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14Jun

Overview of Intermediary Liability in Senegal

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Astou Diouf |

Among its west African counterparts, Senegal is among the leaders in digitalisation efforts. Its press freedom rankings are high and the country has also recorded positive strides in data protection. Telecommunications sector players include 2018 entrants ARC Telecom, WAW Telecom and Africa Access, alongside the state-owned Sonatel, Free (initially licensed as SENTEL, later rebranded as Tigo), and Expresso Senegal. 

Moreover, internet affordability remains a challenge, with the country ranked 25th out of 72 countries assessed under the Affordability Index. As at December 2020, internet penetration in Senegal was estimated at 88.7% and mobile penetration at 114.2%. However,  there are concerns about repressive controls purportedly aimed at countering cybercrime, misinformation and hate speech. 

This article highlights the state of intermediary liability in Senegal, including the legal and regulatory environment relevant to intermediaries’ obligations including information/ data disclosure to law enforcement authorities, filtering or blocking content, and service restrictions. 

Legislative and Regulatory Overview

The electronic transactions law and eCommunications decree are the primary legislations that establish an intermediary liability framework in Senegal. Article 3(1) of law n° 2008-08 of January 25, 2008 on Electronic Transactions refers to intermediaries as “persons whose activity is  to provide  the public access to services through information and communication technologies”.

Borrowing from France’s law n° 2004-575 of June 21, 2004 on Confidence in the Digital Economy, the 2008 law places limited obligations on intermediaries to monitor content, but requires them to put in place mechanisms to remove or prevent access to unlawful content, inform users of service restrictions and complaints.

Article 3(2) states that a natural or legal persons who provides  to the public a service of storage of signals, writings, images,  sound or messages “cannot be held liable for the activities or information stored at the request of a recipient of these services if they did not have actual knowledge of their illicit nature or of facts and circumstances showing this nature or if, from the moment they had such knowledge, they acted promptly to remove this data or to make access [to it] impossible“.

However, without a clear definition of what constitutes illicit content, the electronic transactions law leaves room for restriction of access to content arbitrarily deemed illegal yet there are no clear provisions on ways to challenge content takedown decisions. 

On the upside, confidentiality of personal information is required under Article 5. Failure to comply with the provisions of the electronic transactions law is an offence under Articles 431-46 to 431-49 of the Penal Code, 2016, punishable with a fine of between 250,000 and 1,000,000 Francs (USD 461-1,845), imprisonment of between six months and one year, or both. 

The 2008 decree on eCommunications considers intermediaries to be neutral parties with no control over content, assuming that they merely provide transmission or storage of information, sometimes temporarily. Accordingly, Article 6 limits the liability of intermediaries when “1) they do not select the recipient of the transmission; 2) they do not initiate the transmission; 3) the activities of transfer and provision of access are aimed exclusively at carrying out the transmission or provision of access; 4) they do not modify the information that is subject to transmission; 5) they execute a decision of a judicial or administrative authority to remove the information or prohibit access to it.” 

While the electronic transactions law and the eCommunications decree limit the liability of intermediaries, other laws place obligations that have implications on users’ rights as detailed below. These include the law on intelligence services, the law amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, the eCommunications Code and the law amending the Penal Code.

Interception of Communications and Information Disclosure

The law n°2016-33 of December 14, 2016 relating to Intelligence Services under Article 10 states that in the interest of national security, intelligence authorities can “use technical, intrusive, surveillance or location procedures to collect information useful for neutralising the threat’’. Article 11 requires service providers to cooperate with and assist unspecified “relevant private bodies” with intelligence activities. 

Act No. 2016-30 amending Act No. 65-61 of 1965 on the Code of Criminal Procedure also mentions  intermediary liability in relation to criminal investigations. Article 90-11 requires the cooperation of intermediaries with investigative authorities in collecting or recording “in real time” relevant electronic data and communications. Article 90-14 provides that a public prosecutor must issue  to telecommunications operators and service providers a formal request for cooperation. Recording and interception of communications under the criminal code are subject to written authorisation by a judge. 

Further, article 90-17 empowers judges to order intermediaries to decrypt data or provide information on the operation of encrypted systems. Orders are not subject to appeal and their validity is restricted  to between two and four months renewable on a case-by-case basis. The lack of provisions for individuals subject to surveillance to challenge court orders is against the provisions of the Budapest Convention (which Senegal is Party to), aimed at ensuring an appropriate balance between the interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental human rights.

