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12Apr

The Data Politics of Pandemics: The Cost of Covid-19 Denialism

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By Bernard Sabiti |

At the onset of the Coronavirus disease (Covid-19), the prognosis for how Africa would manage the  pandemic was bleak. Many (mostly western-based) epidemiologists anticipated that the pandemic would kill millions of Africans. Researchers at the Imperial College London put the number of estimated deaths at three million as the worst case scenario if nothing was done.

As the pandemic ravaged the western world, however, many of these scientists and analysts were mystified by the comparably fewer deaths in Africa. While many credited Africa’s young population, less travel infrastructure, and a stroke of luck for this success, John Nkengasong, Director of the Africa Center for Disease Control and Prevention, attributed this early success to African countries taking radical preventative steps very early on.

Having dealt with epidemics such as Ebola in recent years, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were more prepared and had more supportive infrastructure in place than was apparent to outsiders. The harsh lockdowns, instituted at a terribly high cost to livelihoods of already poor populations, may have inoculated most of the continent from the kind of catastrophe that befell Italy, the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom, Brazil and other countries.

This, however, is not to say that all African countries took the same scientifically sound responses to the pandemic. Some governments took a dismissive approach to the disease. Some outrightly denied its existence. In all instances, there have been significant social-economic and political costs.

A Deadly Infodemic

From presidents to religious, and opinion leaders, through to citizens, a small, but influential group of Covid-19 skeptics harmed an otherwise somewhat successful response to the pandemic on the continent.

Increased spread of false and misleading information about the virus via social media platforms has exacerbated the problem, often across demographics –  the educated and uneducated, young and old, rural and urban. African ‘WhatsApp aunties’ have been the most susceptible to, and purveyors of, Covid-19 misinformation, a phenomenon that compelled the World Health Organization (WHO) Africa Office to directly appeal to them to join the fight against misinformation.

However, when a government, under the tutelage of a powerful president, leads the misinformation campaign, the dynamics become different in scope, and the impact to public health and safety can be more catastrophic. Some governments have weaponised Covid-19 information and data to narrow the democratic space and muzzle political opponents.

For example, the governments of Tanzania and Burundi, led by their outspoken and populist presidents, outrightly denied the existence of the virus, stopped sharing data with WHO, and even harassed WHO officials based in those countries who were tracking the virus. Both presidents have since died – officially from heart-related complications but suspicions abound that they succumbed to the coronavirus disease. Both countries continue to reel from multiple deaths, attributed to ‘acute Pneumonia’, which independent experts say is a euphemism for Covid-19.

A case study of Burundi and Tanzania: one learned its lesson and changed tack, the other stayed the course with devastatingly different outcomes for both of them.

Tanzania

When neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda were frantically scrambling to shut down borders, schools, economies, and enforce mandatory curfew and quarantines, the Tanzanian government did not institute a lockdown and emphatically told its people that their daily routine would remain unchanged. Markets, churches, sports events, bars, and restaurants remained open even after the country confirmed its first case of Covid-19 on March 16, 2020. Two months later in May 2020, authorities stopped updating the WHO with Covid-19 statistic, which at the time stood at 509 cases and 21 deaths.

President John Pombe Magufuli incredulously claimed that the virus was not real, and that he had ordered tests for goats and pawpaws which had all returned positive results. In any case, he said, if the virus was real, God would protect the country. The government made no plans to order for vaccines which Magufuli termed a western plot to exterminate his people. Instead, Magufuli encouraged steaming, using natural remedies, and most importantly he encouraged prayer.

In the meantime, there were an increased number of deaths attributed to pneumonia in Tanzania, with the dead buried under the cover of night, and relatives cowered into silence. With an official policy of not reporting Covid-19 cases, the full scale of the virus’ toll in Tanzania is impossible to tell.

