The AU Disability Protocol Comes Into Force: Implications for Digital Rights for Persons with Disabilities in Africa

By Paul Kimumwe & Michael Aboneka |

On this International Day for Persons with Disabilities, CIPESA reflects on the impact of the African Union (AU) Disability Protocol and its Implication on digital rights for persons with disabilities in Africa and calls upon the African Commission to establish a Special Mandate to enhance the respect for and protection of the rights for persons with disabilities in Africa

Six years after its adoption, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa came into force in May 2024 after securing the mandatory 15th ratification by the Republic of Congo. The other 14 African Union member states that have ratified the Protocol are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Uganda. 

For disability rights activists, this was a defining moment as the protocol augments the rights of persons with disabilities to barrier-free access to the physical environment, transportation, information, and other communication technologies and systems. Specifically, under articles 23 and 24 of the protocol, States Parties should take “effective and appropriate measures” to facilitate the full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of the right to freedom of expression and opinion and access to information, including through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has been a longstanding advocate for African governments to urgently ratify the protocol. However, CIPESA has also stated, including in submissions to the Africa Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), that ratifying the protocol would be a major but insufficient step in ensuring that persons with disabilities access and use digital technologies and that there is sufficient disaggregated data to inform programme interventions.

Indeed, article 24(2) requires States Parties to put in place policy, legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right to freedom of expression and access to information on an equal basis, including:

  1. Providing information intended for the general public as well as information required for official interactions with persons with disabilities in accessible formats and technologies appropriate to different kinds of disabilities in a timely manner and without additional cost to persons with disabilities. 
  2. Requiring private entities that provide services to the general public, including through the internet, to provide information and services in accessible and usable formats for persons with disabilities. 
  3. Recognising and promoting the use of sign language. 
  4. Ensuring that persons with visual impairments or with other print disabilities have effective access to published works, including by using information and communication technologies.

The protocol adds to the available digital rights advocacy tools for disability rights actors, including the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which places significant obligations on States Parties to take appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and meaningful access to ICT, including the internet. 

The CRPD was the first international human rights treaty requiring the accessibility of digital tools as a prerequisite for persons with disabilities to fully enjoy their fundamental rights without discrimination. It highlights the inherent risks of exclusion of persons with disabilities from participating equally in society by defining ICT accessibility as integral to general accessibility rights and on par with access to the physical environment and transportation.

While there has been some progress in the enactment of disability rights-respecting and ICT-enabling laws for persons with disabilities in Africa, implementation is a challenge. Moreover, the Protocol comes into force when the digital divide and exclusion of persons with disabilities has worsened despite the exponential growth and penetration of digital technologies on the continent. Persons with disabilities have consistently remained disproportionately excluded from the digital society due to factors such as low levels of ICT skills, high illiteracy levels, and high cost of assistive technologies such as screen readers, screen magnification software, text readers, and speech input software.

It is against this background that CIPESA adds its voice to other calls to the African Commission to expedite the establishment of a special mandate at the level of Special Rapporteur for Persons with Disabilities. This elevated position will ensure that the rights of persons with disabilities in Africa are mainstreamed and upheld.

CIPESA recognises that as a regional human rights instrument, the protocol empowers disability rights actors to demand the enactment and full implementation of policies and laws that promote the rights of persons with disabilities, including in accessing and using digital technologies.

For example, disability rights actors, including civil society, activists, and Disability Rights Organisations (DPOs), should develop mechanisms to monitor the status of implementation of the protocol, including ensuring that the states parties submit their statutory reports as required by Article 34 of the protocol. The DPOs should also actively participate in developing shadow reports on the status of implementation of the protocol, especially on access to information and participation in public affairs.

In addition, disability rights organisations should work with policymakers and the executive to ensure that more countries ratify the protocol and domesticate it through national policies, laws, and practices. Both the protocol and the CRPD should become a reference point during any discussions of draft laws and policies that affect persons with disabilities.

For the media, it is important that, through their reporting, they hold governments accountable for failure to ratify or to fully implement the provisions of the protocol.

