Blog – Page 72 of 166 – Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

10Mar

Building a Robust Data Protection Regime in Senegal

admin March 10, 2020

By Simone Toussi |
Across Africa, there is a push for digitalisation with different countries at various stages of technology adoption and varying levels of legislative regimes that uphold human rights in the digital sphere.
Senegal is among the African countries that remain committed to upgrading legal and institutional frameworks governing the technology sector. Senegal passed a data protection law twelve years ago and was among the first African states and the first African Francophone country to ratify the Africa Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in 2016. It has therefore established itself among the pioneers in data governance in Africa.
Given rapid developments related to biometrics, big data, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing, among others, the government of Senegal is in the process of repealing law n° 2008-12 of January 25, 2008 which governs personal data protection. A draft bill published at the tail end of 2019 to replace the preceding law is currently under public consultation.
On February 27 – 28, 2020, Jonction Senegal, in partnership with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Facebook hosted a workshop to review the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 and make relevant recommendations from a digital rights perspective. The workshop brought together 25 participants including officials from the Personal Data Commission (CDP), the Ministry of Digital Economy and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Women, Family and Gender, the Ministry of Justice, and representatives from the private sector, and civil society organisations including human rights defenders, lawyers, academia, bloggers and journalists.
Opening the workshop, Professor Mamadou Niane, Director of the Legal Department of the CDP justified the draft bill, citing inadequacies in the 2008 law given the dynamic digital environment and emergence of a diversity of players and threats. Furthermore, he noted the need for convergence with regional and international data protection developments and standards such as those laid out in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data signed and ratified by Senegal in 2016, the Budapest Convention, and the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. According to Prof. Niane, other considerations for a new law related to the composition and oversight powers of the CDP and compliance monitoring mechanisms are also to be addressed. He stated that the draft bill provided for data protection principles in the proposed article 7 including the need for processing within the legal requirements, seeking consent, and necessity with exceptions tied to processing for lawful purpose.
Indeed, Diagne El Hadji Daouda, a cybersecurity specialist from the Computech Institute highlighted the importance of data security and commended the draft bill for outlining the principles of identification and authentication, confidentiality, availability and integrity (non-alteration or modification of the data during processing) under Articles 42 and 43. He also commended the proposed obligations for data controllers to put in place encryption measures and regularly review them to ensure data security; and the notification of breaches to data subjects and authorities (Article 44). However, Daouda noted that despite these provisions, the draft bill did not incorporate the principle of anonymisation, which is crucial for preserving personal data confidentiality and guaranteeing its security.
The draft bill proposes the establishment of the Personal Data Protection Authority (APDP) to replace the CDP – with a diverse member composition including non-governmental representation. Member nomination is by decree of the president (Article 52). However, a number of provisions in the draft bill refer to a Control Authority and a Protection Authority, which seem separate from the APDP.
Dr. Ndiogou Thierno Amadou, Lecturer and Researcher at the Faculty of Legal and Political Sciences of Cheikh Anta Diop University (UCAD), raised concerns about the distinction between the three different authorities mentioned in the draft bill. Participants therefore urged for clarity on the role of the Control Authority (Article 44), as well as a clear definition and distinction between the APDP and the Protection Authority (Article 62) to avoid ambiguities. The CDP’s Prof. Niane clarified that all mentions of an authority in the draft bill refer to the APDP and that the necessary revisions would be made in the next draft.
The need to strike a balance between freedom of expression and personal data protection also emerged. In his presentation, independent journalist and Director of PressAfrik.com Faye Ibrahima Lissa cited the continent-wide trend in legislative restrictions to freedom of expression on grounds of national security and public order. He emphasised that exemptions under the proposed article 105 of the draft bill relating to personal data for the purposes of journalism, research, artistic or literary expression should be precise to avoid them being used to persecute critical voices.
Similarly, Joe Marone, a media trainer and head of online radio Futurs Media noted the fundamental role of journalists in seeking the truth and being the moral conscience of public opinion and civil society. In this regard, journalism ethics and code of conduct pre-empt personal data protection through protection of sources. However, given the advent of data journalism and citizen journalists, the draft bill serves to better guarantee personal data protection within the profession.
Other issues that emerged included age of consent to data collection. Consent is defined as a declaration or clear affirmative action, either orally or in writing that gives permission to process personal data (article 8). The age of consent is not provided for in the draft bill. Prof. Niane stated that ongoing efforts at the CDP and Ministry of Justice in partnership with the Ministry of Digital Economy and Telecommunications seek to establish a Children’s Code and related strategy dedicated to minors’ protection in the context of data protection and privacy.
The workshop participants made the following formal recommendations for revision in the next draft of the bill:

