Policy Alternatives for an Artificial Intelligence Ecosystem in Uganda

CIPESA |

Economic projections show that by 2030, artificial intelligence (AI) will add USD 15.7 trillion to the global economy. Of this, USD 1.2 trillion will be generated in Africa and could boost the continent’s Gross Domestic Product by 5.6%. Despite AI’s transformative potential, there are concerns about the risks it poses to individuals’ rights and freedoms. There is therefore a need to foster a trusted and ethical AI ecosystem that elicits peoples’ confidence while guaranteeing an enabling atmosphere for innovation, to best harness AI for the greater public good for all. 

The discussion on AI in Uganda is still in early stages. Nonetheless, the country needs to develop a comprehensive and AI-specific legal and institutional governance framework to provide for regulatory oversight over AI and the diverse actors in the AI ecosystem. Currently, various pieces of legislation, which majorly focus on general-purpose technologies, constitute the legal framework relevant to AI. However, these laws do not provide sufficient regulatory cover to AI, its associated benefits and mitigation of risks to human security, rights and freedoms. 

In a new policy brief, the Collaboration on ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) reviews the AI policymaking journeys of various countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, Singapore, Luxembourg, France and Germany, and proposes 11 actions Uganda could take to fulfil its aspiration to effectively regulate and harness AI.

The existing key policy frameworks include the Uganda Vision 2040, which emphasises the importance of Science, Technology, Engineering and Innovation (STEI) as critical drivers of economic growth and social transformation; and the National Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) Strategy that aims to accelerate Uganda’s development into an innovative, productive and competitive society using 4IR technologies, with  emphasis on  using AI in the public sector to improve financial management and tax revenue collection. Meanwhile, the third National Development Plan (NDP III) identifies the promotion of digital transformation and the adoption of 4IR technologies, including AI, as critical components for achieving Uganda’s vision of becoming a middle-income country. 

The legal frameworks that impact AI-related oversight include the Constitution that lays out crucial benchmarks for the regulation of AI. It provides for the role of the state in stimulating agricultural, industrial, technological and scientific development by adopting appropriate policies and enacting enabling legislation. The constitution also provides for the right to privacy, freedom from discrimination, and the right to equality. 

Other key laws include the Data Protection and Privacy Act of 2019 which, even if it was not drafted with AI in mind, is directly relevant to the regulation of AI technologies through the lens of data protection. The Computer Misuse Act of 2011 provides a framework that addresses unlawful use of computers and electronic systems. Relevant to the governance of AI is section 12, which criminalises unauthorised access to a computer or electronic system.  

The National Information Technology Authority, Uganda (NITA-U) Act offers a foundation for improving infrastructure to support AI regulation efforts, and  established NITA-U, a body responsible for regulating, coordinating, and promoting information technology in the country. 

Overall, the current policy and legal framework, however fragmented, provides a starting point for enacting comprehensive, AI-specific legislation.

The growing adoption of AI brings a host of opportunities that positively impact society, including improved productivity and efficiency for individuals, the health sector, civil society organisations, the media, financial institutions, manufacturing industries, supplier chains, agriculture, climate and weather research and academia. AI is also being used by public agencies such as Uganda Revenue Authority to support more effective revenue collection. Uganda’s telecommunications operators are also utilising AI, for example to send targeted messages that encourage users to subscribe to loan offers such as Airtel Wewole and MTN MoKash..

Prospects for AI Regulation in Uganda

As Uganda’s journey of AI adoption and usage gains traction, the following guiding actions that underlie progressive AI frameworks across various countries could help quicken and offer direction to Uganda’s AI aspirations.

