State of Internet Freedom In Africa Report

2025 State of Internet Freedom In Africa Report Documents the Implications of AI on Digital Democracy in Africa

By Juliet Nanfuka | 

The 2025 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica25) concluded on a high note with the unveiling of the latest State of Internet Freedom in Africa (SIFA) report. Titled Navigating the Implications of AI on Digital Democracy in Africa, this landmark study unpacks how artificial intelligence is shaping, disrupting, and reimagining civic space and digital rights across the continent.

Drawing on research from 14 countries (Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), the report documents both the immense promise and the urgent perils of AI in Africa. It highlights AI’s potential to strengthen democratic participation, improve public services, and drive innovation, while also warning of its role in amplifying surveillance, disinformation, and exclusion. 

Using a qualitative approach, including literature review and key informant interviews, the report shows that AI is rapidly transforming how Africans interact with technology, yet AI also amplifies existing vulnerabilities, introduces new challenges that undermine fundamental freedoms, and deepens existing inequalities.

The report notes that the political environment is a crucial determinant of AI’s trajectory, with strong democracies generally enabling a positive outcome. Top performers in freedom and governance indices such as South Africa, Ghana, Namibia, and Senegal are more likely to set the standard to AI rollout in Africa. Conversely, countries with lower democratic credentials such as Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Rwanda risk constraining AI’s potential or deploying it to amplify digital authoritarianism and political repression.  

Countries such as South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt that have a higher internet access and technological development, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and score highly on the Human Development Index (HDI), are more likely to lead in AI. Meanwhile, countries with lower or weaker levels of digital infrastructure face greater challenges and higher risks of AI replicating and worsening existing divides. Such countries include Cameroon, Mozambique and Uganda.

The political environment is a crucial determinant of AI’s trajectory, with strong democracies generally enabling a positive outcome. Economic and developmental status also dictates the capacity for AI development and adoption. 

Despite these challenges, the report documents that AI offers substantial value to the public sector by improving service delivery and enhancing transparency. Governments are leveraging AI tools for efficiency, such as the South African Revenue Services (SARS) AI Assistant for tax assessments and Nigeria’s Service-Wise GPT for streamlined governance document access. In Kenya, the Sauti ya Bajeti (Voice of the Budget) platform fosters fiscal transparency by allowing citizens to query and track government expenditures. Furthermore, countries like Tunisia and Uganda are using AI models within tax bodies to detect fraud, while Rwanda is deploying AI for judicial system improvements and identity management at borders.

The private sector and academic institutions are driving AI-inspired innovation, particularly in the areas of FinTech, AgriTech, and Natural Language Processing (NLP). For the latter, notable efforts to localise AI include Tunisia’s TUNBERT model for Tunisian Arabic, and Ghana’s Khaya, an open-source AI-powered translator tailored for local languages. In Ghana, the DeafCanTalk, is an AI-powered app that enables bidirectional translation between sign language and spoken language, and has enhanced accessibility for deaf users. Rwanda has integrated AI into healthcare using drone delivery systems for medical supplies, while Cameroon and Uganda use AI to assist farmers with pest identification. 

However, despite increasing investment, such as the ongoing USD 720 million investment in compute power by Cassava Technologies across hubs in South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria, Africa receives  significantly lower AI funding than global counterparts.

Moreover, while AI is gaining traction across many sectors, the proliferation of AI-generated misinformation and disinformation is a pervasive and growing challenge that poses a critical threat to electoral integrity. During South Africa’s 2024 elections, deepfake videos were circulated to manipulate perceptions and endorse political entities. Similarly, during elections and protests in Kenya and Namibia, deepfake technology and automated campaigns were used to discredit opponents. 

