

Digital Rights in Uganda Stakeholder Submission to The Fourth Cycle Universal Periodic Review

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Association for Progressive Communications (APC)

APC, an organisation in consultative status with ECOSOC, is an international network of civil society organisations founded in 1990, dedicated to empowering and supporting people working for peace, human rights, development, and protection of the environment, through the strategic use of information and communications technologies (ICTs). The APC network has 73 organisational members and 44 associates active in 74 countries, including Uganda.

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Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

CIPESA is one of two centres established under the Catalysing Access to Information and Communications Technologies in Africa (CATIA) initiative, which was funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID). CIPESA focuses on decision-making that facilitates the use of ICT in support of good governance, human rights, and livelihoods.

CIPESA's establishment in 2004 was in response to the findings of the Louder Voices Report for DfID, which cited the lack of easy, affordable, and timely access to information about ICT-related issues and processes as a key barrier to effective and inclusive ICT policy-making in Africa. As such, our work responds to the shortage of information, resources, and actors consistently working at the nexus of technology, human rights, and society.

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Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET)

WOUGNET is a Ugandan non-governmental organization in consultative status with ECOSOC, awarded in 2025. WOUGNET was initiated in May 2000 by several women's organizations in Uganda to develop the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) among women as tools to share information and address issues collectively. WOUGNET leverages its work through collaborations with partners, its over 67 members, and through the Kubere Information Centre (KIC), established in 2005 in Northern Uganda with support from the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), operating as a multidimensional digital hub that leverages ICTs to empower women and girls across various sectors.

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Introduction

1. Digital rights and freedoms should be accorded equal protection as offline rights and freedoms, in line with the landmark United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/20/8. The resolution emphasises the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the internet.¹ Uganda is bound by national, regional, and international obligations that protect freedom of expression, access to information, equality and non-discrimination, privacy, data protection, participation in public affairs, and access to remedy.
2. Uganda was last reviewed during the third cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in January 2022. In that cycle, Uganda received 273 recommendations, of which it supported 139 and noted 134. The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and partners such as the Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET) made a joint submission,² highlighting the state of digital rights and suggesting measures to the government to improve the country's digital rights record. Since the last review, Uganda has made some progress in connectivity, data protection enforcement, and digital public service delivery. Nevertheless, this progress has been largely undermined by recurring controls, restrictions, and curtailment of online freedoms.
3. Uganda's internet freedom score declined from 53/100 in 2024 to 52/100 in Freedom House's 2025 assessment,³ with concerns including restrictive laws, arrests and prison sentences for online expression, continued regulation of online news media, and online intimidation of vulnerable groups. This score places Uganda among the partly free countries in the region, reflecting an elevated pattern of limitations and curtailment of digital spaces.
4. This report examines the state of online rights and freedoms in Uganda, with a focus on expression, access to information and censorship, digital connectivity and inclusion, data protection and privacy, and technology-facilitated gender-based violence, particularly against women human rights defenders.

¹ United Nations Human Rights Council. (2012). *The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet: Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8)*. United Nations. <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/g12/153/25/pdf/g1215325.pdf>

² Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, & Small Media. (2021). *Digital rights in Uganda, UPR submission, Session 40*. CIPESA. https://cipesa.org/wp-content/files/documents/Digital-Rights-in-Uganda_2021-UPR-Submission.pdf

³ Freedom House. (2025). *Uganda: Freedom on the Net 2025 country report*. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-net/2025>

Freedom of Expression and Opinion

5. Article 29 of the Constitution of Uganda protects freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media. Uganda is also bound by Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which protect freedom of speech. Despite these guarantees, Uganda has continued to limit, restrict, and curtail the expression and speech of civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights defenders (HRDs), political opponents, critics and dissidents, the media and journalists, and activists using regressive laws and policies.
6. The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) continues to require authorisation for online data communication and broadcasting services, including blogs, online television, online radio, and online newspapers.⁴
7. In 2022, Uganda enacted the now annulled Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, 2022.⁵ The law criminalised broad categories of expression, including hate speech, unsolicited information, malicious information, and misuse of social media.⁶ Under the Act, the Ugandan government enforced strict controls over online speech, a move that many critics argued aimed to suppress dissent and restrict freedom of expression in the country.⁷ The Constitutional Court annulled the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, 2022.⁸ The Court also struck down criminal defamation provisions under the Penal Code Act.⁹ While this is a positive development, the ruling rested on procedural defects in the law's enactment rather than on a substantive assessment of the provisions' unconstitutionality. There remains a risk that similar vague and overbroad offences could be reintroduced unless Parliament undertakes comprehensive, rights-based reform.
8. Between 2024 and 2025, there was a serious crackdown on online expression. Several TikTok users, comedians, former public officials, and social media users were arrested, charged, and sentenced for online content deemed insulting to the President, the First Family, the former Speaker of Parliament (Anita Among), or other public officials.¹⁰ These include 21-year-old Emmanuel Nabugodi, who was sentenced to two years in jail for allegedly spreading hate speech against President Yoweri Museveni, and comedian Obed Lubega, who was detained for politically themed satire and faced charges of "social media misuse."¹¹

