Localization Sprint at FIFAfrica24

FIFAfrica24 |

The Localization Lab is hosting a Sprint at the 2024 edition of the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica24). The Sprint will explore Tips, Tools, and How-tos for Safer Online Communications (Surveillance Self-Defence Guides) developed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation to raise awareness around ways to stay safe online on a day to day basis. The main focus will be on providing digital security guides in local languages that enhance the knowledge of everyday users who use the internet on how to protect themselves adequately while online. 
An integral part of this event will also be providing useful feedback for the resources that are localized as well as discussing outreach strategies to promote the use of these resources once they are localized.

When: September 25, 2023

Where: Radisson Blu Hotel, Dakar Sea Plaza, Route de la Corniche Ouest, Dakar, BP 16868, Senegal

Room: Mermoz II

Time: 8:30-17.00

If you are interested in participating in the #FIFAfrica24 Localization Sprint, please fill out the SPRINT APPLICATION AND PRE-EVENT SURVEY

*Participants are required to be fluent in English/ French and their local language to participate.

Please note that this event is open to any individuals who are passionate about making technology accessible to their communities. While technical background plays a key role in localization, it is not a requirement. Individuals from diverse professional backgrounds are encouraged to register to add important perspectives to discussions and localization work.

Please confirm your attendance by way of email to Chido Musodza at chido[at]localizationlab dot org.

What is Localization Lab?

Localization Lab is a network of approximately 7,000 individuals who promote Internet freedom worldwide by adapting digital security and circumvention resources for the communities that need them. Even though access to technology and the Internet are steadily increasing worldwide, we are faced with a problem of language bias which heavily favors English as the language of technology and Internet content. As more and more individuals around the globe enter the digital world, our goal as a community is to ensure they can also access the tools to ensure their digital security and open access to the Internet.

Along with a host of other tools and resources supported by the Localization Lab community, you can browse a list of the Lab’s projects on their website and Transifex.

What is a Localization Sprint?

A Localization Sprint is a fun, collaborative event that brings together individuals from diverse backgrounds to localize (translate and adapt) technology and/or resources for their communities. Localization Sprints often integrate localization with digital security training, tool demos, technical terminology development, and formulating an outreach strategy. In this way, participants leave the event with a localized technology, an in-depth understanding of it, and the tools for continuing localization efforts and promoting localized tools and resources in their communities.

Cameroon’s 2025 Presidential Election: Equipping Actors to Address Disinformation

By Simone Toussi |

Cameroon’s upcoming presidential election in 2025 is likely to be dogged by rising disinformation. The government’s weaponisation of laws against false news further exacerbates the issue and raises more concerns regarding a smooth electoral process. In that light, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy on East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and ADISI-Cameroun  organised a two-days’ workshop to equip key players with the tools necessary to combat disinformation, promote democratic practices online, and safeguard electoral integrity in Cameroon.

The porous boundary between regulation and repression

Cameroon’s efforts to combat disinformation have led to a complex legal framework that raises concerns for freedom of expression. Laws like the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Law N°2010/012 of 21 December 2010 and Law N°2016/007 of 12 July 2016 on the Penal Code contain broad provisions criminalising the dissemination of false information. Article 78 of the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Law, and Articles 113 and 240 of the Penal Code, impose fines and imprisonment on those found guilty of spreading false news that could harm public authorities or national unity.

While these laws aim to protect public order, they are often criticised for being vague and disproportionate. This is because they have been used to suppress critical voices, targeting journalists, activists, and whistleblowers. The penalties for violating the laws can be harsh as they include hefty fines and imprisonment. As such, these provisions can be used to stifle legitimate dissent and undermine democratic principles.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and media watchdogs play a critical role in monitoring disinformation and advocating for media literacy and transparency, but they often face restrictions and censorship. Journalists are often arbitrarily arrested and detained for “spreading false news”, while media outlets and CSOs are usually intimidated for publishing “false” reports about the government.

In addition, while efforts by various stakeholders to regulate digital platforms are underway, they struggle to keep pace with rapidly evolving technology platforms. These platforms are the primary channels through which disinformation spreads in Cameroon, and the government’s approach to mitigate their effect reverberates on media freedom and democratic expression, as it often intersects with broader issues of political repression.

