Liberia Hosts National Data Policy Consultation with African Union Support

Event |

The Government of Liberia, through the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MoPT), in collaboration with the African Union Commission, and delivered by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), is convening a two-day capacity-building workshop on data governance.

This workshop aims to strengthen the capacity of government officials, civil society representatives, and private-sector stakeholders to understand and apply the principles of data governance in advancing Liberia’s digital transformation agenda. Participants will gain insights into how to harness the transformative potential of data to drive equitable socio-economic growth, empower citizens, safeguard collective interests, and protect digital rights.

The training will also cover key aspects such as foundational digital infrastructure, data value creation and markets, legitimate and trustworthy data systems, data standards and categorisation, and institutional governance mechanisms that promote transparency, innovation, and accountability.

The event is taking place from 11th to 12th November 2025, Monrovia, Liberia.

Can African Commission Resolution 580 Stem Rising Tide of Internet Shutdowns?

By Edrine Wanyama |

In March 2024, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights passed a resolution that calls on states to desist from shutting down the internet during elections. Yet, that same year registered a spiral in internet disruptions, and 2025 has similarly seen several countries disrupt digital networks. This begs the question: Can this resolution actually be leveraged to stem the tide of network disruptions on the continent?

The Resolution on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa – ACHPR.Res.580 (LXXVIII) urges states to ensure unrestricted access to the internet before, during and after elections. This, it states, is in line with protecting freedom of expression and access to information, which are guaranteed by article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right. 

Last year, the number of internet disruptions in Africa rose to 21, up from 17 in 2023, according to figures by the KeepItOn coalition. In 2025, a number of countries holding elections have imposed disruptions, and shutdowns. Tanzania, Cameroon are the latest addition to electoral related disruptions while Sudan over examinations and Libya over public protests in the same year implemented internet disruptions. 

The Resolution among others calls for state parties’ compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance and other regional and international human rights instruments. It also calls for open and secure and while also sounds the call for telecommunications and internet service providers to inform users of potential disruptions and exercise due diligence to resolve any disruptions expeditiously.

Eight years ago, Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Information and Expression on the Internet in Africa – ACHPR/Res.362(LIX)2016 was passed which urged States Parties to not only respect but also to “take legislative and other measures to guarantee, respect and protect citizen’s right to freedom of information and expression through access to Internet services.”

However, to date, neither of these Resolutions appear to have an impact on the path that access to information nor freedom from internet shutdowns have taken in Africa. The spaces to exercise digital democracy remain shrinking as do the spaces for citizens to assert their rights for government transparency and accountability.

The latest mis-happenings have been recorded in the October 2025 election in  Cameroon which bore witness to  internet disruption.. Within the same month, Tanzania imposed internet disruptions similarly blocking access across the country. 

Conversely, these disruptions are implemented despite constant calls from civic actors from the local and international community on governments of Tanzania and Cameroon to desist from internet disruptions due to the associated dangers including erosion of public trust in the electoral process and undermining credibility of elections, cutting off expression, access to information and documentation of human rights violations. 

Trends by African governments in total disregard of the efforts and calls by the Commission lie squarely on often applied broad and ambiguously fronted justifications of managing disinformation and maintaining public order.

Internet shutdowns and disruptions are a tool for controlling or limiting electoral narratives, suppressing the gathering and flow of evidence and information by key actors such as journalists, citizens and election observers.

Electoral processes including voter turn-up, electoral malpractices, intimidation, human rights violation, and brutality of governments and their agencies often go hidden and unnoticed. Internet shutdowns and disruptions constitute a tool for demobilising opposition actors by curtailing coordination, vote counting and the opportunity to mobilise, assemble and associate. 

As other countries including Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, gear up for elections in the remainder of year, and in 2026 including Cape Verde, Benin, Republic of the Congo, Morocco, Gambia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, São Tomé and Principe, South Sudan, Uganda and Zambia, fears of mirroring actions are more intense than ever. 

Without clear punitive measures and enforcement mechanisms, the Commission’s resolutions continue to suffer impunity actions which potentially dominate curtailment of the democratic landscape that further exacerbate economic losses, cripple businesses, stifle innovation, and human rights violations. 

The continued undermining of the Resolutions that emerge from the Commission on democracy and an open internet during elections requires joint and collaborative actions by both the state and non-state actors to give them the legal effect they deserve. 

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) hence calls on stakeholders including:

  • Civil society organisations, human rights defenders, and legal practitioners to proactively pursue strategic litigation in both national and regional courts to secure strategies, actions and measures that push States parties into compliance with the regional human rights instruments.
  • The African Union political organs such as the peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the election observation missions to adopt and integrate internet freedoms in the undertakings as a key security and governance tool. 
  • Establish legal harbours that protect telecommunications companies and internet service providers from the overreach powers of governments that often rely on overly broad laws to order internet shutdowns especially in election periods. 

Applications are Open for a New Round of Africa Digital Rights Funding!

