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13Jan

Uganda’s Election and the Lingering Legacy of Internet Blockage

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Juliet Nanfuka |

In two days, as Uganda heads to its presidential and parliamentary elections slated for January 15, 2026, citizens, civil society actors, journalists, and digital rights defenders were stumped with the question, “will they shut down the internet again?” Or, this time, will we see a commitment to adherence to one of the basic fundamentals of digital democracy and have an election in which access to digital communications remains open?  

In recent weeks, anxiety about an impending internet blackout has surged despite Dr. Aminah Zawedde, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, and Hon. Nyombi Thembo, Executive Director of the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), dismissing rumours of plans to shut down the internet, calling them “false and misleading”.

However, for many, these pronouncements have done little to quell suspicions, especially due to the actions witnessed during the 2016 and 2021 elections. During those previous two elections, access to digital communications was restricted, resulting in a block to online communication, commerce, and key avenues for civic engagement.

Various actions in the lead up to the polls have also served to compound the suspicions. In a report issued in January 2026, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) describes the arrests of state critics as “arbitrary and discriminatory” and outside of the country’s constitutional guarantees.

“Despite the strong constitutional protection of rights, the human rights situation in Uganda during the period under review has been characterized by increasingly restrictive legislation and their arbitrary and discriminatory application. The Government of Uganda has continued to rely on legislation such as the Public Order Management Act (POMA), the Anti-Terrorism Act, the NGO Act, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act and the Penal Code Act to shrink civic and democratic space and further weaken political participation, particularly of political opponents and their supporters, as well as the work of civil society, including journalists and human rights defenders.” OHCHR Report on Uganda

Meanwhile, independent media has come under increasing pressure, experiencing various forms of clampdowns in the lead up to the elections, including the denial of advertising spend. In October 2025, independent outlets – NTV Uganda and The Daily Monitor – were denied accreditation to cover parliamentary and presidential proceedings. Reports of harassment, equipment confiscation as well as attacks on journalists during election campaign coverage, and raids on media offices, have been commonplace – underscoring a deteriorating environment for media freedom.

Meanwhile the satellite internet provider Starlink, which has services that can operate independently of terrestrial networks, was halted in Uganda after a regulatory directive in early January 2026, rendering all Starlink terminals inactive ahead of polling day. The satellite internet service provider was providing  services without a valid local license. Critics still argue that the directive serves to limit alternatives for connectivity in the event of broader restrictions on internet access, feeding anxieties about reduced access to independent channels of information.

The UCC has also come under fire following its warning to broadcasters and digital content creators against live coverage of riots, protests, or incidents that could disrupt public order. The regulator stated that only the Electoral Commission may declare election results, and sharing unverified results is illegal. Dr. Zawedde stated, “Media platforms must not be abused to incite violence, spread misinformation, or undermine the credibility of the electoral process.”

By the afternoon of January 13, 2026, a directive circulating online had been issued by UCC to mobile network operators to block public access to the internet, effective at 18:00.

In a public statement, Access Now and the global #KeepItOn coalition had urged President Yoweri Museveni and relevant national authorities to ensure unrestricted internet access throughout the electoral period and to refrain from any disruptive measures that impede the free flow of information. The statement stresses the fundamental role that connectivity plays in inclusive participation, freedom of expression, and the credibility of the electoral process.

Likewise, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) also reaffirmed that internet access is a core human right and a necessary condition for free and fair elections, warning against restrictions that would stifle civic space. The Commission called on the Government of Uganda to ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, signed on January 27, 2013, which emphasises the importance of a culture of peaceful change of power based on regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial electoral bodies.

For democracy to flourish in Uganda, authorities must demonstrate their commitment to open digital spaces. This means not only publicly guaranteeing uninterrupted internet access before, during, and after the elections but also building trust through transparency and accountability.  Citizens deserve to communicate freely, monitor the electoral process, and hold all actors accountable without fear of arbitrary disruption.

Ultimately, Uganda’s electoral credibility will not be judged by what happens at polling stations, but by whether the state resists the temptation to control information by disrupting digital access. In an era where civic participation, journalism, election transparency, and even livelihoods heavily rely on digital access, a disruption would signal a fear of accountability.

If the government chooses restraint in the coming hours, it would mark a major departure from a troubling past and offer Ugandans a rare assurance in the election process. If it does not, history will record yet another election where the digital access was shut down to presumably manage dissent rather than protect democracy.