Article 20 of the eCommunications Code re-emphasises the requirement for service providers to cooperate with government authorities in accordance with the provisions of Article 90-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including through disclosing relevant information and offering technical assistance when asked. 

Service Restrictions

The 2018 eCommunications Code requires service providers to “prevent impending network congestion and mitigate the effects of exceptional or temporary congestion, provided that equivalent categories of traffic are subject to equal treatment” (Article 27)”. It adds that “the regulatory authority may authorise or impose any traffic management measure it deems useful to preserve competition in the electronic telecommunications sector and ensure fair treatment of similar services.” In application of these provisions, intermediaries can reduce the speed or interrupt the internet at times and locations, under the pretext of reducing network congestion. The provisions also give the Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority (ARTP) unchecked powers to authorise or impose restrictions  on the availability of digital communication networks. 

Strict confidentiality and continuity of service requirements are also placed on intermediaries and their staff under the Penal Code Article 167 which states that “deletion or opening of correspondence addressed to third parties in bad faith” is an offense punishable by imprisonment for between six days and one year, a fine of 20,000-100,000 francs (USD 36-185), or both.  

Content Restrictions

There are no specific obligations for intermediaries to actively monitor networks and platforms for infringing content. Article 3(5) of the 2008 electronic transactions law states that service providers “are not subject to a general obligation to monitor the information they transmit or store, nor to a general obligation to search for facts or circumstances revealing illicit activities.” However, the provision is subject to targeted surveillance activity and requests by judicial authorities. In relation to crimes against humanity, incitement to racial hatred and child ponography, Article 3(5) states that intermediaries should set up systems that are “easily accessible and visible” to allow for such content to be brought to their attention. Furthermore, to promptly inform authorities of infringing content and inform users of the policies and practice in place to fight against illegal content. 

Whereas the Constitution of Senegal guarantees free speech, the Penal Code under Article 255 provides that: “The publication, dissemination, disclosure or reproduction, by any means whatsoever, of false news, fabricated, falsified or falsely attributed to third parties” that results in civil disobedience, endangers the public, or discredits public institutions is an offense punishable by imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 100,000 to 1,500,000 Francs (USD 185 to 2,770). Without a clear definition of what constitutes false news, and considering requirements to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, failure of intermediaries to report any infringements may lead to sanctions. 

Under Article 431-61 of the Penal Code, conviction for an offense under the law that is committed via electronic communications attracts additional penalties. They include prohibition from sending electronic communications, temporary or permanent prohibition of access to the site used to commit the offense or its host. The article also requires service providers to implement measures necessary to ensure compliance with the penalties, violation of which is an offense punishable by six months to three years imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 2,000,000 Francs (USD 923 to 3,693). 

Cases of intermediary liability 

  1. Several private and public entities collect personal data in Senegal. For instance, there is Mandatory SIM card registration linked to the national identity database. However, there have been numerous reports of non-compliance with the data protection law and Commission of Personal Data (CDP) regulations. See, for instance, quarterly CDP notice. 
  2. During riots in early 2021, the government suspended private television channels Sen TV and Walf TV for repeatedly broadcasting images of the unrest following the arrest of the Senegalese opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. Furthermore, access to social media platforms including Youtube and Whatsapp was restricted.
  3. On June 20, 2019, the online newspaper “Pressafrik” was allegedly inaccessible for hours after it collaborated with the BBC on an investigative report into allegations of corruption implicating the brother of President Mack Sall. According to the Publishing Director Lissa Faye, the hack was “sponsored” given that “60% of Senegalese news sites are with the same host and PressAfrik is the only site to be inaccessible”. 
  4. The telecoms regulator ARTP has in the past issued ultimatums to telecommunications operators to improve quality of services.
  5. According to Facebook’s Transparency report, Senegal made six requests for user data, relating to seven accounts in 2020 – none of which was complied with. Earlier requests totaling 21 in the period 2016-2019 were also not complied with.
  6. Since 2009, Senegal has made four requests to remove content to Google
  7. Back in 2016, Senegal is reported to have made the second highest number of subscriber information requests  to Orange  – 18,653, up from 13,557 the previous year.  

Conclusion and Recommendations

The legislative and practice environment for liability of intermediaries in Senegal lacks clarity on roles and obligations. In some cases excessive powers over network operations are granted to service providers and the regulator. In others, requirements to cooperate with law enforcement authorities are broad, without specifying the recourse avenues for abuse of users’ rights. While the eTransactions Act and the Decree on eCommunications are clear about intermediary’s role regarding user’s content, the Intelligence Services Act, the Penal Code and other documents provide conflicting provisions related to surveillance and interception of communications that are likely to infringe privacy and freedom of expression online. 

