Navigating the Threats To Journalism in Uganda

By Brian Byaruhanga |

Over the years, journalists in Uganda have confronted a relentless tide of harassment, censorship, and physical violence as they diligently performed their duty. As reported by the Press Freedom Index, compiled by the Human Rights Network of Journalists, incidents of violations and abuse against journalists in Uganda have surged over recent years, climbing from 163 in 2018, to 165 in 2019, peaking at 174 in 2020, and 131 violations in 2021, culminating with Uganda dropping 7 (seven) places to 132 out of 180 countries from the 2021 rankings by the Freedom in the World Report in 2022. These transgressions are primarily orchestrated by regulatory authorities and security agencies. While challenges to journalism in Uganda are not novel, the advent of digital transformation and emergent technologies has infused new complexities into the landscape of press freedom and journalism practice in the country.

The ubiquity of digital technology has afforded journalists the ability to disseminate information rapidly. However, this swiftness has ushered in a suite of challenges to the very essence of journalism. It has engendered a proliferation of misinformation and disinformation, the imposition and acceptance of repressive legal frameworks, and the establishment of intricate content moderation systems.

In 2018, the Ugandan government, ostensibly to counteract the spread of what it pejoratively termed “gossip,” levied a tax on social media. This move was interpreted by critics as an effort to curtail freedom of speech and suppress dissenting viewpoints. Though, after years of resistance, this tax was ultimately overturned, it starkly illuminated the strained relationship between the government and the media.

In July 2022, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Bill was introduced in the Ugandan Parliament, a piece of legislation that later became law. It outlined a fresh set of offenses, subject to punitive penalties of imprisonment and fines. The bill was devised to “prohibit the sending or sharing of information that promotes hate speech” and “provide for the prohibition of sending or sharing false, malicious, and unsolicited information.” It also sought to define and penalize hate speech. 

See this CIPESA analysis of the  Computer Misuse Amendment Bill 2022.

According to the bill, “a person shall not write, send or share any information through a computer, which is likely to ridicule, degrade, or demean another person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion or gender; create divisions among persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender; or promote hostility against a person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender.”

Less than three months following its introduction, the Ugandan Computer Misuse Amendment Act of 2022 came into force, receiving the presidential assent of H.E Yoweri Kaguta Museveni on October 14, 2022.

These legislative measures appear to cloak attempts at content moderation under the guise of instilling self-censorship and disseminating fear regarding the sharing of information. Moreover, state surveillance emerges as another potent tool wielded against journalists, perpetuating reports of harassment, arrests, and detentions, often facilitated through state-sanctioned surveillance activities. There have also been allegations of the government employing spyware to target journalists and activists.

In the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 general elections, the Ugandan government implemented stringent surveillance protocols while intensifying existing restrictions on free expression. This crackdown became particularly conspicuous after a cohort of Ugandan investigative journalists received notifications that their devices had been compromised by Pegasus, a spy software enabling operators to extract messages, photos, emails, record calls, and clandestinely activate microphones and cameras. Notably, this software is attributed to the Israeli spyware firm, NSO Group, which officially supplies the Pegasus software to military, law enforcement, and government intelligence agencies for the purpose of targeting criminals and terrorists. However, multiple reports surfaced indicating the use of the software against politicians, journalists, and activists. Investigative journalist Canary Mugume was among the few who received an alert from Apple, signalling that state-sponsored attackers may be targeting his phone.

The escalating adoption of technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning also invokes apprehension. While these technologies have the potential to enhance journalistic work, they also harbor the capacity to manipulate information and undermine the credibility of journalists. A notable example is the use of deepfake technology, capable of crafting persuasive yet fabricated videos or audio recordings, employed to discredit journalists and their work.

To address these threats to journalism in Uganda, it is imperative for journalists to embrace digital resilient practices, safeguarding their sources and their work. Additionally, media organizations should make investments in technologies capable of detecting and countering disinformation and misinformation.

The perils of disinformation and misinformation, state surveillance, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and brutality pose substantial challenges to the function of journalists and the role of media in a democratic society. Overcoming these challenges necessitates concerted efforts by journalists, media organizations, governments, civil society, and international entities to champion a free and independent media that effectively serves the public interest.

It is therefore imperative to acknowledge that journalists operate within an ever-evolving media and digital milieu. And proactive measures must be adopted to ensure their digital security through the implementation of appropriate precautions and the ongoing pursuit of the latest security measures. Specifically, journalists must undertake the following steps to safeguard their well-being while executing their professional responsibilities:

Digital Security Training: Journalists should participate in digital security training to acquire knowledge on how to protect themselves and their sources online. These training programs offer guidance on encrypting communications, securing devices, and maintaining anonymity.

