Social Media Archives – Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

08Jul

Cybercrime Laws, “False News” Offences, and Online Expression in Africa

CIPESA July 8, 2026July 9, 2026

By CIPESA Writer |

As African societies become increasingly digital, governments are grappling with the balance between the protection of citizens from online harms while preserving the fundamental freedoms of free expression, access to information and freedom to participate in governance.

The legal tools adopted to address these challenges are raising an equally pressing concern. Cybercrime and so-called “false news” laws are increasingly extending beyond their stated purpose of combating digital harm and are instead being used to regulate political speech, suppress dissent, and narrow civic space.

This emerging tension sits at the heart of CIPESA’s latest policy brief, Cybercrime Laws, “False News” Offences, and Online Expression in Africa. Drawing on legislative developments, court decisions, and recent cases from select countries, the brief examines how cybercrime legislation has evolved into one of the defining governance issues of Africa’s digital era.

Many countries have introduced offences such as “false information”, “offensive communication”, “malicious communication”, and “harmful content”. While these provisions are often justified as necessary responses to online abuse, they frequently suffer from vague drafting and broad enforcement powers. This creates uncertainty about what constitutes unlawful speech and allows authorities considerable discretion in deciding who should face criminal investigation or prosecution.

In several African countries, journalists, activists, bloggers, opposition politicians, and ordinary citizens have been arrested or prosecuted for online expression that would ordinarily fall within the boundaries of legitimate public debate. At the same time, restrictions on online speech increasingly operate alongside expanding surveillance powers, internet shutdowns, and growing state control over digital communications, reinforcing broader patterns of digital authoritarianism.

Importantly, however, this is not simply a story of shrinking freedoms. Encouraging developments in several jurisdictions demonstrate that alternative approaches are both possible and necessary. Recent constitutional decisions in Uganda and Kenya have reaffirmed that restrictions on freedom of expression must be clearly defined, proportionate, and consistent with constitutional protections. Similarly, in Nigeria legislative reforms illustrate how sustained engagement by civil society can improve legal frameworks, even if implementation challenges persist.

These developments highlight an important policy lesson as to how regulation can effectively address genuine digital harms without criminalising legitimate expression or weakening democratic accountability.

This policy brief explores these issues in greater depth, examining the emerging patterns across Africa, the evolving role of national and regional courts, and the reforms needed to ensure that cybercrime regulation strengthens both digital security and democratic governance. It concludes that the future of digital freedom in Africa will depend on how governments, courts, regional institutions, and technology companies navigate this balance.

The brief sets out concrete recommendations for four groups of actors. Governments should repeal or amend vague offences, including those relating to false information, offensive communication, and similarly broad categories, that have been used to criminalise legitimate online expression. They should prioritise civil remedies over criminal sanctions in defamation and reputation-related disputes, refrain from imposing internet shutdowns, and ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression comply with international human rights standards.

Legislators and regulators should ensure that cybercrime and digital governance laws comply with the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. They should also require human rights impact assessments before introducing new cybercrime or disinformation laws and establish meaningful public participation throughout the law-making processes. Laws developed without meaningful public scrutiny and civil society engagement are more likely to undermine rights than protect them.

Regional institutions should strengthen the monitoring and implementation of regional human rights commitments and promote common standards on digital rights and accountable digital governance to guide national legal reforms across the continent.

Finally, technology platforms should invest in African language content moderation and local contextual expertise, improve transparency around content moderation decisions and algorithmic decision making, and strengthen grievance and appeals mechanisms for users in African countries, where existing processes often remain inaccessible or ineffective.

Please read the full Policy Brief here.

01Jul

How Digital Participation is Redefining Civic Space for Young People in Africa

CIPESA July 1, 2026July 1, 2026

By Raylenne Kambua |

Across Africa, young people are engaging with public life through digital spaces. Social media platforms, messaging apps, livestreams, and short-form video are now part of how youth learn about public issues, share experiences, and respond to matters that affect their lives.

