Tanzania’s Digital Rights Record Faces Fresh Scrutiny at the UPR

By Ainembabazi Patricia |

In November 2026, Tanzania will be up for its fourth cycle review under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC). Ahead of the review, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), and JamiiAfrica made a joint stakeholder submission on the state of digital rights including expression, access to information, assembly and association, privacy, data protection, and gender equality in digital spaces in Tanzania.

The submission recognises the positive steps taken by Tanzania to advance the digital ecosystem  since its previous assessment in 2021. Internet connectivity has expanded significantly, and the country has adopted important digital governance measures. These include the enactment of the Personal Data Protection Act, 2022, and the establishment of the Personal Data Protection Commission, reforms to the Media Services Act, and policy initiatives such as the Digital Economy Strategic Framework 2024–2034, and emerging AI governance frameworks.

However, the report finds that these gains have not translated into a freer or safer digital civic space in the country. Repressive laws and regulations continue to be used to restrict online expression, limit publications, silence dissent and elevate censorship. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations as amended in 2020 and 2025 still require licensing for online media service providers and grant the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) broad powers to suspend or revoke licences. Vague provisions in the Cybercrimes Act and related laws also continue to criminalise legitimate expression, creating a chilling effect for journalists, bloggers, activists, and ordinary users.

According to the CIPESA, PALU and JamiiAfrica report, several incidents have narrowed the environment for the exercise of online freedoms.  Key media and engagement platforms such as the Clubhouse, X (formerly Twitter) and JamiiForums were blocked in 2023 and 2025 respectively. In 2024, Tanzania’s media space was marked by intensified restrictions.  TCRA suspended Mwananchi Communications’ online platforms for 30 days on October 2, 2024, against a backdrop of broader restrictions on unregistered Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) in October 2023.

Particularly concerning were the restrictions imposed during the 2025 general elections. The report notes that Tanzania implemented a nationwide internet shutdown from October 29 to November 3, 2025, cutting off access to major social media and communication platforms. This disrupted the ability of citizens, journalists, and observers to share information, document events, and participate in public debate during a critical democratic moment.

While Tanzania in 2022 enacted the Personal Data Protection Act, which came into force in 2023, its implementation is weakened by restrictions on anonymity and VPN usage, as well as heightened surveillance. Pronouncements by government officials against sharing certain election-related content have fostered fear and self-censorship. For many Tanzanians, especially critics of government and civic actors, legal protections for personal data remain undermined by surveillance-related risks.

The submission also draws attention to the growing threat of Technology-Facilitated Gender-based Violence (TFGBV). Women journalists, politicians, activists, and other public-facing women are increasingly subjected to online harassment, sexualised abuse, doxxing, reputational attacks, and coordinated trolling. These harms were particularly acute around the 2025 elections, when gendered disinformation and intimidation converged with broader restrictions on online speech.

To address these concerns, the report recommends that Tanzania repeals or amends vague and overly broad laws including the Cybercrimes Act and the Online Content Regulations. The report calls for compliance with international human rights standards, discouraging restrictions such as internet shutdowns and platform blocking. It also calls for judicial oversight over surveillance, greater transparency in state requests to technology companies, stronger support for the Personal Data Protection Commission, investment in digital rights literacy, and explicit protections against TFGBV.

Read the full report submission here.

CIPESA Condemns Zambia’s Cancellation of RightsCon 2026

By CIPESA Writer |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) notes with deep concern the Government of Zambia’s decision to postpone Rights Con 2026, which was scheduled to take place in Lusaka next week. The postponement was confirmed by the organisers on April 29, 2026. Civic convenings of this nature thrive precisely because they create a safe space for diverse, sometimes uncomfortable, conversations about rights, technology, and power. Restricting that space undermines the principles of openness, dialogue, and democratic engagement on the continent.

The information provided by the Zambia government suggests that halting of RightsCon was not a necessary and proportionate measure. It has caused undue financial losses and disrupted the plans of thousands of national and international human rights actors and the local tourism, travel and conferencing sector, while also denting Zambia’s  governance credentials and international standing.

CIPESA has joined over 130 organisations from across the world in expressing concern over the  government’s decision that raises questions about transparency, civic space, and commitment to inclusive global digital governance.

The cancellation of RightsCon 2026 escalates an ongoing crisis of democratic regression and the rise of digital authoritarianism on the continent.