⁴ Freedom House, 'Uganda: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report' (2024) <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-net/2024>

⁵ The Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2022, [https://bills.parliament.ug/attachments/Computer%20Misuse%20\(Amendment\)AcBeforeBefore,%202022.pdf](https://bills.parliament.ug/attachments/Computer%20Misuse%20(Amendment)AcBeforeBefore,%202022.pdf)

⁶ Edrine Wanyama, 'CIPESA Welcomes the Annulment of Sections of Uganda's Computer Misuse Act,' CIPESA, 18 March 2026, <https://cipesa.org/2026/03/cipesa-welcomes-the-annulment-of-sections-of-ugandas-computer-misuse-act/>

⁷ The Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2022, [https://bills.parliament.ug/attachments/Computer%20Misuse%20\(Amendment\)AcBeforeBefore,%202022.pdf](https://bills.parliament.ug/attachments/Computer%20Misuse%20(Amendment)AcBeforeBefore,%202022.pdf)

⁸ Edrine Wanyama, 'CIPESA Welcomes the Annulment of Sections of Uganda's Computer Misuse Act' (CIPESA, 18 March 2026) <https://cipesa.org/2026/03/cipesa-welcomes-the-annulment-of-sections-of-ugandas-computer-misuse-act/>

⁹ EU SEE, 'Constitutional Court Nullifies Key Provisions of the Computer Misuse Act in a CSOs Backed Petition' (22 April 2026) <https://eusee.hivos.org/alert/constitutional-court-nullifies-key-provisions-of-the-computer-misuse-act-in-a-csos-backed-petition/>

¹⁰ Mwesige, P., & Wanyama, E. (2025, April 28). Uganda steps up pressure on social media critics ahead of 2026 polls. CIPESA. <https://cipesa.org/2025/04/uganda-steps-up-pressure-on-social-media-critics-ahead-of-2026-polls/>

¹¹ Kigongo, J. (2024, July 25). Comedian Reign charged with attempt to commit hate speech. Daily Monitor. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/comedian-reign-charged-with-attempt-to-commit-hate-speech--4702968>

9. Journalists and media workers faced physical and digital threats. Between March 13, 2025, two journalists were injured and their equipment seized at a private residence where officials from the opposition party National Unity Platform (NUP) were visiting to examine ballot pre-ticking ahead of the Kawempe North Constituency by-election.¹² Stephen Kibwiika from NTV/Spark TV was assaulted during the incident on March 12.¹³ The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights expressed concerns,¹⁴ ahead of the January 2026 elections, about harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, and abuse of journalists and media practitioners in Uganda. It cited reports that at least 32 journalists, including three women, were assaulted or had their equipment confiscated or damaged during the March 2025 Kawempe North by-election.¹⁵ These developments indicated broader attacks on media freedom during the elections.

Freedom of Information and Censorship of Content

10. The Access to Information Act, Cap 95,¹⁶ gives effect to Article 41 of the Constitution,¹⁷ which guarantees every citizen the right of access to information (ATI) held by the State or any State organ or agency. However, its implementation remains weak. Information access is undermined by poor proactive disclosure, the absence of a dedicated and independent enforcement institution, non-compliance by public bodies, and limited citizen awareness of ATI. Election-period restrictions, social media blockages, and pressure on online media have further weakened the practical enjoyment of the right to seek, receive, and impart information through digital channels.¹⁸
11. Uganda has continued to use regulatory directives to control online media and digital content. In May 2024, the UCC ordered online media outlets to register within two months or face closure.¹⁹ On November 28, 2025, UCC published a list of illegal providers of online data communications and broadcasting services in Uganda.²⁰ The entities, with accounts on Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube, were given five days to obtain authorisation or cease operations lest they face the wrath of enforcement and prosecution for illegal broadcasting.²¹ The directive raised concerns about licensing as a censorship tool.²²

