective action. When the committee on climate change was inaugurated, its then chairperson, Lawrence Biyika Songa, promised decisive action.

“We assure Ugandans that this committee will, on their behalf, and without fear or favour, treat the matter of climate change as a national emergency and therefore, employ a strict code of operation that will ensure and enforce compliance with guidelines by all stakeholders and citizens,” Songa said.

However, beyond parliament, climate change is increasingly discussed through the lens of misinformation and disinformation, which can distort public understanding, erode trust in credible institutions and undermine support for evidence-based responses.

At the Climate Change and Information Integrity Masterclass organised by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and UNESCO during the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 (#FIFAfrica26) in Mauritius, participants examined the growing reach and complexity of climate misinformation and disinformation in African digital spaces.

The discussions highlighted how misleading narratives can encourage harmful environmental practices, exhaust communities through repeated exposure to false claims, and undermine confidence in trusted sources of information. 

These effects can deepen existing inequalities, particularly where people have limited access to reliable, timely and locally relevant climate information.

Climate misinformation takes several forms including through narratives that deny climate change exists or question the reliability of climate modelling without engaging with the available evidence. 

Others use “whataboutism”, arguing that Uganda’s contribution to global emissions is too small anyway to justify action, while overlooking the country’s need to prepare for climate impacts and protect its natural resources.

Another tactic shifts responsibility to individuals and consumers, suggesting that personal lifestyle changes alone can solve a problem that also requires institutional action, public investment and effective regulation.

​​But like MTN Group president and chief executive Ralph Mupita said in the 2022 report, climate change still remains one of the most pressing challenges of the time and affects even the less concerned people or entities.

For example, the April 2022 devastating storms that struck South Africa and killed more than 400 people in the Eastern Cape also affected and disrupted connectivity at more than 500 MTN sites. 

“We are proud of our progress [on climate], but there is still much complex and challenging work to do — within our own
 business
and as an industry. No single company can do it alone, and we intend to use our influence, technology and reach to inspire and enable wider action to tackle the climate emergency — by our customers, our suppliers, our industry and beyond,” he said.

The company’s climate commitments to protecting the environment and achieving net-zero emissions by 2040 include working with its 208 suppliers to support the target and is transitioning some network sites to alternative energy sources. It also diverted over 817 tonnes of network waste from landfills for refurbishment and reuse at new sites in underserved areas.

Other narratives argue that society will accept only voluntary policies and that restrictive measures are inevitably doomed to fail. The ongoing controversy surrounding Uganda’s charcoal restrictions illustrates how climate and environmental policies can become contentious when communities are not adequately consulted or when affordable alternatives are unclear.

A further tactic is to redirect responsibility by insisting that someone else should act first. In Uganda, debates about budget allocations, industrial emissions and the responsibilities of wealthier countries have become opportunities to evade scrutiny of domestic action.

While the historical responsibility of industrialised countries for greenhouse gas emissions is a legitimate issue, it should not be used to dismiss Uganda’s own climate risks or the need for effective policies.

Doomism presents another challenge. It portrays climate impacts as irreversible and all mitigation efforts as futile, encouraging resignation rather than informed action. The so-called climate “doomers” claim humanity should just wait for its extinction because, according to them, nobody is capable of fighting nature, and that humanity is being punished for its past mistakes against the planet.

Such claims, which are gaining popularity among young social media users, can weaken public support for measures that still have the potential to reduce risks and strengthen resilience. And as UN scientists have repeatedly pointed out, according to the BBC, there must be “rapid, deep and immediate” cuts in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions within three years to stave off the worst impacts.

The media has a critical role in challenging these narratives, but journalists themselves face significant obstacles. Limited resources, insufficient specialist knowlede, limited factual information and data, as well as a lack of fact-checking capacity can make it difficult to investigate climate change-related claims and explain complex scientific findings accurately.

Climate change affects communities differently. A report about drought, flooding or changing rainfall patterns needs to reflect local realities and the experiences of the people directly affected. Generic information from foreign publications may provide useful context, but it cannot always substitute for local research, community voices and evidence relevant to Uganda.

Social media has further complicated the information environment. Influencers and online commentators can reach large audiences without necessarily having the scientific expertise or editorial safeguards needed to assess climate claims.

Misleading content can remain accessible long after it has been challenged, while the absence of clear reporting channels makes correction difficult.