In a related development, the World Press Freedom Day (WPFD) Global Conference, originally scheduled to also take place in Lusaka ahead of RightsCon. has also undergone significant changes. UNESCO has announced that the conference will now be held online, while the UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize ceremony will be relocated to the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, France at a later date. These developments effectively delist Zambia as the host of this year’s WPFD, although a commemorative event remains scheduled for May 4, 2026.

African Governments are Using “Smart City” Systems to Monitor Dissent and Consolidate State Control

By CIVICUS |

CIVICUS discusses the spread of AI-powered surveillance in Africa with Wairagala Wakabi, executive director of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and co-editor of Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, the latest report by the African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS).
At least 11 African governments have spent over US$2 billion on Chinese-built surveillance infrastructure that uses AI-powered cameras, biometric data collection and facial recognition to monitor public spaces. Marketed as ‘smart city’ solutions to reduce crime and manage urban growth, these systems have been rolled out with little regulation and no independent evidence of their effectiveness. This technology is instead being used to monitor activists, track protesters and silence dissent, with a chilling effect on freedoms of assembly and expression.

How widespread is AI-powered surveillance in Africa?

Under the guise of reducing crime and fighting terrorism, at least 11 governments have invested over US$2 billion in AI-powered ‘smart city’ surveillance infrastructure: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Governments are installing thousands of CCTV cameras linked to central command centres, paired with tools such as automatic number-plate recognition, biometric ID systems and facial recognition to track people and vehicles. The largest known investments are in Nigeria (over US$470 million), Mauritius (US$456 million) and Kenya (US$219 million), though the real total is likely much higher, since surveillance spending is often secret and the report covers only 11 of Africa’s 55 countries.

Despite being presented as tools for crime prevention, counter-terrorism, modernisation and urban management, these are not targeted security measures. They represent a broader shift toward continuous, population-level monitoring of public spaces, rolled out over the past five to ten years almost always without clear legal limits or public debate.

Are these systems achieving their stated purpose?

No, there is no compelling evidence that they have in any of the countries studied. Instead, the data points to a pattern of use that raises serious human rights concerns.

In Uganda and Zimbabwe, AI-powered surveillance including facial recognition is being used to suppress dissent rather than ensure public safety. Activists, critics of the government, opposition leaders and protesters are identified and monitored through this system, even after protests have ended. In Mozambique, smart CCTV systems have reportedly been installed in areas of strong political opposition, suggesting targeted rather than neutral surveillance.

In Senegal and Zambia, countries with relatively low terrorism threats, governments have still invested heavily, which calls into question the stated security rationale.

Across the countries studied, the scale of surveillance far exceeds any actual or perceived security threat, and the infrastructure is consistently being used to monitor dissent and consolidate state control rather than address genuine public safety needs.

Who’s supplying this technology?

While firms from Israel, South Korea and the USA supply surveillance technologies, Chinese companies are the primary suppliers and financiers. They typically offer end-to-end ‘smart city’ packages that include cameras, software platforms, data analytics systems, training and ongoing technical support. Many projects are backed by loans from Chinese state-linked banks, which makes them financially accessible in the short term but creates long-term dependencies on external vendors for maintenance, system management and upgrades.

This model undermines transparency. Procurement processes are opaque and civil society, the public and oversight institutions including parliaments rarely have information about how these systems operate, how data is stored or who has access to it. That lack of accountability is what makes abuse not just possible, but hard to detect or challenge.

What impact is this having on civic space?

This large-scale surveillance of public spaces is not legal, necessary or proportionate to the legitimate aim of providing security. Recording, analysing and retaining facial images of people in public without their consent interferes with their right to privacy and, over time, their willingness to move, assemble and speak freely.

The most immediate consequence is a chilling effect, particularly where civic space is already restricted. Knowing they can be identified and tracked, activists and journalists are less willing to attend protests for fear of later arrest or reprisals, and end up self-censoring. Civil society organisations also report heightened anxiety about the risks for their members and partners.

What should governments and civil society do?

None of the 11 countries studied have a legal framework capable of balancing the state’s security needs with its commitments to protect fundamental human rights. That must change. Governments must adopt clear regulations on surveillance, including restrictions on facial recognition and other AI tools, require independent human rights impact assessments before introducing new systems, make procurement and deployment processes transparent and establish strong oversight mechanisms, including judicial and parliamentary scrutiny, to prevent abuse.

Civil society should continue documenting abuses, raising public awareness and advocating for accountability, while also supporting affected people and communities through digital security support and legal assistance.