Member countries can also demand for accountability of their peers on the status of implementation of the key provisions of the protocol through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Please read more about CIPESA submissions on policy actions governments should take after ratifying the protocol. See also The Disability and ICT Accessibility Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of ICT Accessibility Laws and Policies in Africa.

Civil Society Statement on Kenya’s Telegram Shutdown

Statement |

As civil society organizations and stakeholders in the Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) sector committed to Digital Rights and Internet Freedom, we are deeply concerned about the Kenyan government’s recent decision to block access to the Telegram social media platform. 

According to an unverified letter circulating online from the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) to service providers (Safaricom, Airtel, Telkom Kenya and Jamii Telecommunications) on 31 October 2024, the operators were required to “use all available mechanisms to suspend the operation of Telegram Inc in the country”.  The suspension was ordered to prevent cheating during the national examinations period on weekdays until 22nd November 2024.  Moreover, the ongoing internet disruption has been confirmed by web connectivity tests from OONI and Netblocks, as well as independent tests by Tatua

Internet disruptions like these undermine fundamental human rights and freedoms outlined in the International Bill of Rights to which the Kenyan government is a party and the Kenyan Constitution. Likewise, they disrupt economic activity and weaken democratic values by limiting the rights to Access to Information and Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association.

This action also goes against the principles outlined in the Global Digital Compact (GDC), which emphasizes the importance of a universal, open, and secure internet. The GDC, part of the commitments that governments endorsed in the Pact of the Future, discourages internet shutdowns, noting their harmful impact on human rights, democracy, and economic growth, and calls for transparent and accountable solutions to address issues in the digital space. At a time when global standards are pushing for universal, secure, and open internet access, national policies must align with these principles rather than undermine them.

Kenya’s commitment to internet freedom appears to be on a worrying downward trend. We note with concern that there was an internet disruption on 25 June, less than 6 months ago, during the protests against the Finance Bill, 2024. A similar blocking of the Telegram App was implemented in November 2023. Such repeated actions not only curtail rights but also erode public trust in digital governance.

While we recognize the importance of maintaining exam integrity, we urge the Kenyan government to explore alternative, lawful and rights-respecting measures to tackle this issue. Instead of blocking the application or disrupting the internet, authorities are encouraged to pursue criminals who breach confidential examination documents and seal loopholes in examination processes. Such alternative actions to tackle this issue can be explored through multi-stakeholder consultations ensuring that they are human rights-respecting. Disrupting the internet or blocking social media access as in this case goes against the three-part test under international human rights law of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. A stable, secure and accessible internet should remain a priority, especially given its critical role in supporting the digital economy, education, livelihoods, and civic engagement.

We call on Kenyan authorities and the CA in particular, to immediately retract the letter to service providers, and for service providers to restore access to Telegram and commit to upholding digital rights and internet freedom. We also urge policymakers to consult civil society and other key stakeholders to develop sustainable, rights-based strategies to address digital governance challenges without resorting to internet disruptions. 

Endorsed on November 9, 2024 by:

Afia-Amani Grands-Lacs

African Internet Rights Alliance (AIRA)

Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI)

Afrika Youth Movement

Article 19 East Africa

Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE)

Brain Builders Youth Development Initiative

Centre for Artificial Intelligence Ethics and Governance in Africa (CAIEGA)

Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD)

Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH)

Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

Collaborative for Peace

Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organizations (CEHRO-Ethiopia)

FactCheck Africa

Gonline Africa

Human Rights Journalists Network Nigeria

Impact Foundation For Youths Development

Internet Without Borders

Internet Society Kenya Chapter

KICTANet

Kijiji Yeetu

Media Rights Agenda (MRA)

Paradigm Initiative (PIN)

Roots Africa Inc.

Tech & Media Convergency (TMC)

The Internet Governance Tanzania Working Group (IGTWG)

Tribeless Youth (TY)

VANGUARD PRESS BOARD UDUS

Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET)

West African Digital Rights Defenders Coalition

The SaferNet Initiative

This article was first published by KICTANET on November 09, 2024.

