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Democratising Big Tech: Lessons from South Africa’s 2024 Election
03Jul

Democratising Big Tech: Lessons from South Africa’s 2024 Election

Author Brian Posted on

By Jean-Andre Deenik | ADRF

South Africa’s seventh democratic elections in May 2024 marked a critical turning point — not just in the political sphere, but in the digital one too. For the first time in our democracy’s history, the information space surrounding an election was shaped more by algorithms, platforms, and private tech corporations than by public broadcasters or community mobilisation.

We have entered an era where the ballot box is not the only battleground for democracy. The online world — fast-moving, largely unregulated, and increasingly dominated by profit-driven platforms — has become central to how citizens access information, express themselves, and participate politically.

At the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), we knew we could not stand by as these forces influenced the lives, choices, and rights of South Africans — particularly those already navigating inequality and exclusion. Between May 2024 and April 2025, with support from the African Digital Rights Fund (ADRF), we implemented the Democratising Big Tech project: an ambitious effort to expose the harms of unregulated digital platforms during elections and advocate for transparency, accountability, and justice in the digital age.

Why This Work Mattered

The stakes were high. In the run-up to the elections, political content flooded platforms like Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter). Some of it was civic-minded and constructive — but much of it was misleading, inflammatory, and harmful.

Our concern wasn’t theoretical. We had already seen how digital platforms contributed to offline violence during the July 2021 unrest, and how coordinated disinformation campaigns were used to sow fear and confusion. Communities already marginalised — migrants, sexual minorities, women — bore the brunt of online abuse and harassment.

South Africa’s Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, dignity, and access to information. Yet these rights are being routinely undermined by algorithmic systems and opaque moderation policies, most of which are designed and governed far beyond our borders. Our project set out to change that.

Centering People: A Public Education Campaign

The project was rooted in a simple truth: rights mean little if people don’t know they have them — or don’t know when they’re being violated. One of our first goals was to build public awareness around digital harms and the broader human rights implications of tech platforms during the elections.

We launched Legal Resources Radio, a podcast series designed to unpack the real-world impact of technologies like political microtargeting, surveillance, and facial recognition. Our guests — journalists, legal experts, academics, and activists — helped translate technical concepts into grounded, urgent conversations.

We spoke to:

Alongside the podcasts, we used Instagram to host

Holding Big Tech to Account

A cornerstone of the project was our collaboration with Global Witness, Mozilla, and the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT). Together, we set out to test whether major tech companies (TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and X) were prepared to protect the integrity of South Africa’s 2024 elections. To do this, we designed and submitted controlled test advertisements that mimicked real-world harmful narratives, including xenophobia, gender-based disinformation, and incitement to violence. These ads were submitted in multiple South African languages to assess whether the platforms’ content moderation systems, both automated and human, could detect and block them. The findings revealed critical gaps in platform preparedness and informed both advocacy and public awareness efforts ahead of the elections.

The results were alarming.

  • Simulated ads with xenophobic content were approved in multiple South African languages;
  • Gender-based harassment ads directed at women journalists were not removed;
  • False information about voting — including the wrong election date and processes — was accepted by TikTok and YouTube.

These findings confirmed what many civil society organisations have long argued: that Big Tech neglects the Global South, failing to invest in local language moderation, culturally relevant policies, or meaningful community engagement. These failures are not just technical oversights. They endanger lives, and they undermine the legitimacy of our democratic processes.

Building an Evidence Base for Reform

Beyond exposing platform failures, we also produced a shadow human rights impact assessment. This report examined how misinformation, hate speech, and algorithmic discrimination disproportionately affect marginalised communities. It documented how online disinformation isn’t simply digital noise — it often translates into real-world harm, from lost trust in electoral systems to threats of violence and intimidation.

We scrutinised South Africa’s legal and policy frameworks and found them severely lacking. Despite the importance of online information ecosystems, there are no clear laws regulating how tech companies should act in our context. Our report recommends:

  • Legal obligations for platforms to publish election transparency reports;
  • Stronger data protection and algorithmic transparency;
  • Content moderation strategies inclusive of all South African languages and communities;
  • Independent oversight mechanisms and civil society input.