  1. Establishment of an AI governance institutional framework to guide the national adoption and usage of AI.
  2. Development and implementation of a “living” framework of best practices on AI that operates across the diverse sectors affected by AI. Singapore provides a best practice in this regard where, as a national agenda, there is consistent codification of best practices that inform the safe evolution of AI in the different spheres. The best practices framework allows for complementing of the regulatory framework. By adopting this best practice framework, Uganda would keep up with the evolution of AI without necessarily undertaking statutory amendments especially in the AI/technology world where there are rapid changes. 
  3. Implementation of checks and balances through the creation of specific policies, regulations, guidelines, and laws to manage AI effectively and address the existing significant gaps in its regulation and oversight. To address this, key stakeholders – including the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, the Uganda Communications Commission, NITA-U, and the Personal Data Protection Office – must collaborate to develop comprehensive and tailored regulations. This effort should focus on understanding AI’s specific dynamics, impacts, and challenges within the Ugandan context and not wholesomely adopting or replicating legislation from other jurisdictions, given the divergences in context at continental, regional and national levels.
  4. Tap into the African AI Frameworks for Inspiration. Drawing on regional and international frameworks, such as the African Union’s AI Policy and the European Union’s AI Act, will offer key strategic guidelines and intervention measures to shape a robust and effective AI legislation in Uganda. 
  5. Establish a National Research and Innovative Fund on AI to effectively tap into and harvest the dividends that come with AI. This kind of funding requiring direct government intervention is informed by the reality that surrounds the high levels of uncertainty of outcomes in tech  innovation. 
  6. Develop and implement a National Strategy for AI to enhance policy coordination and coherence and offer direction and guidance. This would encompass the national vision for AI in Uganda’s social and economic development, and guide all other initiatives on progressive AI regulation.
  7. Develop and implement a National Citizenry Awareness and Public Education Programme on AI to better prepare citizens to engage with AI responsibly, ensure inclusion and advocate for ethical practices.
  8. Apply human rights protective AI to influence the designing of AI systems with fairness, transparency, and accountability, and employ diverse and representative datasets to mitigate biases related to ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status.
  9. Establish  a mechanism that can enforce ethical use of AI by the various stakeholders, including through emphasising transparency and accountability in AI deployment.
  1. Establish cyber security protocols to counter inherent vulnerability to cyber-attacks and other attendant digital security risks that come with AI.  
  2. Create a conducive atmosphere for citizenry platforms for AI engagements. These platforms can be conduits for encouraging best practices, and latest research information among other emerging issues on AI that could benefit the country. An AI ecosystem should thus favour and strategically support such inter-agency, inter-sector and public-private collaboration and formal linkages to also facilitate AI technology transfer from explorations, studies and innovation to actual application.

Read the full brief here.

Social Media’s Role in Hate Speech: A Double-Edged Sword for South Sudan

By Ochaya Jackson & George Gumikiriza |

The lead-up to and aftermath of the now-stalled December 2024 elections in South Sudan has highlighted the role of social media as a powerful tool for communication, civic engagement, and information sharing. Platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok have connected people across the world’s youngest nation, enabling dialogue, amplifying marginalised voices, and spreading crucial information. However, alongside these benefits, social media has also become a breeding ground for hate speech, misinformation, and incitement to violence.

The Rise of Hate Speech on Social Media

From June to November 2024, DefyHateNow (recently renamed Digital Rights Frontlines – DRF) monitored incidents of hate speech in South Sudan. The monitoring was done on content created and shared via social media platforms. Of the 255 incidents recorded, Facebook accounted for 89.4%, with WhatsApp, X, and TikTok coming in as close second. The monitoring findings further indicate that 50.5% of online content contained misinformation or disinformation, while 39.9% was classified as hate speech.

Facebook is the most widely used social media platform in South Sudan, which explains why it holds most of the illegal and harmful content. The popularity of the platform partly arises from its “free mode” feature which allows MTN mobile subscribers in South Sudan to access Facebook, create and share content when they do not have an internet data bundle; only viewing or uploading photos and videos requires users to have data.

Social media’s accessibility and rapid reach make it easy for harmful content to spread, fueling ethnic and political tensions. Given South Sudan’s history of conflict, inflammatory online rhetoric can have real-world consequences, inciting violence, deepening divisions, and undermining peacebuilding efforts.

Why Does Hate Speech Spread So Easily?

As part of the project, DefyHateNow convened the country’s first Symposium in commemoration of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech as a platform for collective action to combat hate speech. The engagements identified several factors that contribute to the proliferation of hate speech and disinformation in South Sudan:

Ethnic and Political Divisions – Long-standing ethnic rivalries and political conflicts provide fertile ground for harmful narratives that further divide communities.

Lack of Digital Literacy – Many social media users lack the skills to critically assess the credibility of online content, making them more susceptible to misinformation.

Anonymity and Lack of Accountability – Many harmful posts are made under fake names or anonymous accounts, reducing the fear of repercussions.

Weak Regulatory Frameworks – South Sudan lacks robust policies to hold social media platforms accountable for harmful content.

Algorithmic Amplification – Social media algorithms prioritise engagement, often promoting divisive and inflammatory content because it generates more reactions and shares.