Use of Encryption: Journalists should employ encryption tools like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), encrypted messaging applications, and secure email services to ensure the security of their communications and data, safeguarding them from interception and surveillance.

Secure Data Storage: Journalists should adopt secure data storage practices, including the utilization of encrypted external hard drives, password-protected archives, and encrypted cloud storage services. These measures prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.

Two-Factor Authentication: To fortify their online security, journalists should implement two-factor authentication for their digital accounts. This extra layer of protection safeguards their accounts against unauthorized access.

Caution with Social Media: Journalists must exercise prudence on social media platforms. They should refrain from disseminating sensitive information and limit the extent of personal details shared online, thus mitigating the risk of exposing themselves or their sources to harm.

Practicing Situational Awareness: Maintaining an acute awareness of their surroundings is crucial for journalists, especially when conducting interviews or reporting from the field. This involves steering clear of hazardous areas and being vigilant for potential threats, ensuring their physical safety while pursuing their professional duties.

Use of Secure Networks: Public Wi-Fi networks, often unsecured, are susceptible to interception. Journalists should avoid their use and instead opt for secure networks or establish their own hotspots, reducing the risk of compromising sensitive data.

In navigating the multifaceted threats to journalism in Uganda, journalists must adopt a multifaceted approach encompassing personal digital security measures, collective industry efforts, and international advocacy for press freedom and journalists’ safety. These actions, coupled with unwavering commitment, will enable journalists to continue their indispensable work, promoting transparency, accountability, and democracy, even in the face of mounting challenges in the digital age.

Through the tireless pursuit of these strategies, journalists in Uganda can reinforce their resilience, fortify their commitment to truth-telling, and persevere in upholding the fundamental principles of journalism – principles that serve not only the interests of a free press but also the broader cause of democracy and informed citizenship. In this era of digital transformation, journalism remains an essential pillar of democracy and an indispensable guardian of society’s well-being. In conclusion, navigating the evolving landscape of journalism in Uganda demands not only the adoption of technical safeguards but also unwavering resolve. The challenges faced by journalists serve as a testament to the vitality of their work in safeguarding democratic values. In embracing the digital era, journalists must continue to shine a light on truth, accountability, and justice, thereby preserving the foundations of a vibrant, free, and democratic society.

Submit Your Session Proposal or Travel Support Application to the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2023 (FIFAfrica23)

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) invites interested parties to submit session proposals to the 2023 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica23). Successful submissions will help to shape the agenda of the event, which will gather hundreds of policymakers, regulators, human rights defenders, journalists, academics, private sector players, global information intermediaries, bloggers, and developers.

FIFAfrica23, which is set to take place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on September 27-29, 2023, offers a platform for deliberation on gaps and opportunities for advancing privacy, free expression, inclusion, free flow of information, civic participation, and innovation online. This year will mark a decade of hosting the landmark event in various African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.

As part of the registration, we invite session proposals including panel discussions, lightning talks, exhibitions, and skills workshops to shape the FIFAfrica23 agenda. 

CIPESA is committed to ensuring diversity of voices, backgrounds and viewpoints in attendance and as organisers and speakers at panels at FIFAfrica. In line with this, there is limited funding to support travel for participation at FIFAfrica23. Preference will be given to applicants who can partially support their attendance and those who organise sessions.

Submissions close at 18.00 (East Africa Time) on July 14, 2023. Successful session proposals and travel support applicants will be directly notified by August 14, 2023.

The session proposal and travel support form can be accessed here.

NOTE: All data collected as part of the registration and session proposal exercise will only be used for purposes of the FIFAfrica event management.   

Follow @cipesaug on Twitter and on the dedicated FIFAfrica website for regular updates on the Forum.

Disinformation and Hate Speech Continue to Fuel the Conflict in Eastern DR Congo 

By Nadine Kampire Temba and CIPESA Writer |

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) continues to witness an information war, characterised by spiralling incitement, misinformation, disinformation and hate speech on social media. The state of affairs has undermined cohesion between communities and continues unabated due to various factors. 