Set a minimum age of consent
The president of the ADPD should be appointed through an internal election by members in order to guarantee the authority’s autonomy.
Provide for adequate resource allocation to the APDP to facilitate smooth implementation and enforcement of the law
Provide for APDP oversight in procurement and contracting of public or government projects involving personal data collection and processing
Provide for authority of the APDP to collect and recover financial penalties imposed on offenders and pass them on to the victims of data breaches.
Strengthen the financial autonomy of the APDP by granting it 50% of the amounts recovered from any data protection operations
Provide for legal personality of the ADPD to give it perpetual succession with capacity to sue and be sued in its name.

Representatives of the CDP and the Ministry of Digital Economy and Telecommunications welcomed the recommendations and committed to including them in the next draft of the bill, before submission to the General Secretariat of the Presidency of Senegal.

04Mar

Silencing Critical Voices: Our Online Civic Space is Shrinking

admin March 4, 2020

By Digital Shelter |

Somalia had recorded steady growth in telephone penetration – with 7.6 mobile subscribers. However, internet penetration remains low – 2% as at 2017, according to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The adoption of technology has expanded civic space in the post conflict era, with social media platforms and blogs empowering journalists, activists and human rights defenders to document and report human abuses, mobilize public opinion, campaign for reforms, share relevant content and information, and build networks at national and global level.

However, the past three years have seen a rise in threats against online freedom of expression, such as the arrest and intimidation of several journalists and social media campaigners for comments posted on social media. There are reports of dissenting social media accounts being hacked, while others have deactivated their accounts due to fear of attacks. A culture of censorship prevails, amidst a rise in sponsored trolls spreading misinformation and propaganda to counter factual narrative reported by journalists, human rights defenders and activists online.

It is against this background that Digital Shelter hosted a panel discussion on the shrinking online civic space in Somalia and the growing digital threats faced by media professionals, bloggers and human right defenders in the digital space on February 13, 2020. The event was part of series of activities under the theme “Protect our Online Space”, supported by the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) – an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

Among the panelists was Mohamed Irbad, a prominent blogger and researcher known for his critical writings on governance, human rights, freedom of expression and censorship on social media platforms. In early 2019, after publishing an article titled “Media Censorship In Somalia: A Nation Risk Into Information Darkness” on his personal blog, Mohamed faced serious online and physical threats which forced him to flee the country for six months due to fear for his safety.
“All critical voices, particularly individuals who are based inside Somalia have been silenced with online and physical threats altogether. For instance, when your raise critical issue on Twitter or Facebook you have two options, you either end up battling with anonymous trolls in their hundreds by answering to their toxic comments or you feel intimidated and sacred of writing about certain issues, hence, your remain silenced . And that is exactly what happened to me after writing that article. And therefore, it is fair to stay that we are witnessing the worst shrinking of our online/offline civic and democratic spaces” Mohamed Irbad.
Also speaking at the event was Hassan Ali Osman, a journalist, with the New Humanitarian newsletter. Hassan actively uses Twitter to disseminate local and international news as it breaks for his 90,000 followers. He shared that he has been constantly attacked by trolls merely because of reporting the truth on social media platforms.
Highlighting the issue of online violence against women was Sucdi Dahir Diriye, a passionate community volunteer and member of CaawiWalaal loosely translated as “HelpYourBrother” – a digital campaign launched three years ago to support local communities affected by droughts in Somalia. As in most of the world, the internet has provided a platform for Somali women to amplify their voices. However, it has also enabled perpetuation of different forms of online violence against women including harassment, doxing, threats, stalking and blackmail, sometimes leading to physical violence. The targets of these attacks are women that are vocal on issues such as gender equality, sexual violence, free expression, or challenging the patriarchal structure of the society. This has created a hostile online environment for women and girls in Somalia, fraught with shaming, intimidation and degrading, leading to withdraw of from the online space.
As part of her work, Sucdi documents cases of online blackmailing and extortion against young girls in Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia. She stated that limited recognition of the existence of online violence and harassment against women in Somalia is allowing the abuse to continue inexorably. Relevant policies to address online violence against women need to be put in place and more women and girls need to be skilled in digital safety and security.
Based on their personal and professional experiences, the panelists stressed the need for counter measures against the prevailing threats. Among the recommendations made was increased digital security skills and knowledge building among activists, bloggers and media professionals. Specialized training on gendered online harassment was encouraged. Panelists also emphasized a dual approach in voice amplification – online and offline to reach wider audiences. Furthermore, more stakeholder dialogue to raise awareness on online civic space and digital rights, including data protection and privacy inline with Somalia’s growing technology sector. Other recommendations included research undertakings on current digital threats in Somalia, to inform advocacy and policy interventions; and establishment of a solidarity network to support victims of online attacks.
“Digital Shelter is proud to be in a unique position to amplify voices in the most difficult time where the online civic space is shrinking in Somalia”, said Abdifatah, co-founder of Digital Shelter in the closing remarks of the forum.
Digital Shelter continues its “Protect our Online Space” drive during March 2020 with series of trainings on digital security. Digital Shelter is also planning to host other forums on expanding online civic space in Somalia.

