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  HomeCollaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)  /  Uganda
17Oct

Job Opportunity: Programme Officer

Author CIPESA Posted on

Call for Applications |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is seeking a Programme Officer to Support the implementation of activities that advance respect for human rights by businesses in Uganda. 

Job Title: Programme Officer 

Location: Kampala, Uganda 

Duration: Two (2) Years

Reports to: Programme Manager

Deadline: October 31, 2024

About CIPESA

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) works to defend and expand the digital civic space to enable the protection and promotion of human rights and to enhance innovation and sustainable development. With a focus on disparate actors, including the private sector, civil society, media, policymakers, and multinational institutions, our work aims to engender a free, open, and secure internet that advances rights, livelihoods, and democratic governance. CIPESA’s work responds to a shortage of information, research, resources, and actors consistently working at the nexus of technology, human rights, and society. Indeed, CIPESA’s establishment in 2004 was in response to the findings of the Louder Voices Report for DFiD, which cited the lack of easy, affordable, and timely access to information about ICT-related issues and processes as key barriers to effective and inclusive ICT policy-making in Africa. 

Job Summary 

The Programme Officer will be responsible for planning, implementing, and reporting all project activities related to business and digital rights. Their duties will include organising and participating in training and mentoring partners, supervising research activities, and engaging with and maintaining relationships with various project stakeholders. 

Key areas of accountability include:
Partnership Building 
  • Identify project partners and develop sustained relationships with various stakeholders in the human rights, digital civic space and the private sector.
  • Build relationships with government actors, particularly those who work on human rights, labour, and digital policy. 
  • Support the capacity building of various stakeholders in advocacy for respect of digital rights by businesses.
  • Participate in events by organisational and project partners. 
Policy Engagement
  • Lead in the convening of digital rights and business policy dialogues. 
  • Coordinate CIPESA research in the area of business and digital rights. 
  • Support policy engagements with District Local Governments, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), as well as Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).
Training and Mentorship
  • Participate in the development of digital rights advocacy toolkits for businesses.
  • Participate in training civil society organisations and SMEs in advocacy for digital rights protection in the business context.
  • Mentor civil society, small business enterprise owners, and associations in implementing digital rights awareness campaigns.
  • Support the development and dissemination of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials.
Project Management and Reporting
  • Ensure that project outcomes are delivered on time, on budget and according to the quality of standards of CIPESA and funding partners.
  • Prepare project reports and briefs and ensure timely submission to the CIPESA Management and funding partners.
  • Monitor the progress of project milestones and activities against the scheduled work plans and objectives.
  • Support the wide dissemination and visibility of project achievements among partners and other stakeholders. 
Qualification and Experience 
  • An undergraduate degree in human rights, law, social or development studies, governance, or project planning and management. A Post-Graduate/ Masters qualification will be an advantage.
  • Four or more years of experience in human rights, governance or humanitarian programming with a reputable institution, preferably in the civil society/ non-government sector. 
  • An understanding of digital rights and human rights in the business context.
  • Effective communication, excellent written and presentation skills, and attention to detail.
  • Demonstrable experience in project management and implementation. 
  • Experience in effective teamwork, as well as interpersonal and liaison skills.
  • Experience in coalition building, advocacy and working with civil society actors to deliver effective policy change.
  • Training and mentoring experience, particularly for adults.
  • Donor funds management and reporting experience.
  • Ability to conduct research and write policy reports and briefs is desirable.
Standards of Professional Conduct:

CIPESA staff and partners must adhere to the values and principles outlined in the Code of Conduct, and the Safeguarding against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEAH) Policy. In accordance with these, CIPESA operates and enforces policies on Beneficiary Protection from Exploitation and Abuse, Child Safeguarding, Harassment-Free Workplace, Fiscal Integrity, Anti-Retaliation, and several others.

How to Apply:

Applications, including a cover letter outlining how you fit the job requirements, your areas of expertise, and salary expectations, a CV, samples of your work, and the names and contacts of two referees, should be submitted in one PDF file to [email protected] with Application for Programme Officer in the email subject line.

17Oct

Job Opportunity: Driver

Author CIPESA Posted on
Call for Applications |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is seeking a Driver to support the implementation of organisational activities. 