Recent public debate over El Niño forecasts in Uganda illustrates the challenge. When social media commentators mock or question meteorological warnings, the issue is not whether public institutions should be scrutinised. They should. The question is whether criticism is grounded in evidence or whether it spreads claims that discourage people from taking credible warnings seriously.

Even when environmental policies pursue legitimate objectives, poor communication and uncertainty about alternatives can make them vulnerable to ridicule and public resistance. The concerns of households that depend on charcoal cannot simply be dismissed as ignorance. Effective policy must address affordability, access to alternative fuels, and the practical circumstances of vulnerable communities.

Yet at the same time, fear of disruption can become an excuse for delaying necessary action. The pursuit of a policy that satisfies every affected party before implementation may leave the government unable to respond to urgent environmental threats. 

The challenge is to develop workable, evidence-based measures, communicate their purpose clearly and provide support to those likely to bear the greatest costs.

Climate misinformation can also aggravate tensions over land, forests and scarce resources. During the masterclass at FIFAfrica, participants discussed how climate-related hazards can compound displacement and protection risks. 

In Terego district, a refugee-hosting area, MP Wilfred Erima Babanga recently raised concerns about forest clearing by refugees compared with local communities’ conservation efforts. Such claims require careful verification and context.

Without reliable evidence, attributing environmental degradation to refugees or another vulnerable group risks turning a complex problem involving land pressure, resource management and climate stress into a source of social hostility. Climate and conflict can overlap, with women, children and men facing displacement as internally displaced people, refugees or victims of trafficking.

Those most exposed to climate risks are often also the people most vulnerable to misleading information. They need accessible forecasts, credible early warnings and practical guidance that supports informed decisions about livelihoods, movement and access to resources.

Public institutions should provide timely, transparent and accessible information. Journalists need training, resources and reliable sources. Civil society organisations and technology partners can help develop fact-checking tools, strengthen collaboration and improve the visibility of evidence-based reporting.

Initiatives such as those supported by Code for Africa can help journalists use technology and collaborative methods to investigate climate-related claims.

Citizens, too, need media literacy skills to distinguish credible information from false or misleading claims. Climate change must not be presented as an elite concern divorced from the daily struggles of ordinary Ugandans. It affects food production, household incomes, health, housing and access to natural resources.

The discussions at the CIPESA-UNESCO masterclass also underscored the importance of examining how rapid internet growth, dependence on digital platforms, shrinking space for environmental journalism, surveillance and harassment can affect climate reporting across Africa. These challenges make it even more important to protect credible information and ensure that climate debates remain open to evidence and scrutiny.

As Uganda prepares for future international climate negotiations, including COP31 in Ankara in November 2026 and COP32 in Ethiopia in 2027, the country needs more than ambitious announcements. It needs transparent implementation, credible public information and institutions that can account for their decisions and spending.

Parliament has a particularly important role to play. The reported failure of its committee on climate change to table a report during the 11th parliament should prompt a clear explanation of what the committee did, how its funds were used, and why its oversight work did not produce reports for the House.

When institutions fail to explain their actions, they leave gaps that rumours, conspiracy theories and misleading narratives can exploit.

The Observer first published this article on October 29, 2026, on its website

Why Africa’s Digital Progress Must Be Grounded in Human Rights Accountability

By Apolo Kakaire and Doreen Elizabeth Namuyanja |

The rapid pace of innovation and technological development has created a new generation of human rights challenges including deepening inequalities, expanding surveillance, environmental degradation and new barriers to participation. Individuals with unreliable internet access or limited digital literacy, undocumented people and persons with disabilities are among the most affected. Companies, whether in the technology sector or not,  often lack the guidance, tools, and accumulated knowledge to assess and address the human rights impacts of their digital operations.

This gap was central to a session on Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs) of Digital Technologies at the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 (FIFAfrica26). The session,  hosted by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) brought together National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), digital rights activists and civil society organisations. The conversation drew on the experiences of NHRIs from South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia and Morocco, who shared practices and methodologies for monitoring the human rights impacts of digitalisation and emerging technologies.

Participants emphasised that digital progress cannot be measured only by increased connectivity or more services being delivered online. It must also be judged by whether it protects human dignity, reduces inequalities and provides effective remedies for rights violations.

“Human rights monitoring must follow the rights, not just the device,” noted Eileen Carter of the South African Human Rights Commission. She urged participants to examine the systems of power, institutions and relationships through which technology operates.