A critical rise and complexification of disinformation

The workshop hosted by CIPESA and ADISI-Cameroun highlighted the alarming rise of disinformation in Cameroon. During the plenary session, speakers discussed  the main trends observed on disinformation in Cameroon. These include political polarisation and partisan disinformation, ethnic and tribal manipulation, disinformation on electoral processes, and foreign influence or disinformation by external actors. Disinformation appears to take different forms, including false information, decontextualised content and misleading information. The disinformation propagators include political actors, partisan and underground media and journalists, influencers and foreign actors. Targets of disinformation include opinion leaders, ethnic groups and various institutions.

Paul Joel Kamtchang, the ADISI-Cameroon head, emphasised the role of post-electoral crises and security challenges in exacerbating disinformation, building onTalk-Paix” regional meetings. He noted how political factions and interest groups spread false narratives to discredit opponents and influence public opinion. Social media platforms are rife with fabricated content that targets voters’ opinions and creates confusion about electoral candidates.

Disinformation actors often exploit ethnic and regional identities to sow division and exacerbate existing tensions. False claims and inflammatory content targeting specific ethnic or regional groups further deepen societal rifts and incite violence, threatening national unity and peace. Ethnic slurs  are used to tribalise public debate and polarise political discourse in both mainstream and social media.

Dr. Roméo Saa Ngouana, Senior Researcher at the African Center for International, Diplomatic, Economic and Strategic Studies (CEIDES), discussed the threat of increased disinformation ahead of the 2025 presidential elections. He observed that false accounts are being used to spread disinformation about opposition parties, potentially undermining the credibility of the electoral system. Additionally, foreign influence operations are contributing to the complexity of the disinformation landscape, with actors exploiting digital platforms to amplify divisive narratives and influence public perception. For instance, Cameroon is often targeted by “Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour” on Meta platforms orchestrated by foreign actors, an indication of how foreign, often unidentified, players have set out to manipulate public opinion in the country on various topics. 

Preventing and mitigating the effects disinformation ahead of elections

After the plenary, practical sessions helped to develop a keener understanding of disinformation and explore its various trends in Cameroon in the lead up to the presidential elections. Participants split into two groups were asked to summarise the key trends of disinformation in Cameroon on the one hand, and to propose recommendations on the other hand.

The second day was dedicated to two main approaches identified as ways of preventing disinformation and mitigating its effects, to prepare for a safer media space during the electoral period. This was carried out as masterclasses on fact-checking for one group, and media and information literacy (MIL) training for the other group.

Led by Marthe Ndiang, Editor-in-Chief of Data-Check, the fact-checking masterclass aimed to get participants aware of the issues and challenges related to disinformation as the 2025 elections approach, sharpen critical thinking skills and equip the participants with tools to combat disinformation.

The MIL masterclass was given by Blaise Pascal Andzongo, President of Eduk Media. It aimed to address how young people are informed in the age of social media, information disorders, overcoming cognitive bias through critical thinking and strategies to combat disinformation through media and information literacy for and with young people.

Conclusion and recommendations

As Cameroon heads towards its next presidential election, disinformation presents a significant challenge to the integrity of the electoral process and the stability of the nation. The interplay between disinformation trends and the current regulatory environment highlights the need for targeted and balanced interventions.

Key recommendations to stakeholders:
  • Strengthen legal frameworks and policy measures needed to combat disinformation without encroaching on freedom of expression;
  • Enhance media literacy and public awareness by integrating them into educational curricula and public outreach campaigns;
  • Support independent media and civil society by protecting journalists from harassment and providing resources for investigative journalism and fact-checking initiatives;
  • Promote digital platform accountability with clearer guidelines for content removal, fact-checking partnerships, and transparency in algorithms that influence content visibility; and
  • Foster dialogue and cooperation between the government, media, CSOs and platforms to build a coordinated response and ensure that measures against disinformation are effective and equitable.

In addition to these recommendations, the “Yaounde Declaration on Electoral Disinformation” was developed to address the threats posed by disinformation in Cameroon’s upcoming elections. It aims to raise awareness, promote media literacy, and support public education on these issues. The full declaration is available here.

FIFAfrica24: Shaping the Future of Internet Freedom in Africa!