Job Title: Driver

Location: Kampala, Uganda 

Duration: Three (3) Years with possibility of renewal 

Reports to: Procurement and Logistics Officer 
Deadline: October 31, 2024

About CIPESA

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) works to defend and expand the digital civic space to enable the protection and promotion of human rights and to enhance innovation and sustainable development. With a focus on disparate actors, including the private sector, civil society, media, policymakers, and multinational institutions, our work aims to engender a free, open, and secure internet that advances rights, livelihoods, and democratic governance. CIPESA’s work responds to a shortage of information, research, resources, and actors consistently working at the nexus of technology, human rights, and society. Indeed, CIPESA’s establishment in 2004 was in response to the findings of the Louder Voices Report for DFiD, which cited the lack of easy, affordable, and timely access to information about ICT-related issues and processes as key barriers to effective and inclusive ICT policy-making in Africa. 

Job Summary

The Driver will be responsible for driving company vehicles to support the implementation of organisational operations. The Driver will also be responsible for maintenance of the organisation’s fleet of vehicles per CIPESA’s Travel and Fleet Management Policy. 

Key responsibilities: 

Vehicle maintenance

  • Ensure that all organisation vehicles are in sound mechanical condition and are serviced promptly. 
  • Ensure that all organisational cars are kept clean and well-maintained.
  • Report any mechanical faults or accidents to the Procurement Officer. 
  • Regularly check that the First Aid kits are complete and that every vehicle has the required spare parts and tools. 
  • Regularly check vehicles and submit a checklist report to the Procurement Officer.
  • Where possible, perform minor repairs as required but recommend significant cases to a garage/auto repair shop.

Record keeping

  • Maintain vehicle log sheets and ensure the accurate record of all vehicle trips, fuel fill-ups, time and mileage readings.
  • Ensure a timely and accurate fuel fill-up of vehicle log sheets.
  • Monitor and ensure that vehicle request forms are filled out and submitted to the Procurement Officer for travel allocation.
  • Ensure that all vehicle repair reports are forwarded to the Procurement Officer every time a repair is done.
  • Regularly check and ensure that vehicle comprehensive and third party insurance is valid before any trip and inform the Procurement Officer a month in advance for renewals. 

Qualifications and Experience 

  • Minimum of O’Level certificate or equivalent 
  • Valid driver’s licence of class ‘B’ and/ ‘D’
  • A Defensive driver’s certificate
  • Demonstrable experience of at least five years of class B and/or D driving 
  • Experience working with an NGO, with at least three years in the field. 
  • Excellent understanding of vehicle mechanics, maintenance and management 
  • Clean criminal record. 
  • Good command of the English language.
  • Good interpersonal skills.

Standards of Professional Conduct:

CIPESA staff and partners must adhere to the values and principles outlined in the Code of Conduct and the Safeguarding against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEAH) Policy. In accordance with these, CIPESA enforces policies on Beneficiary Protection from Exploitation and Abuse, Child Safeguarding, Harassment-Free Workplace, Fiscal Integrity, Anti-Retaliation, and several others.

How to apply 
Applications, including a cover letter and CV with the contacts of two referees, should be submitted in one PDF file to [email protected] with “Application for Driver” in the email subject line.

27Sep

2024 State of Internet Freedom in Africa Report Unveils the Promises and Challenges of Technology in African Elections

Author CIPESA Posted on

By FIFAfrica |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy has launched the 11th edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report. This year, the report examines the interplay between technology and elections in Africa during the so-called Year of Democracy, when at least 20 African countries were scheduled to go to the polls.

While highlighting the growing influence of technology in elections, the study documents that much of the deployment has been characterised by risks and pitfalls where the majority of authoritarian governments have selectively deployed technology to entrench their power.

The increase in Internet and mobile phone penetration rates in recent years and the adoption of technology in electoral processes such as the use of biometric voter registration and verification applications by different governments,  raised a the promise of better electoral outcomes due to the anticipated increased transparency, efficiency and affordance that technology would lend to the electoral processes, especially in 2024. However, in reality, many countries have failed to fully realise these benefits.