In February 2021, the Catholic Church of Tanzania broke its silence, reporting that up to 25 of its priests and 60 nuns had died of Covid-19, and when the Vice President of semi-autonomous Zanzibar died, the government there admitted Covid-19 was the cause of death and urged citizens to take precautions. Several high-profile individuals, including cabinet ministers, died but the government remained in denial. In one infamous incident, the country’s Finance Minister was taken from Intensive Care and paraded before the media to dispel rumours that he was dead. In coughing fits and clearly weak, surrounded by mask-less officials, he struggled to make a statement.

When President Magufuli disappeared from public view for weeks in mid-February, the country was rife with speculation that he had contracted the virus. The government dismissed the reports as untrue and claimed that the president was “busy working hard” for the country. Opposition leaders claimed that Magufuli had been flown to Kenya on life support due to Covid-19. This was again dismissed by the government. On March 17, 2021, the government announced that the president had died from heart disease.

Burundi

In May 2020, Burundi expelled WHO officials for questioning the wisdom of holding a presidential election amidst the pandemic. At the time, the country had not instituted a lockdown or any other preventative measures. A general election went on with massive rallies. By June 24, 2020 the country had reported 144 cases and one death, amid criticism that the true scale of the pandemic was not being reported. Civil society and health workers were purportedly gagged from talking about the virus.

The shocking death of outgoing president Pierre Nkurunziza in June 2020, however, seems to have caused a change of heart in the new leadership. Officially, Nkurunziza succumbed to a heart attack. However, many analysts alleged Covid-19. His wife had earlier been evacuated to Nairobi, Kenya for treatment, allegedly for the virus.

In July, the incoming government adopted a new Covid-19 response strategy, putting in place measures and restrictions including mandatory Covid-19 negative test results and quarantine at a government designated facility for incoming travellers. Land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda were closed and the new president declared Covid-19 “the biggest enemy of Burundians.”

Both Magufuli and Nkurunziza were fervent Christians, the Tanzanian a devout Catholic, the Burundian a Pentecostal, and both had a penchant for populist politics. The intersection of religion, social media misinformation and populism in the two presidents’ approach created a perfect combination for an anti-science, conspiracy-filled fertile ground for Covid-19 misinformation to thrive.

Weaponisation of Social Media

Only 22% of the continent’s population has internet access. While the digital divide between rural and urban Africans is still wide, with increasing availability of cheap smartphones, and enabling infrastructure like rural electrification and broadband programmes, there is increased access to information via online platforms compared to traditional broadcast media. This is creating a challenge with communities that are not media-savvy and are unable to decipher context or fact-check information received, and are therefore more prone to misinformation.

Consequently, social media has had a devastating role in fueling Covid-19 misinformation in Africa.  From ‘WhatsApp aunties,’ to religious leaders who claim that the virus does not exist, or that Africans are immune to it, or that it is just the flu, or a punishment from God, the information ecosystem has been fostering faster spread of Covid-19 denialism. This ecosystem feeds off each other, mutates and multiplies just like the virus itself as it moves easily and seamlessly across platforms reaching broad audiences. An obscure video from Brazil will reach the remotest village in Nigeria within minutes.

Socio-Economic Impacts of Covid-19 Denialism

As more African countries procure vaccines and inoculate citizens, it is expected that the pandemic will soon recede, and economies are revived. Approaches like that of Tanzania will likely harm its once thriving tourism industry as more tourists perceive it as an unsafe destination. Already, a number of countries have banned flights to and from Tanzania, including some neighbouring ones like Kenya that have closed some borders with the country. Most Western embassies currently maintain the highest-level travel risk advisories against the country. Prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, tourism was Tanzania’s fastest growing sector, employing over 10% of the total workforce and serving as the largest single source of foreign currency. The proposed adoption of Vaccine Passports, if implemented, is likely to further isolate the country.

Corruption and Covid Conspiracies

Meanwhile, Covid-19 has turned out to be not just a health and economic crisis but also a corruption crisis. The 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released on January 28, 2021 by Transparency International reveals that persistent corruption is undermining health care systems and contributing to democratic backsliding amid the Covid-19 pandemic. Politicians, from South Africa to Uganda, have taken advantage of the pandemic to illegally seize lucrative procurement deals, and gone on borrowing sprees, ballooning countries’ domestic and external debt in the process. This has further fueled conspiracies in some countries that Covid-19 and its numbers are a ploy by corrupt leaders to rip off taxpayers.