28Apr

Uganda Steps Up Pressure on Social Media Critics Ahead of 2026 Polls

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Peter Mwesige and Edrine Wanyama |

As Uganda inches closer to the 2026 general elections, state pressure on digital expression is intensifying. A wave of arrests, warnings, and regulatory threats is targeting online critics – particularly users of TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube – raising concerns over the shrinking space for free expression and political dissent in the digital sphere.

This emerging crackdown reflects long-standing government discomfort with the influence of social media in political discourse, civic engagement, and political mobilisation. In a country where traditional media are increasingly constrained, social media has become a vital platform for citizens to access information, express opinions, and hold leaders to account. But as past election cycles in 2016 and 2021 have shown, authorities often treat digital civic engagement as a threat to stability, rather than a cornerstone of democratic participation.

Recent Arrests Spark Alarm

In recent months, a string of arrests has drawn attention to the government’s increasingly punitive approach to online dissent. In November 2024, three TikTokers were arrested and charged under the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, 2022 with “hate speech” and “spreading malicious information”. Their alleged offence? Posting videos deemed insulting to President Yoweri Museveni, the First Lady, and other high-ranking officials.

Just days later, a 21-year-old TikToker was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison for what prosecutors described as ridiculing and spreading hate speech and malicious information against President Museveni and his family. Emmanuel Nabugodi, who was also charged under the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, allegedly posted a video of a mock trial of the President and called for his public flogging. 

Under section 26 of the Computer Misuse Act, it is an offence to “…share any information through a computer, which is likely to- (a) ridicule, degrade, or demean another person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender; (b) create divisions among persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion, or gender; or (c) promote hostility against a person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion or gender.”  

In July 2024, a 24-year-old TikToker had been sentenced to six years in prison for insulting the President, First Lady Janet Museveni, and the First Son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who is also the Chief of Defence Forces. 

That same month the former Rubaga Division Deputy Resident City Commissioner, Herbert Anderson Burora, was charged in court with spreading hate speech and malicious information about the Speaker of Parliament via his X handle. Burora, who spent three weeks on remand in prison, was released on bail. Comedians like Obed Lubega have also found themselves in the crosshairs, facing arrest and charges of “social media misuse” for politically themed satire.

This pattern mirrors earlier arrests of online critics. In 2019, academic and activist Stella Nyanzi, who was charged under the Computer Misuse Act, 2011 for allegedly harassing and annoying President Museveni in a Facebook post, was convicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison. Dr Nyanzi, who had spent nine months in prison, was convicted of “cyber harassment”. She was acquitted on appeal in February 2020, after spending 15 months in prison. She relocated to Germany in 2022.

In January 2022, novelist and activist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija was charged with offensive communication under the same law for allegedly insulting President Museveni and his son Kainerugaba on Twitter. Kakwenza, who was tortured while in detention, fled into exile in February 2022, after he was released on bail.

Legal Tools for Suppression

Uganda’s legal framework provides broad latitude for the suppression of digital expression. The Computer Misuse Act under section 29(5) criminalises a wide range of online behaviour, including “sending unsolicited messages,” “sharing malicious information,” and broadly defined “misuse” of social media. These vague provisions give authorities sweeping powers to arrest and prosecute individuals for content that would otherwise be protected under the Constitution.

Although the Penal Code provisions on the publication of false news and on sedition were repealed by the Supreme Court in 2004 and the Constitutional Court in 2010 respectively –  the Uganda Law Revision (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2023 formally repealed these offences in the Penal Code – their spirit lives on in new laws and administrative practices. 

The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) has become a central actor in this environment, frequently issuing threats to online content creators and broadcasters, and accusing them of violating “public morality” and “minimum broadcasting standards.”

In October 2024, the UCC warned media houses that their employees’ online conduct could cost them their broadcast licences. Employers were urged to police their staff’s social media posts and enforce compliance with internal policies – a move that blurs the line between professional oversight and state-enforced censorship.

Surveillance and Policy Threats

Alongside prosecutions and regulatory threats, the Ugandan government is ramping up surveillance of digital platforms. The planned importation of AI-powered equipment to monitor social media activity, as recently disclosed by the UCC, is raising red flags among digital rights advocates. The technology is reportedly intended to filter out so-called “harmful content,” including hate speech, disinformation, and incitement. However, without transparent oversight and public safeguards, such measures risk becoming tools of censorship rather than protection.