The study, conducted across several countries in Africa included interviews with experts in digital rights, electoral democracy, and technology. It was complimented with g literature reviews, legal and policy analysis resulting in a broad perspective on the intersection of technology and elections in Africa. Key Findings from the report including the following:

  • Democratic Governance is Under Siege: There is a significant decline in the state of democratic governance in Africa, with growing authoritarianism, coups, hereditary presidencies, weakened oversight institutions, political instability, and restricted political competition. The persistent failure to address corruption, social divisions, and economic inequality continues to undermine electoral integrity and public trust. In these contexts, political elites manipulate elections and exploit historical tensions and unresolved economic grievances to maintain power, thus eroding public trust in the democratic foundations necessary for fair and fair elections.
  • Intensification of Digital Authoritarianism: Digital authoritarianism is a growing concern in Africa as governments continue to deploy a combination of tools and tactics of repression, such as internet shutdowns, censorship of news outlets, targeted surveillance, and regressive laws to limit civic participation and suppress dissent. These practices have a significant social and economicimpacts resulting in  an environment where technology and democratic processes can be exploited to undermine democracy rather than strengthen it.
  • The Persistent Digital Divide is Deepening Political Inequalities and Exclusion: Africa’s digital divide remains a significant barrier to inclusive political participation, with rural, underserved communities and marginalised groups disproportionately affected. High internet usage costs, expensive digital devices, inadequate digital infrastructure, and low digital literacy compound political inequalities, thus limiting citizens’ ability to engage in political discourse and access critical electoral information. In the year of elections, such a disconnect is profound.
  • The Rise of AI-Enabled Disinformation Narratives: The study underscores the growing threat of misinformation and disinformation, particularly AI-generated content, in shaping electoral outcomes. AI tools were used in countries such as Rwanda and South Africa Rwanda to create deep fakes and synthetic media, manipulating public perception. Social media platforms have been slow to address this issue, and where they have, the approaches have not been uniform across countries. Disinformation campaigns can make it difficult for voters to access credible information, stifle democratic participation online, and erode citizens’ trust in democratic processes.
  • Progress and Innovation in the Use of Technology during Elections: The study has established the progress in the adoption of technologies in Ghana, Namibia, and South Africa for voter registration, results tallying and transmission, voter education, and engagement. Despite challenges in deployment, these technologies have the potential to improve electoral transparency, efficiency, and accountability. Also notable were the various initiatives to combat disinformation, build solidarity for good governance, and increase access to election information.  

The study concludes that the continent is at a crossroads as the use of technology in Africa’s 2024 elections presents both promises and pitfalls. On the one hand, technology has the potential to improve electoral transparency, promote citizen engagement, and ensure credible elections. On the other hand, the misuse of digital tools by authoritarian regimes, combined with the digital divide, the rise of disinformation, and declining constitutional governance risks undermining the democratic process. Governments, election management bodies, and civil society must work collaboratively to safeguard digital rights, promote digital inclusion, and build robust frameworks for the ethical use of technology in elections.

Secondly, while technology played a central role in the 2024 elections in several countries, one of the highlights has been the use of AI in ways that illuminate both its promises and dangers for electoral integrity and democracy. Clearly, few African countries have adopted the use of AI in elections, and this holds true for various election stakeholders, such as election observers, political parties, candidates, and Election Management Bodies (EMBs). Nonetheless, in the few countries studied where AI was adopted, some positive results could be discerned. Still, even in those countries where elements of AI were adopted, they were small-scale and did not fully exploit the promise that AI holds for enhancing the efficiency and transparency of elections.

Five Key Recommendations Emerged from the Report:

  1. Strengthen protection for digital rights: Countries should adopt progressive legal and policy frameworks that safeguard digital rights, protect privacy, entrench transparency and accountability in the technology sector, and govern the use of technologies, including artificial intelligence, in elections.
  2. Demand accountability: Civil society organisations, the tech community, media, and academia should leverage their watchdog role to document digital rights abuses, educate and raise awareness on the importance of internet freedoms, data privacy, AI governance, and their role in elections, in order to enable them to demand accountability from platforms and governments.
  3. Address the digital divide: The study proposes wide investments to expand internet access, especially in marginalised and underserved areas, together with measures to reduce the cost of access, the promotion of digital literacy, and building resilient digital infrastructure.
  4. Combat disinformation: Joint efforts bringing together social media platforms, election bodies, fact-checkers, civil society, academia, and media should be encouraged in efforts to combat disinformation. 
  5. Innovate election tech: Election management bodies should adopt transparent processes in the design, development, and deployment of election technologies, including disclosing independent audit and impact assessment reports, facilitating election observation, and independent monitoring of election technologies to promote and maintain public trust.