By FIFAfrica |

The highly anticipated Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2024 (FIFAfrica24) is just around the corner, and this year we’re heading to the vibrant city of Dakar, Senegal that in 2024,  has been the backdrop of a variety of both controversial and pivotal developments impacting democracy and digital rights.

Senegal was to host its elections on February 25, 2024, but instead was thrown into turmoil following a February 3, 2024 announcement that the elections had been postponed and that the incumbent – Macky Sall’s presidency would be extended until his successor is installed.  Shortly after the announcement,  internet access in the country was restricted in a move that the Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications, and Digital Economy justified as a response to the spread of “hateful and subversive messages” threatening public order.

Elections would eventually be held on March 24 vote and would run smoothly with no major incidents reported, and an eventual peaceful transition of power to President Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye. Senegal’s electoral journey stands out, particularly in contrast to the turbulent electoral climates in other African states.

While 2024 has been hailed as the Year of Democracy in which more than 2 billion people will go to the polls in 65+ elections across the world, in the biggest elections megacycle so far this century, with several taking place in Africa. 

Meanwhile, despite its economic challenges, Senegal is among a handful of African states alongside Benin, Mauritius, and Rwanda that have developed national Artificial Intelligence strategies. This goes against the trend in which the most developed or largest economies are the first to create national AI strategies. In the case of Africa, countries like South Africa or Nigeria would create national AI strategies first, yet neither has done so (though Nigeria’s strategy is reportedly in development).

Senegal’s commitments to a progressive legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the technology sector include its efforts in data governance, a hub for innovation, a  National Digital Addressing, and advancing a comprehensive National Data Strategy.

This year, Senegal joined 17 African countries that have put at least one satellite in orbit. It joined countries such as South Africa and Egypt which have 13 satellites each, with Nigeria ranking in third with seven satellites. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye remarked that the move signified a major step towards Senegal’s “technological sovereignty”.

This points to the wide spectrum along which many African countries sit regarding digital adoption, digital inclusion, technology-related regulation and legislation. The Forum aims to capture this diversity through the following themes:

  • Digital Inclusion
  • Digital Resilience                             
  • Freedom of Expression & Access to Information
  • Information disorder (mis/disinfromation)          
  • Implications of AI            
  • Governance and Policy
  • Movement Building

See the agenda

As a member of the #InternetFreedomAfrica community, FIFAfrica24 offers a unique platform to explore a wide range of themes and also provides valuable networking opportunities with participants from around the world with the shared vision of digital rights in Africa.

Join the Conversation

Can’t make it to Dakar? Don’t worry FIFAfrica24 will be streamed live here! You can still participate in discussions, watch live panels, and engage with attendees using the hashtag #FIFAfrica24 on social media. Better yet, you can register to attend remotely or in person and engage directly with participants within the event platform.

Be sure to stay connected, follow the debates and discussions, and contribute your thoughts and insights to the #InterneyFreedomAfrica community.

Leveraging Digital Technologies to Enhance Data Governance Practices in Africa

By Paul Kimumwe |

Data governance policies and practices in many African countries have continued to attract attention due to their inadequacy in ensuring the protection and respect for the rights of individual data subjects. Key concerns have been raised regarding the data management practices, particularly related to biometrics, that have undermined the safety, confidentiality, accuracy, accessibility, and reliability of personal data, which are critical principles in data governance.

Several studies have documented cases of misuse of digitalised personal data, including data breaches, surveillance, misuse of personal information, unwarranted intrusion, and financial harm. Despite these misgivings, digitisation of data has been recognised within the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030) as critical in promoting and building confidence for the continent’s digital economy. For many governments, the desire to transform service delivery and enhance public participation has been a key driver for the adoption of biometric data collection and digital identities for purposes of issuing National Identity cards and updating of biometric voter registration and identification programmes.

In this blog, we highlight the critical areas in which advances in digital technologies can enhance data governance practices in Africa.

Understanding Data Governance

Data governance refers to the holistic approach to data management that entails the development and implementation of relevant norms, procedures, and standards to ensure that data is secure, accurate, reliable and consistently available, particularly spelling out clear standards and protocols that govern data collection, storage, and management, resulting in accurate, consistent, and up-to-date data. There is a growing concern that without a robust data governance framework, the continent risks missing out on maximising the benefits from its own datasets as they would be prone to abuse and misuse by poorly regulated data collectors and controllers.

