Promoting Effective and Inclusive ICT Policy in Africa

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  HomeCollaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)  /  Technology
24Feb

African Media Festival 

Author CIPESA Posted on

Event |

Date: 24-25 February, 2026

Location: Nairobi, Kenya 

The Africa Media Festival is a gathering for journalists, editors, storytellers, creators, and media builders from across the continent and the diaspora.

The festival is a meeting place for those working in reporting, production, technology and creative enterprise who are asking real questions about the future of media and how it is made, funded and sustained.

This year’s edition continues to expand pathways for participation across Africa and beyond. The two days of conversation, learning and collaboration will centre on the ideas, challenges and opportunities shaping media and creative work today.

31Jan

African Women’s Digital Safety: From Resolution to Reality

Author CIPESA Posted on

Edrine Wanyama |

Amplifying the Resolution on the Protection of Women Against Digital Violence in Africa: Towards Meaningful Actions by States

Two and a half years after the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted the Resolution on the Protection of Women Against Digital Violence in Africa, its implementation remains a pipe dream. With Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) continuing to proliferate across the continent, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) is challenging African governments to use the occasion of International Women’s Day to commit to taking legislative and practical measures to implement this pivotal resolution.

ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 is important as it offers ground breaking approaches to addressing digital violence against women on the African continent.  While the digital realm should be a space of innovation and empowerment, it has become a battleground where women face harassment, intimidation, and violence. The non-consensual sharing of intimate images, sexist hate speech, misogynistic disinformation campaigns, cyberstalking, cyber bullying, cyber flashing, unsolicited sexually explicit content, doxing, deep fakes, trolling and mansplaining have steadily increased and contributed to a growing digital gender divide in Africa. 

This digital gender divide further exacerbates existing inequalities and hinders progress towards achieving gender equality in the region, stripping girls and women of their voices and hindering meaningful participation in online discourse. The inequalities also hinder the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 5 that, among others, aims to advance gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls as a prerequisite for development.

Given the snail-speed implementation of the 2022 Resolution, in 2024  the Commission adopted another resolution, ACHPR/Res.591 (LXXX) 2024, which mandates the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa to undertake a study on the causes, manifestations, and impacts of digital violence against women in Africa. It also aims to further the development of comprehensive norms and standards to assist countries ​in ​address​ing TFGBV.  

This Resolution underscores the need to fulfill Article 9 of the African Charter on free expression and access to information, and Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa on the rights to life, integrity and security of the person of the woman. 

According to CIPESA’s Programme Manager, Ashnah Kalemera, governments are not to be reminded of their obligations with regards to gender equity online but should take all the necessary measures and “accelerate actions including adopting appropriate laws to address TFGBV.” 

While TFGBV has become a major global challenge, many approaches adopted to tackle it on the continent either fall short of the capability to hold those responsible for rights violations accountable, or focus on curtailing the digital civic spaces. For example, electoral periods such as in Uganda have  witnessed  multiple reports of targeted online violence against women, with some existing laws on cybercrime often targeting the female victims and not the perpetrators of gender-based violence online.

In a recent report on Kenya, almost 90% of young adults enrolled in tertiary institutions in the country’s capital Nairobi have reportedly suffered gender-based violence in online spaces, with 39% having experienced the harms personally. These harms, according to the study, are more pronounced amongst females (64.4%) in comparison to males (35.5%). Meanwhile, sexism and sexualisation of content such as in Zimbabwe and Uganda, attacks on female journalists in Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania, the harassment of female journalists in South Africa and against women in politics  in Kenya continually undermined their political and public affairs.

Guided by this year’s theme, Accelerate Actions to commemorate International Women’s Day, CIPESA calls on African governments to undertake the following actions to implement Resolution ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022.