The Positive Side: Social Media for Good

Despite these challenges, social media remains a vital tool for positive change. Platforms have been used for:

Peacebuilding and Dialogue – Initiatives like #defyhatenow and DRF’s online campaigns promote counter-speech and encourage respectful conversations.

Fact-checking and Misinformation Prevention – Programmes like 211Check work to verify online information and educate communities about identifying false narratives.

Civic Engagement – Social media allows citizens to engage with governance, report human rights abuses, and access critical updates on national issues.

Curiosity – The disinformation awareness campaigns conducted raise the level of literacy and criticality among online audiences, which makes them detect and counter disinformation.

Towards maximising the benefits of social media, DefyHateNow also conducted awareness campaigns through the publication of animations in print media, radio talk shows and dissemination of posters across South Sudan’s capital Juba. The campaign messages reinforced the call for action against hate speech, misinformation and disinformation as well as raised awareness about their dangers and how to identify them.

Ahead of the rescheduled elections slated for December 2026, collective effort from tech companies, policymakers, civil society, the media and individual users is required to address the challenges of hate speech and disinformation. By promoting digital literacy, implementing stronger regulations, and encouraging responsible social media use, South Sudan can harness the power of social media platforms for peace and progress.

DefyHate Now’s work was supported by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) in the context of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF).

Do you want to be part of the solution? Join Digital Rights Frontlines (DRF) in advocating for safer digital spaces. Stay informed, report harmful content, and contribute to a more inclusive and responsible online community.

For more information, visit www.digitalrights.ngo or contact us at [email protected]

Digital Shadows: Deepfakes Used As Violence Against Women in Journalism and Politics During African Elections

By Risper Arose |

In the ever-evolving digital landscape, technology has transformed how we communicate, access information, and engage with the world. But with these advances comes a darker side – one that disproportionately affects women in journalism and politics, particularly during pivotal moments such as elections. One such dark side is deepfakes – synthetic media generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) that manipulates voices, faces, and actions –  which have become a powerful tool for deception.

Media manipulation in itself is not new and has long influenced politics and relations, helping create and spread narratives. For instance, in the 20th century, photos were manually edited to manipulate public opinion during political repression campaigns. At the time, this was a slow and meticulous process requiring skilled labour. With the rise of digital technology, manipulating media has become much easier and cheaper. This proliferation of deepfakes is further fuelled by the ever-growing unprecedented power of the internet and social media platforms to rapidly and virally disseminate digital content.

While deepfakes can be used for creative and educational purposes, in the age of information warfare they have increasingly been weaponised, causing significant disruption to the stability, integrity, and trust in institutions, the media, and society as a whole. They have the potential to further undermine norms of truth and trust on individual, organisational, and societal levels.

Additionally, the fact that deepfakes initially appeared as non-consensual pornography highlights their malicious potential, particularly as a gendered tool that disproportionately targets women. This also demonstrates the unique and troubling ability of AI to mimic real humans without consent, undermining their credibility and the agendas they champion, tarnishing their reputations, and inciting harassment. The effects ripple far beyond the screen, manifesting in offline violence, professional fallout, and psychological scars.

This month, Tanda Community Network launched a new research report that provides a comprehensive overview of the critical issue, shedding light on the interplay between deepfake technology, Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV), and democratic processes.

The report highlights case studies from three African countries: Ghana, Senegal and Namibia, revealing how deepfakes are weaponised during elections. With support from the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), Tanda Community Network carried out focus group discussions, interviewed policymakers, technologists, women journalists, women politicians and civil society in the digital sector and surveyed over 100  women in the three countries.

The findings indicate that deepfake attacks inflict lasting socio-cultural, professional and psychological harm. For female journalists and politicians, the stakes are even higher, with the violence often spilling over into offline spaces.

Many victims of TFGBV, including deepfake attacks, fear the stigma associated with speaking out, leading many to suffer in silence. This leads to severe underreporting, fueled by a lack of trust, inadequate support systems, and the absence of effective tools or expertise to detect and combat these threats.

Compounding this is widespread media illiteracy. Media literacy is alarmingly low, leaving the public vulnerable to manipulation and unable to differentiate between authentic and fake content.

Perhaps the most concerning finding is the lack of robust legal frameworks to address deepfakes and online harassment. Across the study countries, there is no specific, enforceable legislation to hold perpetrators accountable for TFGBV involving deepfakes.

It goes without saying that there is an urgent need for safeguards against such attacks. These attacks, which often manifest as targeted online harassment, have severe implications – not just for the individuals involved but also for public trust in information.

