CIPESA Builds the Capacity of State Actors to Address Online Harms

By CIPESA Writer |

Digital platforms serve as vital spaces for civic participation, political expression, and social mobilisation throughout Africa, including for women, youths, and human rights advocates. However, there has been a rise in digital hams that threaten online rights, safety, and democratic engagement. Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based violence (TFGBV), disinformation, digital surveillance, and increasingly complex attacks made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) are all on the rise in African online spaces. The majority of those harmed are journalists, activists, women and girls.

To address these challenges, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) last month convened a two-day regional engagement in Mauritius to explore trends in digital harms and equip state actors with practical tools and guidance to monitor, prevent, and respond to online rights violations. It drew 30 participants from seven countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe). They included judges, magistrates, law enforcement officers, communications regulators, and representatives of data protection authorities and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs).

Although the internet and digital technologies have enhanced civic participation and broadened the enjoyment of human rights, they have also brought about new risks for individuals and organisations. Accordingly, the discussion addressed the evolving nature of online harms and their impact on digital rights and democratic engagement.

Across all countries in the region, TFGBV is a major concern. Women in public roles, such as politicians, journalists, and activists, face a rising wave of online harassment, sexualised threats, and disinformation campaigns aimed at intimidating and silencing them. In countries like Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, these attacks increase significantly during elections, compelling numerous women to withdraw from public engagement.

Disinformation and AI-driven manipulation present another concern. Coordinated disinformation campaigns, often amplified by bots and increasingly reliant on synthetic media like deepfakes, influence public opinion and target independent and critical voices. In countries where laws are enacted to address these ills, they often fail to target harmful manipulation and are instead weaponised to suppress legitimate expression.

For instance, laws on cybercrime and “false information”in countries like Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Uganda are often broadly framed, with ambiguous provisions and overly broad definitions and excessive penalties. These laws are frequently applied to detain and prosecute individuals, primarily journalists, bloggers and social accountability activists. Even where prosecutions are rare, the chilling effect on civic engagement is significant.

The engagement also heard that, in several countries, surveillance-enabling measures, from SIM card registration linked to national IDs, to biometric voter databases and interception technologies, have expanded without proper independent oversight.

Speaking at the engagement, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Commissioner and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, Ourveena Geereesha Topsy-Sonoo, discussed how her mandate was addressing digital harms and promoting rights. She highlighted the commission’s resolution against internet disruptions and Resolution 591, which addresses the growing issue of violence against women on digital platforms across the continent.

In 2019, the ACHPR adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa and has more recently issued resolutions addressing digital violence against women. However, most governments are yet to domesticate and implement these key instruments.

The meeting also underscored how democratic backsliding, shrinking civic space, and the expansion of executive power, as witnessed in several countries, create an environment in which digital harms flourish. While instruments such as the African Charter, the Malabo Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) provide safeguards, their impact depends on independent courts, empowered regulators, and capable NHRIs.

Participants noted that limited capacity, resources, and coordination across government institutions often undermine enforcement, monitoring, and accountability. The Mauritius engagement therefore, recommended establishing stronger institutional capacity, such as inter-ministerial committees on digital rights, to foster collaboration among key actors responsible for protecting digital rights.

Participants further explored practical approaches to monitoring digital rights violations, supporting survivors of online abuse, and ensuring accountability for harmful online behaviour. These discussions also drew from a handbook developed by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and CIPESA, which provides guidance for NHRIs on monitoring and promoting digital rights.

In particular, the convening challenged NHRIs to play a greater role in addressing digital harms through investigating violations, providing remedies to victims, advising on legislation and standards, and conducting public education.

Another focus of the discussions was the role of technology companies in moderating harmful content. Participants highlighted concerns that major platforms such as Meta and X do not allocate sufficient resources to content moderation in Africa. In many cases, moderation systems rely heavily on automated tools that are poorly adapted to local languages and socio-political contexts, while the number of human moderators covering African content remains limited.

Participants recommended that African governments strengthen their engagement with big tech companies through regional mechanisms such as the African Union, to present a more coordinated voice on issues of platform accountability.

Through this engagement, CIPESA strengthened the capacity of state actors to safeguard digital rights, highlighting that protecting these rights is both their legal mandate and central to growing democratic resilience and inclusion across Africa. The engagement was supported by the Irene M. Staehelin Foundation.