Find the report here.

12Aug

Rollout of Digital Number Plates Poses Privacy Concerns in Uganda

Author CIPESA Posted on

By CIPESA Writer |

The rollout of the digital number plate system in Uganda is well underway. At a press conference last month, the Ministry of Works and Transport announced January 2025 as the deadline for full roll out. The system – over two years in the making – is a joint project between the government of Uganda and Russian company Joint Stock Company Global Security and has caused alarm among rights activists as it introduces another layer of massive personal data collection and processing amidst weak controls.

The stated objective of the Intelligent Transport Monitoring System (ITMS) is to improve the country’s transport management systems and security by enabling the authorities to “swiftly identify vehicles involved in criminal activities and improve traffic management through efficient ticketing and revenue collection”. It will involve the installation of digital number plates on all vehicles and motorcycles in the country, allowing security agencies to track and pinpoint their location at any one time.

  Overview of ITMS
Digital Number Plate ComponentsStatus of Fitment on Government Vehicles as at June 2024Target Installations (Registered Vehicles as at July 2024)
Aluminium plates – front and back1,0912,145, 988
A tracker
A sim chip
Bluetooth beacons – front and back
Snap locks

Once rolled out, the digital plates will add to the catalogue of surveillance apparatus in Uganda. The country already has a plethora of retrogressive laws, such as the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 that require communication service providers to aid in intercepting communication by ensuring that their systems are always technically capable of supporting lawful interception. The laws also grant powers to an authorised officer to intercept the communications of a person and to conduct surveillance of individuals.

The components of the digital number plates will enable the government through its security agencies, such as the police, to swiftly identify vehicles and their owners. Instantaneous data exchanges pose major challenges to data privacy, especially in cases where there are calculated targets such as civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), activists, and political opponents, government critics, or dissidents.

An added concern is that, according to the Uganda Police, the digital number plate system will be integrated with the Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) system and others such as the motor vehicle registration system, the e-tax system managed by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and the national identity database managed by the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) to “ensure comprehensive vehicle and personal identification.” Given weak controls over data held by public bodies and rare punishment for data breaches and unauthorised access, linking these databases absent clear data-sharing frameworks and robust controls poses grave concerns. Notably, Uganda does not have a law or regulations governing CCTV/ video surveillance.

Whereas there are efforts to localise parts of the system through the establishment of a local production facility for the various components, the partnership with Joint Stock Company Global Security underscores Uganda’s reliance on foreign entities for purposes of conducting surveillance and interception of private communication of its citizens. For example, in August 2022, there were reports that the Uganda Police had purchased UFED, a technology developed by the Israeli firm Cellebrite that enables authorities to hack into password-protected smartphones.

Earlier, starting in 2018, Uganda turned to a Chinese company, Huawei, for the supply and installation of CCTV across major cities. The decision to install the CCTV cameras came on the heels of a spate of murders that had engulfed the country, with the security forces keen on using the CCTV cameras to improve security in the country. Like many other government security procurements, the CCTV deal raised a lot of transparency and accountability issues, including the secrecy that surrounded the entire process.

Additionally, there were reports that security agencies were working with Huawei technicians in Uganda to spy on opposition critics by intercepting encrypted communications and using cell data to track their movements. This appeared to be the continuation of a trend that was documented earlier in 2012, when the Uganda government reportedly relied on a Germany-made spyware, FinFisher, which it is said to have covertly installed in various places, including hotels, the parliament and key government institutions, for purposes of surveilling on its opponents, including politicians, civil society, and the media.

Given the country’s history of repressing the civic space and harassing political opponents, CSOs and HRDs, the ITMS digital number plates could further the suppression of civil liberties, including political participation, freedom of expression, access to information and assembly and association. Moreover, deeper democratic regression could occur since these liberties largely depend on privacy and the ability to express oneself with minimal interruptions or interference.