Ultimately, the seeds of misinformation, including a culture of mistrust and skepticism against the government, have the potential to affect public programmes implementation, in public health and beyond, as populations will continue to question the science and intentions.

Addressing the Covid Denialism Infodemic

  • Misinformation counter-narratives: As fake news and misinformation thrive on social media, governments need to utilise the same platforms, including through champions, with counter scientific messaging to allay fears, misconceptions and conspiracy theories.
  • Multi-agency coordination and collaboration: Close coordination and collaboration among fact-checkers, public health institutions and other communications stakeholders is essential for addressing the unique misinformation challenges faced today, “where informational ambiguity based on scant or conflicting evidence, or emerging scientific knowledge can exacerbate the spread of disease.”
  • Narrow the Digital Divide: Dedicated efforts to promote connectivity in tandem with digital and media literacy programmes should be scaled up.
  • Promote Covid-19 data transparency: Many African countries have established Covid-19 websites and information portals where infections, deaths and recovery rates are published. Meanwhile, the WHO Africa Region and CDC Africa run dashboards that are updated daily. However, many other governments still do not report routine Covid-19 data. Readily available, accessible data including on cases, procurement, vaccines, emergency relief and other measures will provide firsthand evidence to users and dispel misinformation and improve transparency around containment measures.

Bernard Sabiti is a Kampala-based Public Policy researcher and analyst focussing on the role of data and access to information in sustainable development.

09Apr

Promoting Digital Inclusion for Refugees Amid the Covid-19 Crisis in Egypt

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By Mohamed Farahat |

The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has dramatically transformed our daily lives, making the virtual world the new reality for many people. However, for many others, including refugees, it has further served to deepen their digital exclusion.

Since the first case of Covid-19 was confirmed in Egypt in February 2020, the number of confirmed cases, including deaths, has been increasing. By April 08, 2021, there have been 207,293 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 12,290 deaths, reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). In order to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus, the Egyptian government took several preventive measures, including ordering a partial lockdown, suspending all public events, imposition of restrictions on movements, and closing of schools and universities.

The pandemic has demonstrated that ensuring access to the internet has never been more vital than it is today. Governments have increasingly been challenged to meet their obligation to bridge the digital divide for vulnerable groups, especially those that lack internet access.

Refugees are often amongst the most vulnerable groups in the host countries and the pandemic has served to further exacerbate their vulnerability. Egypt hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers from 57 countries. As of December 31, 2020, the country had registered at least 259,292 refugees and asylum-seekers. The pandemic rendered many refugees jobless, with no income to cover internet costs and thereby keeping them out of connectivity. As a result, there is an increased need for the state to address gaps in digital access, affordability and ultimately access to information during this time of crisis.

Refugees and Access to ICT

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees are 50% less likely to own internet-enabled phones than the rest of the population. The situation is more dire in rural areas, where 20% of refugees do not have a permanent means of communication. In urban areas, where the internet is available, many refugees cannot afford to access the internet due to the lack of income and thus, like other vulnerable sections of society, refugees continue to lag behind in a quickly digitalising world.

Recognising the internet connectivity challenges faced by refugees, the UNHCR launched a global initiative – Connectivity for Refugees  – with the purpose of ensuring that all refugees, and the communities that host them, have access to available, affordable and usable mobile and internet connectivity in order to leverage these technologies for protection, communications, education, health, self-reliance, and community empowerment.

Vitality of Internet Access

According to the UNHCR-Egypt country office, the majority of refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt were already highly vulnerable prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 and have been directly impacted by the evolving circumstances. Many have lost their sources of income and cannot afford to buy sufficient basic supplies or pay their rent.

While access to the internet has been essential for refugees to work, learn, access information, and express their opinions, its usage has decreased dramatically due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Restrictions have been imposed on several daily spheres such as freedom of movement, work and education.