This reflects a broader shift in how young people participate in public life, where civic engagement is no longer confined to formal institutions or organised campaigns. For many, especially those with limited access to formal institutions, mobile phones have become the main entry point into civic life.

This evolution is unfolding alongside growing global attention to digital governance and rights, reflected in frameworks such as the United Nations Global Digital Compact and the African Union Data Policy Framework. Across regional and global mechanisms, youth are increasingly recognised not only as beneficiaries of policy but as actors shaping digital and civic futures.

Yet these policy discussions are responding to changes already visible in everyday practice. Young people use digital platforms to access information, interpret public decisions, connect with peers, and engage with institutions through the channels they use daily. Understanding these practices is key to understanding how civic space itself is changing.

Digital Participation in Practice
In Kenya, the 2024 #RejectFinanceBill discussions showed young people using X and TikTok to break down tax proposals, share experiences of the rising cost of living, and mobilise protests, turning complex fiscal debates into accessible, peer-to-peer civic learning. Nigeria’s 2024 #EndBadGovernance mobilisation followed a similar pattern, with social media reframing inflation and subsidy cuts as shared public issues.

Even in contexts where civic space is shrinking, and mass mobilisation is not always possible, young people are using social media to discuss public issues, share news, and raise concerns. This is evident in discussions on accountability in Uganda, Tanzania and Senegal, especially during elections or moments of tension. Across these contexts, digital participation shapes how political views are formed and shared in everyday life.

In Mozambique, social media has become an important space for political discussion, particularly during sensitive periods when traditional media is constrained, extending the reach of public debate beyond broadcast and print channels.

In parts of the Sahel, including Mali and Niger, participation happens under more constrained conditions. Internet shutdowns, surveillance risks, and restrictive regulations shape when and how young people can engage online. Even so, messaging apps, virtual private networks (VPNs), and diaspora networks remain important channels for staying connected to civic life.

Digital Spaces as Civic Space
For many young people, civic life is increasingly shaped by digital spaces, where public issues are first encountered, discussed, and interpreted before being shared and debated within peer networks that extend beyond formal institutions.Social media is used not only for expression but also to translate policy issues into accessible language, share experiences of public services, and circulate practical information on health, education, and livelihoods.

CIVICUS civic space monitoring highlights how digital tools are central to how citizens organise and engage institutions, including in contexts where civic space is narrowed. Meanwhile, Afrobarometer research shows that young people are more active in informal and digital participation and are more likely than older persons to use social media as a source of political information.

Participation is therefore less tied to formal moments such as elections and more embedded in continuous interaction with information, discussion, and response through everyday digital communication.

This participation is becoming more accessible, as young people are increasingly able to enter public debate with basic connectivity and a smartphone, without needing formal entry points into political or civic institutions.

Engagement is also more issue-driven, organised around immediate concerns such as cost of living, education, health services, employment, taxation, and accountability, which anchor participation in everyday experience rather than formal political calendars. At the same time, participation is becoming more networked and expressive, as memes, short videos, and livestreams allow complex issues to be translated and broken down into shareable formats while enabling rapid circulation of information across dispersed networks.

These shifts point to a pattern in which participation is less tied to formal civic moments and more embedded in continuous interaction with public debate, shaped by the speed and flow of digital communication.

Implications for Participation and Inclusion
Digital participation is now part of how young people learn, connect, and navigate daily life. This has implications for inclusion because the same platforms used for civic expression are also used to access information on services, opportunities, and public systems.

Participation in civic life is increasingly shaped by inclusion in digital spaces, where access to information influences the ability to participate in public discussion. In many contexts, messaging platforms and short-form video are used to share knowledge about public services and everyday challenges, showing how civic participation and practical information often overlap.

Barriers to Digital Engagement
Despite growing participation, digital civic engagement faces constraints that influence how safely and meaningfully young people can engage in public life online.