Navigating the Complex Digital Rights Terrain in the Sahel: Advocates Speak Out

By Simone Toussi |

Countries in the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, present a perilous environment for human rights defenders as military regimes entrench themselves in power. The digital space, once considered a beacon of opportunity for free speech and access to pluralistic information, has steadily come under siege, with the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and the ability to access and share information increasingly being stifled. 

Whereas these countries face the digital rights prevalent in other Francophone African countries, such as internet disruptions, state surveillance, online censorship, and weaponisation of cybersecurity and disinformation laws, the overthrow of civilian governments by the military  in the three countries has deepened the level of authoritarianism. 

At the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa – hosted by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and AfricTivistes in September 2024 in Dakar, Senegal, experts gathered to discuss the mounting challenges and opportunities for digital rights in the region. The session highlighted the precarious position of human rights defenders in the region and the role of digital technologies in both exacerbating and addressing these challenges. 

In line  with CIPESA’s work to address the information disorder in Sub-Saharan Africa and equip actors to better advocate for rights-respecting digital laws, the session addressed critical digital rights concerns  as well as pressing social issues such as gender inequality, armed conflict, and the deteriorating press freedom, while examining the regulatory framework emerging in response to these issues. 

Human rights defenders in the Sahel, particularly women’s rights activists and journalists, face immense challenges due to the political instability, armed violence, and authoritarian regimes which have imposed severe restrictions on press freedom, the flow of information, and civil society activities. 

According to Djibril Saidou from International Media Support (IMS), digital rights challenges in the Sahel go beyond protecting free speech. It’s about ensuring access to information on urgent issues like gender rights and armed conflicts,” said Saidou. Given the challenging contexts, he stated that intervention efforts should be focused on resisting censorship and promoting resilience for advocates of digital rights and democracy. 

Chantal Nare, a feminist blogger of Bloggueuses226 and activist from Burkina Faso, shared her experience advocating for women’s rights in such a volatile environment. She highlighted the constant fear of retaliation and surveillance, which stifles free expression, even on digital platforms. Chantal raised a crucial question: “How can digital technologies like WhatsApp or blogs be used to protect and empower women without exposing them to further risk from state or extremist actors?”

Urbain Yameogo from Centre for Information and Training on Human Rights in Africa (CIFDHA) cited the abuse of cybercrime and anti-terrorism laws to curtail freedom of expression. 

The 2015 Anti-Terrorism law in Burkina Faso, initially allowed journalists some latitude to access sensitive information related to terrorism for professional purposes. However, revisions to the Penal Code in 2019 removed these exemptions, exposing journalists to prosecution for acts they would have previously carried out in the course of their work, such as accessing websites linked to terrorism. This change has created a legal grey area where journalists and human rights defenders are left vulnerable to legal persecution.” – Urbain Yameogo, CIFDHA.

Panelists emphasised that journalists in the region who report on sensitive topics such as terrorism and human rights violations are increasingly prosecuted under cybercrime laws rather than traditional press laws, which historically offered more protection for media practitioners. This shift undermines the rights of journalists to report freely, as cybercrime laws are often ill-defined and can be interpreted broadly to suppress legitimate journalistic work.  

Faced with the challenge of defending digital rights in an environment of heightened fear of reprisals from the military regimes, some participants emphasised the need for exercising extreme caution and  taking  a conciliatory approach to their work. 

This was underscored by Cheikh Fall from the regional human rights organisation AfricTivistes: “Sometimes, we must choose between life and freedom. In Sahel countries under military rule, digital rights are overshadowed by the immediate need for survival. This stark reality emphasises that when basic human rights are at stake, the struggle for freedom becomes paramount. It’s essential to recognise that in such situations, the struggle for basic human rights is intertwined with the fight for freedom.” 

Proposals were made to create unified laws addressing both digital and media issues. However, given concerns that such laws could be double-edged, potentially enhancing repression rather than protecting freedoms, inclusive dialogue and participatory policy processes were crucial. This would ensure strengthened protection not only for journalists and advocates, but also women and other vulnerable groups.  In this regard, Nare called for legislation that encompasses both physical and digital forms of repression. 