Firstly, the country’s long history of political instability has created an environment where misinformation, disinformation and hate speech thrive. Over the past three decades, the DR Congo has witnessed cyclic and indiscriminate violence, and internationalised conflict. These have been fuelled by impunity for atrocities, endemic corruption, poor governance, leadership wrangles and differences over the control of an estimated USD 24 trillion worth of mineral resources, pitting the government against neighbouring countries, at least 120 armed groups and other parties. 

The instability has left at least 24.6 million people (one in four Congolese) at risk of food insecurity and a further six million citizens internally displaced, the highest on the continent. Human rights violations have remained commonplace despite years of humanitarian interventions. More recently, the conflict has escalated in Ituri and Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the country. Violence between government forces and armed groups has led to the death of at least 1,300 people since October 2022 and forced about 300,000 civilians to flee their homes and villages. 

Secondly, divisions among the country’s diverse ethnic groups have contributed to the escalation of tensions and hostility, while disputes with neighbouring Rwanda have led to the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two states. Congo, United Nations experts and western governments accuse Rwanda of backing the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group which continues to extend its control in North Kivu – accusations Rwanda and the rebel group deny. 

The Congolese government has labelled the M23 a “terrorist movement” and blamed it for committing atrocities, including summary executions and forced enlistment of civilians. In January 2023, Congo accused Rwanda of shooting down its fighter jet and described this as a “deliberate act of aggression that amounts to an act of war”. Rwanda claimed the jet had violated its airspace on three occasions. This came eight months after Kinshasa banned Rwanda Air from its airspace.

For its part, the Rwanda government accuses the Congolese army of utilising proxy armed groups, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Les Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, FDLR), to contain the M23 offensive and to destabilise Rwanda.

The strained relations between the two countries, coupled with social divisions based on ethnicity, religion, nationality and political affiliation, continue to be exploited by politicians and groups affiliated to both countries to create tension and fuel hate speech and disinformation online and offline. On October 30, 2022, the Congolese government ordered the Rwandan ambassador, Vincent Karega, to leave the country within 48 hours in retaliation for Kigali’s alleged support to the M23. The DR Congo also recalled its top diplomat from Rwanda in a further souring of relations. A day later, on October 31, 2022, thousands of Congolese citizens, mostly in Goma city, attended anti-Rwanda protests to denounce Kigali’s alleged support of the M23, a mostly Congolese Tutsi group and what they called the “hypocrisy of the international community in the face of Rwanda’s aggression.” 

During the protests, names of individuals identified as Rwandans were read out, resulting in attacks and lynching of some individuals. In response, online trolls affiliated to Rwanda have targeted Congolese political leaders, journalists and civil society leaders. The targets of attacks in Congo have included the Banyarwanda (Tutsi) and the Banyamulenge whose citizenship, equal rights and belonging in DR Congo have been constantly questioned. They often face threats, attacks, and dehumanising stereotypes as they are perceived as foreigners or Rwandan implants supporting the M23 rebellion. 

Amidst these tensions is a weak and underdeveloped media environment in both DR CongoC and Rwanda, coupled with low media literacy among the population, which are enabling the spread of false information without being challenged or fact-checked. The situation has been further complicated by the lack of both skills and tools in content moderation and editorial guidance on the part of local media outlets and journalists working from both sides of the border. 

Media houses have to compete with social media platforms where users have found a sense of “community” by connecting with a variety of actors at the national level and in the diaspora who anonymously disseminate and amplify well-scripted radical messages, conspiracy theories and polarising narratives to wider audiences and appeal to ethnic loyalties and sow discord among communities. Some of the rivalling groups have deployed bots and trolls in order to manipulate the public opinion on social media.

According to Congolese journalist Desanges Kihuha, the media that are committed to providing truthful information are struggling to match the speed at which conflict-related disinformation and misinformation are spreading on social media platforms due to limited skills and funding. Thus, any actor intent on spreading false information can publish information online where it can easily gain virality without being fact-checked. “In the current context of war and insecurity in North Kivu province, misinformation continues to spread at a fast rate due to the use of digital and social media. Unfortunately, there is little press coverage of this phenomenon of hate speech and fake news,” says Kihuha.

Related to the above is that a significant part of the population, especially those in rural areas, lack access to accurate, verifiable and reliable information, while at the same time, the youth rely on social media for information. In addition, the social and economic challenges affecting the public, such as high poverty levels and limited access to basic services and infrastructure, create frustration, resentment, anger and distrust of the state, making the public vulnerable to exploitation. 