There is need for specific legislation to determine the liability of intermediaries including with precision on content subject to take down or blockage, appeals procedures for decisions and measures for reinstating removed content. In the absence of a specific legal document entirely dedicated to intermediary liability, definition of intermediary liability, responsibilities and obligations, as well as unlawful content should be clear and consistent across all the existing legislation.

For their part, intermediaries should provide clear, accessible and understandable terms and conditions for service use, including options for privacy, back up and anonymisation, in accessible formats towards promoting privacy and data protection. Furthermore, increased transparency of service providers should include advance communication of changes to relevant user policies, service restrictions, as well as publication of detailed reports on cooperation with authorities.  Meanwhile, there is need for increased partnerships and engagement with civil society towards collaborative advocacy to promote business and human rights principles

Astou Diouf is a CIPESA Fellow, working on the role of internet intermediaries and service providers in the fight against Covid-19 in Senegal, including on issues such as facilitating increased access to the internet, privacy and personal data infringements, and content.

09Apr

Promoting Digital Inclusion for Refugees Amid the Covid-19 Crisis in Egypt

Author admin Posted on

By Mohamed Farahat |

The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has dramatically transformed our daily lives, making the virtual world the new reality for many people. However, for many others, including refugees, it has further served to deepen their digital exclusion.

Since the first case of Covid-19 was confirmed in Egypt in February 2020, the number of confirmed cases, including deaths, has been increasing. By April 08, 2021, there have been 207,293 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 12,290 deaths, reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). In order to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus, the Egyptian government took several preventive measures, including ordering a partial lockdown, suspending all public events, imposition of restrictions on movements, and closing of schools and universities.

The pandemic has demonstrated that ensuring access to the internet has never been more vital than it is today. Governments have increasingly been challenged to meet their obligation to bridge the digital divide for vulnerable groups, especially those that lack internet access.

Refugees are often amongst the most vulnerable groups in the host countries and the pandemic has served to further exacerbate their vulnerability. Egypt hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers from 57 countries. As of December 31, 2020, the country had registered at least 259,292 refugees and asylum-seekers. The pandemic rendered many refugees jobless, with no income to cover internet costs and thereby keeping them out of connectivity. As a result, there is an increased need for the state to address gaps in digital access, affordability and ultimately access to information during this time of crisis.

Refugees and Access to ICT

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees are 50% less likely to own internet-enabled phones than the rest of the population. The situation is more dire in rural areas, where 20% of refugees do not have a permanent means of communication. In urban areas, where the internet is available, many refugees cannot afford to access the internet due to the lack of income and thus, like other vulnerable sections of society, refugees continue to lag behind in a quickly digitalising world.

Recognising the internet connectivity challenges faced by refugees, the UNHCR launched a global initiative – Connectivity for Refugees  – with the purpose of ensuring that all refugees, and the communities that host them, have access to available, affordable and usable mobile and internet connectivity in order to leverage these technologies for protection, communications, education, health, self-reliance, and community empowerment.

Vitality of Internet Access

According to the UNHCR-Egypt country office, the majority of refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt were already highly vulnerable prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 and have been directly impacted by the evolving circumstances. Many have lost their sources of income and cannot afford to buy sufficient basic supplies or pay their rent.

While access to the internet has been essential for refugees to work, learn, access information, and express their opinions, its usage has decreased dramatically due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Restrictions have been imposed on several daily spheres such as freedom of movement, work and education.

The Covid-19 pandemic forced most organisations and refugee service providers, including the UNHCR Egypt office, to close offices in preference for remote working. Further, the UNHCR came to rely on online communications such as via zoom including in conducting  interviews with refugees. During this period, the handling of refugees’ applications and the conduct of awareness raising sessions  were held through online video and audio-conferencing platforms. In spite of this adaptation, most of this work was stalled by connectivity and accessibility challenges faced by the refugees.

The Right to Education

With the pandemic effects of quarantines and lock downs, virtual life became inevitable for common activities including education. Many education institutions have embraced distance learning which is majorly reliant on internet access and connectivity. The  UNHCR –Egypt Fact sheet for July 2020 notes that more than half of all refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR are children and youths of school age.