Demand for a Robust Data Governance Framework

In Africa, the demand for a robust data governance framework has gained traction as a response to several countries moving away from paper-based to more digitised data management practices, raising concerns about the rights of data subjects, particularly the safety and confidentiality of user data.

While progress has been registered normatively – with the adoption of regional instruments such as the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection and the AU Data Policy Framework, both of which provide frameworks for rights’ respecting data protection practices, and with several countries adopting relevant privacy and data protection laws – full implementation remains a challenge.

In addition, the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030) calls upon states to “promote open data policies that can ensure the mandate and sustainability of data exchange platforms or initiatives to enable new local business models, while ensuring data protection and cyber resilience to protect citizens from misuse of data and businesses from cybercrime.”

Unfortunately, several laws contain problematic and vague provisions that provide for sharing of sensitive information and data localisation that are prone to abuse and misinterpretation. For example, provisions such as section 18 of Algeria’s Law No. 18-07 of 2018 on the protection of personal data, sections 44-47 of Kenya’s Data Protection Act 2019, and section 9 of Uganda’s Data Protection and Privacy Act, 2019, provide for circumstances under which sensitive personal information can be accessed, such as safeguarding national security, public interest, enforcement of the law, and conduct of criminal investigations. In addition, in many countries, biometric data collection programmes were initiated before the enactment of relevant data protection laws.

Leveraging Digital Technologies

While for the most part digital technologies have been used by various states to undermine the legitimacy and enjoyment of digital rights through surveillance and interception of communication, internet shutdowns, and data breaches, there is a growing belief that these technologies can be instrumental in building a robust data governance framework if applied correctly.

Ease of Authentication

Recent technological advancements including the multi-factor authentications (MFA) that enable secure access to services on the go are critical in facilitating seamless data collection, processing, verification and enhancing the authenticity and reliability of data compared to paper-based identifiers. Data subjects can easily request access to and verify their digitised data in the possession of data controllers. As technology becomes more accessible and affordable, governments and private entities can leverage biometrics and biometric technologies for functional and foundational identity purposes, and for an expanding array of applications.

Improving Data Storage and Confidentiality

Data storage is a key pillar within the data governance framework as it easily allows data subjects to exercise their individual rights to request and obtain their personal data in the hands of data controllers in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable format, as well as request that their data be transferred directly to another organisation. With advances in technology, data controllers can easily encrypt, de-identify and destroy personal data in their possession. Technologies such as the Identity Management Systems (IDMS) facilitate interoperability, allowing seamless integration between different data management systems used by data controllers. In addition, new technologies such as blockchain facilitate the secure storage of datasets in blocks that are connected through cryptography.

Ease of Data Rectification

One of the fundamental rights of data subjects is the right to request data controllers to correct any inaccurate and incomplete data the data controller may have collected. Under Principles 5 and 16 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), data controllers are required to keep personal data accurate and up-to-date,  and to take “every reasonable step” to ensure that inaccurate personal data is erased or rectified.

In many countries, data controllers have been accused of collecting and processing inaccurate and incomplete personal data due to the analogue way data is collected. The adoption of digital technologies and use of biometric data identifiers such as fingerprint, facial, or iris recognition become critical forms of authentication in issuing different forms of identities as well as easing on the verification and rectification processes by both data subjects and controllers.

As Africa strives to improve its data governance framework, it is important that we leverage on the new and emerging technologies such as biometric data collection, blockchain, and identify management systems to enhance the safety, security, accuracy, reliability and confidentiality of personal data.

Rollout of Digital Number Plates Poses Privacy Concerns in Uganda

By CIPESA Writer |

The rollout of the digital number plate system in Uganda is well underway. At a press conference last month, the Ministry of Works and Transport announced January 2025 as the deadline for full roll out. The system – over two years in the making – is a joint project between the government of Uganda and Russian company Joint Stock Company Global Security and has caused alarm among rights activists as it introduces another layer of massive personal data collection and processing amidst weak controls.