As a result, politicians, armed groups and their allies exploit these vulnerabilities to create tension by manipulating public opinion to generate support for their extremist political views or groups and channelling the public anger to promote hate speech and disinformation to further escalate the ethnic and regional conflicts. Theogene Magarambe, a Rwandan journalist, describes this as the “instrumentalisation of the M23 insurgency” in order to distract the public from governance shortcomings and the failure to restore peace and rule of law in Kivu. 

The failure by governments on both sides of the border to create an environment to push back against the political polarisation and disinformation online is widely acknowledged. “At the practical level, policies related to content moderation and regulation are currently inexistent, though we are engaging cross-border communities in order to create space for dialogue, hosting workshops and platforms where we exchange knowledge,” says Marion Ngavho Kambale, who is the head of the civil society of the North Kivu province.  Magarambe adds: “Today the true legitimacy test for any credible government is whether it can implement legal safeguards on privately developed technologies and hold platform operators accountable for failure to moderate content.”

Critics point to the challenge of the structural conception of social media platforms, whose business models and algorithms mostly prioritise content based on its engagement value rather than its accuracy or truth. Platforms such as Facebook have been criticised for inaction in the face of online ethnic incitement and massacres in Ethiopia – a potential risk in the DR Congo-Rwanda conflict. As Arsene Tungali, a digital rights and internet governance expert observed, inadequate actions by the likes of Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp means “the devastating effects of political polarisation, hate speech and disinformation peddled on  social media remain a problem.”

Louis Gitinywa, a digital rights and technology lawyer, says although the internet has offered citizens and private actors in the two countries a robust civic space for organising and engaging with key societal priorities, the “lawlessness and disinformation online … continue to contribute to fighting and killings”. 

Overall, addressing hate and disinformation in the DR Congo-Rwanda conflict will require a sustained and coordinated effort from multiple actors. Looking ahead, there is a critical need to build capacity and expertise amongst all the stakeholders in order to formulate effective strategies for content moderation. This includes building the legal expertise and strategic litigation to hold liable social media such as Facebook and Twitter for failing to effectively put adequate measures to moderate content in native and indigenous languages.

Further, since media literacy is limited, it is important to build the capacity of journalists, media practitioners and civil society reporting on the conflict to be aware of the complex information environment, relevant skills in fact-checking, professional ethics, content moderation as well as building their own professional networks for sharing credible information with counterparts across borders and avoiding sensationalism in reporting. They can also use the available platforms to promote responsible social media use, tolerance and dialogue between different groups in order to build trust. Moreover, the different actors should desist from propagating hate speech and disinformation. 

Nadine Kampire Temba is a journalist and digital rights lawyer based in Goma city, DR Congo, and a fellow with CIPESA. She coordinates Afia Amani Grands Lacs, an online media outlet that undertakes fact-checking and defends press freedom in the Great Lakes Region. You can follow her on Twitter @nadineKampire

Gear Up! The 2023 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) is Heading to Tanzania!

Announcement |

The annual Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) hosted by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) will be held in Dar es Salam, Tanzania on September 27-29, 2023. This year will mark a decade of the largest gathering on internet freedom in Africa, which has since 2014 put internet freedom on the agenda of key actors including African policy makers, platform operators, telcos, regulators, human rights defenders, academia, law enforcement representatives, and the media. This has paved the way for broader work on advancing digital rights in Africa and promoting the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance.

In several African countries, it is becoming increasingly challenging to utilise the internet to defend human rights, strengthen independent media, support democratisation, and demand accountable and transparent governance, or to freely access information and contribute content in the diversity of African languages. This is undermining the core principle of the internet as a free and open platform. 

The decision to host the 2023 edition of FIFAfrica in Tanzania is in recognition of the country’s progressive shift to advance digitalisation for sustainable development. Under the leadership of its first female President, Samia Suluhu Hassan, a proponent for civil rights and women’s rights, the country has undergone political and legal reforms aimed at enhancing civic space and digitalisation agenda. Notably, a data protection law has been enacted, the law governing media operations is being revised, and the  Online Content Regulations 2020 were revised to make them more supportive of online speech, privacy and access to information. 

It is upon this backdrop that FIFAfrica 2023 will offer a platform for critical engagement of diverse stakeholders in identifying the most pressing internet rights-related issues and challenges that have to be addressed at national and regional levels. Over the years, FIFAfrica has identified opportunities for bringing the debate on the importance of digital rights to national, regional and global fora. In particular, the Forum supports the development of substantive inputs to inform a wide range of conversations at organisational, national, regional, continental and global levels, including at the African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the United Nations Human Rights Council, the African Internet Governance Forum (IGF), sub-regional IGFs and at the global IGF.