However, the digital approach raises questions as to whether refugee students can afford and are accessing the education delivered via digital platforms. As the UNHCR has noted, most of the refugee and host communities have limited access to hardware devices, and connectivity is thus prohibitively expensive. Additionally, lack of access also limits acquisition/development of the digital literacy and skills required by teachers, students, and their communities to make the most of the available learning resources.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has proposed some solutions, including the use and prioritisation of digital and broadcast remote learning policies to universally address the needs of all households and to accommodate situations where children do not have the necessary technological assets at home, through deliberate policies that facilitate infrastructure development in technology for displaced persons and children in remote and rural areas and those displaced by emergencies.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The high costs of computers and smartphones and of accessing the internet have left most refugees without connectivity. Similarly, enabling tools like SIM cards are usually hard to access for refugees without official documents.

Refugees have a right to access the internet and to enjoy all digital rights and freedoms. Accordingly, there should be the necessary infrastructure to enable access to services and information. However, the impediments that came because of Covid-19 have fundamentally affected online activities including learning for refugees.

The Egyptian government is therefore urged to take all measures that aim to ensure accessible and affordable internet to all individuals including refugees whose health and education continue to be greatly threatened by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Specifically, the government and responsible agencies such as the UNHCR should double their efforts to ensure that refugee communities have access to SIM cards to facilitate easy internet access by easing on the stringent requirements to register for SIM cards. In this regard, the government should allow refugees to use their UNHCR-issued identity cards to register for telephone and internet services.

Additionally, it is critical that measures are taken to ensure that refugee students do not miss out on education by providing the necessary digital technologies to enable them attend school and sit for their examinations.

Mohamed Farahat is a 2020 CIPESA Fellow. He is an Egyptian human rights lawyer, specialising in refugees and migration. As part of the fellowship, he is documenting inclusion of refugees in the technology-based responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in Egypt; and the role of the judiciary in the internet freedom landscape in North Africa.

25Mar

14th International Conference on ICT, Society and Human Beings

The effects of ICT on human beings as well as the interaction between ICT, individuals, and society are all within the focus of this conference. Today, computer science and ICT-related disciplines are working more and more together with various behavioural and social sciences including child psychology and developmental psychology.
For more information, please click here.

25Mar

16th ISSA International Conference on Information and Communication Technology in Social Security

Focussing on the theme Digital transformation for adaptable and people centric social security, this world-class event, held only once every three years is the unique opportunity to analyse and discuss opportunities and challenges regarding the management of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in social security institutions with the professionals. Click here for more information.

Réactions des Télécoms à la Covid-19 au Sénégal
24Feb

Réactions des Télécoms à la Covid-19 au Sénégal

Author CIPESA Posted on

Par Astou Diouf |

Le Sénégal a enregistré son premier cas de Covid-19 le 2 mars 2020. Trois semaines plus tard, le 23 mars, le pays a déclaré l’état d’urgence et pris diverses mesures pour freiner la propagation du virus. En réponse à la pandémie, l’Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications et des Postes (ARTP) a apporté une contribution financière de 117 millions de francs CFA (216 000 dollars US) à la “Force Covid-19”. L’ARTP a également réuni les fournisseurs de services de télécommunications au Sénégal pour solliciter leur soutien dans le cadre des mesures d’urgence.

L’appel aux opérateurs de télécommunications a été lancé en reconnaissance du rôle de la technologie dans les stratégies de riposte à la Covid-19 et du taux de pénétration de l’internet du pays qui est passé de 68,49 % en 2018 à 88,73 % en 2020. En effet, les principaux opérateurs de télécommunications au Sénégal ainsi que l’Agence de l’Informatique de l’État (ADIE) ont joué un rôle décisif dans la lutte contre le virus dans le pays.

Structure administrative autonome, l’ADIE est le principal levier pour la mise en œuvre de la politique et des initiatives d’e-gouvernement en coordination avec les ministères, départements et agences du gouvernement. En réponse à la pandémie, l’ADIE a mis en place une plateforme accessible via covid19.gouv.sn permettant d’accéder à des informations fiables sur la Covid-19, notamment des conseils pratiques et des vidéos de sensibilisation, ainsi que des statistiques sur la propagation du virus au moyen d’une carte interactive. En outre, un “chatbot Doctor covid” accessible sur Whatsapp a été mis en place avec une voix intégrée en français et en wolof.

Les Sénégalais de la diaspora n’ont pas été laissés pour compte dans les efforts de l’ADIE. Afin de garantir un accès équitable à l’aide d’urgence mise à la disposition des citoyens dans le cadre de la task-force Covid-19, l’agence a mis en place une plateforme en ligne pour enregistrer les citoyens à l’étranger afin qu’ils puissent bénéficier de l’aide.