The state’s track record heightens these concerns. During the 2021 elections, Uganda experienced a near-total internet shutdown. In 2016, social media and mobile money services were blocked. And since January 2021, Facebook has remained inaccessible in Uganda due to a standoff with the government over the platform’s removal of pro-government accounts.

These precedents suggest that the government views online platforms not as forums for democratic exchange but as threats to political control. With elections on the horizon, similar disruptions could lie ahead.

Disinformation as a Pretext

Efforts to combat disinformation – while necessary in any democracy – are also being weaponised. The UCC’s recent “Dis-Mis Fake News Campaign,” launched in partnership with the Next Media Group, aims to address the proliferation of false information online. Yet statements condemning “explicit” or “offensive” content frequently target political commentary and satire rather than genuinely harmful content.

The blurring of lines between disinformation control and censorship underscores the need for balanced, rights-respecting approaches. Without clear definitions, independent oversight, and meaningful public input, anti-disinformation efforts can too easily be turned against legitimate expression.

A Chilling Effect

The cumulative effect of arrests, prosecutions, surveillance, and regulatory overreach is a chilling of free expression. Content creators, journalists, and ordinary citizens are increasingly engaging in self-censorship out of fear of legal repercussions or job loss. The pressure extends beyond individuals to media houses and telecom companies, many of which feel compelled to comply with state directives even when they infringe on constitutional rights.

This environment undermines Uganda’s commitments under national and international human rights law. Freedom of expression, access to information, and the right to privacy are not privileges to be granted or revoked; they are fundamental rights that should be protected, especially during elections.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated in its General Comment No 34 on Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that laws that provide special protection to public figures, such as “insult laws”, are not justifiable as they often suppress legitimate criticism. The UN Human Rights Committee adds that criminal penalties for insult laws are disproportionate and risk having a chilling effect on freedom of speech. 

The Way Forward

To safeguard Uganda’s digital civic space in the lead-up to the 2026 elections, urgent action is needed. Laws that criminalise online expression must be reviewed and aligned with human rights standards. Regulatory bodies like the UCC must act independently and transparently, with clear mandates focused on enabling – not stifling – public discourse.

More broadly, the government, civil society, media, and the private sector must commit to upholding digital rights as integral to democratic participation. As Uganda prepares to head to the next elections, the internet must remain a space for open dialogue, not a battlefield for repression.

20Sep

Cameroon’s 2025 Presidential Election: Equipping Actors to Address Disinformation

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Simone Toussi |

Cameroon’s upcoming presidential election in 2025 is likely to be dogged by rising disinformation. The government’s weaponisation of laws against false news further exacerbates the issue and raises more concerns regarding a smooth electoral process. In that light, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy on East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and ADISI-Cameroun  organised a two-days’ workshop to equip key players with the tools necessary to combat disinformation, promote democratic practices online, and safeguard electoral integrity in Cameroon.

The porous boundary between regulation and repression

Cameroon’s efforts to combat disinformation have led to a complex legal framework that raises concerns for freedom of expression. Laws like the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Law N°2010/012 of 21 December 2010 and Law N°2016/007 of 12 July 2016 on the Penal Code contain broad provisions criminalising the dissemination of false information. Article 78 of the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Law, and Articles 113 and 240 of the Penal Code, impose fines and imprisonment on those found guilty of spreading false news that could harm public authorities or national unity.

While these laws aim to protect public order, they are often criticised for being vague and disproportionate. This is because they have been used to suppress critical voices, targeting journalists, activists, and whistleblowers. The penalties for violating the laws can be harsh as they include hefty fines and imprisonment. As such, these provisions can be used to stifle legitimate dissent and undermine democratic principles.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and media watchdogs play a critical role in monitoring disinformation and advocating for media literacy and transparency, but they often face restrictions and censorship. Journalists are often arbitrarily arrested and detained for “spreading false news”, while media outlets and CSOs are usually intimidated for publishing “false” reports about the government.

In addition, while efforts by various stakeholders to regulate digital platforms are underway, they struggle to keep pace with rapidly evolving technology platforms. These platforms are the primary channels through which disinformation spreads in Cameroon, and the government’s approach to mitigate their effect reverberates on media freedom and democratic expression, as it often intersects with broader issues of political repression.