Announcement |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is calling for proposals to support digital rights work across Africa.

This call for proposals is the 10th under the CIPESA-run Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) initiative that provides rapid response and flexible grants to organisations and networks to implement activities that promote digital rights and digital democracy, including advocacy, litigation, research, policy analysis, skills development, and movement building.

 The current call is particularly interested in proposals for work related to:

  • Data governance including aspects of data localisation, cross-border data flows, biometric databases, and digital ID.
  • Digital resilience for human rights defenders, other activists and journalists.
  • Censorship and network disruptions.
  • Digital economy.
  • Digital inclusion, including aspects of accessibility for persons with disabilities.
  • Disinformation and related digital harms.
  • Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV).
  • Platform accountability and content moderation.
  • Implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
  • Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).

Grant amounts available range between USD 5,000 and USD 25,000 per applicant, depending on the need and scope of the proposed intervention. Cost-sharing is strongly encouraged, and the grant period should not exceed eight months. Applications will be accepted until November 17, 2025. 

Since its launch in April 2019, the ADRF has provided initiatives across Africa with more than one million US Dollars and contributed to building capacity and traction for digital rights advocacy on the continent.  

Application Guidelines

Geographical Coverage

The ADRF is open to organisations/networks based or operational in Africa and with interventions covering any country on the continent.

Size of Grants

Grant size shall range from USD 5,000 to USD 25,000. Cost sharing is strongly encouraged.

Eligible Activities

The activities that are eligible for funding are those that protect and advance digital rights and digital democracy. These may include but are not limited to research, advocacy, engagement in policy processes, litigation, digital literacy and digital security skills building. 

Duration

The grant funding shall be for a period not exceeding eight months.

Eligibility Requirements

  • The Fund is open to organisations and coalitions working to advance digital rights and digital democracy in Africa. This includes but is not limited to human rights defenders, media, activists, think tanks, legal aid groups, and tech hubs. Entities working on women’s rights, or with youth, refugees, persons with disabilities, and other marginalised groups are strongly encouraged to apply.
  • The initiatives to be funded will preferably have formal registration in an African country, but in some circumstances, organisations and coalitions that do not have formal registration may be considered. Such organisations need to show evidence that they are operational in a particular African country or countries.
  • The activities to be funded must be in/on an African country or countries.

Ineligible Activities

  • The Fund shall not fund any activity that does not directly advance digital rights or digital democracy.
  • The Fund will not support travel to attend conferences or workshops, except in exceptional circumstances where such travel is directly linked to an activity that is eligible.
  • Costs that have already been incurred are ineligible.
  • The Fund shall not provide scholarships.
  • The Fund shall not support equipment or asset acquisition.

Administration

The Fund is administered by CIPESA. An internal and external panel of experts will make decisions on beneficiaries based on the following criteria:

  • If the proposed intervention fits within the Fund’s digital rights priorities.
  • The relevance to the given context/country.
  • Commitment and experience of the applicant in advancing digital rights and digital democracy.
  • Potential impact of the intervention on digital rights and digital democracy policies or practices.

The deadline for submissions is Monday, November 17, 2025. The application form can be accessed here.

Tanzania’s Internet Disruption Undermines Electoral Integrity and Imperils Livelihoods

By CIPESA Staff | 

The ongoing internet disruption in Tanzania is gravely undermining the integrity of the country’s general elections and jeopardising livelihoods. With citizens unable to access credible and diverse information, the blackout not only erodes public trust but also risks intensifying ongoing demonstrations. It further prevents citizens, journalists, and civil society actors from documenting human rights violations committed by security agencies and other actors.

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) expresses solidarity with the people of Tanzania and joins the local and international community in urging the Government of Tanzania to immediately and fully restore internet access and to refrain from any form of network disruption.

CIPESA has joined numerous international organisations in calling on Tanzania’s Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to uphold digital rights and to keep the internet on before, during, and after the elections.

CIPESA also supports the #KeepItOn coalition which is a global network of more than 345 organisations across 106 countries working to end internet shutdowns in its appeal to President Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan to publicly commit to ensuring that all people in Tanzania have unrestricted access to the internet, digital platforms, and communication channels throughout the electoral period.

In addition, CIPESA has joined the Net Rights Coalition, a network of internet freedom advocates working to share knowledge and combat digital rights threats, in calling on the Government of Tanzania to respect and promote digital rights.

These calls come against a backdrop of declining digital freedoms in Tanzania, marked by increasing restrictions on online expression, threats to media independence, and a shrinking civic space. Restoring full internet access is not only a democratic imperative. It is essential for protecting human rights, fostering transparency, and ensuring that citizens can freely participate in shaping their country’s future.

CIPESA’s efforts are in line with the principles of the African Declaration on Digital Freedom and Democracy that emphasises digital democracy as a cornerstone of open, inclusive, and rights-respecting societies.