In several contexts, internet shutdowns, surveillance practices, unwarranted arrests stemming from social media content, and platform restrictions limit access to information during moments of political tension and weaken trust in digital spaces as reliable channels for civic engagement. Legal and regulatory frameworks can further shape participation where broad provisions on misinformation, cybercrime, or public order create uncertainty and encourage self-censorship among users.

The rapid spread of online content has increased exposure to misinformation, making it harder to verify information, particularly where trusted public sources are limited. Uneven access to devices, high data costs, and gaps in digital skills also shape who can participate meaningfully and on what terms, reinforcing the same inequalities that determine access to information and services more broadly. Limited awareness of digital safety can further affect confidence in engaging openly.

These constraints are reinforced by a growing gap between the scale of youth participation online and the extent to which institutions provide structured ways to respond to what is being expressed in digital spaces. Much of this participation, therefore, does not always translate into formal decision-making, even where it is widespread and visible.

What Needs to Change
Young people are already participating in public life through digital spaces. The question is not whether this is happening, but how institutions respond to forms of engagement that take place outside formal structures.

This calls for a shift in how digital engagement is understood: not a separate or informal layer of civic life, but part of the broader system through which public debate and accountability now operate.

Governments and institutions need to protect the conditions that enable participation, including safeguarding freedom of expression, avoiding disruptions such as internet shutdowns, and ensuring that laws governing online spaces are clear, predictable, and rights-respecting, since these conditions directly shape whether participation is safe and meaningful.

It also requires more responsive and structured ways of engaging with what young people are already raising on digital platforms, so that online discussions are not left to exist in isolation but can inform decision-making in practice. This goes beyond one-way communication and calls for approaches that allow feedback, dialogue, and institutional response to the concerns and priorities circulating in digital spaces, while recognising young people not only as users of platforms but as actors shaping how civic engagement unfolds.

The task is therefore not to introduce participation, but to strengthen the conditions under which it becomes safer, more meaningful, and more likely to influence public decisions.

01Jul

Navigating Digital Rights in Africa amidst Increasing Foreign Malign Influence

CIPESA July 1, 2026July 6, 2026

By CIPESA Writers |

On May 21, 2026, more than 300 delegates convened in Nairobi, Kenya, for the 19th edition of the Kenya Internet Governance Forum (KeIGF) to discuss the state of digital rights and internet governance on the continent.

The KeIGF was held three weeks after the continent’s digital landscape was jolted by the Zambian government’s decision to postpone RightsCon, the global digital rights forum, four days before it was scheduled to start. Efforts to resolve the issue yielded no positive results, and Access Now, the event organiser, decided to cancel the conference.

According to the Access Now statement, officials in Zambia’s Ministry of Technology and Science had reached out to them with concerns raised by diplomats from the People’s Republic of China, who were “pressuring” the Zambian government over the planned in-person participation of Taiwanese civil society.

Proceeding with the event while excluding some participants at the behest of certain countries would have set a bad precedent. The RightsCon cancellation, however, had a ripple effect. Several in-person sessions of the World Press Freedom Day 2026 Global Conference, which was to be held alongside the RightsCon conference at the Mulungushi International Conference Centre in Lusaka, were cancelled, while others were rescheduled to later dates.

These events highlight the growing influence of national governments on the success or failure of regional and international digital rights convenings. As Access Now explained, such convenings often involve extensive diplomatic engagement between conference organisers and host countries to secure their commitments, among other things, to respect the fundamental human rights of all participants and to ensure smooth logistical preparations. For example, in March 2026, the Zambian Ministry of Technology and Science issued a statement announcing that the government would be a co-host of the RightsCon conference.

Access Now’s decision was a timely reminder that fundamental human rights, including digital rights, are non-negotiable and interdependent, and that national governments should not be at liberty to choose which rights to respect.