A critical rise and complexification of disinformation

The workshop hosted by CIPESA and ADISI-Cameroun highlighted the alarming rise of disinformation in Cameroon. During the plenary session, speakers discussed  the main trends observed on disinformation in Cameroon. These include political polarisation and partisan disinformation, ethnic and tribal manipulation, disinformation on electoral processes, and foreign influence or disinformation by external actors. Disinformation appears to take different forms, including false information, decontextualised content and misleading information. The disinformation propagators include political actors, partisan and underground media and journalists, influencers and foreign actors. Targets of disinformation include opinion leaders, ethnic groups and various institutions.

Paul Joel Kamtchang, the ADISI-Cameroon head, emphasised the role of post-electoral crises and security challenges in exacerbating disinformation, building on “Talk-Paix” regional meetings. He noted how political factions and interest groups spread false narratives to discredit opponents and influence public opinion. Social media platforms are rife with fabricated content that targets voters’ opinions and creates confusion about electoral candidates.

Disinformation actors often exploit ethnic and regional identities to sow division and exacerbate existing tensions. False claims and inflammatory content targeting specific ethnic or regional groups further deepen societal rifts and incite violence, threatening national unity and peace. Ethnic slurs  are used to tribalise public debate and polarise political discourse in both mainstream and social media.

Dr. Roméo Saa Ngouana, Senior Researcher at the African Center for International, Diplomatic, Economic and Strategic Studies (CEIDES), discussed the threat of increased disinformation ahead of the 2025 presidential elections. He observed that false accounts are being used to spread disinformation about opposition parties, potentially undermining the credibility of the electoral system. Additionally, foreign influence operations are contributing to the complexity of the disinformation landscape, with actors exploiting digital platforms to amplify divisive narratives and influence public perception. For instance, Cameroon is often targeted by “Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour” on Meta platforms orchestrated by foreign actors, an indication of how foreign, often unidentified, players have set out to manipulate public opinion in the country on various topics. 

Preventing and mitigating the effects disinformation ahead of elections

After the plenary, practical sessions helped to develop a keener understanding of disinformation and explore its various trends in Cameroon in the lead up to the presidential elections. Participants split into two groups were asked to summarise the key trends of disinformation in Cameroon on the one hand, and to propose recommendations on the other hand.

The second day was dedicated to two main approaches identified as ways of preventing disinformation and mitigating its effects, to prepare for a safer media space during the electoral period. This was carried out as masterclasses on fact-checking for one group, and media and information literacy (MIL) training for the other group.

Led by Marthe Ndiang, Editor-in-Chief of Data-Check, the fact-checking masterclass aimed to get participants aware of the issues and challenges related to disinformation as the 2025 elections approach, sharpen critical thinking skills and equip the participants with tools to combat disinformation.

The MIL masterclass was given by Blaise Pascal Andzongo, President of Eduk Media. It aimed to address how young people are informed in the age of social media, information disorders, overcoming cognitive bias through critical thinking and strategies to combat disinformation through media and information literacy for and with young people.

Conclusion and recommendations

As Cameroon heads towards its next presidential election, disinformation presents a significant challenge to the integrity of the electoral process and the stability of the nation. The interplay between disinformation trends and the current regulatory environment highlights the need for targeted and balanced interventions.

Key recommendations to stakeholders:
  • Strengthen legal frameworks and policy measures needed to combat disinformation without encroaching on freedom of expression;
  • Enhance media literacy and public awareness by integrating them into educational curricula and public outreach campaigns;
  • Support independent media and civil society by protecting journalists from harassment and providing resources for investigative journalism and fact-checking initiatives;
  • Promote digital platform accountability with clearer guidelines for content removal, fact-checking partnerships, and transparency in algorithms that influence content visibility; and
  • Foster dialogue and cooperation between the government, media, CSOs and platforms to build a coordinated response and ensure that measures against disinformation are effective and equitable.

In addition to these recommendations, the “Yaounde Declaration on Electoral Disinformation” was developed to address the threats posed by disinformation in Cameroon’s upcoming elections. It aims to raise awareness, promote media literacy, and support public education on these issues. The full declaration is available here.

17May

The ADRF Awards USD 134,000 to 10 Initiatives to Advance Tech Accountability in Africa

Author CIPESA Posted on

Announcement |

The grant recipients of the eighth round of the Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF) will implement projects focused on Artificial Intelligence (AI), hate speech, disinformation, microtargeting, network disruptions, data access, and online violence against women journalists and politicians. The work of the 10 initiatives, who were selected from 130 applications, will span the breadth of the African continent in advancing tech accountability.

