Promoting Effective and Inclusive ICT Policy in Africa

Tag Archives: Access to information

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11Oct

Can the AU Data Policy Framework (DPF) support Digital Trade in SACU?

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Shamira Ahmed |

As Africa navigates the complexities of digital transformation, the African Union’s Data Policy Framework (DPF) has been heralded as a key instrument for establishing coherent data governance across the continent. However, in the specific context of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), its digital trade ambitions, and the complexities of international rules governing cross-border data flows (CBDF) and digital trade the question arises:

Can the AU Data Policy Framework (DPF) support Digital Trade in SACU?
For SACU member states (MS)—comprising Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa—digital trade can be a key facilitator of economic development.

While the DPF offers important guiding principles, the Data Economy Policy Hub (DepHUB) supported by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) have published a paper and policy brief on “Assessing the Suitability of the African Union Data Policy Framework for Digital Trade in Africa: A South African Customs Union (SACU) Case Study” thatreveals shortcomings regarding the DPF according to three main categories, namely, approach, implementation, and scope that affect its suitability for SACU’s digital trade aspirations.
SACU has the potential to leverage digitalisation to enhance trade facilitation, revenue collection, and competitiveness. However, SACU’s digital landscape is still evolving, with varying levels of endowments, capabilities, and enablers such as digital infrastructure, robust data governance policies, and regulatory frameworks amongst the SACU member states, which pose a significant challenge to deepening SACU integration.

Furthermore, the successful integration of digital trade within the African context relies on the effectiveness and harmonization of various prerequisites and enablers, such as cross-border data policy frameworks and essential network infrastructure, among others, to support an inclusive digital single market.

The DPF offers an essential starting point for SACU’s engagement with digital trade, but it falls short in several key areas:

  1. Approach: The DPF’s overemphasis on legal frameworks such as FRAND , and regulatory sandboxes as only positive aspects needs to be recalibrated with a more balanced approach to better support digital trade in Africa. CBDF should be prioritized alongside data sovereignty and mutual recognition agreements— greater flexibility and policy space is needed to enable innovation in SACU’s nascent data ecosystem.
  • Implementation: Relying on national data protection authorities and the AUC’s limited capacity may hinder effective implementation across SACU. A more legally binding regionally coordinated approach such as the Digital Protocols of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) may be more appropriate as the Draft Protocol can create binding conditions necessary to ensure that all SACU members benefit from the DPF.

Scope: The DPF does not include data governance issues that impact digital trade such as all the dimensions of data interoperability, gender inequality, and environmental sustainability. Addressing these gaps is crucial for ensuring that SACU’s digital trade is not only economically inclusive but also socially and environmentally responsible.
To fully capitalize on the potential of digital technologies for economic growth, SACU countries need a more harmonized and collaborative approach to data governance.

A proactive sociotechnical approach, which better addresses the complexity of the data economy, must be adopted to balance the risks and benefits of digital transformation.

To overcome multidimensional barriers, SACU member states must adopt a transversal approach that aligns digital trade policies with broader economic, regulatory, and infrastructure goals. A transversal approach requires a much-needed focus on both supply-side policies, such as enhancing digital public infrastructure, and demand-side policies, such as promoting digital capabilities.

13Sep

FIFAfrica24: Shaping the Future of Internet Freedom in Africa!

Author CIPESA Posted on

By FIFAfrica |

The highly anticipated Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2024 (FIFAfrica24) is just around the corner, and this year we’re heading to the vibrant city of Dakar, Senegal that in 2024,  has been the backdrop of a variety of both controversial and pivotal developments impacting democracy and digital rights.

Senegal was to host its elections on February 25, 2024, but instead was thrown into turmoil following a February 3, 2024 announcement that the elections had been postponed and that the incumbent – Macky Sall’s presidency would be extended until his successor is installed.  Shortly after the announcement,  internet access in the country was restricted in a move that the Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications, and Digital Economy justified as a response to the spread of “hateful and subversive messages” threatening public order.

Elections would eventually be held on March 24 vote and would run smoothly with no major incidents reported, and an eventual peaceful transition of power to President Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye. Senegal’s electoral journey stands out, particularly in contrast to the turbulent electoral climates in other African states.

While 2024 has been hailed as the Year of Democracy in which more than 2 billion people will go to the polls in 65+ elections across the world, in the biggest elections megacycle so far this century, with several taking place in Africa. 

Meanwhile, despite its economic challenges, Senegal is among a handful of African states alongside Benin, Mauritius, and Rwanda that have developed national Artificial Intelligence strategies. This goes against the trend in which the most developed or largest economies are the first to create national AI strategies. In the case of Africa, countries like South Africa or Nigeria would create national AI strategies first, yet neither has done so (though Nigeria’s strategy is reportedly in development).