To address these challenges, a multi-pronged approach is essential.

  • Education must play a central role in combating the threat of deepfakes. Awareness campaigns and media literacy programs should aim to teach users to critically analyse the content they consume, recognise digital manipulations, and navigate online spaces safely. Toolkits and training programs must be tailored for different stakeholder groups, including journalists, policymakers, and grassroots communities, to equip them with the skills needed to identify and respond to these threats effectively.
  • Policymakers must prioritise creating enforceable legal frameworks that clearly define and punish perpetrators of digital violence. These laws should also address the broader spectrum of TFGBV, acknowledging its various manifestations and far-reaching impacts.
  • Social media platforms also have a critical responsibility to ensure accountability. They must develop and enforce robust policies to address the spread of deepfakes and harassment, investing in technologies that can detect manipulated content before it causes harm. Transparency and collaboration with civil society organisations would enhance these platforms’ ability to mitigate risks.
  • Institutions, including research organisations and academia, need to focus on developing actionable, evidence-based solutions. Research should be targeted toward understanding the nuances of deepfake attacks on different stakeholder groups and providing implementable recommendations that can influence policy and practice.

The key to combating deepfakes lies in people-centered solutions that can empower everyone.  This requires conscious efforts that put community consultation and community leadership front and centre in the decision-making process, moving away from siloed interventions that are often top-down and driven by external motivations.

By addressing these challenges, women can participate fully and fearlessly in shaping our democracy and society. This report is a call to action to lawmakers, civil society and tech platforms to create safer, more inclusive spaces for women politicians and journalists and in a broader sense the general public.

As deepfakes grow smarter and harder to detect, the challenges they pose will only intensify. Yet, we are not starting from scratch. Existing knowledge and past experiences in combating digital threats provide a foundation we can build upon. The fight against deepfakes and digital violence is not just about protecting women in journalism and politics; it is about safeguarding democracy, fostering inclusion, and ensuring that technology serves humanity rather than undermining it.

Digital Shadows is more than a research report; it is a call to action for governments, tech companies, and civil society, among other stakeholders, to advocate for meaningful policies and equip the general public with the tools they need to navigate this evolving landscape.

Let’s act now—because the longer we wait, the more entrenched these digital shadows will become.

Download the Digital Shadow full report
Risper Arose is the Partnership Lead at Tanda Community Network.

African Women’s Digital Safety: From Resolution to Reality

Edrine Wanyama |

Amplifying the Resolution on the Protection of Women Against Digital Violence in Africa: Towards Meaningful Actions by States

Two and a half years after the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted the Resolution on the Protection of Women Against Digital Violence in Africa, its implementation remains a pipe dream. With Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) continuing to proliferate across the continent, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is challenging African governments to use the occasion of International Women’s Day to commit to taking legislative and practical measures to implement this pivotal resolution.

ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 is important as it offers ground breaking approaches to addressing digital violence against women on the African continent.  While the digital realm should be a space of innovation and empowerment, it has become a battleground where women face harassment, intimidation, and violence. The non-consensual sharing of intimate images, sexist hate speech, misogynistic disinformation campaigns, cyberstalking, cyber bullying, cyber flashing, unsolicited sexually explicit content, doxing, deep fakes, trolling and mansplaining have steadily increased and contributed to a growing digital gender divide in Africa. 

This digital gender divide further exacerbates existing inequalities and hinders progress towards achieving gender equality in the region, stripping girls and women of their voices and hindering meaningful participation in online discourse. The inequalities also hinder the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 5 that, among others, aims to advance gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls as a prerequisite for development.

Given the snail-speed implementation of the 2022 Resolution, in 2024  the Commission adopted another resolution, ACHPR/Res.591 (LXXX) 2024, which mandates the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa to undertake a study on the causes, manifestations, and impacts of digital violence against women in Africa. It also aims to further the development of comprehensive norms and standards to assist countries ​in ​address​ing TFGBV.  

This Resolution underscores the need to fulfill Article 9 of the African Charter on free expression and access to information, and Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa on the rights to life, integrity and security of the person of the woman. 

According to CIPESA’s Programme Manager, Ashnah Kalemera, governments are not to be reminded of their obligations with regards to gender equity online but should take all the necessary measures and “accelerate actions including adopting appropriate laws to address TFGBV.” 