The human rights impacts of technology are rarely felt equally. Gender, disability, age, language, location and socioeconomic circumstances can determine who benefits and who is excluded. Digital rights monitoring should therefore go beyond measuring adoption or access and examine how different groups experience a technology, including whether it reinforces or reduces existing inequalities.

Participants noted that the absence of complaints received by NHRIs does not necessarily mean a digital system is causing little harm. People unable to access a service, understand how their data is used or challenge an automated decision may never appear in the evidence informing an assessment. Opaque decision-making and unequal access to information can further hide harm. Effective monitoring must therefore ask not only who uses a technology, but also who is excluded, whose experiences remain undocumented and who can demand accountability.

Human rights impact assessments offer a structured way to address these challenges. Rather than treating human rights as a compliance checklist, an HRIA identifies and analyses a technology’s potential and actual effects on individuals and communities. Both positive and negative impacts are considered. It involves gathering evidence, assessing impacts, identifying measures to prevent or mitigate harm, providing for remedy, and monitoring implementation.

The process runs from planning and scoping through evidence collection, impact analysis, prevention, mitigation and remedy, and reporting, with affected groups consulted throughout. It should establish which rights are affected, who is affected, what evidence is available,  the severity of the impact and what action is required. Crucially, an HRIA must investigate people’s  actual experiences rather than simply test whether an organisation meets predetermined requirements. This allows affected communities to participate meaningfully throughout the process.

Assessments should begin early enough to influence how a technology is designed and deployed, rather than only after harm occurs. They must also evolve as technologies and their uses change. Because digital systems cross borders and involve many public and private actors, assessing a product or platform in isolation may overlook wider risks. Sector-wide impact assessments can reveal harms that arise from interactions between telecommunications infrastructure, government agencies, data processors and technology providers.

Assessing digital technologies is not straightforward, and three challenges stand out. Digital technologies operate across jurisdictions, making it difficult to define the scope of an assessment. Additionally, digital ecosystems involve governments, technology companies, intermediaries, users and affected communities, so assessors must distinguish between primary and secondary stakeholders. Meanwhile, technology changes quickly, raising questions about when an assessment should be undertaken and how often findings should be revisited. Traditional methodologies may therefore need to be adapted, and HRIAs of digital technologies should be iterative rather than one-off, with periodic reassessment as technologies, users and impacts evolve.

During the FIFAfrica session, a practical exercise on a hypothetical national digital identity system illustrated these risks. While such a system could reduce fraud and improve access to public services, registration requirements, biometric databases and authentication processes could also expose people to privacy violations, discrimination or exclusion. Refugees, rural communities, older people, persons with disabilities, informal workers and women lacking required documentation often face particular barriers.

Participants  emphasised that assessing such a system requires more than reviewing technical safeguards. It demands scrutiny of the whole ecosystem around the system: registration requirements, biometric databases, authentication systems, government agencies, private technology providers and mechanisms for challenging incorrect decisions. Governments introducing digital identity systems should therefore provide accessible alternatives, effective grievance and remedy mechanisms, robust data protection safeguards, and specific measures for groups likely to face exclusion.

The discussions also examined what happens after an assessment is completed. Participants noted that evidence has limited value unless it reaches institutions able to act on it. HRIA findings can inform legislation, regulation, NHRI recommendations, complaints mechanisms,  public procurement, corporate engagement, investigations, litigation and advocacy. Every assessment should identify who is responsible for responding, what action is required and how implementation will be monitored.

NHRIs were singled out as well positioned to connect evidence with accountability. Their independence, formal mandates, and access to policymakers can strengthen human rights oversight. However, many face resource constraints and are still building the expertise needed to monitor rapidly evolving digital environments.

Participants called for stronger collaboration among NHRIs, civil society, researchers, regulators and affected communities. NHRIs bring institutional authority and oversight, while civil society contributes specialist knowledge, community relationships and evidence of harms that formal complaint mechanisms may miss. Universities and research institutions can strengthen the evidence base, while regulators can support enforcement within their mandates.

Sharing research, methodologies and findings would reduce duplication and help institutions make better use of limited resources. It was stressed that African organisations should build on existing evidence and data, rather than work in silos.

