The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) condemns the ongoing internet disruptions in Uganda and urges the government to immediately restore full access to social media platforms, blocked websites, and mobile money services. We further call upon the Government of Uganda to cease and desist from ordering internet throttling and blockages, which unjustifiably deny citizens the right to express themselves and to access, share and disseminate information. Internet disruptions further limit the public’s ability to conduct business, access public services, participate in community and civic affairs, socialise, and maintain contact with friends, family, and associates.
CIPESA joins numerous independent observers who have strongly condemned the disruptions to digital communications, including the Uganda Law Society, which has described the disruptions as unlawful. While the Uganda Communications Act (2013) grants powers to the national communications regulator, according to the Uganda Law Society, the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) may order a blockage of communications following a formal declaration of a state of emergency. No such state of emergency was declared at the time the regulator ordered a nationwide shutdown two days before the January 15, 2025, polls. Government officials said the disruption was aimed at curbing the spread of online misinformation, electoral fraud, and incitement to violence in the lead-up to the elections.
As affirmed by the African Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, as well as global civil society organisations, governments must refrain from imposing network disruptions and instead address security or public order concerns through lawful, necessary, and proportionate measures. Indeed, internet shutdowns and restrictions are a disproportionate measure that violate Uganda’s constitutional guarantees and its regional and international human rights obligations, including those under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Furthermore, CIPESA is concerned by the broader pattern of repression, including relentless attacks on civil society organisations. In the days preceding the elections, several organisations working on media rights, democratic governance and human rights protection were suspended, in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to silence independent voices. This broader crackdown on civic space also included the arrest of human rights defender Sarah Bireete, Executive Director of the Centre for Constitutional Governance, further illustrating the shrinking environment for civil society and human rights work in the country.
A free, independent, and vibrant civil society is indispensable to any democratic society and should not be treated as government adversaries. The Government of Uganda should therefore recognise civil society organisations as legitimate and valuable partners in improving livelihoods, strengthening rights protection, and advancing democratic governance and socio-economic transformation.
Similarly, CIPESA urges the government to immediately cease attacks against journalists and media workers, particularly those from independent media houses and journalists who are critical of government actions. These violations, which have been widely documented by national and international actors, including the United Nations, undermine media freedom and the public’s right to access information, especially during electoral periods.
In two days, as Uganda heads to its presidential and parliamentary elections slated for January 15, 2026, citizens, civil society actors, journalists, and digital rights defenders were stumped with the question, “will they shut down the internet again?” Or, this time, will we see a commitment to adherence to one of the basic fundamentals of digital democracy and have an election in which access to digital communications remains open?
In recent weeks, anxiety about an impending internet blackout has surged despite Dr. Aminah Zawedde, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, and Hon. Nyombi Thembo, Executive Director of the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), dismissing rumours of plans to shut down the internet, calling them “false and misleading”.
However, for many, these pronouncements have done little to quell suspicions, especially due to the actions witnessed during the 2016 and 2021 elections. During those previous two elections, access to digital communications was restricted, resulting in a block to online communication, commerce, and key avenues for civic engagement.
Various actions in the lead up to the polls have also served to compound the suspicions. In a report issued in January 2026, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) describes the arrests of state critics as “arbitrary and discriminatory” and outside of the country’s constitutional guarantees.
“Despite the strong constitutional protection of rights, the human rights situation in Uganda during the period under review has been characterized by increasingly restrictive legislation and their arbitrary and discriminatory application. The Government of Uganda has continued to rely on legislation such as the Public Order Management Act (POMA), the Anti-Terrorism Act, the NGO Act, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act and the Penal Code Act to shrink civic and democratic space and further weaken political participation, particularly of political opponents and their supporters, as well as the work of civil society, including journalists and human rights defenders.” OHCHR Report on Uganda
Meanwhile, independent media has come under increasing pressure, experiencing various forms of clampdowns in the lead up to the elections, including the denial of advertising spend. In October 2025, independent outlets – NTV Uganda and The Daily Monitor – were denied accreditation to cover parliamentary and presidential proceedings. Reports of harassment, equipment confiscation as well as attacks on journalists during election campaign coverage, and raids on media offices, have been commonplace – underscoring a deteriorating environment for media freedom.