The stated objective of the Intelligent Transport Monitoring System (ITMS) is to improve the country’s transport management systems and security by enabling the authorities to “swiftly identify vehicles involved in criminal activities and improve traffic management through efficient ticketing and revenue collection”. It will involve the installation of digital number plates on all vehicles and motorcycles in the country, allowing security agencies to track and pinpoint their location at any one time.

  Overview of ITMS
Digital Number Plate ComponentsStatus of Fitment on Government Vehicles as at June 2024Target Installations (Registered Vehicles as at July 2024)
Aluminium plates – front and back1,0912,145, 988
A tracker
A sim chip
Bluetooth beacons – front and back
Snap locks

Once rolled out, the digital plates will add to the catalogue of surveillance apparatus in Uganda. The country already has a plethora of retrogressive laws, such as the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 that require communication service providers to aid in intercepting communication by ensuring that their systems are always technically capable of supporting lawful interception. The laws also grant powers to an authorised officer to intercept the communications of a person and to conduct surveillance of individuals.

The components of the digital number plates will enable the government through its security agencies, such as the police, to swiftly identify vehicles and their owners. Instantaneous data exchanges pose major challenges to data privacy, especially in cases where there are calculated targets such as civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), activists, and political opponents, government critics, or dissidents.

An added concern is that, according to the Uganda Police, the digital number plate system will be integrated with the Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) system and others such as the motor vehicle registration system, the e-tax system managed by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and the national identity database managed by the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) to “ensure comprehensive vehicle and personal identification.” Given weak controls over data held by public bodies and rare punishment for data breaches and unauthorised access, linking these databases absent clear data-sharing frameworks and robust controls poses grave concerns. Notably, Uganda does not have a law or regulations governing CCTV/ video surveillance.

Whereas there are efforts to localise parts of the system through the establishment of a local production facility for the various components, the partnership with Joint Stock Company Global Security underscores Uganda’s reliance on foreign entities for purposes of conducting surveillance and interception of private communication of its citizens. For example, in August 2022, there were reports that the Uganda Police had purchased UFED, a technology developed by the Israeli firm Cellebrite that enables authorities to hack into password-protected smartphones.

Earlier, starting in 2018, Uganda turned to a Chinese company, Huawei, for the supply and installation of CCTV across major cities. The decision to install the CCTV cameras came on the heels of a spate of murders that had engulfed the country, with the security forces keen on using the CCTV cameras to improve security in the country. Like many other government security procurements, the CCTV deal raised a lot of transparency and accountability issues, including the secrecy that surrounded the entire process.

Additionally, there were reports that security agencies were working with Huawei technicians in Uganda to spy on opposition critics by intercepting encrypted communications and using cell data to track their movements. This appeared to be the continuation of a trend that was documented earlier in 2012, when the Uganda government reportedly relied on a Germany-made spyware, FinFisher, which it is said to have covertly installed in various places, including hotels, the parliament and key government institutions, for purposes of surveilling on its opponents, including politicians, civil society, and the media.

Given the country’s history of repressing the civic space and harassing political opponents, CSOs and HRDs, the ITMS digital number plates could further the suppression of civil liberties, including political participation, freedom of expression, access to information and assembly and association. Moreover, deeper democratic regression could occur since these liberties largely depend on privacy and the ability to express oneself with minimal interruptions or interference.

While the government has a legitimate desire to improve the security of its people and transport management, recent events as discussed above where the same government has used the acquired technologies to surveil its citizens and undermine digital rights, it is critical that any future attempt to enhance its surveillance apparatus is anchored in law with clear oversight mechanisms. This is because the deployment of surveillance technologies such as ITMS, FinFisher, and Huawei’s CCTV present a veritable avenue for economic and political exploitation by collecting extensive data on people’s behaviour, location, activities, and interests online and offline. This makes the risk of violation of privacy apparent, rendering citizens helpless because they essentially have no control over how the data will be used, even when they are aware that data is being collected.

It is, therefore, important that the government reduce its reliance on foreign-manufactured surveillance technologies, particularly from countries whose human rights record is wanting, as these have tended to use these tools to suppress civic spaces. In addition, the government should reconsider its regulatory framework to ensure it conforms to international standards on privacy and data protection, especially during the procurement and deployment of potentially intrusive technology that is prone to abuse.