The report also documents that governments are deploying AI-powered surveillance technologies, which has led to widespread privacy violations and a chilling effect on freedoms. For example, pro-government propagandists in Rwanda utilised Large Language Models (LLMs) to mass-produce synthetic messages on social media, simulating authentic support and suppressing dissenting voices. Meanwhile, algorithmic bias and exclusion are producing discriminatory outcomes, particularly against low-resource African languages. Also, AI-based content moderation is often ineffective because it lacks contextual understanding and fails to capture local nuance.

A key finding in the report is that across the continent, the pace of AI development far outstrips regulatory readiness. None of the 14 study countries has AI-specific legislation. Instead, fragmented laws on data protection, cybercrime, and copyright are stretched to cover AI, but remain inadequate. Data protection authorities are under-resourced, under-staffed, and often lack the technical expertise required to audit or govern complex AI systems.

Although many national AI strategies are emerging, they prioritise economic growth while neglecting human rights and accountability. This is also fuelled by policy processes that are often opaque and dominated by state actors, with limited multistakeholder participation.

The report  stresses that without deliberate, inclusive, and rights-centred governance, AI risks entrenching authoritarianism and exacerbating inequalities. 

To avoid the current trajectory that AI is taking in Africa, in which AI risks entrenching authoritarianism and exacerbating inequalities, the report calls for a human-centred AI governance framework built on inclusivity, transparency, and context. 

It also makes recommendations, including enacting comprehensive AI-specific legislation, instituting mandatory human rights impact assessments, establishing empowered AI and data governance institutions, and promoting rights-based advocacy. Others are building technical capacity across governments, civil society and media, and developing policies that prioritise equity and human dignity alongside innovation.

AI offers Africa the opportunity to foster innovation, strengthen democracy, and drive sustainable development. This edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report provides an evidence-based roadmap to ensure that Africa’s digital future remains open, inclusive, and rights-respecting.Find the report here.

One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa's Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.

One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa’s Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.

Reflecting on the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) at the Internet Governance Forum 2017

IGF Pre-event |
Join the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) at the Internet Governance Forum 2017 where we will share on the evolution of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) at a pre-event on December 17, 2017!
We’ll explore insights from our latest report on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2017 themed Intermediaries’ Role In Advancing Internet Freedom – Challenges And Prospects as well as uncover what is sometimes left out of discussions on the economic impacts of internet shutdowns in Sub-Saharan Africa. For this discussion we’ll reference a new framework we developed this year. You can see more about it here: Calculating the Economic Impact of Internet Disruptions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Are you keen on going into the IGF with a solid background on the internet freedom landscape in Africa?  Join us as we reflect on the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica), discuss its evolution, the lessons learnt, the gaps and opportunities that lie ahead for policy development and practical advancement of digital rights in  Africa.

  • Venue: Join us at Room 18, Centre International de Conférences Genève (CICG)
  • Location:  17 rue de Varembé, CH – 1211 Genève 20
  • Date: Sunday, December 17, 2017
  • Time: 13h30 – 14h30

We’ll also share how various organisations have supported the growth of the FIFAfrica in various ways ranging from increasing participation of African delegates, in-depth research and analysis, unique workshops, through to skills exchange and network building.
To confirm attendance, please register here. 

About FIFAfrica

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and the Association for Progressive Communication (APC) are proud to co-host the 2017 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica).

This year’s Forum will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, thus expanding the physical footprint of the Forum which has since inception in 2014 been held in Kampala, Uganda. The landmark event convenes various stakeholders from the internet governance and online rights arenas in Africa and beyond to deliberate on gaps, concerns and opportunities for advancing privacy, access to information, free expression, non-discrimination and the free flow of information online.

The Forum brings together human rights defenders, journalists, government officials, private sector players, global information intermediaries, bloggers, developers, the arts community, law enforcers and regulators – all of whom have a role to play in advancing internet freedom in Africa.

Highlights at FIFAfrica include the launch of the annual State of Internet Freedom in Africa research report, the commemoration of the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI) that falls on September 28, digital security clinics and this year, an exhibition showcasing the work and products of various players in the internet freedom arena in Africa.

Read more about FIFAfrica here