“The latest round of the ADRF is supporting catalytic work in response to the urgent need to counter the harms of technology in electoral processes,” said Ashnah Kalemera, the Programmes Manager at the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) – the administrators of the Fund. She added that for many of the initiatives being supported, tech accountability was a new area of work but the various projects’ advocacy, research and storytelling efforts would prove instrumental in pushing for tech justice. 

Established in 2019 as a rapid response and flexible funding mechanism, the ADRF aims to overcome the limitations of reach, skills, resources, and consistency in engagement faced by new and emerging initiatives working to defend and promote rights and innovation in the face of growing digital authoritarianism and threats to digital democracy in Africa. The sum of USD 134,000 awarded in the latest round, which was administered by CIPESA in partnership with Digital Action, brings to USD 834,000 the total amount awarded by the ADRF since inception to 62 initiatives across the continent.

According to Kalemera, the growth in the number of applicants to the ADRF reflects the demand for seed funding for digital rights work on the continent. Indeed, whereas the call for proposals for the eighth round was limited to tech accountability work, many applicants submitted  strong proposals on pertinent issues such as digital inclusion, media and information literacy, digital safety and security, surveillance, data protection and privacy, access and affordability – underscoring the cruciality of the ADRF. 

Here’s What the Grantees Will be Up To

In the lead-up to local government elections in Tanzania, Jamii Forums will engage content hosts, creators and journalists on obligations to tackle hate speech and disinformation online as a means to safeguard electoral integrity. In parallel, through its Jamii Check initiative, Jamii Forums will raise public awareness about the harms of disinformation and hate speech.

Combating hate speech and disinformation is also the focus of interventions supported in Senegal and South Sudan. Ahead of elections in the world’s youngest nation, DefyHateNow will monitor and track hate speech online in South Sudan, host a stakeholder symposium in commemoration of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech as a platform for engagement on collective action to combat hate speech, and run multi-media campaigns to raise public awareness on the harms of hate speech. Post elections in Senegal, Jonction will analyse the link between disinformation and network disruptions and engage stakeholders on alternatives to disruptions in future elections.

In the Sahel region, events leading up to coups in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been characterised by restrictions on media and internet freedom, amidst which disinformation and violent extremism thrived. As some of the states in the region, notably Burkina Faso and Mali, move towards an end to military rule and head to the polls, the Thoth Media Research Institute will research disinformation and its role in sustaining authoritarian narratives and eroding human rights. The learnings from the research will form the basis of stakeholder convenings on strategies to combat disinformation in complex political, social, and security landscapes. Similarly, Internet Sans Frontières (ISF) will study the role of political microtargeting in shaping campaign strategies and voter behaviour, and the ultimate impact on the rights to privacy and participation in Mali. 

In South Africa, the Legal and Resources Centre (LRC), will raise awareness about the adequacy and efficacy of social media platforms’ content moderation policies and safeguards as well as online political advertising models in the country’s upcoming elections. The centre will also provide legal services for reparations and litigate for reforms related to online harms.

A study has found that Africa’s access to data from tech platforms, for research and monitoring electoral integrity, was below that in Europe and North America. Increased access to platform data for African researchers, civil society organisations, and Election Management Bodies (EMBs) would enable a deeper understanding of online content and its harms on the continent, and inform mitigation strategies. Accordingly, the ADRF will support Research ICT Africa to coordinate an alliance to advocate for increased data access for research purposes on the continent and to develop guidelines for ethical and responsible access to data to study elections-related content.

The impact of AI on the information ecosystem and democratic processes in Africa is the focus of two grantees’ work. On the one hand, the Eastern Africa Editors Society will assess how editors and journalists in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia have adopted AI and to what extent they adhere to best practice and the principles of the Paris Charter on AI and Journalism. On the other hand, the Outbox Foundation through its Thraets initiative will research the risks of AI-generated disinformation on elections, with a focus on Ghana and Tunisia. The findings will feed into tutorials for journalists and fact checkers on identifying and countering AI-generated disinformation as part of elections coverage, and awareness campaigns on the need for transparency on the capabilities of AI tools and their risks to democracy. 

Meanwhile, a group of young researchers under the stewardship of the Tanda Community-Based Organisation will research how deep fakes and other forms of manipulated media contribute to online gender-based violence against women journalists and politicians in the context of elections in Ghana, Senegal, and Namibia. The study will also compare the effectiveness of the legal and regulatory environment across the three countries in protecting women online, hold consultations and make recommendations for policy makers, platforms  and civil society on how to promote a safe and inclusive digital election environment for women.