Meanwhile the satellite internet provider Starlink, which has services that can operate independently of terrestrial networks, was halted in Uganda after a regulatory directive in early January 2026, rendering all Starlink terminals inactive ahead of polling day. The satellite internet service provider was providing services without a valid local license. Critics still argue that the directive serves to limit alternatives for connectivity in the event of broader restrictions on internet access, feeding anxieties about reduced access to independent channels of information.
The UCC has also come under fire following its warning to broadcasters and digital content creators against live coverage of riots, protests, or incidents that could disrupt public order. The regulator stated that only the Electoral Commission may declare election results, and sharing unverified results is illegal. Dr. Zawedde stated, “Media platforms must not be abused to incite violence, spread misinformation, or undermine the credibility of the electoral process.”
By the afternoon of January 13, 2026, a directive circulating online had been issued by UCC to mobile network operators to block public access to the internet, effective at 18:00.
In a public statement, Access Now and the global #KeepItOn coalition had urged President Yoweri Museveni and relevant national authorities to ensure unrestricted internet access throughout the electoral period and to refrain from any disruptive measures that impede the free flow of information. The statement stresses the fundamental role that connectivity plays in inclusive participation, freedom of expression, and the credibility of the electoral process.
Likewise, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) also reaffirmed that internet access is a core human right and a necessary condition for free and fair elections, warning against restrictions that would stifle civic space. The Commission called on the Government of Uganda to ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, signed on January 27, 2013, which emphasises the importance of a culture of peaceful change of power based on regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial electoral bodies.
For democracy to flourish in Uganda, authorities must demonstrate their commitment to open digital spaces. This means not only publicly guaranteeing uninterrupted internet access before, during, and after the elections but also building trust through transparency and accountability. Citizens deserve to communicate freely, monitor the electoral process, and hold all actors accountable without fear of arbitrary disruption.
Ultimately, Uganda’s electoral credibility will not be judged by what happens at polling stations, but by whether the state resists the temptation to control information by disrupting digital access. In an era where civic participation, journalism, election transparency, and even livelihoods heavily rely on digital access, a disruption would signal a fear of accountability.
If the government chooses restraint in the coming hours, it would mark a major departure from a troubling past and offer Ugandans a rare assurance in the election process. If it does not, history will record yet another election where the digital access was shut down to presumably manage dissent rather than protect democracy.
Nairobi, Kenya – In a significant step toward safeguarding digital rights and constitutional freedoms, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and six other organisations have filed a landmark public interest case before the High Court of Kenya to challenge the arbitrary and unlawful disruptions of internet access in the country.
The petitioners – Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE), Katiba Institute, Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ), Law Society of Kenya (LSK), Paradigm Initiative (PIN), the International Commission of Jurists – Kenya Section (ICJ Kenya), and CIPESA, seek judicial redress following recurring internet disruptions during critical national moments, including the 2024 #RejectFinanceBill protests and the 2024 Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) examinations.
Following the filing of the case, High Court Justice Bahati Mwamuye issued interim orders prohibiting any interference with internet access until the case is heard and determined. The legal challenge targets the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA), the Attorney General, the Cabinet Secretary for Information, Communications and the Digital Economy, and service providers Safaricom and Airtel Kenya.
The petition relies on technical evidence from Cloudflare, the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), and the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA), which confirms instances of intentional internet throttling and platform blocking, such as the disruption of Telegram.
“These unlawful internet shutdowns directly violate rights enshrined in the Kenyan Constitution, including freedom of expression (Article 33), media freedom (Article 34), access to information (Article 35), and economic and social rights (Article 43),” said Eric Mukoya, Executive Director of ICJ Kenya.