The Covid-19 pandemic forced most organisations and refugee service providers, including the UNHCR Egypt office, to close offices in preference for remote working. Further, the UNHCR came to rely on online communications such as via zoom including in conducting  interviews with refugees. During this period, the handling of refugees’ applications and the conduct of awareness raising sessions  were held through online video and audio-conferencing platforms. In spite of this adaptation, most of this work was stalled by connectivity and accessibility challenges faced by the refugees.

The Right to Education

With the pandemic effects of quarantines and lock downs, virtual life became inevitable for common activities including education. Many education institutions have embraced distance learning which is majorly reliant on internet access and connectivity. The  UNHCR –Egypt Fact sheet for July 2020 notes that more than half of all refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR are children and youths of school age.

However, the digital approach raises questions as to whether refugee students can afford and are accessing the education delivered via digital platforms. As the UNHCR has noted, most of the refugee and host communities have limited access to hardware devices, and connectivity is thus prohibitively expensive. Additionally, lack of access also limits acquisition/development of the digital literacy and skills required by teachers, students, and their communities to make the most of the available learning resources.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has proposed some solutions, including the use and prioritisation of digital and broadcast remote learning policies to universally address the needs of all households and to accommodate situations where children do not have the necessary technological assets at home, through deliberate policies that facilitate infrastructure development in technology for displaced persons and children in remote and rural areas and those displaced by emergencies.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The high costs of computers and smartphones and of accessing the internet have left most refugees without connectivity. Similarly, enabling tools like SIM cards are usually hard to access for refugees without official documents.

Refugees have a right to access the internet and to enjoy all digital rights and freedoms. Accordingly, there should be the necessary infrastructure to enable access to services and information. However, the impediments that came because of Covid-19 have fundamentally affected online activities including learning for refugees.

The Egyptian government is therefore urged to take all measures that aim to ensure accessible and affordable internet to all individuals including refugees whose health and education continue to be greatly threatened by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Specifically, the government and responsible agencies such as the UNHCR should double their efforts to ensure that refugee communities have access to SIM cards to facilitate easy internet access by easing on the stringent requirements to register for SIM cards. In this regard, the government should allow refugees to use their UNHCR-issued identity cards to register for telephone and internet services.

Additionally, it is critical that measures are taken to ensure that refugee students do not miss out on education by providing the necessary digital technologies to enable them attend school and sit for their examinations.

Mohamed Farahat is a 2020 CIPESA Fellow. He is an Egyptian human rights lawyer, specialising in refugees and migration. As part of the fellowship, he is documenting inclusion of refugees in the technology-based responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in Egypt; and the role of the judiciary in the internet freedom landscape in North Africa.

09Apr

Telcos in Nigeria and Kenya Should Address Exclusion of Persons With Disabilities