Past and present supporters of the ADRF include the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), the Omidyar Network, the Hewlett Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the Skoll Foundation and New Venture Fund (NVF).

30Mar

Governments Urged to Adopt Specific Policies Addressing Tech-Facilitated Violence Against Women in Politics

Author CIPESA Posted on

By Asimwe John Ishabairu |

As part of events to commemorate this year’s International Women’s Day, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) hosted a webinar under the theme ‘InspireInclusion: African Women in Politics are Pushing Back Against Tech Facilitated Online Violence’. The webinar highlighted the importance of increased political inclusion of women, which  is undermined by rising affronts to women’s presence and participation in political narratives both online and offline.

“As women, we indeed face a lot of online abuse, and it’s really unfortunate that whatever is happening now may hinder those who would want to be politicians, especially women. Because of online abuse, most women who want to join politics will be afraid of putting their life in the public eye,” said Susan Dossi, Member of Parliament (MP) representing Chikwawa West Constituency in Malawi. She added that Malawi is working on strategies to ensure that the country has more women in parliament.

Tanzania’s MP representing Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Neema Lugangira, acknowledged that she had on several occasions been a victim of online abuse.

“When we are talking about online abuse, it’s not just on the social media platforms where you don’t know the people who are doing these abuses. It is from Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, all the way to WhatsApp groups where you actually know the people’s [contact numbers]. It is not an easy situation to be in,” said Lugangira.

She added that abusers often  hide under the guise of exercising their freedom of expression to critique female politicians, but in reality  “they are using their freedom of expression to limit us from using our own freedom of expression.,”

Lugangira said that as a result of the abuse they are subjected to, many women parliamentarians choose not to be online and instead opt to self-censor.

She added that online abuse of women in politics is diminishing democracy and hampering African countries’ efforts  to increase the number of women and girls who want to join politics.

The webinar also cast a spotlight on how women in active politics in African countries are working to protect the rights of women online, including through legal frameworks and engaging technology platforms to address Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) associated with political spaces and discourse.

As a possible solution to this, Modestus Amutse, the Deputy Minister of Information and Communication Technology in Namibia, said more African countries need to develop policies with specific provisions to protect women against gender-based violence, especially online, so as to give women confidence to use the internet without fear.

He added that while countries have laws that regulate the use of the internet in terms of data protection or cyber security, in many cases such legislation is not gender-specific.

“They are just there to protect, perhaps the security of everyone on an equal basis,” said Amutse. “I would have loved to see policies that have provisions targeting the protection of women so that they are free when they use the internet.”

Meanwhile, Adedolapo Adegoro, a Technology Policy Analyst with Tech Hive Advisory, noted that Nigeria has one of the lowest levels of women’s representations in parliament or holding political positions, in Africa.i She said the country had failed  to implement laws that seek to protect women from online bullying.

“The Nigerian Cyber Crimes Act has the highest provisions that sort of protect women from online bullying. These provisions have been there for quite a while, however, the first time it really received definition of interpretation from the courts was about four or five years ago,” Adedolapo noted.

She cited a need to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach where all actors are involved in putting together policies and procedures geared towards protection of women online.

Sylvia Musalagani, Head of Safety Policy for Africa, Middle East and Turkey at Meta, said that their organization believes that women have a right to participate in the online environment and a right to find economic opportunities.

“We do recognise the place that our platforms play in women’s participation online and we are committed to continue having direct conversations with parliamentary initiatives and share ideas on how to improve,” she said.

The panelists appealed to social media platform operators to improve their content moderation practices regarding TFGBV. They observed a need for Meta to engage legislators through the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance (APNIG) so as to strengthen the safety of online space and enable more women  to join  politics.

“For more women to retain political seats, we need to be visible… If we are not online, it limits our visibility,” said Lugangira, who also heads APNIG.

According to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on Gender Equality, digital technologies have the potential to increase women’s inclusion, participation, and engagement in politics, providing them with a platform to have their voices heard.

Over the years, women in politics have increasingly relied on various digital tools, especially social media platforms, to connect with their constituencies. However, they have also become the targets of online threats and abuse. It was observed that TFGBV not only impedes women’s equitable and meaningful participation in public offices but also their long-term willingness to engage in public life.

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