Growing Incidents of Foreign Malign Influence in Africa

Foreign governments’ interference in the internal affairs of African countries is not new, and while incidents of foreign malign influence in Africa’s trajectory toward digital authoritarianism have been well documented, the RightsCon cancellation was possibly the first time a foreign entity worked so blatantly to influence the direction of a digital rights convening itself. This clearly demonstrated the dangers posed by the growing economic and power imbalances between African countries and their trading partners.

Because many African countries have turned to China and Russia for support for their economic and security agendas, respectively, they have inadvertently surrendered part of their sovereignty to these superpowers due to what is referred to as the “debt trap”.

For example, in April 2026, China was reported to have scrapped tariffs on all African countries except Eswatini, which maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a move that contributed to friction between Access Now and the Zambian government. Earlier in 2022, the Chinese government was reported to have “forgiven” 23 interest-free loans to 17 African nations after it had also cancelled more than USD 3.4 billion in debt and restructured around USD 15 billion in debt in Africa between 2000 and 2019.

Reports by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) have shown that geopolitical interests have often crossed national boundaries, with powerful nations exerting influence on the legal landscapes and digital public infrastructure of many African countries.

According to an Institute of Development Studies study that mapped smart surveillance technologies in 11 African countries, many African countries that have embraced smart city surveillance have tended to rely on China for financing their digital public infrastructure, including tools, software, and capacity-building, which are often deployed to conduct digital surveillance of their citizens. Digital rights actors and individual government critics have often borne the brunt of these surveillance practices.

Unfortunately, the deployment of these digital surveillance tools and software is often characterised by limited oversight and a lack of transparency regarding their purchases and operations, raising serious concerns about their intentions and their impact on human rights.

In April 2026, a team of United Nations Experts raised serious concerns about the proliferation of digital surveillance technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), noting that their misuse by states in law enforcement, counter-terrorism, border management, and national security and military contexts poses serious human rights risks.

Disinformation and Information Warfare

Africa has also become a battlefield for disinformation campaigns as different superpowers scramble to expand their spheres of influence. Foreign disinformation campaigns are particularly prominent during periods of contestation, such as elections, protests, and civil strife.

Because they are more covert, disinformation campaigns have become more insidious as they are rarely noticeable or easily associated with foreign actors. For example, in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria, Russia has worked with locally based influencers and digital content creators to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives and messaging while keeping their connections to Russian-backed initiatives a secret.

In 2024 alone, there were at least 80 documented cases of Russian-linked disinformation campaigns targeting more than 22 African countries. Indeed, several of Africa’s fragile autocracies, such as Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan, have come to rely on Russia’s well-coordinated digital propaganda to sustain their stay in power.

Mitigating the Malign Influence

Foreign malign influence has continued to thrive in Africa, partly due to African countries’ overreliance on the “generosity” of superpowers seeking to shape Africa’s political, social, and economic landscape. While development partnerships and support are critical to a country’s development, these should be anchored in rights-respecting frameworks and geared towards benefiting ordinary citizens.

Taken together, the various aspects of foreign malign influence are undermining the democratic practices of many African countries, including electoral processes, while emboldening autocratic leaders to embrace digital authoritarianism.

For digital rights activists, especially in Africa, it is therefore important to understand and address the factors driving the expansion of foreign digital malign influence and to develop strategies to counter it, including mechanisms to hold governments accountable when they purchase and deploy digital surveillance tools and software.

More specifically, digital rights actors should:

Strengthen Digital and Media Literacy

Because foreign malign influence most often thrives in contexts with limited media and information literacy, weak media systems, and digital inequalities, it is important that rights actors build systems that promote information integrity, such as media independence, fact-checking, and independent journalism, to counter information manipulation. In most of Africa, the media and information ecosystems are so integrated, enabling the viral spread of misinformation through influencers and digital content creators with large followings. Quite often, media houses amplify the disinformation tapped from influencers with large followings without verification.

Build Stronger Coalitions and Regional Networks

In many African countries, governments have often used the tried-and-tested “divide and rule” approach, mischaracterising digital rights actors as either sympathetic to them or “enemies”. The main purpose is always to isolate certain actors deemed too critical.