Beyond the legal reforms, the panelists also emphasised the need for increased digital security training and stronger collaboration between local and international actors.

Can the AU Data Policy Framework (DPF) support Digital Trade in SACU?

By Shamira Ahmed |

As Africa navigates the complexities of digital transformation, the African Union’s Data Policy Framework (DPF) has been heralded as a key instrument for establishing coherent data governance across the continent. However, in the specific context of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), its digital trade ambitions, and the complexities of international rules governing cross-border data flows (CBDF) and digital trade the question arises:

Can the AU Data Policy Framework (DPF) support Digital Trade in SACU?
For SACU member states (MS)—comprising Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa—digital trade can be a key facilitator of economic development.

While the DPF offers important guiding principles, the Data Economy Policy Hub (DepHUB) supported by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) have published a paper and policy brief on “Assessing the Suitability of the African Union Data Policy Framework for Digital Trade in Africa: A South African Customs Union (SACU) Case Study” thatreveals shortcomings regarding the DPF according to three main categories, namely, approach, implementation, and scope that affect its suitability for SACU’s digital trade aspirations.
SACU has the potential to leverage digitalisation to enhance trade facilitation, revenue collection, and competitiveness. However, SACU’s digital landscape is still evolving, with varying levels of endowments, capabilities, and enablers such as digital infrastructure, robust data governance policies, and regulatory frameworks amongst the SACU member states, which pose a significant challenge to deepening SACU integration.

Furthermore, the successful integration of digital trade within the African context relies on the effectiveness and harmonization of various prerequisites and enablers, such as cross-border data policy frameworks and essential network infrastructure, among others, to support an inclusive digital single market.

The DPF offers an essential starting point for SACU’s engagement with digital trade, but it falls short in several key areas:

  1. Approach: The DPF’s overemphasis on legal frameworks such as FRAND , and regulatory sandboxes as only positive aspects needs to be recalibrated with a more balanced approach to better support digital trade in Africa. CBDF should be prioritized alongside data sovereignty and mutual recognition agreements— greater flexibility and policy space is needed to enable innovation in SACU’s nascent data ecosystem.
  • Implementation: Relying on national data protection authorities and the AUC’s limited capacity may hinder effective implementation across SACU. A more legally binding regionally coordinated approach such as the Digital Protocols of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) may be more appropriate as the Draft Protocol can create binding conditions necessary to ensure that all SACU members benefit from the DPF.

Scope: The DPF does not include data governance issues that impact digital trade such as all the dimensions of data interoperability, gender inequality, and environmental sustainability. Addressing these gaps is crucial for ensuring that SACU’s digital trade is not only economically inclusive but also socially and environmentally responsible.
To fully capitalize on the potential of digital technologies for economic growth, SACU countries need a more harmonized and collaborative approach to data governance.

A proactive sociotechnical approach, which better addresses the complexity of the data economy, must be adopted to balance the risks and benefits of digital transformation.

To overcome multidimensional barriers, SACU member states must adopt a transversal approach that aligns digital trade policies with broader economic, regulatory, and infrastructure goals. A transversal approach requires a much-needed focus on both supply-side policies, such as enhancing digital public infrastructure, and demand-side policies, such as promoting digital capabilities.

Why Technology Has Failed To Improve Africa’s Elections – Report

Update |

Technology was supposed to be a great equalizer in Africa’s democratic journey, but as the “State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2024” report reveals, technology has instead become a tool for authoritarian control.

As internet shutdowns, disinformation, and the digital divide grow, the hope for transparent elections continues to dim away, writes FRANK KISAKYE.

Technologies initially seen as tools to empower Africa’s youth and dismantle authoritarian regimes have, paradoxically, become instruments of digital repression. Rather than facilitating democratic transitions, politicians are exploiting these innovations for misinformation, censorship and disinformation.

Hopes were high as mobile phone usage and internet access rapidly expanded across the continent, reaching 43 per cent mobile penetration with 489 million unique subscribers and 25 per cent internet penetration with 287 million mobile internet users. These advances were expected to modernize electoral processes through biometric voter registration, digital verification methods, and faster result transmission.