While TFGBV has become a major global challenge, many approaches adopted to tackle it on the continent either fall short of the capability to hold those responsible for rights violations accountable, or focus on curtailing the digital civic spaces. For example, electoral periods such as in Uganda have  witnessed  multiple reports of targeted online violence against women, with some existing laws on cybercrime often targeting the female victims and not the perpetrators of gender-based violence online.

In a recent report on Kenya, almost 90% of young adults enrolled in tertiary institutions in the country’s capital Nairobi have reportedly suffered gender-based violence in online spaces, with 39% having experienced the harms personally. These harms, according to the study, are more pronounced amongst females (64.4%) in comparison to males (35.5%). Meanwhile, sexism and sexualisation of content such as in Zimbabwe and Uganda, attacks on female journalists in Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania, the harassment of female journalists in South Africa and against women in politics  in Kenya continually undermined their political and public affairs.

Guided by this year’s theme, Accelerate Actions to commemorate International Women’s Day, CIPESA calls on African governments to undertake the following actions to implement Resolution ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022.

Adopt Gender-Sensitive Legal and Policy Frameworks

Adoption of gender-sensitive legal and policy frameworks is critical to provide the legal basis for addressing TFGBV. States, technology companies including social media platforms, media and news organisations, and other stakeholders should recognise online violence from a gender lens, enact laws and policies that employ gender-balanced language, criminalise all forms of online violence and prioritise the digital safety of women and girls.

Evidence-Based Research for Gendered Actions

Evidence-based research is crucial for innovation and development of effective gendered actions to inform targeted interventions, policies, and programs that aim to combat online violence. Data that establishes the nature, prevalence, extent and the risk factors of TFGBV and the impact it poses should be collected and analysed by states alongside other stakeholders like CSOs. Such studies can be the foundational basis for identifying and addressing the root causes of the violence for more effective gendered actions against the vice.

Capacity Building and Awareness Raising

In line with the resolution, there is a need for capacity building and awareness raising in addressing TFGBV. Capacity building and awareness raising through various fora such as the media has the capacity to empower governments, individuals, communities, and institutions to understand, prevent, and respond to violence against women. Programmes such as digital literacy, advocacy interventions, community and network-led education, and capacitating law enforcement officers, the judiciary and other institutions will contribute to the wider goal of addressing online violence targeting women. Specific efforts in privacy awareness, online safety and digital hygiene will contribute to the creation of safer spaces for women who are disproportionately targeted by online violence.

Cooperation with Stakeholders including CSOs and Service Providers

The Resolution calls for cooperation of states with stakeholders including CSOs and service providers to end TFGBV. Collaboration amongst these players can help to combat TFGBV. CSOs can continually play the watchdog role of outreach and monitoring state efforts and activities. Service providers should engage in promoting responsibility over content and enhance accountability over the use of the online spaces and platforms. Similarly, there should be joint efforts to end violence against women such as through information sharing, capacity building, conducting joint campaigns and employing policy advocacy and tech solutions such as use of technology tools to track and investigate suspected cases of violence against women.

Protection and Support for Victims

The effects of violence in any form can be devastating. The devastating effects call for mitigation of the harm caused and empowering of survivors to heal and seek justice. States need to adopt comprehensive approaches which facilitate mitigation of harms including taking appropriate action for immediate support and providing safe spaces for survivors, safety planning and documentation of evidence. Similarly, clear mechanisms for reporting and redress including law enforcement and legal assistance for survivors can go a long way in victim support. Psychological and emotional support and providing self-care resources are also key. Additionally, digital security and privacy support, community support and advocacy such as awareness raising, provision of specialised services such as trauma-informed care and culturally sensitive services, and education including digital literacy programmes and public awareness aimed at enhancing preventive measures are important strategies for combating TFGBV. 

Buttressing Prevention Measures

The ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 enlists a number of actions which African Union Member States should undertake. If undertaken, these actions could check on tech-enabled violence against women. They could also be the basis upon which equality in the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms in the online space can be achieved. By strengthening prevention measures, a society that is pro-rights and freedoms that ensures a safe and inclusive space for empowering women and girls will be attained. Thus, individuals, groups, and communities through buttressed approaches will be equipped with knowledge, tools and skills to prevent, respond to and combat online violence.


Conclusively, the ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 is a step forward in the fight against gender discrimination and women targeted violence in the online spaces. It sets a powerful benchmark for dealing with and addressing TFGBV. Its multi-faceted approach of bringing various stakeholders including governments, civil society, and the private sector together and, dealing with the issues in a comprehensive manner especially by states, provides a progressive roadmap for creating a safer and more inclusive online environment for women across Africa.