¹² Bagala, A. (2025, March 13). NMG journalist, NUP leaders attacked. *Daily Monitor*. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/nmg-journalist-nup-leaders-attacked-4962572>

¹³ Nile Post, 'UPPA Condemns Assault on Journalists Covering Kawempe By-Election' Nile Post (Kampala, 12 March 2025) <https://nilepost.co.ug/news/247484/uppa-condemns-assault-on-journalists-covering-kawempe-by-election>

¹⁴ African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2026, January 6). Press statement on the escalating restrictions on freedom of expression, media freedom, and internet access in Uganda ahead of the 2026 general elections. <https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-01-06/press-statement-escalating-restrictions-freedom-expression-media-f>

¹⁵ International Federation of Journalists. (2025, March 17). Uganda: Journalists reporting on elections brutalised by security forces. *ReliefWeb*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/uganda-journalists-reporting-elections-brutalised-security-forces>

¹⁶ Access to Information Act 2005 (Uganda) <http://judiciary.go.ug/files/downloads/access%20to%20informationinformation%20Act2005.pdf>

¹⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (Uganda) art 41 <https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution/eng@2023-12-31>

¹⁸ Unwanted Witness. (2026, March 31). Uneven enforcement of data protection laws puts data subjects' rights at risk in Uganda's 2026 polls: A data protection election watch report. <https://www.unwantedwitness.org/download/reports/Uneven-Enforcement-of-Data-Protection-Laws-Puts-Data-Subjects-Rights-at-Risk-in-Ugandas-2026-Polls-report-31.03.2026.pdf>

¹⁹ The Independent. (2024, May 29). UCC gives online media two months to register or close. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.ug/ucc-gives-online-media-two-months-to-register-or-close/>

²⁰ Uganda Communications Commission. (2025, November 28). List of illegal providers of online data communications and broadcasting services in Uganda. <https://www.ucc.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/list-final-of-illegal-providers-of-online-data-communication-and-broadcasting-as-of-28th-november-2025.pdf>

²¹ Ibid.

²² Freedom House. (2024). Uganda: Freedom on the Net 2024 country report. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-net/2024>

12. Between April and June 2025, TikTok removed more than 1.5 million videos posted by Ugandan users²³ for alleged violations of its Community Guidelines, including hate speech, misinformation, and obscenity, placing Uganda 29th globally for video removals during the period. While publicly available information does not establish that these removals resulted from formal Ugandan government takedown requests, the scale of removals raises concerns about platform moderation transparency, due process, appeal mechanisms, and the possible chilling effect of content governance in a context where Ugandan authorities have prosecuted users for online expression.
13. During the January 2026 election period, the state imposed additional content restrictions. The government banned live broadcasts and streaming of riots, “unlawful processions” and violent incidents, and also prohibited the dissemination of content described as inciting, hateful or violent.²⁴ Such broad restrictions risk censoring legitimate reporting on public protests, police conduct, electoral violence, and matters of public concern.
13. Internet disruptions have persisted despite previous recommendations calling on Uganda to desist from shutdowns and arbitrary restrictions on access to the internet.²⁵ The internet was shut down before the January 2026 general election purportedly to mitigate misinformation, electoral fraud, and incitement to violence.²⁶ The shutdown lasted almost five days and caused significant economic and rights-related harm, with estimates placing direct losses at approximately UGX 59.7 billion (USD 16 million) during the shutdown period.²⁷ The restrictions during the January 2026 elections significantly hindered citizens’ ability to communicate, access information, and engage in public life since their primary communication channels were closed.²⁸
13. While the internet was restored on January 18, 2026, social media platforms and over-the-top applications remained restricted, with UCC citing public order and national security concerns.²⁹ This pattern violated the African Commission’s position that internet shutdowns and undue restrictions on digital communications are prohibited under Article 9 of the African Charter. The January 2026 shutdown also set a troubling regional precedent, as Uganda has now shut down the internet in three consecutive election cycles (2016, 2021, 2026).