Speaking on behalf of CIPESA, Patricia Ainembabazi, Policy and Advocacy Officer, stated:
“This is a trend-setting moment for Kenya as a country to uphold the rule of law and adhere to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution 580, which speaks directly to freedoms of expression and deters internet shutdowns. With the recent positive ECOWAS Court judgments in Guinea, Togo and Nigeria, we hope that East Africa will do better.”
The case marks a pivotal moment in the defence of the digital civic space in Kenya. The petitioners argue that any restriction to internet access must be subject to strict legal scrutiny under Article 24 of the Constitution, which requires any limitation to be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.
“The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for millions of Kenyans who rely on unimpeded connectivity for livelihoods, education, and civic engagement,” said Kennedy Kachwanya, Chairperson of BAKE. “We call upon civil society, media partners, and the international community to amplify this crucial fight for digital rights as a cornerstone of Kenya’s democratic future.”
This collective legal action is part of a growing continental movement to resist digital repression and promote rights-respecting governance in Africa’s digital age.
Signed,
1. Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE)
2. Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)
3. Katiba Institute
4. Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ)
5. Law Society of Kenya (LSK)
6. Paradigm Initiative (PIN)
7. The International Commission of Jurists, Kenya Section (ICJ Kenya)
Resources:
Petition by ICJ Kenya, BAKE & others against CA, AG & others on Internet Shutdowns in Kenya is here.
Internet Shutdown Case Court Orders, Download PDF here.
Over three years since the ouster of long-term authoritarian president Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s ongoing political crisis continues to present challenges for internet freedom in the country. Initial positive reforms initiated by the transitional government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok have been clawed back since a military coup in October 2021. The new military government has weaponised laws, continues to institute network disruptions, and is clamping down on civil society organisations so as to consolidate its grip on power and silence critics.
The political situation in the country has had a marked correlation with the state of internet freedom in the north African state, whose record was largely poor even before the crisis deepened. According to the Freedom On The Net 2022 report, Sudan scored 29 out of 100 on internet freedom, thus continuing its classification on the index as “Not Free”. Developments in 2022 signalled a rapid decline from the progress recorded in 2021 and2020, when the country scored 33 and 30 respectively on the index, up from a lower score of 25 in 2019.
The Cybercrime Law Continues to Repress
One of the measures adopted by Sudanese authorities has been the use of internet-related laws as a weapon for repression. The cybercrimes law, which first came into force in the final days of al-Bashir’s regime in 2018, and its amendments in subsequent years, appear to be aimed at thwarting mass protests and restricting critical opinion of the government and its officials. The most recent amendment to the law, which contains vague provisions, was first announced in April 2022, with some reports stating that it was intended to criminalise acts such as insulting the leaders of the state and undermining the prestige of the state.
On November 2, 2022, the government spokesperson announced that the cabinet had adopted the amendments. The announcement stated that the law was necessary to address the proliferation of information-related crimes and the concealment of their perpetrators through the use of modern computer applications. Also, it claimed that it was necessary to address the shortcomings of the application of court fines that had failed to achieve complete deterrence. The amendment obliges courts to imprison offenders where the victim of defamation or fake news is a governmental public figure. As of December 2022, the amendment law is yet to be published and is awaiting the final approval of the President of the Sovereign Council.
Article 21 of the cybercrime law provides that: “Whoever prepares or uses the information or communications network or any information means or any applications to publish or promote ideas, programs, words or actions contrary to public order or morals, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding six years”. Under article 24, “Anyone who publishes lies or fake news in cyberspace will be punished [with imprisonment of] four years, fined or both”.
Meanwhile, article 25 states that “Whoever prepares or uses the information or communications network, or any information means or applications to defame any person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years.” The law also imposes a penalty of up to seven years imprisonment for anyone who obtains data or information that affects the “economy or the national security” of the country, which terms are not defined.
These articles limit access to information and freedom of expression as they fail to provide a clear definition of the acts constituting the offence, are excessive, and use undefined terms such as “public order” and “morals”, which can be interpreted subjectively by security and prosecutorial agencies and applied to punish legitimate expression.