L’ADIE a également mis en place un système de vidéoconférence pour faciliter les réunions à distance entre le Président et le Conseil des ministres. Un système similaire a été mis en place pour le ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, avec la fourniture de smartphones pour faciliter la communication sur le terrain et la coordination entre les équipes d’intervention.

La SONATEL, qui détient la part du lion (53%) du marché des télécommunications mobiles au Sénégal, a également mené une série d’actions de soutien à la lutte contre la Covid-19. En plus du don de matériel médical au centre Diamniadio, la Sonatel a fourni au ministère de la Santé des Pompiers pour renforcer la capacité du centre d’appel national gratuit contre la Covid-19 (800 00 50 50) et des services de communication gratuits via un groupe fermé d’utilisateurs. En outre, la Sonatel a diffusé des messages de sensibilisation à ses abonnés, a mené une campagne baptisée “Héros en blanc” qui rend hommage au personnel médical du pays et a soutenu l’enseignement à distance avec le Pass éducation gratuit de 1 Go pour l’accès aux contenus éducatifs.

Pour les entreprises et les personnes morales, la Sonatel a facilité le télétravail grâce à l’augmentation de la bande passante en fibre et à la fourniture gratuite de 3 Go de données mobiles pour les abonnés dans le cadre d’Orange Business Services.

Free Senegal est le deuxième opérateur téléphonique du Sénégal avec 25% de part de marché. Comme son homologue Sonatel, Free Senegal a envoyé des messages de sensibilisation à ses abonnés, mettant en avant les mesures préventives à la Covid-19. Il a également fourni une bande passante gratuite et a supprimé les frais de transaction d’argent mobile pour les abonnés ; et a fait un  don d’équipements au ministère de la santé, entre autres, en réponse à la Covid-19.

Au niveau opérationnel, Expresso Sénégal a annoncé des plans pour retarder le déploiement de son réseau 4G. Dans une déclaration à l’Agence de presse sénégalaise (APS), l’opérateur a indiqué que “dans un contexte marqué par une crise sanitaire sans précédent et en raison de l’état d’urgence décrété par le gouvernement, Expresso Sénégal reporte le déploiement de son réseau 4G”.

Si les différentes interventions ci-dessus sont louables, certaines d’entre elles constituent une menace pour les droits numériques. Par exemple, le ministère de la santé, en collaboration avec les opérateurs de télécommunications, a mis en place un système de traçage des contacts par téléphone portable pour freiner la propagation du virus au sein de la communauté. La Commission de protection des données personnelles (CDP) a “béni” ces efforts de traçage des contacts, en assurant aux abonnés que la confidentialité et la sécurité des informations personnelles seraient respectées.

En outre, l’adoption de la technologie dans le cadre des efforts de riposte à la Covid-19 est entachée par les faibles niveaux de culture numérique, ainsi que par l’accessibilité et le coût de l’internet, non seulement chez les fonctionnaires, mais aussi chez les groupes marginalisés, notamment les populations rurales, les femmes et les personnes handicapées. Parallèlement, les efforts de numérisation des gouvernements restent limités, certains services publics tels que l’enregistrement des actes d’état civil (naissance, mariage et décès), le signalement des crimes, les permis de séjour et les services de passeport nécessitant souvent une présence physique – contrairement à la volonté des citoyens de rester chez eux.

Les divers efforts du gouvernement et des télécoms mentionnés ci-dessus ont été déterminants dans la lutte contre la Covid-19 au Sénégal en facilitant la mise en place d’équipes d’intervention d’urgence, le travail à distance et l’apprentissage. Cependant, il y a place pour des abus du droit des citoyens à la vie privée et à la liberté d’expression, ainsi que pour l’élargissement de la fracture numérique et l’inhibition de l’accès à l’information. Il est essentiel que les interventions basées sur la technologie contre la Covid-19 soient à la fois inclusives et respectueuses des droits humains. Il faut pour cela que la société civile plaide davantage contre les mesures régressives, et que les opérateurs de télécommunications et le gouvernement fassent des efforts pour améliorer la connectivité rurale, la numérisation et l’accessibilité numérique des groupes marginalisés.

Astou Diouf est une boursière du CIPESA 2020 qui se concentre sur le rôle des intermédiaires et des fournisseurs de services Internet dans la lutte contre la Covid-19 au Sénégal, notamment sur des questions telles que la facilitation d’un accès accru à l’Internet, les atteintes à la vie privée et aux données personnelles, et la réglementation des contenus.

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