To mitigate the risks associated with engaging with less democratic governments, digital rights actors should aim to build synergies and support systems, ensuring that collective voices among like-minded organisations, such as academia, media, and telecom companies, can, among other things, challenge government excesses. This could include issuing joint statements, which is critical as it does not expose any entity; and providing technical and financial assistance to more at-risk organisations.

Leverage Digital Rights Convenings

Digital rights convenings such as the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) and Internet Governance Forum have become strategic platforms for digital rights advocacy and engagements, especially with national governments. It is therefore important that digital rights actors use these platforms to continuously ask duty bearers the hard questions regarding the conduct of due diligence reports on any technologies imported into the continent and their impact on fundamental human rights.

For example, Africa will host several international and regional digital rights convenings, including the 21st Global Internet Governance Forum, which will be held in Kenya in December 2026, the fourth time the event will be held on the continent. In September, Mauritius will host the 13th FIFAfrica edition, while Ghana will host the 15th Annual Africa Internet Governance Forum in November 2026.

These events present great opportunities for digital rights actors to reflect on Africa’s digital rights record and the progress made so far, and to table concrete African positions on digital rights, including data sovereignty, Artificial Intelligence, and platform accountability.

23Jun

Towards Regulation of App-Based Health Data in Africa

CIPESA June 23, 2026June 23, 2026

By Edrine Wanyama |

Digital health technologies are reshaping healthcare delivery across Africa. App-based systems now connect patients, clinicians, pharmacies, laboratories, and public health agencies, creating new opportunities to improve access, efficiency, and coordination of care. At the same time, they generate large volumes of highly sensitive health data, much of it moving across platforms, providers, and in some cases, national borders.

A new Policy brief by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) examines the critical need for robust governance of app-based health data in Africa.

The brief highlights significant health data governance gaps, which include the lack of health-specific AI regulation, fragmented legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and the unresolved distinction between wellness tracking and clinical care. These gaps fundamentally undermine health data handling and management standards, with flaws in consent, accountability, and cross-border data management requirements.

Across the continent, digital health applications now span multiple functions within health systems, from clinical management systems and electronic medical records (EMR) platforms to pharmaceutical logistics and supply chains. Alongside these systems, AI-enabled and specialist care platforms are expanding diagnostic and treatment capacity. Patient-facing applications are also expanding, particularly in chronic care, maternal health, and home-based services.

While these innovations are improving access to services and efficiency, they also introduce significant governance risks. Health data is among the most sensitive categories of personal data, capable of revealing medical history, reproductive health, mental health status, and genetic information. In app-based systems, this data is often processed by multiple actors, including developers, health providers, cloud infrastructure providers, and third-party analytics firms, many of which are not visible to users.

In practice, consent is often weak or poorly understood, data sharing arrangements are opaque, and users have limited visibility or control over the use of their information. This creates risks not only to privacy, but also to trust in digital health systems.

These risks are compounded by fragmented legal and institutional frameworks. Although many countries have enacted data protection laws and digital health policies, enforcement remains uneven and coordination between health ministries, data protection authorities, and digital regulators is often weak. This creates a persistent governance gap between the rapid expansion of app-based health systems and the capacity of institutions to regulate them effectively.

At the continental level, emerging frameworks such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and global guidance such as the World Health Organization (WHO) Digital Health Strategy set important normative directions for secure, rights-respecting health data governance. However, translating these commitments into enforceable national systems remains limited, particularly in relation to interoperability, cross-border data flows, and platform accountability.