Participants also called for extending cooperation across borders – noting that digital services, data flows and corporate operations frequently span jurisdictions, while individual African countries may struggle to influence large technology companies on their own. Other recommendations included sharing court decisions, policy recommendations and evidence of cross-border violations to strengthen collective advocacy. Regional mechanisms, including African Union structures, were identified as additional avenues for coordinated action and follow-up on human rights commitments.

The meeting noted that international developments, including the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act, the Digital Services Act (DSA) and approaches to corporate human rights due diligence, offer useful reference points. However, African countries should not simply transplant external models. Assessment methodologies must reflect local laws, languages, socioeconomic realities and institutional capacities.

They should also address risks arising from Africa’s digital infrastructure, including the concentration of personal data in institutions that may simultaneously provide public services and exercise surveillance powers. Experiences from South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia show that national approaches to AI, cybersecurity, human rights and business already differ, underscoring the value of locally grounded approaches that selectively draw on international good practice.

Africa’s digital future will depend not only on technological investment but also on the strength of its accountability mechanisms. HRIAs can make the consequences of digitalisation visible, amplify the voices of affected communities and translate evidence into institutional and policy action. However, their effectiveness depends on institutional capacity, meaningful responses from governments and companies, and follow-up on recommendations.

Where Digital Rights and Economic Freedom Intersect

By Anna Kompanek |

The internet is the lifeblood of a modern economy. From a tech company bringing innovative solutions to the market, to a farmer using his mobile phone to check current crop prices and receive payments, connectivity has become key to unlocking economic opportunity. Building affordable infrastructure remains a challenge in many places. But connectivity now raises an equally daunting question: how to keep that access both available and rights-preserving.

New challenge of the internet era

At the 2026 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), co-hosted in Mauritius by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Halley Movement, Executive Director Dr. Wairagala Wakabi described a shift: when the Forum began in 2014, connectivity was the leading challenge. Today, the questions concern not just getting online but data privacy, governance, and the risks of being online. In Africa and beyond, the key issue is how that vital access can be denied by actors ranging from authoritarian governments to hackers – and, increasingly, bots or misused agentic artificial intelligence (AI).

On the government side, internet shutdowns and throttling remain a persistent reality in many places. While they are often seen through the perspective of suppressing human rights, there is an important economic dimension as well. When an internet disruption stops a merchant from advertising her goods, a small exporter from contacting buyers, or a chamber of commerce from reaching its members, digital repression becomes an economic issue. The question is no longer just how to connect entrepreneurs to the digital economy, but how to keep them connected when that access becomes fragile or politically contested.

I came to this year’s FIFAfrica to explore how emerging technologies can help digital rights advocates and local businesses defend their shared online space. As in past years, the Forum brought together an impressive group of open internet advocates, researchers, technologists, and policymakers. My main practical lesson: tools that help civil society operate under pressure might also protect local businesses and their independent associations.

When efficiency can become dependency

CIPESA’s State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2026 report examines digital public infrastructure (DPI) across 11 countries, focusing on identity, payment, and data sharing systems. Such systems can lower transaction costs, widen inclusion, and improve public services, but weak safeguards can entrench exclusion and enable intrusive surveillance. As the report explains, their shared dependence on connectivity means a cable cut, power failure, cloud outage, or internet disruption can interrupt identity, payments, and public services, affecting both socio-economic and civil-political rights.

The response – like with all new technologies – is not to reject DPI advancement, but to demand transparency, data protection, due process, accessible appeals, and practical alternatives.

Tools from the digital rights’ front lines

This year, FIFAfrica’s Digital Reality Walk showcased tools relevant to civil society and local businesses, including OONI Probe, Orbot, Tor Browser, and Butter Box. Custom VPNs offer another promising application. Bitcoin and other decentralised payment arrangements, while not without their own risks, have helped civil society groups retain channels for funding when conventional banking is constrained. Such tools empower users to monitor internet restrictions, anonymise mobile traffic, browse the web securely, share digital resources offline, use private encryption servers, and retain financial freedom. These civil society applications may also help businesses in challenging environments.

What businesses are already doing

Local businesses, chambers of commerce, and business associations around the world have a direct stake in privacy, free expression, and an open digital economy. This business case for digital rights, as outlined by the Center for International Private Enterprise, provides a foundation for connecting digital rights advocacy to economic opportunity.