This article was first published by the Digital Shelter on March 04, 2020

21Feb

Malawi's Democracy and Digital Rights Record to be Spotlighted by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations

admin February 21, 2020

By Michael Kaiyatsa and Ashnah Kalemera |

On February 3, 2020 Malawi scored a democracy victory when the Constitutional Court nullified the May 2019 presidential elections and ordered for fresh polls within 150 days. In that time, the country will also undergo its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by the Human Rights Council, scheduled for May 2020. Whereas previous reviews did not receive elections-related recommendations, Malawi’s democratic credentials – freedom of expression, media freedom, and access to information – have come under scrutiny.

At the upcoming review, it is crucial that the country’s democratic credentials are scrutinised and recommendations to the Malawian government reflect explicitly the need to uphold rights and freedoms online and offline, in line with the state’s obligations under Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

In recent years, Malawi has made significant policy and structural reforms in the technology sector. The third Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS III) (2017–2022), recognises Information and Communications Technology (ICT) among the five priority areas in accelerating development. The strategy aims to increase access to ICT services; provide well-developed ICT broadband and infrastructure services; and increase the number of ICT-skilled and industry-ready workforce in public and private sector institutions. Meanwhile, the National ICT Policy, 2013 is dedicated to promoting the use of ICT in the country, and a national fibre optic backbone project was completed in April 2018.

However, the country must commit towards ensuring a conducive environment for privacy and data protection as well as access to and affordability of the internet and related technology as key enablers of social, economic, and political development.

Freedom of expression

Article 35 of the Malawi Constitution guarantees freedom of expression while Article 36 makes provisions for a free press. Despite these enabling constitutional provisions, other legislation places restrictions on citizens’ exercise of the right to freedom of expression.

The Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act of 2016 provides for restrictions on online communications to “protect public order and national security”. The law also penalises “offensive communication” via online platforms with fines of Malawian Kwacha (MWK) 1,000,000 (USD 1,352) or a maximum 12 months prison sentence. Section 4 of the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act, 2012 makes it an offence to “do any act or utter any words or publish or utter any writing calculated to insult, ridicule or to show disrespect” to the President, the national flag, armorial ensigns, the public seal or any other protected emblem or likeness. The Penal Code penalises sedition (punishable with a fine of up to MWK 354, 845 – USD Dollars 480 – and imprisonment of five years for first time offenders and seven years for subsequent offences), and libel (up to two years imprisonment).

In the previous cycle of the UPR (May 2015), the government of Malawi received three recommendations relating to freedom of expression, opinion and the press from the governments of Austria, Ghana, and Tunisia although none explicitly mentioned the online sphere. Austria and Tunisia’s recommendations to “fully investigate all cases of harassment and intimidation of journalists and human rights defenders with a view of bringing the perpetrators to justice” and “issue a standing invitation to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and ensure an enabling environment for the activities of journalists, human rights defenders and other civil society actors”, respectively were supported. However, Ghana’s recommendation to “decriminalise defamation and incorporate this into the Civil Code” was only “noted”.