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By CIPESA Writer |
In January 2019, after nine years in the making, Nigeria signed into law the Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) Act, 2018. In Kenya, a similar framework had been signed into law in 2003. Both laws were aimed at promoting a more inclusive society for persons with disabilities.
Sections 24 and 25 of the Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) Act 2018 require the government to ensure that persons with disabilities are given special considerations, including provision of special communication emergencies.
On the other hand, Kenya’s constitution outlaws’ discrimination on the grounds of disability, under article 27(4). Under article 54, it emphasizes that a person with a disability shall be entitled to treatment with respect and dignity, access to educational institutions and facilities, reasonable access to all places, public transport and information, and access materials and devices including for communications. Additionally, Kenya’s National ICT Policy of 2016 outlines, under article 13, strategies for “an accessible ICT environment in the country in order to enable persons with disabilities to take full advantage of ICTs.”
However, despite these constitutional and other legal provisions, telecom operators in the two countries have largely failed to address the digital communication needs of persons with disabilities.
At least 7% of Nigeria’s (25 million people) and 3.5% of Kenya’s population (1.3 million people) are recognized by countries’ national census as persons with disabilities. Yet major operators – with the exception of Safaricom in Kenya – have failed to make their services accessible to a large section of this customer segment.
Section 15(1) of the Consumer Code of Practice Regulations 2007 issued by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) requires telcos to ensure that the interests of consumers with disabilities are fully taken into account in developing and providing their services. However, leading telcos MTN Nigeria and Airtel Nigeria, which jointly have a 75% share of the telecom market share, have done little to fulfil this requirement.
In both countries, whereas the outlets of the telecom companies assessed were physically accessible to persons with disabilities, there was a stark lack of training for sales and customer services staff in serving persons with disabilities. In total, ten companies in five countries were assessed, including Safaricom and Wananchi Telecom (Kenya), Airtel Nigeria and MTN Nigeria, along with others in Botswana, South Africa, and Uganda. The assessment was guided by a tool that drew assessment criteria from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Model Accessibility Policy 2014, the Web and Mobile Content Accessibility Guidelines developed by the World Wide Web Consortium, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
The telecom companies were assessed on various facets of promoting digital accessibility, such as availability of accessible handsets and other mobile devices embedded with accessibility features; physical accessibility of sales and customer service outlets of the telecom operators; and whether the operators trained their staff to serve customers with disabilities.
In Nigeria, despite its high population of persons with disabilities, the Joint National Association of Persons Living with Disabilities (JONAPWD) reported that there were barely any accessible and affordable devices offered for sale by telecom companies. Equally, the telecom companies had not made any efforts to offer accessible services.
In contrast, Safaricom in Kenya had put considerable effort in sensitivity training and upskilling its staff in the provision of services to persons with disabilities. Further, it created a database of its customers with visual impairment and once they call its customer service numbers, they are connected to customer care agents trained to cater to them.
In December 2017, Safaricom introduced the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) that enabled visually impaired customers to manage their M-Pesa transactions; and in November 2018, it launched the DOT Braille Watch, which displayed SMS notifications in braille, enabling the visually impaired to use M-Pesa services without having to seek assistance from third parties. Safaricom had also committed to employing more persons with disabilities and as of April 2019, it reported that 2.1% of its employees were persons with disabilities (up from 1.7% in 2018), with ambitions of reaching 5% in coming years.
Given the potential of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to make significant improvements in the lives of persons with disabilities, telecom operators need to address their concerns regarding the operators’ services and products. They should provide public information or communication in accessible formats such as Braille, large print, visual and audio formats; understand the numbers and needs of their customers with disabilities so that they build focused products and services to suit these customers; ramp up sensitivity training for staff, including in basic sign language; and improve availability for sale of affordable mobile telecommunication devices with accessible features.
Further, telecom companies should form partnerships with academia, civil society, disability rights organisations, tech developers and innovators as well as device manufacturers to develop accessible mobile communication solutions. Finally, operators in Kenya, Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa should look to Safaricom and Vodacom South Africa for learning examples on how to proactively and consistently work to improve digital accessibility and build partnerships that improve service provision to persons with disabilities.
See the full report here.

24Mar

Namibia and Sierra Leone’s Digital Rights Record to be Assessed at the 38th Session of the Universal Peer Review

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By Edrine Wanyama |

Namibia and Sierra Leone are among the countries that will undergo their Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the upcoming 38th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council slated to take place in May 2021. The two countries have distinct human rights and governance track records, accompanied by  increasing digitalisation, making it important that the UPR recommendations for both states reflect the need for the protection of fundamental freedoms both online and offline.

Despite being coastal countries with direct connection to  submarine cables, internet penetration rates remain low – 36.8% in Namibia and 13.2 % in Sierra Leone. Namibia continues to suffer from high income inequality which exacerbates internet affordability and  service delivery. These factors contribute to its poor ranking at 84 out of the 100 countries assessed as part of  the 2020 Inclusive Internet Index on internet availability, affordability, relevance of content and readiness. For its part, Sierra Leone ranks at 57 out of 61 countries assessed by the Alliance for Affordable Internet on  internet affordability. Prevailing challenges include poor service delivery and reported  misappropriation of funds.