New Tax on Online Services A Threat to Internet Freedom in Mauritius

By Thomas Robertson |

Under the premise of Covid-19 austerity measures, the government of Mauritius passed a new tax on digital services in August 2020. The “Liability to Value Added Tax on Digital and Electronic Services” is one of the several amendments to the Value Added Tax (VAT) Act introduced in the July 2020 Finance Bill.

The Act defines “digital or electronic service” as any service supplied by “a foreign supplier over the internet or an electronic network which is reliant on the internet; or by a foreign supplier and is dependent on information technology for its supply.”

The penalties for failure to comply with VAT that are outlined in the original VAT Act (which are unchanged in the amendment that extended the tax to digital services) include a fine of up to 50,000 rupees (USD 1,255) or imprisonment of up to five years.

The digital VAT introduction is the latest in Mauritius’ move towards internet regulation that has already manifested in restrictions to freedom of expression through the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act and application of expanded surveillance technologies in tourist areas.

The Bumpy Legal Road to Mauritius’ Blossoming ICT Sector

 Mauritius’ economic success and a strong culture of democracy have allowed for the development of an emerging ICT sector. In 2019, the ICT sector contributed up to 5.8% to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounting to over 800 million US dollars. This is not surprising given that Mauritius has set out to be the world’s first Cyber Island and has fulfilled that goal by establishing Africa’s first Cybercity. Additionally, a conducive legal framework is in place, including laws on cybercrime, data protection, and ICT usage regulation and democratisation. Mauritius is also implementing a 2018-2022 Digital Government Strategy that aims to integrate technology into government operations and service delivery.

Nonetheless, there has been a series of regressive developments to which the online services tax now contributes. In 2018, a contentious amendment to the ICT Act was passed, which criminalised content perceived to cause “annoyance, humiliation, inconvenience, distress or anxiety to any person,” and established penalties of up to 10 years in prison. However, even before the amendment of the ICT Act, two internet users were arrested in 2016 following a complaint filed by a member of the Mauritian cabinet regarding their Facebook posts. One of the two users arrested in 2016, Farihah Ruhomaully, was arrested again in July 2020 after she called a Member of Parliament a “dirtbag” on Facebook. Both of these arrests were justified as responding to breaches of the ICT Act, indicating that the Act is enforced not just to prevent cybercrime, but also to crack down on dissent.

The ICT Act has also been used to criminalise the dissemination of false news as demonstrated by the arrest of a former government minister on allegations of spreading false information regarding the purchase of Covid-19 medical equipment. Meanwhile, there are reports of the involvement of the Mauritian government in the blockage of social media accounts of critics on grounds of national security.

In addition, the Mauritian government is one of several across Africa to institute a widespread surveillance apparatus. The Safe City project funded by Huawei will install a system of hundreds of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras in the Port-Louis area purportedly intended to fight crime. This is troubling given Huawei’s reported collaboration with state police forces in Uganda and Zambia to target the political opposition.

Looking Beyond the Tax Act’s Impacts on Internet Affordability and Free Speech

Mauritius boasts relatively high internet access rates compared to much of sub-Saharan Africa – 59% internet penetration as of 2018, according to the World Bank and the International Telecommunication Union. The country is also ranked favourably in internet affordability by the Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI) Affordability Report: 13th out of 61 countries assessed worldwide and first in Africa.

Without a list of the range of digital services under the scope of the new VAT provisions, it is unclear which services will be affected, though Netflix and Google Drive are among the services speculated to be taxed. At 15% of the value of “digital or electronic services”, the levy will likely increase the price of affected services – putting them out of reach for many Mauritians. Indeed, similar VAT modifications on online services in Mexico and Chile demonstrate the effects of the increased tax burden on consumers.

With a strong history of democracy and rule of law, legislative constraints that stifle free speech online and expand surveillance show regression into authoritarianism. The introduction of VAT on online services resembles the likes of the Ugandan government’s social media tax and the Zambian government’s  tax on internet voice calls. The timing of the tax also seems peculiar given that many Mauritians are relying on digital services during the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, digital platforms have recently been utilised to mobilise opposition against the Mauritian government’s response to the Wakashio oil spill, resulting in over 50,000 citizens participating in an anti-government protest in August 2020.


Thomas Roberston is a 2020 CIPESA Fellow focussing on digital expression and China-Africa relations.