Censorship
The contentious provisions of the cybercrime law have been used to limit press freedom through the blockage of access to online news websites. In September 2022, the public prosecutor ordered the blockage of the website of the Al-Sudani newspaper, one of the most respected dailies in Sudan, without even notifying the newspaper’s management. The Sudanese Electronic Press Association condemned the order, stating: “We reject prior trials and convictions from any party except the judiciary”. Ultimately, the website was not blocked after the leakage of the prosecutor’s order.
In the same month, Abdalrahman Al-Aqib, a journalist, was arrested by police after publishing an investigative article on corruption at the Ministry of Minerals in a local daily and on his Facebook account. Al-Aqib was charged under articles 24 and 25 of the cybercrimes law for publishing lies and fake news. Following his arrest, the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate condemned the actions of the police. It stated: “Al-Aqib was treated in a humiliating manner, and they did not respect his most fundamental rights, amid delays from the police’s duty officer, so as not to obtain his legal right to the guarantee”.
In both cases, the government’s response was primarily reprisal as opposed to offering counter-responses to the allegations raised in the stories. Notably, authorities did not use the press law against the journalist, perhaps because it prescribes less penalties in comparison to the harsh penalties under the cybercrimes law. The press law does not provide for imprisonment of journalists; rather, it stipulates disciplinary sanctions, such as fines and suspending a journalist from publishing for a specific period.
Network Disruptions
Disruptions to internet access and blockage of social media continues unabated, with authorities justifying them as necessary to ensure “national security and emergency state”. Five have been recorded during the past 15 months.
During the October 2021 coup, the army imposed a nationwide internet shutdown to isolate the protestors from mobilisation to resist the coup. The shutdown lasted 25 days, and after access was restored, some social media platforms remained blocked for two more days. On the one year anniversary of the coup, the authorities shut down the internet for eight hours during a public march organised by pro-democracy groups against the coup. Earlier the same month on October 18, 2022, a regional internet shutdown was imposed in Wad Al-Mahi, a governorate in the Blue Nile region. The shutdown was in response to tribal conflict in several villages in the area. It could not be independently verified when access was restored.
Also, on June 11, 2022, the public prosecutor ordered the shutdown of the internet for three hours on a daily basis, over a 12-day period. The reason given was that it was necessary to prevent cheating during the national secondary school exams. Following the 12-day period, the internet was again disrupted for 25 hours on June 30, 2022, during the “Million Man March” to mark the anniversary of the 2019 massacre of protestors by the military.
Catalogue of Internet Disruptions in Sudan Since October 2021
These recent incidents mirror Sudan’s long history of instituting network disruptions, rivalled only by neighbouring Ethiopia. Crucially, the disruptions are indicative of the current regime’s bias and disregard for freedom of association and assembly. Three of the internet disruptions (October 2021, June 2022 and October 2022) were in response to protests against military rule. In contrast, the military did not implement any disruptions on October 29, 2022, when the Sudan People’s Appeal Initiative held protests. The initiative comprises supporters of former president Al-Bashir’s ousted regime, who protested in Khartoum demanding that the United Nations not interfere in Sudanese affairs.
Crackdown on Civil Society
The government has also led an onslaught against civil society organisations. For example, on October 23, 2022, the Human Aid Commission (HAC), which is the regulator of non-governmental organisations in Sudan, notified the director of the Sudanese Consumers Protection Society (SCPS) of its decision to cancel SCPS’s registration, seize its assets and properties and freeze its bank accounts inside and outside Sudan. The SCPS has been at the forefront of advocating against network disruptions by pushing for the enforcement of contractual obligations of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide services to their customers.
Looking Ahead
The affronts by the Sudanese government on internet freedom and civic space go against its obligations under international human rights law. The design and deployment of punitive laws by authorities to target and silence activists, government critics, journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs), and the political opposition create an environment of fear and self-censorship. Equally, responses such as the deregistration of civil society organisations only serve as a threat to other civil society organisations, of possible sanctions. Lastly, these actions together with internet shutdowns and the repression of digital rights through the cybercrime laws constitute unjustifiable limitations of freedom of expression, assembly, association, access to information, rights of the media, and rights to political participation.