While the government has a legitimate desire to improve the security of its people and transport management, recent events as discussed above where the same government has used the acquired technologies to surveil its citizens and undermine digital rights, it is critical that any future attempt to enhance its surveillance apparatus is anchored in law with clear oversight mechanisms. This is because the deployment of surveillance technologies such as ITMS, FinFisher, and Huawei’s CCTV present a veritable avenue for economic and political exploitation by collecting extensive data on people’s behaviour, location, activities, and interests online and offline. This makes the risk of violation of privacy apparent, rendering citizens helpless because they essentially have no control over how the data will be used, even when they are aware that data is being collected.

It is, therefore, important that the government reduce its reliance on foreign-manufactured surveillance technologies, particularly from countries whose human rights record is wanting, as these have tended to use these tools to suppress civic spaces. In addition, the government should reconsider its regulatory framework to ensure it conforms to international standards on privacy and data protection, especially during the procurement and deployment of potentially intrusive technology that is prone to abuse.

10Jul

Is Foreign Malign Influence Inspiring Digital Authoritarianism in Uganda?

Author CIPESA Posted on

By CIPESA Writer |

A new policy brief by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) on the deteriorating state of digital rights in Uganda examines whether the east African country is drawing inspiration from China for its brand of digital authoritarianism.

Uganda is ranked as “Partly Free” by Freedom House’s annual Freedom on the Net report, with the biggest contributing factor being the repressive laws governing the digital civic space and surveillance, particularly those that enable internet censorship, network disruptions, and deployment of surveillance technologies such as spyware and video surveillance.

China has been a notable source of support in developing Uganda’s digital communication and other infrastructure. For example, Chinese telecom firm Huawei helped set up a video surveillance system for the Uganda Police, and reportedly aided security agencies to spy on political opponents in the country. China has also organised numerous study tours for Ugandan officials and journalists that are centred on popularising its economic and governance systems.

The brief illuminates how China and its model of governance and state surveillance may be influencing or inspiring retrogressive laws and undermining digital rights in Uganda. It explores the legal reforms necessary to advance digital rights in Uganda and the role that legislators, civil society organisations, human rights defenders (HRDs), and journalists should play.

Uganda has mirrored some practices from China, a country which various global indices consider a leading player in digital authoritarianism. While it is not patently clear whether China has directly influenced legislation in Uganda, the brief notes that “it has arguably inspired some of the legal frameworks and practices that fuel digital authoritarianism in the east African country.”

There is ample evidence indicating that African autocracies are exploiting the adoption of Chinese technology and model of internet controls to roll back democratic gains through surveillance and censorship.

China invested more than USD 110 million in Uganda’s National Backbone Data Transmission Project and also supported the National Fibre-Optic Project. There are suggestions that the national backbone and fibre-optic projects are part of a digital infrastructure that has enhanced the Uganda government’s surveillance capabilities that violate the right to privacy and freedom of expression.

China has continually buttressed its influence over Uganda’s social-economic development through the seemingly no-strings-attached loan schemes that have often been acknowledged and praised by President Museveni. This non-interference policy in the internal affairs of other countries allows their governments greater leeway to suppress dissent and democratic processes without facing criticism or repercussions from China.

By contrast, the Uganda government or senior public officials have during 2023 and 2024 attracted sanctions by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank over governance and human rights concerns. As such, the Chinese no-governance-strings-attached model is criticised for emboldening authoritarian tendencies in the countries it partners with.

However, the brief states that claims of China actively seeking to export its governance model and influencing local laws and practices in Africa are often anecdotal and inconclusive. Moreover, such claims and, often, the evidence they advance, assume that African governments are incapable of developing home-grown systems of governance and thoughtlessly rely on models from other continents.

Recommendations

Uganda should resist all foreign influence and models that promote digital authoritarianism and undermine democracy. The country’s laws must respect internationally recognised human rights standards and promote the use of a free, open, and safe internet.

The brief makes several recommendations, such as:

  • Parliament should strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks by amending or repealing regressive and oppressive frameworks to ensure responsible and ethical use of surveillance technology.
  • Parliament should enact laws that specifically protect journalists, whistle-blowers, human rights defenders, and activists from wanton threats, arrests, and prosecutions over legitimate online communications and activism that advances social accountability, respect for human rights, and good governance.
  • Civil society should conduct evidence-based research into the actions of foreign actors and how they adversely impact local laws, policies, and democratic governance.
  • Various stakeholders, including academia, the media, and lawyers, should engage in public interest litigation to challenge provisions in legislation that limit the exercise of digital rights.

See the full policy brief here.

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