Senegal’s commitments to a progressive legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the technology sector include its efforts in data governance, a hub for innovation, a  National Digital Addressing, and advancing a comprehensive National Data Strategy.

This year, Senegal joined 17 African countries that have put at least one satellite in orbit. It joined countries such as South Africa and Egypt which have 13 satellites each, with Nigeria ranking in third with seven satellites. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye remarked that the move signified a major step towards Senegal’s “technological sovereignty”.

This points to the wide spectrum along which many African countries sit regarding digital adoption, digital inclusion, technology-related regulation and legislation. The Forum aims to capture this diversity through the following themes:

  • Digital Inclusion
  • Digital Resilience                             
  • Freedom of Expression & Access to Information
  • Information disorder (mis/disinfromation)          
  • Implications of AI            
  • Governance and Policy
  • Movement Building

See the agenda

As a member of the #InternetFreedomAfrica community, FIFAfrica24 offers a unique platform to explore a wide range of themes and also provides valuable networking opportunities with participants from around the world with the shared vision of digital rights in Africa.

Join the Conversation

Can’t make it to Dakar? Don’t worry FIFAfrica24 will be streamed live here! You can still participate in discussions, watch live panels, and engage with attendees using the hashtag #FIFAfrica24 on social media. Better yet, you can register to attend remotely or in person and engage directly with participants within the event platform.

Be sure to stay connected, follow the debates and discussions, and contribute your thoughts and insights to the #InterneyFreedomAfrica community.

30Aug

Report Highlights Collaborative Efforts to Counter Disinformation in Africa

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Patricia Ainembabazi |

Disinformation is an escalating challenge across Africa, threatening democratic processes, social cohesion, and undermining trust in the media. However, evidence of the successes and pitfalls of initiatives that are working to counter disinformation remains minimal.

A new report by  CIPESA, in collaboration with Bertelsmann Stiftung, examines the evolving landscape of disinformation in Africa, highlighting key protagonists involved in the pushback against it and the tactics they employ, as well as the challenges. It offers recommendations for a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach to tackling the vice. The report includes case studies on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa.

The disinformation campaigns often exploit existing social and political divisions, including during electoral periods, when false and misleading content is utilised to sow discord and manipulate public opinion. The tactics used are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with technologies such as deep fakes increasingly being employed. The consequences of these campaigns can be particularly severe in fragile democracies, where disinformation undermines election integrity and fuels conflicts.

The study identifies various protagonists fighting disinformation, including country-specific protagonists, multi-country initiatives, pan-African protagonists, international protagonists, media, and coalitions. However, most rely on basic and moderate methods in identifying and pushing back against disinformation despite the increasing sophistication with which it is generated and disseminated. 

Another notable challenge is that some platforms are not doing enough to fight disinformation or moderate harmful content. Although they derive financial benefits from the region, some platforms do not seem to invest appropriately in human resources or respect national laws regarding content. The report notes that some platforms have run election-related adverts containing patent disinformation while making it expensive and cumbersome for African researchers to gain access to data on political advertising, which would be crucial to tackling disinformation in the region.

In addition, many African countries lack comprehensive legal frameworks to combat disinformation effectively. In some cases, existing laws are outdated, while in others they are poorly enforced and end up stifling legitimate expression.

The study highlights the need for more symbiotic approaches where different protagonists such as multi-stakeholder coalitions that include the state, civil society, platforms, and technologists collaboratively reinforce truth and debunk disinformation. An example is Kenya’s National Coalition on Freedom of Expression and Content Moderation (FECOMO) which brings together more than 20 state, civil society, and media entities to ensure that content moderation protects freedom of expression while tackling harmful content. 

In South Africa, ahead of the 2024 elections, the Electoral Commission entered a Framework of Cooperation with social media platforms Google, Meta, TikTok, and the non-profit Media Monitoring Africa (MMA), to curb disinformation. A related initiative is the Real411 run by the MMA, whose Digital Complaints Committee (DCC) receives complaints on disinformation and hate speech from the public and makes public the outcomes of its investigations of such complaints. 

The success of these efforts, however, often hinges on the active participation of local actors uniquely positioned to address their communities’ specific needs and dynamics. It is without a doubt that the fight against disinformation requires a coordinated response from various stakeholders, including governments, civil society, media, and tech companies.