Technology-exporting states and donors must enforce stricter controls and safeguards on the export and financing of these tools, support rights-based approaches to digital governance and help fund independent monitoring and advocacy across Africa.

Without urgent action, these systems will continue to expand, and the rights of people across Africa will continue to shrink.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

This article was first published on the Website of CIVICUS LENS on April 07, 2026

African Commission Resolution 655 and What it Offers for the Future of Electoral Democracy

By Edrine Wanyama |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) welcomes the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adoption of the Resolution on Elections in Africa in 2026 – ACHPR/Res. 655, which calls on all Member States to uphold human rights, the rule of law, and democratic governance.

The resolution comes at a time when several African countries are experiencing democratic regression, marked by harassment of opposition politicians and civil society actors, and mistrust in  electoral processes.  

With 12 countries – Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome & Principe, and Zambia – scheduled to hold elections in 2026, the resolution provides a timely reminder to governments to ensure that elections are free, fair, and transparent, with the playing field levelled for all contestants.

Resolution 655 builds on existing regional instruments that seek to promote democratic governance on the continent. The main instrument is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance , which has been  ratified by 39 out of 55 AU member states. Notably, some countries that are preparing to hold elections, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of the Congo, are yet to ratify the Charter on Democracy, raising concerns about alignment with its standards.

The resolution also complements the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, whose article 9 calls for the inclusive participation of women in political and electoral processes.

Elections in the Digital Age
A notable strength of Resolution 655 is its recognition of the evolving digital landscape and its impact on electoral integrity. In line with Resolution ACHPR.Res. 580(LXXVIII)2024 on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa, this new resolution re-echoes the need to respect internet freedoms, including freedom of expression and access to information, which are core to the conduct of free and democratic elections. Moreover, the resolution notes with concern, the human rights violations that were perpetuated in Tanzania and Cameroon, and the disruptions in Guinea-Bissau, during their elections in 2025.

The resolution also highlights emerging risks associated with the use of Artificial Intelligence, misinformation and disinformation, all of which can compromise  electoral integrity.

CIPESA stands in solidarity with the Commission’s call to end repression against voters, civil society, journalists, and opposition actors. We call upon all member states, particularly those holding elections in 2026, to implement the recommendations and ensure inclusive,  rights-respecting electoral processes.

Stakeholders in Kenya Commit to Safeguarding the Country’s 2027 General Elections

By Lyndcey Oriko |

As Kenya looks ahead to the 2027 general elections, the rapid digitisation of the civic space presents both opportunities and risks. A February 2026 multi-stakeholder engagement organised by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), in partnership with the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), reflected on preparedness for the 2027 elections, with a strong emphasis on moving from reactive responses to proactive, coordinated action.

The Nairobi convening brought together electoral bodies, oversight institutions, law enforcement, regulators, and media actors to deliberate on the need to safeguard rights, strengthen coordination, and build trust in an increasingly digital electoral environment.

Across Africa, digital platforms are reshaping how elections unfold. They have opened up participation, especially for young people, but also introduced new challenges. Increased online regulation, network disruptions, hate speech and disinformation are commonplace, while women, particularly those actively involved in politics, face rising levels of technology-facilitated gender-based violence.

This shifting environment highlights a key reality: the same digital tools that enable participation can also erode trust and weaken social cohesion. And what begins online does not stay online. It often carries real consequences offline, and vice versa. Kenya is no exception. The country’s upcoming 2027 elections are high-stakes, closely contested and in an environment fraught with disinformation.

More recently, there has been a heightened crackdown on activism, including through the abduction and intimidation of activists and journalists, politically motivated internet censorship, rising disinformation, cyber threats, data breaches, and a decline in freedom.

CIPESA’s Kenya’s Digital Crossroads brief, published in February 2025, offers a detailed account of the scale of this challenge. In June 2024, Kenya experienced its first nationwide internet shutdown, imposed during the #RejectFinanceBill2024 protests that disrupted mobile payments, health services, and education systems alongside social media.

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) documented 50 deaths, 413 injuries, 59 abductions, and 682 arbitrary arrests as of July 2024, with over 82 people subsequently abducted by armed plainclothes officers. The Communications Authority recorded 657.8 million cyber threats in just three months between July and September 2024, while government and media institutions — including KBC, K24 TV, and the DCI’s account on X — faced successful cyberattacks. The Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act was deployed to target critics, bloggers, and political activists. And in January 2025, the incoming Cabinet Secretary for ICT publicly pledged readiness to shut down the internet again if national security is threatened. These patterns have direct implications for 2027.