Leading business organisations are also paying attention to these issues. The International Chamber of Commerce advances the digital economy agenda through its Digital Standards Initiative (DSI), which promotes a globally harmonised digital trade environment; its Global Digital Economy Commission, which advocates trustworthy, risk-based AI governance and responsible cross-border data flows; and its cybersecurity and internet governance positions, which emphasise security without excessive fragmentation or restrictions on legitimate use.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also supports an open and competitive digital economy. Its U.S.-Africa Business Center’s Digital Economy Task Force has championed affordable connectivity, enabling regulations, cross-border data flows, and digital entrepreneurship; Africa Digital Innovation Competition has supported African startups developing solutions in fintech, cybersecurity, and digital supply chains; and Global Connect initiative advocates against forced data localisation and other restrictions that fragment digital markets, while promoting privacy, cybersecurity, and sound regulation of emerging technologies.

These initiatives demonstrate the business community’s recognition that digital openness underpins economic opportunity. They focus on trade regulatory ecosystems that promote competitive markets and innovation rather than digital rights explicitly. Yet, they reinforce the same principle: businesses, like civil society, need open, dependable, secure digital systems governed by predictable rules.

A shared economic freedom agenda

In November, global business leaders will gather in Washington, DC for the B20 Summit where digital transformation will feature prominently. An equally important question is what happens when technologies that connect businesses to customers, finance, and global markets become instruments of surveillance, censorship, or economic control.

The B20’s focus on innovation, trusted digital systems, small business participation, and resilient supply chains offers an opening. Businesses need more than reduced economic barriers and better digital infrastructure: they must be able to communicate securely, access information, receive payments, and organise independently.

Digital rights defenders have spent years developing technologies to preserve these freedoms under pressure. Entrepreneurs in challenging environments can learn from them to defend the basic capacity of businesses to communicate, associate, access markets, and transact.

My main takeaway from FIFAfrica is that economic freedom and internet freedom are inseparable. Digital freedom organisations bring experience operating under pressure; chambers and business associations bring knowledge of members’ operational needs and the economic costs of politically motivated restrictions. Connecting their advocacy and resilience strategies could particularly benefit smaller businesses and independent local associations facing similar challenges as civil society organisations.

Anna Kompaneck is an International Development Consultant.

Kenya’s 2027 Elections Will Test Its Commitment to Digital and Media Rights

By Raylenne Kambua |

As Kenya approaches its August 2027 general elections, there are growing concerns about how the country’s digital and media laws and practices could affect citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process.

Over the last few years, Kenya has passed or amended several laws, such as the Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA) and the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (CMCA), which directly impact citizens’ online participation in civic and democratic processes. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) has flagged more than 20 pieces of legislation that contain retrogressive provisions that threaten journalists’ right to report, their privacy, and citizens’ access to information.

As in many other African countries, digital technologies, including social media platforms and Artificial Intelligence (AI), have become central to citizens’ social, economic and political participation, particularly during periods of contestation, such as elections and protests.

During the 2024 Gen Z protests, young Kenyans used AI and other digital tools to simplify legislation and produce mobilisation materials, and used social media platforms to coordinate protests. The state responded with digital repression, including online threats, unwarranted arrests, abductions, internet disruptions, and unlawful surveillance. The 2027 campaigns will run on the same digital infrastructure, with more AI capabilities and with human rights at stake.

Digital Threats as Electoral Threats

On October 6, 2026, the Collaboration of International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) attended a stakeholder engagement hosted by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in Nairobi, where the Roadmap to a Violence-Free 2027 General Election report was launched.

The report identified the weaponisation of AI and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as key threats to peaceful elections. It also found that social media is where election violence is seeded, incubated, and mobilised, and called for digital hygiene and responsible use of digital media.

In an earlier engagement with the commission, CIPESA asserted that no single institution can address digital threats alone. Clear inter-institutional protocols can, however, enable timely, coordinated and rights-respecting responses, while strengthening the accountability of digital platforms.

Digital tools and AI were used in the 2022 general elections, and their use has since grown. As these tools become more sophisticated, real and fabricated content becomes harder to distinguish, increasing the risk of harm during elections.

CIPESA’s report, Navigating the Implications of AI on Digital Democracy in Kenya, finds that AI is reshaping digital participation and access to information in the country. However, the report warns that the existing AI governance gaps, rise of AI-powered political advertising, deepfakes, and microtargeting threaten to distort democratic processes and the information ecosystem in profound ways.