Since then, there have been various instances of restrictions on freedom of expression online with notable arrests and prosecution for allegedly insulting the President and First Lady on Facebook; speech against a marginalised group; circulating forged documents; and treason. In July 2019, the Minister of Information and Government Spokesperson warned that the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act, 2016 would be used to take punitive action against online speech viewed as denigrating to others. Furthermore, in the run up to the now annulled elections, the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) issued a notice warning the public against disinformation on social media platforms. The notice stated that the regulator would “work with various stakeholders to seek ways of countering the spread of fake news.”

Freedom of information and censorship of content

Citizens’ right of access to information is provided for under Article 37 of the Constitution. The Access to Information Act of 2017 provides for the right of access to information in the custody of public bodies and relevant private bodies, as well as the processes and procedures for obtaining such information.

However the Official Secrets Act under section 4(1) prohibits disclosure of a wide range of information. The Preservation of Public Security Act (1960), under section 3 (Public Security Regulations) makes it an offense to publish anything likely to be “prejudicial to public security; undermine the authority of, or the public confidence in, the government; promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between any sections of classes or races of the inhabitants of Malawi; or promote industrial unrest in the country.” These two outdated laws place restrictions on access to information, in addition to offenses relating to sedition and publication of false information under the Penal Code. Further, Section 46 of the Penal Code empowers the Minister of Justice to prohibit the publication or importation of any publication that he or she considers to be contrary to the public interest.

During the second cycle of the UPR, the government of Malawi received two recommendations from Norway relating to the freedom of information – “Consolidate the policy gains into legal reforms on issues such as treatment of same-sex relations and access to information” (noted) and “Prioritise public education and information as well as capacity building of state institutions as part of efforts to strengthen implementation of national human rights legislation” (supported).

Since the review, instances of restrictions to access to information online include internet outages on election day in May 2019, with reports suggesting that the disruption was ordered by the government to disrupt information flows and keep citizens un-informed during the election. On censorship of content, amidst concerns over “moral standards, values and aspirations as a nation” within the music industry, in May 2018, the Malawi Censorship Board embarked on a programme to review songs and films with “suspicious moral content” in order to “protect the rights of listeners”. In February 2019, Malawi Police arrested a musician for producing a “blasphemous song”. He was sentenced to two years in jail. According to Freedom House, “several journalists have complained that their articles are sometimes never published online or in print because their editors received directives from officials to refrain from publishing about certain topics”.

Equality and barriers to access

Section 157 of the Communications Act of 2016 mandates MACRA to establish a Universal Service Fund. In October 2019, MACRA announced that it would roll out the Universal Access to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Services Project starting in 2020 to ensure universal coverage in the country, including to rural and under-served areas.

Despite these efforts, ICT adoption in Malawi remains among the lowest in the world – 25.5 mobile broadband subscriptions for every 100 inhabitants as at 2017, the most recent year International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data is available for. The Inclusive Internet Index 2019 which assesses internet availability, affordability, relevance of content and readiness ranks Malawi 98^th out of 100 countries. Malawi is currently ranked 52 out of 61 countries in internet affordability. The average monthly cost of 1GB data is MWK 3,500 (USD 4.8).

The country has maintained a 17.5% value-added tax (VAT) on mobile phones and services, a 16.5% VAT on internet services and an additional 10% excise duty on mobile phone text messages and internet data transfers, introduced in 2015.

In October 2019, the government of Malawi attempted to introduce a 1% withholding tax on mobile money transactions in the 2019/20 National Budget. The proposal was withdrawn following pressure from civil society groups and the private sector.

Data protection and privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 21 of the Constitution of Malawi, which stipulates that “Every person shall have the right to personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to: (a) searches of his or her person, home or property; (b) the seizure of private possessions; or (c) interference with private communications, including mail and all forms of telecommunications”.

Malawi does not have a standalone data protection law. In March 2018, the then Minister of ICT, Nicholas Dausi, announced plans to draft a bill on data protection in response to the changing media and technological landscape. In the meantime, The Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act of 2016 which aims “to put in place mechanisms that safeguard information and communication technology users from fraud, breach of privacy, misuse of information and immoral behaviour brought by the use of information and communication technology” provides some protections. The Act provides for the processing of personal data (section 71); and the rights of data subjects (section 72) while sections 73 and 74 relate to the obligations of a data controller. Under section 84, the Act criminalises unauthorised access, interception, and modification of data with conviction attracting fines of MWK2,000,000 (USD 2,680) and imprisonment for five years. However, article 29 requires service providers to retain data and disclose it when required by courts.