This work is part of a longer-term vision: to ensure that South Africa’s digital future is rights-based, inclusive, and democratic.

Continental Solidarity

In April 2025, we took this work to Lusaka, Zambia, where we presented at the Digital Rights and Inclusion Forum (DRIF) 2025. We shared lessons from South Africa and connected with allies across the continent who are also working to make technology accountable to the people it impacts.

What became clear is that while platforms may ignore us individually, there is power in regional solidarity. From Kenya to Nigeria, Senegal to Zambia, African civil society is uniting around a shared demand: that digital technology must serve the public good — not profit at the cost of people’s rights.

What Comes Next?

South Africa’s 2024 elections have come and gone. But the challenges we exposed remain. The online harms we documented did not begin with the elections, and they will not end with them.

That’s why we see the Democratising Big Tech project not as a one-off intervention, but as the beginning of a sustained push for digital justice. We will continue to build coalitions, push for regulatory reform, and educate the public. We will work with journalists, technologists, and communities to resist surveillance, expose disinformation, and uphold our rights online.

Because the fight for democracy doesn’t end at the polls. It must also be fought — and won — in the digital spaces where power is increasingly wielded, often without scrutiny or consequence.

Final Reflections

At the LRC, we do not believe in technology for technology’s sake. We believe in justice — and that means challenging any system, digital or otherwise, that puts people at risk or threatens their rights. Through this project, we’ve seen what’s possible when civil society speaks with clarity, courage, and conviction.

The algorithms may be powerful. But our Constitution, our communities, and our collective will are stronger.

13Dec

ANALYSIS: Zambia’s Proposed Cyber Laws Facilitate Suppression of Civil Liberties

Author CIPESA Writer Posted on

Zambia has published the Cyber Security Bill, 2024 and the Cyber Crimes Bill, 2024, which would repeal the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021. These proposed laws’ objective of combating cyber crimes and promoting a safe and healthy digital society is welcome, as is the need for the country to strengthen its cyber security posture, including through legislation.

However, the current drafts of the laws not only miss the opportunity to cure some of the deficiencies in the 2021 cyber crimes law they are repealing but also introduce several, more regressive provisions.

In an analysis of the two Bills, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and the Bloggers of Zambia, who also hosts the Zambia CSO Coalition on Digital Rights, point to the retrogressive and vague provisions in the two Bills, and offer recommendations that can render the proposed laws more robustly rights-respecting and effective in combating cyber crimes.

The bills have some progressive provisions, such as the separation of cybersecurity and cybercrime functions; the structured cybersecurity governance that includes the creation of dedicated bodies such as the Cyber Security Agency and the Cyber Incident Response Teams (CIRTs); and provision of a framework for mutual legal assistance and cooperation with foreign entities. The bills also introduce new offences in response to emerging cyberthreats, such as identity-related crimes, attacks on critical information infrastructure, cyber harassment, cyber terrorism, and “revenge pornography”.

However, the list of concerns is much longer, as detailed below:

  1. Weak Human Rights and procedural safeguards: The bills do not affirm adherence to regional and international human rights standards and obligations, such as privacy, freedom of expression, access to information, or due process. Also, enforcement measures lack comprehensive human rights and due process safeguards to ensure provisions and practices are proportionate, necessary, and pursue legitimate aims. 
  1. Potential for abuse of power: The bills provide law enforcement agencies significant discretion in applying their provisions, thereby increasing risks for political interference, unchecked surveillance and the widespread targeting of dissenters. These are aided by broad surveillance powers and ambiguous definitions of terms and offences, which create room for subjective interpretation and arbitrary application. These could be used to suppress freedom of expression and legitimate public discourse.
  1. Weak oversight and governance: There are limited independent or judicial review processes mandated for surveillance, data collection, or search and seizure activities. Further, the centralised control of the Cyber Security Agency and Central Monitoring and Co-ordination Centre (CMCC) and the absence of independent oversight mechanisms raise accountability concerns. Also, there is no clear separation of cybersecurity functions from the cybercrime-related functions between the two bills, which could lead to duplication and implementation challenges.
  2. Overly broad surveillance powers: Law enforcement is granted broad interception powers including real-time data collection and communication interception and extensive search-and-seizure powers. The provisions do not include clear limits or provide sufficient safeguards such as judicial oversight, proportionality, or transparency and accountability.
  1. Insufficient safeguards for privacy: The bills enable widespread surveillance and interception without clear provisions on data retention limits, purpose limitation, secure handling of intercepted data and oversight. This could allow for indefinite storage of data, increasing the risk of misuse or unauthorised access. Also, the absence of anonymity protections for whistleblowers, journalists, and researchers could criminalise legitimate anonymous or pseudonymous activities. The provisions limit privacy rights, and are in total disregard of the country’s Data Protection Act, 2021.

General Recommendations

  1. Provide adequate human rights and procedural safeguards: Incorporate a dedicated section affirming the bill’s compliance with Zambia’s constitutional and international human rights obligations. Further, align the bills with the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa and the African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Personal Data Protection. In addition, conduct a Regulatory and Human Rights Impact Assessment and require periodic review of the bill’s implementation for potential human rights impacts.
  2. Strengthen oversight and governance mechanisms: Introduce mandatory independent judicial oversight, notification and documentation and annual reporting requirements on the use of powers under the bill, ensuring accountability and public trust. Establish independent oversight mechanisms for the Cybersecurity Agency, CMCC and surveillance practices. 

Review the structure and functioning of the newly established agencies vis-a-vis the roles of other agencies e.g. Office of the President, Ministry of ICT, Zambia Information Technology Authority (ZICTA), security agencies, among others, to enhance coordination and avoid duplication of roles and fragmentation. It is also important to have clear delineation of cybersecurity functions and cybercrime functions to avoid confusion or duplication of roles.

  1. Ensure proportionality: Many offences in the Cyber Crimes Bill criminalise minor or vague conduct without proportionality thresholds. Introduce proportionality clauses limiting criminalisation to significant harm, or graduated scales that enhance penalties based on severity, complexity and impact of offences on victims, critical infrastructure or organisations.
  2. Invest in capacity building: Provide a framework for training of law enforcement, prosecution and judiciary officials on applying the law proportionately, balancing enforcement with human rights protection.
  3. Ensure compliance with data protection laws: Ensure the bills align with the provisions of Zambia’s Data Protection Act, 2021, to protect individuals’ privacy rights.

The full analysis can be found here.