²³ Staff Reporter. (2025). TikTok deletes 1.5 million videos posted by Ugandans. TRT Afrika. <https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/c2d9004f3b13>

²⁴ Reuters. (2026, January 6). Uganda bans live broadcasts of riots and “unlawful processions” ahead of vote. Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/uganda-bans-live-broadcasts-riots-unlawful-processions-ahead-vote-2026-01-05/>

²⁵ Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. (2026, March). Assessing the impact of the 2026 internet shutdown on Uganda’s digital economy. https://cipesa.org/wp-content/files/reports/Assessing_the_Impact_of_the_2026_Internet_Shutdown_on_Ugandas_Digital_Economy.pdf

²⁶ Nanfuka, J. (2026, January 19). Navigating the aftermath of Uganda’s internet shutdown. Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. <https://cipesa.org/2026/01/navigating-the-aftermath-of-ugandas-internet-shutdown/>

²⁷ Muhammad, N. (2026, April 1). Assessing the impact of the 2026 internet shutdown on Uganda’s digital economy. Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. <https://cipesa.org/2026/04/assessing-the-impact-of-the-2026-internet-shutdown-on-ugandas-digital-economy/>

²⁸ The Unwanted Witness, & Women of Uganda Network. (2026, February). No signal, no voice: How internet shutdowns undermined Uganda’s 2026 elections. https://www.unwantedwitness.org/download/uploads/internet_shutdowns/Internet-shutdown-report-18.02.2026.pdf

²⁹ Uganda Broadcasting Corporation. (2026, January 19). UCC lifts internet suspension but retains social media restrictions post-elections. <https://ubc.go.ug/2026/01/19/ucc-lifts-internet-suspension-but-retains-social-media-restrictions-post-elections/>

16. Uganda's communications sector has continued to expand. As of December 2025, active mobile subscriptions stood at 47.1 million, active internet subscriptions at 18.5 million, and active mobile money accounts at 36.3 million.³⁰ The Uganda Communications Commission has also reported investments in school ICT laboratories, public access centres, assistive technologies for persons with disabilities, and smart-device initiatives for low-income households.³¹ However, these access gains have not translated into universal, affordable, and meaningful connectivity. Device affordability, taxation, rural-urban inequalities, gender disparities, digital literacy gaps, and limited accessibility for persons with disabilities continue to constrain equal participation in Uganda's digital society.³²
17. The 2024 National Population and Housing Census report reveals notable gender and regional differences in internet use, showing 11% of men and 8% of women accessing the internet. Regionally, Buganda (the central region) leads with 19% of its population using the internet, while Karamoja in the north east has the lowest at 3%.³³ Access to the internet is widely recognised as an indispensable enabler of a broad range of human rights.³⁴
18. Uganda continues to impose multiple taxes on digital services. In 2023, Uganda introduced the Digital Services Tax through the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 2023. The tax imposed a 5% levy on non-resident suppliers deriving income from digital services, which widely impacted data service providers, online advertising, and social media platforms in the country.³⁵ Additionally, since 2022, Uganda levies a 12% tax on the net price of internet data, after which 18% VAT applies, along with 12% excise duty on airtime and value-added services, and 10% import duty on devices. These taxes increase the cost of connectivity, devices, hardware, and software, thereby widening the affordability gap, with the burden falling most heavily on those who can least afford it.³⁶ According to the Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI), a 1 GB mobile broadband data bundle in Uganda costs approximately 4–6% of average monthly income, well above the internationally recommended 2% affordability threshold.³⁷ Young people, smallholder farmers, rural women, persons with disabilities, and refugees are disproportionately excluded by these cost barriers, limiting their access to e-government, telemedicine, digital financial services, and online education. These developments fall short of Goal 9 of the Sustainable Development Goals on building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and fostering innovation.³⁸

³⁰ Uganda Communications Commission. (2026, May 15). Uganda Communications Commission: A snapshot of gains, impact and progress. <https://www.ucc.co.ug/uganda-communications-commission-a-snapshot-of-gains-impact-and-progress/>

³¹ Uganda Communications Commission. (2026, February 19). UCC study highlights strong impact of ICT4PWD programme. <https://www.ucc.co.ug/ucc-study-highlights-strong-impact-of-ict4pwd-programme/>

³² Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. (2025, April). Submissions to white paper on ICT tax reduction: Submitted to the National Task Team on Enhancement of Government Revenue from the ICT Sector, Ministry of ICT in Uganda. https://cipesa.org/wp-content/files/briefs/report/CIPESA_Submission_to_White_Paper_on_ICT_Tax_Reduction_-_Uganda.pdf

³³ Uganda Bureau of Statistics. (2024). National Population and Housing Census 2024: Final report—Volume I (Main). <https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/National-Population-and-Housing-Census-2024-Final-Report-Volume-1-Main.pdf>

³⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, May 13). Internet shutdowns: Trends, causes, legal implications and impacts on a range of human rights (Report No. A/HRC/50/55). United Nations. <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/50/55>