                See insights on digital access by our Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) Grantee, Global Voices

Out of the 218 recommendations made to Namibia by 88 countries in the second cycle of the UPR in 2016, only one reference was made to freedom of expression and the press. Understandably, it is the highest ranked African country  on the global press freedom index – 23rd in  2019 and 2020 out of 180 countries assessed. Namibian Courts have also been instrumental in upholding freedom of expression and other related rights as reflected in a judgment in which an appeal by the Namibia Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) that sought to stop the publication of an article about corruption was dismissed. Similarly, the Supreme Court in 2018 ruled that the collection of licensed operators’ turnover by the Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia was unconstitutional since the Universal Service Fund which is provided for by Section 57 of the Communications Act, 2009 (Act No. 8 of 2009) was not operational yet.

Nonetheless, there are freedom of expression challenges in Namibia including government threats to media independence, harsh criticisms of the media, calls to gag social media under the guise of  fighting misinformation and cybercrime, and preferential treatment accorded to state-owned media. Further, there are reported cases of harassment, assault and threats against media practitioners such as the assault of two journalists by the President’s Security Unit during the opening of the Covid-19 isolation facility. During the elections in 2019, there were blatant attacks on media practitioners over alleged influence of elections, while the government warned citizens against bullying and irresponsible use of social media platforms, which purportedly endangers lives. The publication of false or misleading statements on Covid-19 was outlawed in April 2020 with a potential penalty of a fine of up to 2,000 Namibian Dollars (USD 134) or imprisonment of up to six months. Since the outlaw, various incidents of arrests and detention of citizens have been reported.

On access to information, Namibia’s proposed access to information bill contains wide ranging exemptions that could negatively impact on the exercise of digital rights and freedoms if passed into law. Some of the notable exemptions include information and records pertaining to national security, proceedings of the cabinet, confidentiality of judicial functions, and information in possession of some public bodies.

In comparison, at the second UPR cycle, Sierra Leone received 213 recommendations from 88 countries, of which  seven recommendations were on freedom of expression. Ranked at 85 on the global press freedom index, the country continues to grapple with press freedom as witnessed in the arrests and arbitrary detention of individuals over online expression on allegations of incitement and subversion, false news and defamation. Moreover, the recent Independent Media Commission (IMC) Act 2020 creates room for censorship of media by empowering the Independent Media Commission to shut down media houses on ambiguous grounds of “public interest”. In July 2019, the IMC threatened  to suspend 12 media houses for non-payment of fines.

Progressive developments in Sierra Leone have included the cabinet move to decriminalise defamation and libel by repealing Part V of the Public Order Act . However, there have been instances where freedom of expression online has been undermined. In March 2018, the internet was shut down on the general election day consequently denying party affiliates an opportunity to receive results from the National Electoral Commission, and citizens and the media the opportunity to engage freely at this critical time. This block to digital access to information was contrary to Sierra Leone’s Access to Information law, 2013 which provides for disclosure of information held by public authorities or by persons providing public services. Notwithstanding the 2013 law’s promotion of openness, there are wide ranging exemptions  under Part II. These include, among others, information related  to national security and defense, international relations, investigations and law enforcement, economic and commercial interests related information.

On data protection, both countries are yet to enact legislation, which has left citizens’ right to privacy and personal data at risk of abuse and misuse. Amidst reports of state sponsored surveillance and online violence against women, the draft bill in Namibia has been undergoing consultations since early 2020. Sierra Leone’s Cybersecurity Bill engenders aspects of privacy and data protection. However, it is yet to be passed by parliament.

As part of the upcoming UPR for both countries, it is important to fasttrack the protection of fundamental human rights and basic freedoms both online and offline against the national, regional, and international human rights obligations. Accordingly, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and Small Media, together with civil society organisations made joint stakeholder submissions on digital rights in the two countries. The Sierra Leone submission was made in partnership with Campaign for Human Rights and Development International, Sierra Leone Reporters Union, Citizens Advocacy Network and the The Institute for Governance Reform while that for Namibia was in partnership with the Internet Society (ISOC) Namibia chapter.