Adopt Gender-Sensitive Legal and Policy Frameworks

Adoption of gender-sensitive legal and policy frameworks is critical to provide the legal basis for addressing TFGBV. States, technology companies including social media platforms, media and news organisations, and other stakeholders should recognise online violence from a gender lens, enact laws and policies that employ gender-balanced language, criminalise all forms of online violence and prioritise the digital safety of women and girls.

Evidence-Based Research for Gendered Actions

Evidence-based research is crucial for innovation and development of effective gendered actions to inform targeted interventions, policies, and programs that aim to combat online violence. Data that establishes the nature, prevalence, extent and the risk factors of TFGBV and the impact it poses should be collected and analysed by states alongside other stakeholders like CSOs. Such studies can be the foundational basis for identifying and addressing the root causes of the violence for more effective gendered actions against the vice.

Capacity Building and Awareness Raising

In line with the resolution, there is a need for capacity building and awareness raising in addressing TFGBV. Capacity building and awareness raising through various fora such as the media has the capacity to empower governments, individuals, communities, and institutions to understand, prevent, and respond to violence against women. Programmes such as digital literacy, advocacy interventions, community and network-led education, and capacitating law enforcement officers, the judiciary and other institutions will contribute to the wider goal of addressing online violence targeting women. Specific efforts in privacy awareness, online safety and digital hygiene will contribute to the creation of safer spaces for women who are disproportionately targeted by online violence.

Cooperation with Stakeholders including CSOs and Service Providers

The Resolution calls for cooperation of states with stakeholders including CSOs and service providers to end TFGBV. Collaboration amongst these players can help to combat TFGBV. CSOs can continually play the watchdog role of outreach and monitoring state efforts and activities. Service providers should engage in promoting responsibility over content and enhance accountability over the use of the online spaces and platforms. Similarly, there should be joint efforts to end violence against women such as through information sharing, capacity building, conducting joint campaigns and employing policy advocacy and tech solutions such as use of technology tools to track and investigate suspected cases of violence against women.

Protection and Support for Victims

The effects of violence in any form can be devastating. The devastating effects call for mitigation of the harm caused and empowering of survivors to heal and seek justice. States need to adopt comprehensive approaches which facilitate mitigation of harms including taking appropriate action for immediate support and providing safe spaces for survivors, safety planning and documentation of evidence. Similarly, clear mechanisms for reporting and redress including law enforcement and legal assistance for survivors can go a long way in victim support. Psychological and emotional support and providing self-care resources are also key. Additionally, digital security and privacy support, community support and advocacy such as awareness raising, provision of specialised services such as trauma-informed care and culturally sensitive services, and education including digital literacy programmes and public awareness aimed at enhancing preventive measures are important strategies for combating TFGBV. 

Buttressing Prevention Measures

The ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 enlists a number of actions which African Union Member States should undertake. If undertaken, these actions could check on tech-enabled violence against women. They could also be the basis upon which equality in the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms in the online space can be achieved. By strengthening prevention measures, a society that is pro-rights and freedoms that ensures a safe and inclusive space for empowering women and girls will be attained. Thus, individuals, groups, and communities through buttressed approaches will be equipped with knowledge, tools and skills to prevent, respond to and combat online violence.


Conclusively, the ACHPR/Res. 522 (LXXII) 2022 is a step forward in the fight against gender discrimination and women targeted violence in the online spaces. It sets a powerful benchmark for dealing with and addressing TFGBV. Its multi-faceted approach of bringing various stakeholders including governments, civil society, and the private sector together and, dealing with the issues in a comprehensive manner especially by states, provides a progressive roadmap for creating a safer and more inclusive online environment for women across Africa.

11Apr

World Technology Law Conference 2023

Attending an ITechLaw conference is “an exciting opportunity to meet colleagues and friends across the globe who are similarly passionate about law and technology. Click here to read more on the event.