The report makes various recommendations, such as:

  • Strengthening legal frameworks by developing and updating laws so that they balance freedom of expression with disinformation countermeasures.
  • Enhancing media literacy by educating the public on disinformation and promoting critical thinking across various sectors.
  • Rebuilding trust in media by ensuring accurate and unbiased reporting, particularly during elections.
  • Increasing platform accountability by asserting pressure on social media platforms to be transparent in their content moderation and algorithms.
  • Facilitating public reporting by establishing accessible channels for reporting disinformation and ensuring transparency in addressing reports of abuse.
  • Encouraging public discourse by promoting broader public engagement and awareness to enhance critical thinking on disinformation.
  • Investing in skills development by providing continuous training for fact-checkers, journalists, and researchers to effectively counter disinformation.

In conclusion, disinformation is a complex and multifaceted issue that requires a comprehensive and collaborative response from all stakeholders. Governments, civil society, media, and tech companies must work together to build resilient systems that can effectively combat the spread of false information. By promoting media literacy, holding intermediaries accountable, and fostering multi-stakeholder engagement, Africa can take significant steps toward countering disinformation and protecting democratic processes on the continent. The report can be accessed here. To read more about CIPESA’s work on disinformation, see here.

12Aug

Rollout of Digital Number Plates Poses Privacy Concerns in Uganda

Author CIPESA Posted on

By CIPESA Writer |

The rollout of the digital number plate system in Uganda is well underway. At a press conference last month, the Ministry of Works and Transport announced January 2025 as the deadline for full roll out. The system – over two years in the making – is a joint project between the government of Uganda and Russian company Joint Stock Company Global Security and has caused alarm among rights activists as it introduces another layer of massive personal data collection and processing amidst weak controls.

The stated objective of the Intelligent Transport Monitoring System (ITMS) is to improve the country’s transport management systems and security by enabling the authorities to “swiftly identify vehicles involved in criminal activities and improve traffic management through efficient ticketing and revenue collection”. It will involve the installation of digital number plates on all vehicles and motorcycles in the country, allowing security agencies to track and pinpoint their location at any one time.

  Overview of ITMS
Digital Number Plate ComponentsStatus of Fitment on Government Vehicles as at June 2024Target Installations (Registered Vehicles as at July 2024)
Aluminium plates – front and back1,0912,145, 988
A tracker
A sim chip
Bluetooth beacons – front and back
Snap locks

Once rolled out, the digital plates will add to the catalogue of surveillance apparatus in Uganda. The country already has a plethora of retrogressive laws, such as the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 that require communication service providers to aid in intercepting communication by ensuring that their systems are always technically capable of supporting lawful interception. The laws also grant powers to an authorised officer to intercept the communications of a person and to conduct surveillance of individuals.

The components of the digital number plates will enable the government through its security agencies, such as the police, to swiftly identify vehicles and their owners. Instantaneous data exchanges pose major challenges to data privacy, especially in cases where there are calculated targets such as civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), activists, and political opponents, government critics, or dissidents.

An added concern is that, according to the Uganda Police, the digital number plate system will be integrated with the Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) system and others such as the motor vehicle registration system, the e-tax system managed by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and the national identity database managed by the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) to “ensure comprehensive vehicle and personal identification.” Given weak controls over data held by public bodies and rare punishment for data breaches and unauthorised access, linking these databases absent clear data-sharing frameworks and robust controls poses grave concerns. Notably, Uganda does not have a law or regulations governing CCTV/ video surveillance.

Whereas there are efforts to localise parts of the system through the establishment of a local production facility for the various components, the partnership with Joint Stock Company Global Security underscores Uganda’s reliance on foreign entities for purposes of conducting surveillance and interception of private communication of its citizens. For example, in August 2022, there were reports that the Uganda Police had purchased UFED, a technology developed by the Israeli firm Cellebrite that enables authorities to hack into password-protected smartphones.

Earlier, starting in 2018, Uganda turned to a Chinese company, Huawei, for the supply and installation of CCTV across major cities. The decision to install the CCTV cameras came on the heels of a spate of murders that had engulfed the country, with the security forces keen on using the CCTV cameras to improve security in the country. Like many other government security procurements, the CCTV deal raised a lot of transparency and accountability issues, including the secrecy that surrounded the entire process.

Additionally, there were reports that security agencies were working with Huawei technicians in Uganda to spy on opposition critics by intercepting encrypted communications and using cell data to track their movements. This appeared to be the continuation of a trend that was documented earlier in 2012, when the Uganda government reportedly relied on a Germany-made spyware, FinFisher, which it is said to have covertly installed in various places, including hotels, the parliament and key government institutions, for purposes of surveilling on its opponents, including politicians, civil society, and the media.

Given the country’s history of repressing the civic space and harassing political opponents, CSOs and HRDs, the ITMS digital number plates could further the suppression of civil liberties, including political participation, freedom of expression, access to information and assembly and association. Moreover, deeper democratic regression could occur since these liberties largely depend on privacy and the ability to express oneself with minimal interruptions or interference.