The growth in diversity of participants and discussions at FIFAfrica reflects the evolving trends and concerns in access and usage of the internet and related technologies.  Topics have included access to information, mass surveillance, turning policy into action, internet shutdowns, content regulation, cyber security, digital economy, online violence against women, data protection and privacy, cyber governance, open source investigative journalism, online movement building and civic building, business and big data, building research capacity in internet measurements, innovation and security in conflict territories, as well as gender-sensitive approaches to ICT Policy and decision making. 

Overall, FIFAfrica is helping to grow the community advancing digital rights in Africa, increasing awareness about and advocacy for internet freedom, while forging new alliances that advance digital rights. It elevates new voices including those of often marginalised groups such as the youth, persons with disabilities and women, and enables state and non-state actors to develop evidence-based interventions that guide policy and practice

FIFAfrica has previously been hosted in Uganda, South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia, with the last edition attended by up to 1,000 individuals (online and offline) from 47 countries.
A call for proposals and travel support applications will be announced soon. For updates, follow CIPESA social media (@cipesaug) accounts  on Twitter,Facebook and LinkedIn.

Court Admits Expert Views from CIPESA, Access Now and Article 19 on Uganda’s Digital ID 

By CIPESA Writer |

On March 24, 2023, the High Court of Uganda at Kampala ruled to allow experts from Access Now, ARTICLE 19, and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) to offer their opinions on the human rights red flags around the country’s digital identification (ID) system. 

The ruling followed an application by the three organisations for admission as “Friends of Court” in a case which challenges the use of the National Identification Register as the sole data source and primary means of identification prior to accessing various social services. Uganda’s national digital ID, also known as Ndaga Muntu, is a mandatory scheme for accessing various socio-economic services.

The court admitted the amicus brief submission by the trio despite objections from the Attorney General and the National Identification Registration Authority (NIRA) on grounds that the application was facilitated by bias and partiality of the applicants. The respondents further argued that the applications introduced new, inadmissible evidence – an assertion the court did not agree with. The court, in fact, noted the significance of the arguments raised  by Access Now, ARTICLE 19 and CIPESA, particularly on data protection, digital inclusion, surveillance, and the sufficiency of protection measures and their impact on the right to privacy.

The admission means that the court will consider the opinions of the three organisations in determining the case challenging Uganda’s digital ID system. In his ruling, Justice  Boniface Wamala noted that the matters the three organisations raised did not constitute evidence. Rather, they “constitute legal concepts that are new, unfamiliar, unusual or unique. Such aspects constitute the quality of novelty.”

The organisations made the application as neutral parties and experts to assist the court to be better abreast with novel areas that potentially contribute to the development of the law. 

The joint brief seeks to help court fully grasp the potential impact of the national digital ID program on online and offline rights including the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, as well as intersecting economic, social, and cultural rights by providing expert evidence at national, sub regional, regional, and international levels. It also explains how the digital identity system might contribute to excluding citizens from basic access to services, thereby leaving them in a vulnerable state.  

The case challenging the ID system was filed by the Initiative for Social and Economic Rights,  Unwanted Witness, and Health Equity and Policy Initiative, against the Ugandan Attorney General and the NIRA. The NIRA is the body charged with creating and managing the National Identification Register by registering births, deaths, citizens and non-citizens. 

In its affidavit in support of the amicus application, CIPESA argued that as an expert in  advancing internet freedom and governance, civic participation, and data governance, it saw the need to intervene as a friend of court, in public interest and the interest of justice, to promote and protect human rights.

According to CIPESA’s Legal Officer, Edrine Wanyama, the ruling to hear the opinions of the expert organisations could help in shaping new and emerging areas of the law in Uganda on the need to respect privacy and other rights in the deployment of digital technologies in public digitalisation programmes, including initiatives like the Digital ID.

“This is a demonstration of the commitment of the courts to remain open to new and emerging knowledge and jurisprudence and to receive expert opinions on how to protect citizens from potential harms associated with the use of technology,” said Wanyama. 

CIPESA anticipates that the court will draw considerable knowledge from the amicus submissions and reach a decision that ensures that the roll-out of the digital ID system does not serve as a tool for exclusion but as an inclusion tool for all persons in accessing social and economic services.

Access Now, ARTICLE 19, and CIPESA aim to continue offering the court expert views that could help to ensure that the digital ID system is implemented in a manner that respects minimum human rights standards and promotes and protects rights and freedoms.