The G20 Should Challenge the Power Dynamics in Digital Public Infrastructure

Juliet Nanfuka |

Data plays a crucial role in T20 discussions at the G20, influencing online interaction and civic engagement. The G20 should use its influence to create a multi-stakeholder agenda for Digital Public Infrastructure design.

Data is at the heart of T20 discussions around the G20, as it informs the architecture of online interaction, civic participation (and exclusion) and the governance of digital society. As such, it is also central to digital public infrastructure (DPI), serving as a foundational requirement and an enabler of new data generation and data mobility. Data drives the three key pillars of DPI – digital identification, digital payments and data exchange – in addition to other emerging features such as geospatial data and data aggregation. However, the expanding role of DPI raises questions about its alignment with constitutional guarantees, data protection frameworks and the lived realities of end users across Africa.

In 2023, India’s G20 presidency laid the foundation for discourse on DPI with great precision. A year later, the 2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration acknowledged ‘the contribution of digital public infrastructure to an equitable digital transformation’. It went on to note ‘the transformative power of digital technologies to bridge existing divides and empower societies and individuals including all women and girls and people in vulnerable situations. 

Consequently, DPI has been positioned as a necessary tool for international trade facilitation and industrialisation in developing countries. In Africa, this momentum has been supported by strategies such as the AU’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030), the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the 2024 adoption of the Continental AI Strategy. Various countries across the continent have integrated DPI into their national strategies.

The pace of DPI integration is mirrored by growing financial investment in DPI. Examples include the $200 million Ghana Digital Acceleration Project by the World Bank in 2022 to expand broadband access and strengthen digital innovation ecosystems. In June 2025, the AfCFTA Adjustment Fund Credit Facility funded $10 million to support private sector adaptation to AfCFTA frameworks, with initial commitments to Telecel Global Services to enhance connectivity and regional integration. The company provides wholesale voice and SMS services and enterprise connectivity solutions to more than 250 telecom operators across Africa and globally.

While the expansion of DPI is often framed as a progressive step, it also carries significant governance trade-offs. The expansion of DPI in countries with weak democratic safeguards heightens the risk of state overreach, mass surveillance and reduced civic freedoms, making it essential to set clear limits on state access to citizens’ data to safeguard participation and accountability. Further, concerns over data sovereignty also loom.

Other T20 commentaries have stressed the urgent need for multi-stakeholder engagement to align DPI with the realities of developing countries. Without this alignment, DPI could increase existing regulatory gaps that compromise civic rights and consumer protection, fraud prevention and privacy. Meanwhile, the current wave of DPI design could exclude smaller economies that lack the capacity to engage in complex cross-border arrangements, such as those established between India’s Unified Payments Interface and Singapore’s PayNow. However, efforts such as the East African Community’s Cross-Border Payment System Masterplan aimed at inclusive, secure, efficient and interoperable cross-border payments in the region are underway.

If DPI is deployed without further interrogation, especially within the contexts of lower-income and developing countries that are often still navigating authoritarian systems, there is a risk of introducing yet another form or layer of digital exclusion from the global ecosystem. This could amplify existing national exclusions emerging from lack of access to the basics promised by DPI, such as national identity documents as keys to financial inclusion or access to basic services and civic rights.

When governments replace human interaction with automated systems, they risk ignoring the real-life experiences and needs of people who use – or could use – DPI. Thus, while DPI is being positioned as a solution to the challenges many developing countries are facing, it is important to keep in mind that infrastructure is not neutral. Its built-in biases, risks and design choices will ultimately impact citizens. Thus, for the real impact of DPI to be realised, it is necessary for the G20 to address concerns on:

  • The power affordances embedded in DPI design. The architecture of DPI prioritises the interests of those who design and fund it. The G20 should require that DPI initiatives undergo power mapping to identify who holds decision-making authority, how data flows are controlled and which actors stand to benefit or be marginalised by the design and deployment of DPI.
  • The institutionalisation of regulatory sandboxing. Regulatory sandboxes offer a controlled, transparent environment where DPI tools and policies can be tested for fairness, legality, inclusivity and public interest alignment before full-scale implementation. The G20 should promote the use of regulatory sandboxes as a mechanism to scrutinise DPI systems and their governance frameworks.
  • Strengthen multi-stakeholder inclusion. DPI needs to be built with the participation of more stakeholders – including civil society, private sector actors, academia and marginalised communities – in decision-making. The G20 should use its convening power to set the multi-stakeholder agenda in the design of DPI interventions. 
  • Safeguard data sovereignty. African countries developing data governance frameworks need to balance sovereignty with interoperability, and prevent a dependency on foreign-controlled systems.
  • Enhance public awareness interventions. Despite significant DPI developments, many citizens remain unaware of their implications. The media plays a critical role in bridging this gap. There should be more integration with media partners in furthering public awareness of DPI, its functions and consequences. The G20 should not negate the role of the media in driving public awareness on DPI interventions.

This commentary was first published on the T20 website on October 06, 2025.