The brief calls for the adoption of a strategic governance architecture grounded in seven data governance principles, namely:

Data sovereignty that reflects African public health priorities, democratic oversight and defined accountability mechanisms;
Cross-border data flows where adequate and comparable safeguards exist and support reciprocal recognition arrangements among Data Protection Authorities (DPAs);
Consent, purpose limitation, and data minimisation that enable individuals to make informed decisions about participation and ensure secondary uses are subject to transparency and safeguards;
Interoperability and standardisation of systems to ensure integration and portability;
Governance of AI-based health tools that require algorithmic impact assessments, independent audits and ongoing monitoring;
Equity and inclusion to ensure systems do not further exclude vulnerable and marginalised communities; and
Accountability and institutional coordination through clear allocations of responsibilities across institutions, consistent oversight, enforcement, and compliance monitoring.

The principles are consistent with the CDC Health Data Governance Framework. Together with other continental instruments, they can support a harmonised, rights-respecting and secure health data governance in Africa.

The brief presents recommendations for various stakeholders which, if implemented, could foster a progressive and trustworthy digital health ecosystem in Africa. Among theses include:

For the African Union and Regional Bodies

Support implementation of the Africa CDC Continental Health Data Governance Framework through clear timelines, monitoring mechanisms, knowledge sharing platforms, and technical assistance for member states.
Develop a continental health-app certification framework, recognised across participating jurisdictions, covering consent requirements, interoperability standards, cybersecurity safeguards, data governance obligations, and algorithmic accountability.
Facilitate regional data trust zones through reciprocal recognition agreements among Data Protection Authorities, enabling secure and accountable cross-border health data flows for disease surveillance, research collaboration, and pandemic preparedness.

For National Governments and Health Ministries

Enact or strengthen health-specific data governance legislation that addresses the full data lifecycle in app-based health systems, including consent, purpose limitation, data minimisation, retention, breach notification, and cross-border transfers.
Establish regulatory sandboxes to assess the safety, effectiveness, and governance implications of emerging digital health technologies before large-scale deployment.

For Data Protection Authorities

Conduct risk-based audits and impact assessments of high-impact health applications, including privacy, security, and algorithmic fairness, where AI systems are deployed.
Develop sector-specific guidance on the processing of health, biometric, and demographic data, including standards for research use, secondary use, and commercial processing.
Enter into reciprocal recognition arrangements with counterpart DPAs across Africa to support coordinated enforcement and trusted cross-border data flows.

For Health Service Providers

Formalise data processing agreements with health app vendors and third-party processors, including provisions on security, breach notification, audit rights, and liability.
Strengthen workforce capacity through regular training on health data governance, cybersecurity, incident reporting, and the responsible handling of sensitive health information.
Implement strong authentication, access-control, and encryption measures to protect patient information throughout its lifecycle.

For App Developers and Platform Operators

Embed privacy-by-design and security-by-design principles throughout the development, deployment, and operation of health applications.
Provide clear and accessible consent mechanisms that enable users to understand and control how their health data is collected, shared, retained, and reused.
Conduct regular testing and independent assessments of digital health tools to identify and address bias, accuracy concerns, and performance disparities across African populations.

For Health Service Consumers and App Users

Exercise rights over personal health data, including rights of access, correction, portability, and deletion where provided under applicable legal frameworks.
Use health applications that comply with relevant regulatory requirements and recognised data protection standards.
Report suspected data breaches, misuse of personal information, or harmful automated decision-making outcomes to relevant regulators and oversight bodies.

Please read the full Policy Brief here.

11Jun

Protecting Children Online in Africa Must Move from Policy to Practice

CIPESA June 11, 2026June 11, 2026

By Patricia Ainembabazi |

Child online safety has returned to the forefront of digital governance discussions across Africa and globally. New regulatory initiatives from the United Nations, the African Union, and industry coalitions reflect growing concern about the risks children face in increasingly digital societies. Yet, while policy commitments are multiplying, implementation continues to lag.

The challenge is particularly acute in Africa, where internet access is expanding rapidly while child protection systems struggle to keep pace. As more children go online, they are increasingly exposed to cyberbullying, online grooming, sexual exploitation, harmful content, privacy violations, and emerging Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled risks such as disinformation and misinformation.