23Jun

Digital Authoritarianism hurting Democratic Participation in Africa

Author Evelyn Lirri Posted on

By Paul Kimumwe |

Although Africa has registered remarkable growth in digitisation with increased internet penetration and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), the proliferation of ICT and other new and emerging technologies has significantly expanded states’ toolkit for repression and social control, deepening human rights challenges.

Several African governments have embraced digital authoritarianism characterised by aggressive and sophisticated measures that curtail internet freedoms. These have included using digital technologies to surveil, repress and manipulate domestic and foreign populations. Although state surveillance is not new, it has dramatically expanded with the increased digitisation.

Further, surveillance has been digitalised and automated, making mass surveillance possible. Numerous countries across the continent have adopted policies and enacted laws that permit states and their respective agencies, especially security services, to use ICT to conduct surveillance; impose liability on telecommunication intermediaries to facilitate the interception of communication; stipulate the mandatory collection of biometric data; limit the use of encryption; require the localisation of personal data; and grant law enforcement agents broad search and seizure powers.

In this brief CIPESA discusses the key control measures adopted by some African states in enforcing digital authoritarianism and their effect on democratic participation.

The brief notes that the rise of digital authoritarianism has greatly undermined citizens’ rights to enjoy the benefits of digital technology. Several of the tools and control measures that states have employed include the surveillance and interception of communications, poorly regulated collection and processing of personal data including biometrics, as well as the weaponisation of laws that have fundamentally undermined the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Collectively, these controls measures have continued to undermine citizens’ digital rights and democratic participation and cement authoritarians’ hold on political power.

Read the full report here: Digital Authoritarianism And Democratic Participation in Africa  

21Apr

Togo: Fumbling With a Digital ID While Actively Surveilling Citizens

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Afi Edoh |

For four years Togo has been inching towards issuing a digital identity (ID) card. While there are indications that 2022 may be the year in which the west African country finally delivers the long-awaited digital ID, the road ahead remains uncertain. Challenges lie both in bureaucratic delays and citizens’ caginess about handing their data to a government with a penchant for surveilling citizens and shutting down digital communications.

The Togolese government announced the e-ID Togo project in 2018, but it was not until mid 2021 that the Ministry of the Digital Economy and Digital Transformation initiated efforts to recruit a communications consultant to devise an awareness campaign to precede the registration stage and a technology solutions service provider. The International Institute of Information Technology Bangalore was awarded the system contract in December 2021.

According to the government, the e-ID project will simplify the process of updating the electoral register, facilitate access to public services and to credit, reduce fraud in the financial sector, and facilitate the targeting of social protection beneficiaries. Only 25% of the country’s population of eight million has a form of identification, with women less likely to have an identification document, which hinders their ability to open bank accounts, enrol children in school, benefit from health insurance, or get a mobile phone number. In recognition of the gaps in civil registration among citizens, the government set out to enrol citizens for e-ID even without proof of birth registration.

Togo passed Law No. 2019-014 relating to the protection of personal data in October 2019. In 2020, parliament passed Law No. 2020-009 relating to the biometric identification of natural persons, whose objective is to establish a system for identification and authentication of natural persons. The law aims to establish a “secure and reliable methodology” for obtaining, maintaining, storing and updating data on the identity of registered individuals. The law requires all citizens and residents in Togo to obtain a Unique Identification Number (NIU) by submitting their demographic and biometric data (Article 4). The biometric data specified for purposes of obtaining a NIU are photograph and / or facial recognition, fingerprints, and iris scan. The National Identification Agency (ANID) is mandated to collect biometric data for the NIU.

SIM Card Registration
In July 2021, a SIM card registration and limitation of subscriptions per individual and network campaign was launched by the telecommunications regulatory authority ARCEP, supported by leading telecom operators Moov Africa Togo and TogoCom. The SIM registration requirements include a national identity card or passport and collection of biometric and demographic data. 

But this extensive collection of individuals’ personal data raises concerns for the safety of such data. These concerns are not unfounded and they partly arise from the state’s record on respect for digital rights, which have seen it order network disruptions and use malware to target opponents and dissidents.