³⁵ PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited. (2023, December). Tax alert: Implementation of Digital Services Tax (DST). <https://www.pwc.com/ug/en/assets/pdf/tax-alert-digital-service-v4.pdf>

³⁶ Wanyama, E. (2022, April 7). Policy brief: Taxing Ugandan citizens out of the digital society. Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. <https://cipesa.org/2022/04/policy-brief-taxing-ugandan-citizens-out-of-the-digital-society/>

³⁷ Alliance for Affordable Internet. (2018, June 6). Uganda: New social media tax will push basic connectivity further out of reach for millions. <https://adi.a4ai.org/uganda-social-media-tax/>

³⁸ Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, & International Telecommunication Union. (2024). Assessment of last-mile connectivity interventions in Uganda. <https://ict.go.ug/site/documents/assessment-of-last-mile-connectivity-projects-in-uganda.pdf>

19. Digital exclusion is also linked to the mandatory use of national identification (ID) systems. In June 2025, the High Court dismissed a case that was challenging the mandatory use of the National Identification Number or national ID card, locally known as Ndaga Muntu, for access to services such as healthcare and social protection.³⁹ Under the scheme, vulnerable groups, including older persons and women, were disproportionately excluded from accessing essential public services. The court recognised that the national ID system was mandatory in law and practice for services such as social security benefits, although it rejected the applicants' claim that systemic exclusion had been proved.⁴⁰
20. Uganda, like many other African countries, has adopted progressive laws and policies on digital access, but implementation remains weak.⁴¹ Affordability, digital illiteracy, lack of accessible devices, and limited use of closed captioning and sign language interpretation continue to restrict access to news, education, services, and civic participation.⁴² Furthermore, the gender digital gap is influenced by factors such as lower incomes, limited digital literacy, domestic responsibilities, high costs of technology and internet access, as well as a lack of knowledge about digital rights, which leads to increased vulnerability to online harassment and cyber threats for women.⁴³ A survey by the World Wide Web found that only 19% of women in Uganda are online, compared to 27% of men.⁴⁴
21. Uganda's introduction of a Communal Access Licence in 2020 recognised the potential of community-based and not-for-profit models to extend connectivity to unserved and underserved areas.⁴⁵ However, the framework remains insufficiently enabling for small community networks. The original licence required a USD 2,500 application fee, a USD 3,000 annual licence fee, and a 2% levy on gross annual revenue, alongside proof of technical and financial capacity.⁴⁶ Applicants must also rely on agreements with licensed telecommunications providers, while the licence does not provide direct access to licensed spectrum.⁴⁷ Taken together, these financial, administrative, and operational requirements may be disproportionate for small, locally managed initiatives, limiting their ability to provide affordable and sustainable last-mile connectivity in rural, low-income, and hard-to-reach communities across Uganda.

³⁹ Aboneka, M. (2025, September 13). Uganda's digital ID barrier worsens as court delivers blow to access. Digital Rights Alliance Africa. <https://digitalrightsalliance.africa/ugandas-digital-id-barrier-worsens-as-court-delivers-blow-to-access/>

⁴⁰ Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER) & 2 Others v. The Attorney General & Another, Miscellaneous Cause No. 0086 of 2022, [2025] UGHCCD 90 (High Court of Uganda at Kampala, Civil Division, June 10, 2025). <https://iser-uganda.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Court-ruling-on-mandatory-use-of-the-digital-National-ID.pdf>

⁴¹ CIPESA Staff. (2024, October 21). Civil society trained on digital rights advocacy for persons with disabilities. Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa. <https://cipesa.org/2024/10/civil-society-trained-on-digital-rights-advocacy-for-persons-with-disabilities/>

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Babirye, R. (2024, June 15). Gender digital divide: Empowering women in the digital space. WOUNGNET. <https://woungnet.org/gender-digital-divide-empowering-women-in-the-digital-space/>

⁴⁴ Paradigm Initiative. (2021, November 1). Gender digital divide—A gap that should be bridged. <https://paradigmhq.org/gender-digital-divide-a-gap-that-should-be-bridged/>

⁴⁵ Uganda Communications Commission. (2020, January 27). Approved new telecommunications license categories. The Communications Blog. <https://uccinfo.org/2020/01/27/approved-new-telecommunications-license-categories/>

⁴⁶ Policy and Regulation for Community Networks. (2023, October 19). Uganda: Country profile. <https://policy.communitynetworks.group/country-profiles/uganda>