Just last month, the United Nations Human Rights Office called for stronger regulation and government oversight, publishing 10 key points to make platforms safer for children, urging technology companies to embed child safety into their product design and address the growing risk posed by AI. This reflects a broader shift in global digital policy. The Global Digital Compact has committed states to strengthen legal and policy frameworks for children’s rights in digital spaces and to prioritise national online child safety policies and standards by 2030.

At the continental level, the African Union Child Onli ne Safety and Empowerment Policy of 2024 sets out principles on children’s safety and privacy, and participation to guide member states in developing national strategies, while the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), UNICEF, and partners recently launched the Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection to strengthen coordination among governments, mobile operators, technology companies, regulators, law enforcement, civil society, and young people.

Some African countries are already taking steps to strengthen child protection online. Rwanda is considering restrictions on social media access for children under 16, while Zimbabwe recently approved a National Child Online Protection Policy for 2026–2030 aimed at addressing online sexual exploitation, cyberbullying, grooming, harmful content, sextortion, and privacy violations.

These developments reflect a broader global shift in approaches to child online safety. Australia has legislated to restrict social media access for children under 16, while the United Kingdom recently concluded a national consultation examining age-based protections and enforcement mechanisms. Across several countries, governments, regulators, and civil society organisations are increasingly calling on technology companies to strengthen safeguards and take greater responsibility for protecting children online.

A broader strategy would expand efforts to ensure that while policies and frameworks on child protection are being developed, children are involved. This would help them understand the several platforms available for use, associated risks, pressures, and opportunities for digital life. The Africa Taskforce on Child Online Protection recognises this mode of participation and has now included youth representatives by integrating their voices for a child-centered digital future in Africa. Replicating this approach at the national level, through wide youth consultations, school-based dialogues, child-friendly policy forums, and participatory design of reporting and safety tools, will foster a healthy digital environment for the young.

It is against this backdrop that the Digital Rights Alliance Africa (DRAA) report, “Child Protection and Safety Online in Africa: The Law, Privacy, Challenges and Solutions, provides crucial, ground-level evidence across 10 countries – Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. It highlights the gaps in child safety and protection online despite technological advancement and expansion.

The report highlights several recommendations that could help foster child safety and protection online, which are directed to different stakeholders, including the government, civil society organisations, international organisations, development partners, the technology sector, media, academia, parents, and the general community, and among others include;

Parliaments should enact specific national laws that protect children’s privacy and safety in digital spaces, with clear safeguards tailored to children’s particular vulnerabilities, such as cyberbullying, grooming, online sexual exploitation, image-based abuse, harmful content, misuse of children’s data, profiling, and age-inappropriate design.
Governments should invest in the implementation of national strategies that set out the roles of government agencies, the judiciary, data protection authorities, law enforcement actors, educators, parents, and the private sector in protecting children in the digital age.
Platforms and telecom companies should design child-friendly products and services, minimise the collection and retention of children’s data, introduce age verification and parental controls, publish transparency reports, and submit protection measures to independent audits.
The media should monitor, document, and report objectively, and expose all cases of online child abuse and demand accountability from the responsible parties.
Civil society organisations should engage in advocacy, awareness raising, legal reform, evidence-based research, and documentation of issues affecting child safety online in order to demand and push for accountability of all the relevant stakeholders.
All stakeholders must ensure that children are meaningfully included in innovation and programming, and that children and young people are actively engaged as participants in discussions, collaborations, and co-design of digital solutions.

Ultimately, for children to stay online, measures must go beyond mere policy expressions and aspirations as reiterated in the Global Digital Compact’s 2030. Laws and frameworks specific to child protection and safety online should be developed and stringently implemented. Moreover, digital service providers must be held accountable, and other stakeholders, including parents, schools, and communities, should join efforts to ensure that children are empowered to safely utilise digital technologies.

CIPESA and partners continue to advocate for rights-respecting policies that advance children’s protection, participation, access, and safe use of digital technologies, while calling on technology companies to embed these principles in platform design, governance, and accountability systems.

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