There is also the Communications Act of 2016 which criminalises unlawful interception or interference, and disclosure of electronic communications (section 176), with penalties upon conviction of a fine of MWK 5,000,000 (USD 6,500) and imprisonment for five years.

Section 20(1) of the Access to Information Act of 2017 requires an information holder to notify third parties if information being requested relates to confidential or commercial interest. Third parties are required to respond in writing within 10 working days from the date of receipt of the notice and indicate whether the requested information is considered confidential and provide reasons for non-disclosure. The Act also prohibits information holders from disclosing information whose disclosure would result in the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party (section 29) or which is likely to result in endangering the life, health or safety of a person (section 31). On the other hand, information holders are prohibited from disclosing legally privileged information unless the data subject (patient, client, source or person entitled to the privilege), consents to the release of the information or has waived the privilege or a court order is made to that effect (section 32).

Section 10 of the National Statistics Act, 2013 empowers the National Statistics Organisation (NSO) to collect all types of information, including personal information, nationwide on behalf of the government.

The major weakness of the current legal and policy framework is the lack of a dedicated data governance framework. This is especially problematic considering ongoing mandatory personal data collection exercises such as SIM card registration and biometric data collection as part of the national identification programme. Meanwhile, the government is reported to have rolled out the Consolidated ICT Regulatory Management System (CIRMS), with perceived surveillance capabilities. In 2017, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an application by Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM), one of the country’s mobile service providers, to stop the implementation of the CIRMS on privacy grounds.

As part of Internet Freedom and UPR advocacy efforts at the Human Rights Council, the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), and Small Media made the following recommendations to UN members to consider putting forward to the Malawi delegation during the upcoming review:

In compliance with international standards and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the ICCPR and section 35 of the Malawi Constitution, guarantee freedom of expression and opinion online as well as offline for media and individuals, including marginalised and discriminated groups by repealing all laws that restrict freedom of expression, including the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act, libel and defamation laws.
Refrain from implementing internet shutdowns or disruptions under any circumstances.
Ensure that the 2017 Access to Information Act is fully implemented and all public bodies are in full compliance in providing their data regularly in accessible formats.
Hasten efforts to provide equal access to technology and communications to all citizens, including disadvantaged and marginalised groups of the population, by removing barriers to access and improving affordability, as well as expanding infrastructure and desisting from internet disruptions.
Approve the legislation on personal data protection and privacy in order to provide safeguards on the use of personal data and to protect the right to privacy online.

21Feb

New Mali Cybercrime Law Potentially Problematic to Digital Rights

admin February 21, 2020

By Simone Toussi |

On December 5, 2019, the president of Mali promulgated L aw n° 2019-056 on the Suppression of Cybercrime. Although timely and relevant, a number of provisions pose potential threats to privacy and freedom of expression online, especially in view of Mali’s democracy deficits and low press freedom ranking.

The new law, applies to “any offence committed by means of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in whole or part on the territory of Mali, to any offence committed in cyberspace and whose effects occur on the national territory” (article 2). It is part of a legislative framework deemed necessary to support reforms in the technology sector, pursuant to the 2000 Mali Telecommunications Sector Policy Declaration.

From Privacy Breaches to Digital Authoritarianism

Mali’s Co nstitution provides for privacy of communications under Article 6 while the Personal Data Protection Act of 2013 under article 5 and the Telecommunications Act, 1999 in article 1 buttress the constitutional provision. Unfortunately, the cybercrime law conflicts with these existing right to privacy guarantees.

The Cybercrime Law in articles 74 to 78 authorises search of computers and seizure of data as part of criminal investigations. Moreover, under article 75, data may be copied and stored where “seizure of the medium seems inappropriate”. The law does not provide for how the copied data should be stored, processed or disposed of upon conclusion of investigations. This undermines the data protection principle laid down in article 7 of the Personal Data Protection Act – that personal data must only be kept for a specified period and purpose.