16Aug

Zambia Introduces Daily Tax on Internet Voice Calls

Author admin Posted on

By Daniel Mwesigwa |
The government of Zambia is set to introduce a daily levy of 30 Ngwee (USD 0.03) on internet voice calls. In a press statement issued after a cabinet meeting on August 12, 2018, the government spokesperson said internet calls through platforms such as Viber, WhatsApp and Skype “threaten the telecommunications industry and jobs” in licenced telecom companies such as Zamtel, Airtel and MTN”.
Accordingly, the cabinet approved the issuance of a Statutory Instrument to “facilitate the  introduction of the tariff to be charged through mobile phone operators and internet providers.” In justifying the introduction of the levy, the government spokesperson cited research which showed that “80 percent of the citizens are using WhatsApp, skype, and Viber to make phone calls.”
The statement did not indicate when the statutory instrument would be introduced, or when the levy is anticipated to take effect. The new tax, according to reports quoting the communications minister, was expected to fetch USD 22 million annually.
The proposed levy adds to Zambia’s mixed record on ICT access and freedom of expression online. The Zambia Information & Communications Technology Authority (ZICTA) reports a mobile phone penetration rate of 81.9% and mobile internet penetration rate of 47.1%. However, mobile and internet proliferation is threatened by high costs of access, a digital divide between men and women and between rural and urban areas. Quality of service also remains poor as evidenced by the recent fines slapped by ZICTA on the three leading telecommunications service providers.  
The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia Chapter and a collective of bloggers have expressed deep concern about the tariffs on internet calls. They asked government to shelve the plans to introduce the tariff and to instead undertake efforts to promote affordable internet access. They argued that the “underlying objective” of the tariff is to “stifle free expression of millions of Zambians who increasingly depend on online tools to communicate.” They added that it is a “threat to entrepreneurship and innovation as many youths and citizens are using internet platforms to advance their socio-economic activities.”
Meanwhile, the Zambian cabinet has also approved the introduction of the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Bill that will repeal and amend provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 21 of 2009. The bill will purportedly “promote an increased cybersecurity posture, facilitate intelligence gathering, investigation, prosecution and judicial processes in respect of preventing and addressing cybercrimes, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare.”
In addition to facilitating the establishment of Zambia National Cyber Security Agency (ZNCSA), which is expected to serve as the “coordination centre for all matters related to cyber security at national and international levels”, the proposed law will also criminalise “computer-based offences and network-related crime in line with the Penal Code”. Furthermore, it will “provide for investigation and collection of evidence for computer and network related crime and also provide for the admission of electronic evidence for such offences” as well as “adequately deal with various crimes committed using social media platforms.”
Zambia’s move  becomes the latest in a string of steps taken by African governments to undermine internet access and affordability, and weaken the potential of the internet and related technologies to promote free expression, access to information and civic participation. In March 2018, Uganda’s communications regulator issued a directive requiring online content providers to register and pay an annual fee of USD 20. Shortly thereafter, in July 2018, social media taxes were introduced with users required to pay a daily levy of Uganda Shillings (UGX) 200 (USD 0.05) before regaining access to social media platforms which were blocked.
In neighbouring Tanzania, online content service providers and producers have to pay over USD 900 to register with the state for permission to maintain their platforms, according to new 2018 regulations. Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in mid June, the ministry of communications issued a decree giving online media outlets a month to comply with new regulations or face harsh penalties.

25May

Zambia’s Mixed Record on ICT Access and Free Expression Online

Author admin Posted on

By Ashnah Kalemera |
The first-ever Lusaka Internet Forum (LIF17) was hosted in Zambia’s capital on May 10-11 as a platform for discussing the various factors impacting internet use in the country, particularly in driving agricultural sustainability, gender equality and freedom of expression online.
The southern African country presents a mixed record: ICT access is growing (a mobile phone penetration rate of 75% and internet penetration rate of 32%), but is undermined by high data and voice usage costs that entrench the digital divide between men and women and between rural and urban areas. Moreover, while the country is investing in extending services to rural and underserved areas, national laws largely undermine free expression and the communications regulator is criticised for undermining citizens’ rights to free expression.
In the last two decades, Zambia has recorded some firsts on internet use – both positive and negative. In 1996, one of the first documented acts of government censorship of online content in Africa happened when Zambia’s government ordered the take down of content from the online edition of The Post newspaper, after threatening to prosecute the country’s main Internet Service Provider (ISP), Zamnet.


The content was banned under the Preservation of Public Security Act for allegedly containing a report based on leaked documents that revealed secret government plans for a referendum on the adoption of a new constitution. A presidential decree warned the public that anyone caught with the banned edition, including the electronic version, would be liable to prosecution.
Since 1996, a number of interruptions to online communication have been reported. Access to some online news outlets, such as the Zambia Watchdog, has been blocked at different intervals, particularly between 2012 and 2014, over publication of content critical of the government. This alongside physical intimidation, arrests and seizure of devices such as journalists’ laptops and mobile phones. Meanwhile, in August 2016, internet connectivity interruptions were reported during the election period but these could not be verified as deliberately orchestrated by the state or service providers.
Despite these affronts to freedom of expression, in 2014 Zambia was the first African country to implement Facebook’s Free Basics initiative that allows users to access prescribed sites without the need for data. Ongoing initiatives by the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority (ZICTA) to promote access include the establishment of ICT training centres, acquisition of equipment for ICT-based learning and examinations under the education ministry, and the development of a computer assembly plant.
This mixed record on ICT access and internet freedom formed the backdrop of the discussions at LIF17, during which participants cited gender barriers, high illiteracy and poverty levels, and high data costs as undermining internet use in the country.