In order to chart a democratic path in the coming years, the Sudanese government must show commitment to uphold media and internet freedom. Policy reforms should repeal regressive provisions such as the cybercrimes law. Sudan should also desist from interrupting access to the internet and social media.
+ Khattab Hamad is a journalist and digital rights researcher who has recently co-founded the Digital Rights Lab Sudan.
On December 19, 2021, the third anniversary of the start of the uprising that overthrew former Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir, protests against the current military rulers rocked the capital Khartoum. Yet these demonstrations are only a small part of the north African country’s challenges, as it remains saddled with a slew of repressive laws that undermine civil liberties, with the digital civic space particularly under attack.
Sudan’s 2019 constitution grants citizens the right to privacy (article 55) and to free expression (article 57) and “the right to access the internet” (article 57(2)). As of December 2020, Sudan had 34.2 million mobile subscriptions while internet subscriptions stood at 13.7 million, representing a penetration of 31%. Sudan has the most affordable mobile internet in Africa and is ranked among the five least expensive countries for mobile internet globally.
Despite the constitutional guarantees and proliferation of technology, a new briefing paper by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) shows that the state of digital rights remains precarious, with the cybercrimes law enabling the military rulers to harass dissenters and critics under the guise of fighting false information online.
Frequent internet shutdowns remain a constant reminder that the government will go to great lengths to control access to and use of digital technologies for mobilisation. In the last three years, six internet disruptions have been recorded, mostly ordered to thwart public protests against bad governance. The disruptions have had significant economic implications and only ended following the intervention of the courts.
The brief explores the repressive elements of media and technology-related laws and how they have been used to undermine freedom of expression, access to information and press freedom in the aftermath of al-Bashir’s overthrow. Overall, whilethere have been some improvements since al-Bashir’s ouster, the current government continues to institute regressive measures such as news website blockages and censorship. The latest power machinations that saw the military stage a coup on October 25, 2021 are making matters worse.
The Sudanese Professionals’ Association (SPA), which spearheaded the uprising that overthrew al-Bashir, extensively used digital technologies to disseminate news about the uprising and to mobilise citizens to attend protests. The military rulers that succeeded Bashir seem to have realised the power of technology in mobilisation and embarked on continuous disruption of the internet, in addition to instituting other measures to curtail online organising, freedom of expression, and the free flow of information online.
Bashir’s dictatorship initiated internet disruptions in view of public protests calling for his overthrow, but the government that succeeded him has been more prolific in utilising shutdowns to try and shut off criticism and protests.
The longest internet disruption in Sudan’s history was recorded in 2019 and lasted 37 days. During protests around the time the shutdown was initiated, more than 100 protesters were killed. The latest shutdown started on October 25, 2021 and lasted 25 days. It was instituted after Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized control of the government. The shutdown was ended by a court order on November 11.
In July 2021, Sudanese authorities blocked more than 30 local news websites in the run up to protests demanding the resignation of the government, a move that severely undermined the right to expression and access to information.
Meanwhile, the cybercrime law of 2020 punishes publishing “lies” and “fake news” online with a heavy penalty of four years imprisonment, or flogging, or both. This law has been used by the military to silence activists and critical state officials. Even Lt. Gen. Burhan has this year invoked it to bring a suit against a prominent critic. The Press and Publications Law of 2009 equally has repressive provisions and was last August controversially invoked to suspendAlitibaha and Alsayha newspapers.
In 2020, Sudan issued the National security law amendment of 2020, article 25 of which leaves latitude for staff of intelligence agencies to violate citizens’ privacy by giving the Sudanese General Intelligence Service “the right to request information, data, documents or things from anyone to check it or take it” without a court order. Last October, military forces that staged a coup appeared to use this provision to search people’s phones in the streets to delete documentation of human rights violations perpetuated by security forces.
See the policy brief for further details on Sudan’s Bad Laws, Internet Censorship and Repressed Civil Liberties.