While the government has a legitimate desire to improve the security of its people and transport management, recent events as discussed above where the same government has used the acquired technologies to surveil its citizens and undermine digital rights, it is critical that any future attempt to enhance its surveillance apparatus is anchored in law with clear oversight mechanisms. This is because the deployment of surveillance technologies such as ITMS, FinFisher, and Huawei’s CCTV present a veritable avenue for economic and political exploitation by collecting extensive data on people’s behaviour, location, activities, and interests online and offline. This makes the risk of violation of privacy apparent, rendering citizens helpless because they essentially have no control over how the data will be used, even when they are aware that data is being collected.

It is, therefore, important that the government reduce its reliance on foreign-manufactured surveillance technologies, particularly from countries whose human rights record is wanting, as these have tended to use these tools to suppress civic spaces. In addition, the government should reconsider its regulatory framework to ensure it conforms to international standards on privacy and data protection, especially during the procurement and deployment of potentially intrusive technology that is prone to abuse.

30Jul

East and Southern African National Human Rights Commissions Trained in Digital Rights Protection

Author CIPESA Posted on

By CIPESA Writer |

As part of its ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of African National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) to monitor, protect, and promote digital freedoms, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) last month conducted a two-day capacity-building training that attracted NHRI representatives from Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

The two-day training that was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on June 25 and 26, 2024, sought to empower staff of NHRIs in the region to engage with the opportunities and challenges that digital technology poses for human rights protection and monitoring of digital rights. In his opening remarks, CIPESA Executive Director Dr. Wairagala Wakabi noted that NHRIs play a critical role in the protection and promotion of human rights, and given the deteriorating state of digital rights in the region, it was important that they are equipped to deal with the intersection between the digital and the traditional human rights. According to the Paris Principles, NHRIs are required to have a broad mandate that allows them to effectively execute their mandate of promoting and protecting human rights, both offline and online.

The Nairobi training followed a similar training that CIPESA conducted in Ethiopia for staff of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), who identified key actions the commission could integrate in its annual work plans, such as digital rights monitoring, advocacy for enabling laws to be enacted, and developing tools for follow up on implementation of recommendations on digital rights by treaty bodies and the United Nations Human Rights Council.

Digital Rights as Human Rights

Digital rights have been recognised at both international and regional levels. For example, in 2018, during its 38th session, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted resolution A/HRC/RES/38/7 that reaffirmed that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.” In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution on “the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” condemning any measures taken by state parties to prevent or disrupt internet access and calling upon them to refrain from and cease any such measures.

In March 2024, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights passed resolution ACHPR.Res.580 (LXXVIII)2024 on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa “reaffirming the importance of access to the internet in the digital age and its implication for the realisation of human rights”. The resolution called upon member states to “refrain from ordering the interruption of telecommunications services, shutting down the internet, and/or disrupting access to any other digital communication platforms before, during or after the elections.”

Challenges Facing NHRIs

In many cases, African NHRIs have found themselves operating in an increasingly hostile environment with limited funding and hostility from state agencies, who sometimes view their role as countering and incriminating the government in human rights violations. In addition, because of the limited funding, many NHRIs are not in a position to recruit or improve the level of expertise among their staff members, especially when it comes to new and emerging technologies and how they affect the enjoyment of human rights. Participants acknowledged that, in many cases, they are always playing catch-up when it comes to legislation, yet they are supposed to be the primary advisors and reviewers of draft laws related to human rights.

In his remarks, Victor Kapiyo, one of the trainers, noted that the adoption of digital technologies has brought up new human rights issues, particularly as governments have reacted by enacting laws that have, for the most part, served to stifle human rights as opposed to facilitating their enjoyment. On the other hand, digital technologies have also facilitated the spread of hate speech, disinformation, and technology-facilitated gender-based violence. It is important that NHRIs keep enhancing their capacity to monitor, investigate, and protect against violations of digital rights by both governments and private actors, including big tech companies.

Practical Strategies for NHRIs

During the training, participants discussed an array of strategies that they can adopt to monitor, document, and protect digital rights, including the use of practical legal and policy guidance set out in the Rabat Plan of Action, as well as Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights when engaging with governments and business entities especially technological companies in regards to their obligations to respect, protect and promote human rights.

Participants also noted the need to engage with security agencies, the justice department, and policymakers on issues of digital rights. It was noted that because the concept of digital rights in Africa is new and evolving with limited understanding and jurisprudence, NHRIs need to constantly retool themselves on the emerging issues if they are to execute their mandates effectively. Other strategies included building coalitions and collaborations with civil society actors, the media and academia to help unpack and create awareness about digital rights.

The training was facilitated by trainers from CIPESA, Internews, the International Centre for Non-Profit Law, and the Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC).

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