Some participants stated that the country’s laws appear to target curtailing citizens’ rights, and faulted the regulator for lacking independence and failing to protect users from abuses by service providers and government agencies such as the police. “Let’s use the laws progressively not to block access to information or to [unjustifiably] control how the media work,” said a blogger. He noted that the ICT Act of 2009 does not speak to current realities, with some of its provisions criminalising freedom of expression.
There are also widespread perceptions of unwarranted surveillance of citizens’ online communications. The right to privacy is threatened by the mandatory registration of SIM cards provided for under the ICT Act and the Statutory Instrument on the Registration of Electronic Communication Apparatus of 2011. Registration requires subscribers to provide their personal details and identity cards, in the absence of a data protection and privacy law.
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2009 provides for lawful interception of communications upon issuance of a court order, and online monitoring of information in the public domain. Nearly 15 years since tabling a draft freedom of information bill, it is yet to be enacted.
Meanwhile, activists criticised the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) director general for misusing their extensive powers to curtail media freedom. Last August, the IBA suspended the broadcasting licences for Muvi TV, Komboni Radio and Itezhi Tezhi Radio for “unprofessional conduct posing a risk to national peace and stability”. Activists also reported increasing attacks on individuals who use radio and TV stations to voice opinions critical of the government.
As such, following the LIF17, CIPESA led an ICT policy training workshop for human rights defenders, activists, media and social media enthusiasts to increase their understanding of relevant ICT policies in Zambia and how these affect human rights online. The workshop entailed developing their strategies in advocating for a free, open and secure internet through the innovative use of both traditional and new media.
During the training, participants were taken through mechanisms for policy engagement such as stakeholder submissions, the analysis of bills and continued activism and campaigns online including through documentation and reporting of internet freedom violation incidents.


LIF17 was organised by the Swedish Embassy in Zambia and partners including the Zambia Governance Foundation as a satellite event in the lead up to the Stockholm Internet Forum. Thematic sessions on agriculture, gender, and freedom of expression were hosted by the technology innovation hub Bongo Hive, the Asikana Network, the Swedish Programme for ICT in Developing Regions (Spider) and CIPESA.
Read more about internet freedom in Zambia in CIPESA’s State of Internet Freedom in Zambia 2016 report.
CIPESA’s work in Zambia is supported by AccessNow and the Mozilla Foundation.
 

25Jul

Analysis of the Relationship Between Online Information Controls and Elections in Zambia

Author admin Posted on

By Arthur Gwagwa |
The defining era in Zambia’s current rise in online political and civic activism can be traced back to the period between 2011 and 2013. This is when the late President Sata embraced social media as part of his political and public diplomacy strategy.  As the country now prepares for the August 2016 General Elections, government, its agencies, such as the Election Ccommission of Zambia (ECZ), the opposition and civil society are all immersed in social media.
As the country’s August 2016 polls draw nearer, government has recently increased its presence on social media to abet and encourage horizontal flows of information. This is in contrast to vertical flows, where information generated by societal actors is gathered by the government through usage of a range of methods, ranging from “responsiveness” on social media to media monitoring.
This paper explores reports of information controls and filtering of the ruling regime, whose leader, Edgar Lungu, strives to  balance the dictates of political survival and his reputation as a lawyer who has previously defended press freedoms. The paper analyses past and current key political events that implicate the relationship between internet-based information controls and elections in Zambia. Finally, the paper  extrapolates likely scenarios in the build up to the 2016 General Elections and Constitution Bill of Rights Referendum to be held on 11 August 2016.
Read the full report here.

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