Opening the discussion, Ashnah Kalemera, Programmes Manager at CIPESA, emphasised the importance of balancing electoral integrity and national security with the protection of civic space. She noted that core freedoms such as free speech, access to information, and participation should continue to be prioritised, even as institutions address digital risks. She also highlighted the need for stronger collaboration, responsible content sharing, and inclusive approaches that bring citizens, especially young people, into the conversation.

Commissioner Ken Williams Nyakomitah of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) stressed that the scale and complexity of digital harms require collective action. He noted that institutions must adapt to evolving technological realities and work in complementarity, emphasising that no single actor can effectively address digital threats in isolation. Strengthening coordination, avoiding duplication, and ensuring timely information sharing were highlighted as critical to improving institutional effectiveness.

The NCIC Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Daniel Mutegi Giti, underscored the importance of early and sustained interventions to promote cohesion. He cautioned that elections could amplify existing tensions if not carefully managed, particularly in digital spaces where narratives spread rapidly and shape public perception. He called for vigilance, responsible engagement, and a shared commitment to upholding constitutional values, including inclusivity and respect for human rights.

Bringing in a technological perspective, Daniel Odongo, Technology Lead at Ushahidi, highlighted the speed, coordination, and sophistication with which harmful content spreads online. He pointed out that misinformation often follows predictable patterns across platforms, making early detection, real-time monitoring, and coordinated response critical to preventing escalation. This further underscores the importance of institutions focusing not just on individual incidents but on identifying patterns, trends, and coordinated behaviour over time.

Director Kilian Nyambu of NCIC emphasised the human dimension of digital harms, noting that information shapes perception, and perception shapes action. This is especially significant for vulnerable groups, including women, youth, and persons with disabilities, who are often disproportionately affected by harmful online narratives. Ensuring inclusivity and protection of these groups remains central to building a peaceful digital environment.

The role of the media was also central to the discussion. Leo Mutisya of the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) highlighted both the resilience and challenges within Kenya’s media landscape. While media remains a key pillar in promoting accountability and public awareness, rising disinformation, political pressure, and declining trust continue to shape how citizens consume information, often leading them to turn to less regulated digital spaces.

At the same time, the engagement highlighted the growing challenge of declining public trust in public institutions and information sources. As more citizens turn to digital platforms for news, the line between credible information and manipulation continues to blur, reinforcing the need for strong media literacy and fact-checking ecosystems. Addressing this trust deficit will require transparency, consistency, and sustained public engagement from institutions.

Concerns were also raised about the emerging risks of Artificial Intelligence (AI), such as AI-generated content and deepfakes, which are increasingly difficult to detect and could significantly distort public perception during elections. Stakeholders emphasised the need to proactively address these risks, including advocating for greater transparency and accountability from digital platforms.

Importantly, participants also highlighted that misinformation is no longer random or organic. It is often coordinated, moving rapidly across platforms within minutes, from X to WhatsApp and into community networks, making early detection and response critical. This calls for investment in real-time monitoring systems and stronger partnerships between institutions and technology platforms. It also reinforces the need for institutions to shift from isolated responses to a more connected, system-wide approach that reflects the complexity of the digital ecosystem.

Discussions further underscored the importance of data protection, responsible platform governance, and context-specific solutions. Participants emphasised that Kenya must develop localised frameworks that reflect its unique realities, rather than relying solely on external models. Building effective responses will require grounding solutions in local contexts, strengthening regional collaboration, and investing in homegrown research and knowledge systems.

Key priorities emerging from the engagement included strengthening inter-agency coordination, investing in early warning and response systems, improving strategic communication, safeguarding data and privacy, and ensuring inclusive approaches that protect all groups. There was also a strong call to establish clear inter-institutional protocols for responding to digital threats, ensuring timely, coordinated, and rights-respecting action across agencies. Strengthening collaboration across institutions and aligning mandates will be essential in closing existing gaps. Ultimately, participants agreed that preparedness must begin now. Building resilient systems, strengthening collaboration, and equipping citizens with the tools to navigate digital spaces responsibly will be critical to shaping peaceful, credible elections.

As Kenya prepares for the 2027 general elections, digital platforms will play a decisive role in shaping public discourse and electoral outcomes. The challenge, and opportunity, lies in ensuring these spaces promote trust, inclusion, and informed participation.