Digital Rights Alliance Africa Condemns Social Media Shutdown in South Sudan

Statement |

Social Media Shutdown in South Sudan Will Aggravate Human Rights Violations

The Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) – a network of non-government organisations that champions the digital civic space and counters threats to digital rights on the continent – is deeply concerned by the recent shutdown of social media platforms by the South Sudan government. The government claims the disruption is aimed to curb the dissemination of graphic content that portrays violence against South Sudanese nationals in neighbouring Sudan, and will last three months. 

The measure is a response to escalating violence and protests across the country arising from the killing of South Sudanese nationals by the Sudanese armed forces in Sudan’s El Gezira state. In response, nationals of South Sudan staged riots during which at least 16 Sudanese citizens were killed. 

The shutdown will aggravate an already precarious human rights situation, undermine the ability of citizens to document the crimes being committed, and deny the public  access to information that is vital to making decisions in life-and-death situations – such as how to access essential services like healthcare or routes to safety away how from the conflict zones.

Moreover, fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, access to information, and peaceful assembly and association, will be undermined. Social media platforms and digital spaces are critical to fostering transparency, dialogue, and trust in times of crisis. Shutting down these spaces creates an information vacuum that breeds disinformation, which not only deepens societal divisions but also undermines efforts toward restoring peace and the rule of law.

According to article 24 of the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan,

  1. Every citizen shall have the right to the freedom of expression, reception and dissemination of information, publication, and access to the press without prejudice to public order, safety or morals as prescribed by law.

           (2) All levels of government shall guarantee the freedom of the press and other media as shall    

                         be regulated by law in a democratic society.

The constitution further guarantees freedom of assembly and association in article 25 and access to information under article 32.

Having acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, South Sudan has an obligation to respect and promote fundamental human rights and freedoms including expression and access to information, assembly and association.

Shutting down social media restricts vital communication, suppresses civic engagement, and hinders citizens’ ability to participate in democratic processes. The shutdown is contrary to the established international human rights standards which require that such restrictions on citizens’ rights must only be implemented where they meet the three part test of (i) being provided for by law; (ii) serving a legitimate aim and (iii) being necessary and proportionate in a free and democratic society. Imposing a shutdown on social media constitutes a disproportionate measure that instead restricts free access to information online – a critical mode of communication in periods of instability.
The decision to curtail access to social media platforms is a dent to South Sudan’s commitment to regional and international laws and undermines the realisation of civil liberties in the online spaces for the people of South Sudan. Specifically, it violates the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa 2019 which, among others, recognises the importance of internet access. It also goes against the recent 2024 Resolution on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa, which emphasises that states should not interfere with the right of individuals to seek, receive and impart information through any means of communication and digital technologies, and should avoid interrupting access to the internet and other digital technologies.

DRAA calls upon the South Sudan government to:

  1. Immediately lift the social media ban and restore access to social media platforms to ensure  free expression and access to critical information by the citizens.
  2. Respect human and peoples’ rights, including digital rights, in accordance with regional and international instruments, which protect the rights of the people of South Sudan  to communicate, assemble and associate.  
  3. Address the root causes of the current unrest and engage in meaningful and transparent dialogue with community leaders, civil society organisations, and affected communities to address underlying grievances and promote reconciliation to build an accountable, peaceful and inclusive society.
  4. Protect all affected communities and take urgent and necessary steps to safeguard vulnerable groups, including Sudanese traders and other minorities, ensuring their safety and dignity are preserved.
  5. Refrain from actions of ordering internet service providers to shut down the internet, to disrupt internet connections  to ensure constant free expression,  open flow of information and the holding of the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable.

DRAA urges the African Union, regional bodies, and the international community to hold South Sudan accountable for these repressive measures. We also continue to stand in solidarity with the people of South Sudan and reaffirm our commitment to advocating for digital rights and freedoms across Africa. 

Signed by CIPESA in collaboration with the Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA)

About Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) 

The Digital Rights Alliance Africa is a network of traditional NGOs, media, lawyers and tech specialists from across Africa that seeks to champion digital civic space and counter threats to digital rights on the continent. The Alliance was created by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) in response to the rising digital authoritarianism in the region. It currently has members from 11 countries, who collectively monitor, engage in research, advocacy, share strategies for navigating digital threats and promote digital policy reforms in line with their shared vision outlined in the outcome declaration endorsed in 2023.

For more information about DRAA’s work and digital rights advocacy in Africa, visit their website or read the full statement.