The submissions among others recommend for the two countries to:

  • Repeal and or amend laws to remove erroneous restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information. Notably, for Namibia – Article 21(2) of the Constitution, the Protection of Information Act, 1982, and Section 4 of Central Intelligence Services Act, 1997; and for Sierra Leone – Independent Media Commission Act, 2020
  • Uphold privacy of the individual by among others, repealing section 9 of the Communications Act (Namibia), and enacting Cybercrime, Data Protection and Privacy legislation through participatory and consultative processes (both countries)
  • Operationalise the Universal Service Funds and continue efforts to promote equitable access and inclusion for minority, marginalised and underserved communities
  • Abstain from arbitrary arrests and detention of journalists, media workers and critics over the exercise of their right to freedom of expression online or offline.
  • Comply with the established regional and international human rights standards and obligations on freedom of expression and access to information online and offline.

Read the full submissions, Namibia and Sierra Leone.

22Mar

How Telecom Companies in Africa Can Respond Better to Internet Disruptions

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By Victor Kapiyo |
In recent years, disruptions to the internet and social media applications have emerged as a common and growing trend of digital repression especially in authoritarian countries in Africa. Since 2019, countries such as Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe have either restricted or blocked access to the entire internet.
Internet disruptions are often ordered by governments requiring intermediaries such as telecommunications and internet service providers to slow internet speeds, block commonly-used social media sites, or block all internet access. As internet disruptions become widespread across the continent, it is important to examine the role of internet intermediaries in facilitating or impeding them.
A February 2021 brief by CIPESA shines the spotlight on intermediaries’ responses to government orders and indicates that while the intermediaries facilitate transactions, access to online information and services, and provide platforms for interaction, expression and citizen participation, they are usually caught up in the overarching control of their activities by the autocratic governance of host governments who usually place political control and dominance over the enjoyment of digital rights.
Consequently, intermediaries’ responses to internet disruption orders on the continent have almost always been of quiet obedience. Most have failed to take any steps to push back against government excesses. Airtel (Chad and Uganda), Africell (Uganda), Gabon Telecom, MTN (Cameroon and Uganda), Tigo Chad, and Zimbabwe’s Econet Wireless are among those that unquestioningly acquiesced to censorship orders by governments in compliance with their license conditions but also to safeguard their business interests. They appeared to remain silent even in the face of pressing demands to restore the internet, and in some instances denied having blocked the internet on their networks.
However, other intermediaries such as MTN Benin, Orange Guinea, and Lesotho’s Econet and Vodacom pushed back. These intermediaries shared publicly the government letters ordering disruptions, identified the government officials ordering the shutdowns, and disclosed the basis for the shutdowns. In some instances they engaged with authorities to make the case for maintaining uninterrupted access, resisted or declined to implement unlawful orders, apologized to the public for disruptions, or even compensated their customers for the downtime arising from the disruptions.
While some of these steps are laudable, more needs to be done by local intermediaries to resist future shutdowns, uphold consumer protection, and promote respect for human rights online. Many of these intermediaries seem to lack the backbone to resist or challenge in court the legality of internet shutdown directives. It remains problematic that they seem to put their business interests first, while paying limited attention to the human rights, social and economic implications of internet disruptions.
The CIPESA brief recommends that intermediaries improve transparency reporting; always insist on written instructions and orders from authorities, and promptly make these orders public; expand their partnerships and engagements with civil society and join key platforms that aim to collaboratively advance a free and open internet.
The brief also recommends that intermediaries give users sufficient notice of impending disruptions; engage regulators and push back against licensing conditions (and laws governing the telecoms sector) that are vague, or that could potentially lead to the violation of human rights; and speak out publicly about the harms which network disruptions cause to their subscribers and to the intermediaries themselves.
Further, intermediaries should develop and make public policies that specifically state their position on shutdowns and how they address any shutdown orders from governments; and strive to comply with the UN Business and Human Rights Principles (UNBHR).
The brief also calls upon individuals and the business community to challenge the actions of intermediaries before national, regional and international mechanisms for accountability and compensation of losses incurred as a result of their actions.
See the brief here.

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