However, the “State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2024” report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) reveals a darker reality. Rather than promoting transparency, governments have turned to technology to undermine elections, suppress dissent and manipulate outcomes.

States have used technology to suppress elections
States have used technology to suppress elections

Launched in Dakar, Senegal, at the 2024 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica) which was co-hosted by CIPESA and AfricTivistes, the report emphasizes how digital repression has become a key tool for authoritarian regimes.

Cheikh Fall, president of AfricTivistes, urged the continent to develop indigenous digital frameworks, saying, “Africa’s greatest challenge today is that it is experiencing the effects of all three industrial revolutions that shaped the world. We must create homegrown technologies and frameworks that address the continent’s unique needs and aspirations.”

INTERNET SHUTDOWNS

The report highlights countries such as Chad, Gabon, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, where internet disruptions and shutdowns have been used during elections and protests to stifle political opposition and control information. Since 2022, over 18 election-related internet disruptions have been recorded across Africa, a clear sign of growing digital authoritarianism. Rather than embracing transparency, these regimes are using technology to erode democratic governance.

Internet censorship, surveillance, and repressive laws are also key tactics used to weaken civic participation. Countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Mali have engaged in targeted surveillance of political opponents and human rights defenders. The result is an environment where citizens fear participating in democratic processes, fearing reprisal and distrusting government institutions.

For example, Uganda has blocked Facebook since 2021 after President Yoweri Museveni accused the platform of siding with the opposition by deactivating accounts linked to his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). Facebook accused NRM of creating ‘fake accounts’ to manipulate the electoral process. This growing trend toward digital suppression makes it increasingly difficult for citizens to engage politically.

In 2023 alone, African governments imposed 283 internet shutdowns in 39 countries – a 41 per cent increase from 201 shutdowns in 2022. Ten of these shutdowns specifically targeted social media platforms like Facebook and X (formerly Twitter), which were once seen as tools for youth empowerment.

Instead, these platforms have become victims of repression, preventing young people from using them to effect political change. Despite 2024 being a pivotal year for African democracy, with over 20 countries heading to the polls, authoritarian regimes are doubling down on their use of technology to suppress opposition and manipulate electoral outcomes. This year could further erode trust in electoral transparency as governments increasingly seize control of internet governance.

Internet shutdowns have far-reaching consequences beyond politics. In conflict zones like Gaza, Myanmar, and Sudan, shutdowns disrupt essential services, including humanitarian aid. African countries are no exception. For instance, Algeria lost an estimated $70.4 million due to internet disruptions between 2019 and 2024.

Ugandan advocate Michael Aboneka warns that the continent may see even more internet shutdowns as regimes aim to control narratives during elections and protests. The economic and social costs are profound – undermining public trust in election outcomes and exacerbating political tensions.

Disinformation has also emerged as a key tactic to manipulate African elections. The CIPESA report highlights the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) to create fake content that misleads voters. Politicians are weaponizing AI to discredit electoral bodies and deepen political polarization.

In Uganda, for example, AI-generated disinformation has fueled the power struggles between prominent figures such as General Muhoozi Kainerugaba and President Museveni’s son-in-law, Odrek Rwabwogo. This not only confuses voters but also distorts the political landscape, making it difficult for citizens to make informed choices.

The proliferation of disinformation diminishes trust in democratic institutions, and AI’s ability to amplify these false narratives poses a growing challenge to fair elections.

While technology has transformed some aspects of African elections, the digital divide remains a significant barrier. High data costs, poor infrastructure, and limited digital literacy exclude large portions of the population, particularly rural communities, women, and people with disabilities.

Countries like Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic have some of the most expensive mobile data prices globally, preventing many citizens from accessing crucial information and participating in online civic spaces. This deepens political inequalities and prevents marginalized groups from fully engaging in the democratic process.

This article was first published on the Observer website on October 09, 2024.

Read full report on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa (SIFA) 2024.