Further, articles 83 to 86 suggest real-time surveillance through interception of communications. Service providers are required to cooperate with authorities, including through ensuring that they have in place the necessary technical means to facilitate interception of communications. These wide powers double as an addition to those given to authorities under article 4 of the Telecommunications Act. This article which states: “When public security or the defense of the territory of Mali so requires, the Government may, for a limited period, requisition all the telecommunications networks established in the territory of Mali, as well as the equipment connected to it and / or prohibit the provision of telecommunications service.” This article has in the past been evoked when the government ordered social media disruptions in 2016 during public protests and more recently during the 2018 elections when it ordered an internet shutdown.

Furthermore, communications service providers are required to put in place mechanisms to monitor systems for potential illegal activity, with failure to inform authorities of illegal activities being punishable by a prison sentence of between six months and two years, a fine of Central African Francs (CFA) 500,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 830 to 3,318 ) or both (article 25).

Warnings for Freedom of Expression

Although Mali’s constitution guarantees freedom of expression and opinion (article 4), the Law on the Press Regime and Press Offences (2000) is vague as it does not explicitly guarantee freedom of the press or media pluralism, nor does it define press offences. It also does not contain any provisions on online media. This constitutes a vacuum preceding the law on the Suppression of Cybercrime which, for its part, contains provisions which directly affect freedom of expression and opinion.

Articles 20 and 21 of the new law punish threats and insults made through an information system, with penalties ranging from six months to 10 years imprisonment, a fine of CFA 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 CFA (USD 1,680 to 16,800), or both. Without a clear definition and detail of the constituent elements of ‘threat’ or ‘insult’, these provisions are open to interpretation that can hinder freedom of expression. This is all the more critical since these terms are also not defined by the law on the press regime and press offences, in its article 33 on incitement and article 38 on defamation.

Moreover, articles 55 and 56 condemn the “public dissemination” of “all printed matter, all writings, drawings, posters, engravings, paintings, photographs, films or stereotypes, matrices or photographic reproductions, emblems, all objects or images that do not tie with good morality.” The corresponding penalties range from six months to seven years imprisonment, a fine of CFA 500,000 to 10,000,000 (USD 840 to 16,800), or both.

Article 54 of the cybercrime law states that “press offenses, committed through information and communication technologies, with the exception of those committed by the press on the internet, are punishable by ordinary law”. Given that the Press Law does not include provisions for online press, it is unclear what the distinction is between press offences via ICT and press offences via the internet. Furthermore, there is a lack of precision on the determination as to whether an offense falls under the cybercrime law, ordinary law, or press law.

Article 23 provides for a fine of CFA 200,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 332 to 3,318), imprisonment of between six months and one year, or both, for fake reports of illegal activity or content online, “with the aim of obtaining its withdrawal or having it stopped by a public eCommunications service provider”. However, activities and contents considered as illegal are not defined by the law, and therefore subject to denunciation.

Way forward

The law is well intentioned in seeking to ensure safe and secure use of ICT in Mali. However, it comes into effect in a fragile context. Provisions relating to data processing as part of criminal investigations pose significant risk to personal data integrity, security and privacy. Further, the law places a huge burden on telecommunications intermediaries to track and monitor network activity, and holds these intermediaries liable for the actions of their clients. Provisions relating to online press offences are inconsistent with legislating the media in the age of digitalisation. The new law and existing related laws therefore require revisions to safeguard and uphold constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and privacy, online and offline.

21Feb

Togo: #KeepItOn During The Elections

admin February 21, 2020

Joint Call |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has joined a call on the Government of Togo to keep digital communications accessible during its upcoming elections.

The country goes to the polls on February 22, 2020, marking the first presidential election since the amendment to the Constitution on term limits. The amendment capped the presidential mandate to two five-year terms. However, it would not apply retrospectively meaning that President Faure Gnassingbe, who succeeded his late father in 2005, can stand for the upcoming election, and again in 2025. In 2017, internet access was disrupted during protests against the family’s 50-year rule of the country.

Access Now, the #KeepItOn campaign lead states that Togo should follow the footsteps of its neighbors Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal who have shown that an open, secure, and accessible internet can foster civic participation during the electioneering processes and beyond, safeguard election results, and promote democracy.

See the full joint call here: English and French.

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