State Surveillance
In 2020, lingering suspicions that the Togolese government was undertaking interceptions of communications gained credence when the Citizen Lab revealed that Israeli-made spyware Pegasus, supplied by the NSO Group, was used between April and May 2019 to target Togolese civil society, including a Catholic bishop and a priest, as well as two members of Togo’s political opposition. The surveillance reportedly coincided with nationwide pro-reform protests that were forcibly dispersed. The Togolese government did not respond to the allegations, which nonetheless sparked debate within Togolese media and civil society.

Further, in October 2021, Amnesty International research found that Togolese activists had been targeted with spyware by the Donot Team hacker group based in India – the  first time that Donot Team spyware was found in use outside of South Asia. According to the report, the activists’ devices were targeted between December 2019 and January 2020, during a tense political climate ahead of the 2020 presidential election.

Network Disruptions

During the February 2020 elections, authorities disrupted access to messaging services (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Telegram). Later that year, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice ruled that the 2017 internet shutdown in Togo was illegal and an affront on the right of freedom to expression. 

According to Access Now, the court ordered the government of Togo to pay two million francs (USD 3,459) to the plaintiffs as compensation, and to take all the necessary measures to guarantee the implementation of safeguards with respect to the right to freedom of expression of the Togolese people.

Privacy and Data Protection

Togo’s laws provide safeguards against unlawful surveillance and unauthorised access to data whilst also granting authorities sweeping powers to violate privacy. Law No. 2012-018 on electronic communications provides for privacy of communications but article 92 empowers the Prime Minister, and the Ministers responsible for the economy and finance, defence, justice, and security and civil protection, to trigger the interception of communications and electronic content.

The biometrics identification law requires the National Identification Agency to encode and encrypt data on its registry and only allows access to authorised agents (article 10, 21 & 22). Violation of the obligation of non-disclosure of personal data, identity theft and unauthorised processing of personal data are punishable with fines ranging from one million to 10 million Central African Francs (USD 1,747 to 17,472), imprisonment between one and five years, or both.   

Article 94 of Togo’s 2012 electronic communication law obliges encryption service providers to comply with lawful interception orders, with refusal to provide secret decryption codes to government agencies punishable with a fine of between USD 3,544 and USD 14,178. Cryptology services providers are required to retain for one year, content and data allowing the identification of anyone who has used their services, and to provide the technical means that enable the identification of those users. The service providers are required to avail this data, on request, to the investigating judge, Prime Minister, Minister for the Economy and Finance, the Minister of Defence, the Minister  of Justice, and the Minister of Security. The multiple officials who access data – similar to the various officials that can trigger the interception of communications – offers wide latitude for abuse of citizens’ data privacy rights.

Digital Exclusion
In the wake of Covid-19, Togo initiated a relief programme for vulnerable citizens whose livelihoods were affected by the state of emergency. As at March 2021, the programme, known as NOVISSI, had disbursed a total of 13.3 billion francs (USD 22 million) to 819,972 citizens via mobile money.

However, the programme was criticised for requiring applicants to possess a voter’s ID card. During the last electoral census, opposition parties called on the population to boycott the exercise, which meant that some citizens had not renewed their voter ID cards. There were also cases of unscrupulous individuals utilising the voter’s ID details of other citizens to fraudulently benefit from the programme. As a result, the government temporarily halted the program to allow for physical verification of beneficiaries at dedicated centres.

Way forward

Whereas the various sanctions within the existing legal framework might be a deterrent against unauthorised access to and misuse of personal data, there is wide latitude for state agencies and officials to access the data, which could be abused. This calls for a review of the provisions to ensure they uphold citizens’ right to privacy and data protection, with adequate oversight and redress mechanisms. Further, the e-ID should be rolled out in a manner that ensures agency and dignity, without enhancing exclusion and surveillance. 

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