Internet and platform shutdowns also contribute to the information disorder and threaten electoral integrity. Election periods carry a heightened risk of internet shutdowns, which can limit voters’ access to information, silence observers and journalists, and leave rumours unchallenged.

There is the fear that Kenya could borrow the shutdown script from neighbours such as Uganda and Tanzania during next year’s elections. The country has already seen the warning signs. Telegram is often blocked during national examinations, and internet disruptions were reported during the 2024 Gen Z protests. In response, stakeholders secured interim orders restraining the government and mobile operators from shutting down internet access. Although the orders are temporary, the final ruling and the commitment of regulators and telecom operators will determine whether Kenyans stay connected during the August 2027 elections.

Press Freedom Under Threat

Private media houses lead in listenership and viewership, and mainstream media remains more trusted than social media as a source of information. Yet these outlets face threats to press freedom and state interference, while journalists encounter harassment. Media stakeholders have condemned these trends ahead of the elections.

Defamation is also a growing concern, and courts have been faulted for awarding serious damages against bloggers and the media, even though international standards hold that public officials should be open to greater scrutiny. Fear of legal consequences can force investigative journalists to slow down, undermining the public’s right to know.

Law as the Main Instrument of Control

Participants at a multi-stakeholder dialogue on ‘Advocacy Strategies for Better Tech and Media Policies’, hosted by KICTANet and the Bloggers Association of Kenya on October 8, 2026, in Nairobi, named vague legislation as one of the most persistent threats to online expression.

Laws such as the CMCA illustrate this pattern. Enacted in 2018, the Act criminalises certain forms of online expression, including false publications. In March 2026, the Court of Appeal struck down two sections of the 2025 Amendment Act for failing the test of constitutional clarity. The ruling prompted Parliament to appeal. The court left the Act’s investigative powers largely intact, while cautioning that courts must act as gatekeepers because those powers can be abused.

Following the court ruling, further amendments to the CMCA introduced new powers for the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee (NC4), including the authority to order the blocking or removal of websites, pages and applications without a court order. In July 2026, the High Court declared two of the new provisions unconstitutional, as the amendments could risk criminalising legitimate speech.

The pattern is consistent: Parliament passes broad provisions, civil society challenges them in court, and courts later narrow their scope or strike them down. Some earlier cases followed a similar course. In 2014, a court rejected an attempt to restrict journalists and bloggers from publishing terror-related content without permission from the national police, holding that laws limiting fundamental rights do not enjoy the usual presumption of constitutionality. In another case, the High Court found the KICA offence of “misusing a telecommunication device” unconstitutionally vague. The court held that any limit on expression must be clear, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate.

The laws used to restrict expression also evolve. The Prevention of Terrorism Act has been used against protesters, and authorities have invoked the CMCA to arrest online critics, some of whom were first abducted. During the 2027 electoral cycle, advocates should watch for existing legal provisions being used in new ways.

Civil society has also shown that early engagement can influence legislation. For instance, it persuaded Parliament to withdraw a proposed KICA amendment on the liability of social media administrators. This calls for proactiveness in policy development processes, ensuring bills are monitored throughout the stages rather than waiting until they have been passed.

Recommendations

  1. Parliament should publish bills early, allow meaningful public participation, and ensure that restrictions on online expression and access to information are clearly defined and consistent with constitutional rights.
  2. The Director of Public Prosecutions and the police should refrain from pursuing arbitrary and politically motivated prosecutions, and from misusing or selectively enforcing laws to prosecute protesters, social media users, bloggers and journalists.
  3. Courts should apply strict scrutiny to search, seizure and surveillance orders, and keep interim protections against internet disruption.
  4. The Communications Authority and telecom operators should commit publicly not to shut down or throttle the internet and publish transparency reports on government takedown requests.
  5. The NCIC, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the judiciary, and the MCK should agree on protocols for responding to digital threats during the elections, with clear roles for each.
  6. Media houses should adopt the MCK election guideline and AI code of conduct, invest in verification and deepfake detection, and strengthen legal support for their journalists.
  7. Digital platforms should expand election integrity and moderation capacity for Kenya, respond promptly to TFGBV and hate speech reports, clearly label AI-generated or manipulated political content, and publish transparency reports on government requests to remove or restrict content.
  8. Civil society should track bills at the policy stage through a shared system and pool legal analysis.
  9. Development partners should fund legal defence for bloggers and journalists, and support strategic litigation, because cases like the CMCA challenge take years to resolve.