⁴⁷ Uganda Communications Commission. (2023). Description of telecom licenses and authorisations. <https://www.ucc.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/DESCRIPTION-OF-TELECOM-LICENSES-AND-AUTHORISATIONS.pdf>

Data Protection and Privacy

22. Uganda has made formal progress through the enactment of the Data Protection and Privacy Act, Cap 97, and the operationalisation of the Personal Data Protection Office (PDPO). However, implementation remains weak, and Uganda has neither signed nor ratified the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.⁴⁸ The PDPO has become more active in enforcement, including through its July 2025 decision⁴⁹ finding Google LLC in breach of Uganda's data protection law for failing to register locally and for inadequate safeguards regarding cross-border transfers of Ugandan users' personal data.⁵⁰ However, local enforcement remains limited, with the PDPO lacking sufficient authority to impose administrative fines or award compensation to affected data subjects. For instance, the Electoral Commission, as an institution that collects, processes, and stores citizens' data, was not registered with PDPO until after the January 2026 elections. Additionally, no political party registered with PDPO during the entire electoral cycle despite actively collecting data.⁵¹
23. The national ID mass enrolment and renewal exercise has raised serious privacy concerns because it involves the collection of sensitive biometric data, including facial images, fingerprints, and iris scans.⁵² Although the PDPO found the collection of these biometrics lawful and proportionate, it also confirmed that NIRA's comprehensive Data Protection Impact Assessment was still under development and that only a summary would be published with sensitive information redacted. Given the growing dependence on the National Identification Number to access public and private services, the collection of permanent biometric identifiers raises concerns about necessity, proportionality, function creep, exclusion, data retention, third-party access, and remedies.
24. Electoral data has also become a privacy concern ahead of the 2026 elections.⁵³ The Electoral Commission warned the public against using an unauthorised voter-register platform operating through registry.ugtally.com, stating that it was not affiliated with the Commission and could expose voters to inaccurate information and data-security risks. UCC subsequently directed licensed telecommunications operators and internet service providers to restrict access to the platform following a formal request from the Electoral Commission.⁵⁴ The incident raises questions about the security of voter-register data, how third parties access or replicate electoral data, and whether regulatory responses to such incidents are transparent, lawful, necessary, and proportionate.

⁴⁸ African Union. (2024, April 16). AU holds a workshop on cyber diplomacy. <https://au.int/ar/node/43711>

⁴⁹ Ssekamwa Frank and 3 Others v. Google LLC, Complaint No. 08/11/24/6683, [2025] PDPO 2 (Personal Data Protection Office, July 18, 2025). <https://ursb.go.ug/2025/08/12/ugandas-data-protection-office-finds-google-in-breach-of-privacy/>

⁵⁰ Wanyama, E. (2025, July 21). Ugandan regulator finds Google in breach of country's data protection law, orders local registration. CIPESA. <https://cipesa.org/2025/07/ugandan-regulator-finds-google-in-breach-of-countrys-data-protection-law-orders-local-registration/>

⁵¹ Unwanted Witness. (2026). Uneven enforcement of data protection laws puts data subjects' rights at risk in Uganda's 2026 polls: A data protection election watch report. <https://www.unwantedwitness.org/download/reports/Uneven-Enforcement-of-Data-Protection-Laws-Puts-Data-Subjects-Rights-at-Risk-in-Ugandas-2026-Polls-report-31.03.2026.pdf>

⁵² Electoral Commission. (2025, December 31). Statement by the chairperson, Electoral Commission, on the progress of implementation of activities under the roadmap for general elections 2026. <https://ec.or.ug/news/statement-chairperson-electoral-commission-progress-implementation-activities-under-roadmap-1>

⁵³ Electoral Commission. (2025, December 31). Statement by the chairperson, Electoral Commission, on the progress of implementation of activities under the roadmap for general elections 2026. <https://ec.or.ug/news/statement-chairperson-electoral-commission-progress-implementation-activities-under-roadmap-1>

⁵⁴ New Vision. (2026, January 7). Why UCC blocked website providing voter-related information. https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/why-ucc-blocked-website-providing-voter-relat-NV_225864_062026

25. Private-sector cases demonstrate continuing enforcement gaps. In the SafeBoda case,⁵⁵ NITA-U found that the company had unlawfully disclosed users' personal data to a third-party analytics company without specific and informed consent, but only made corrective orders rather than strong sanctions or compensation for affected users.⁵⁶ The Uganda Securities Exchange and Soft Edge Uganda Limited data breach also exposed weaknesses in third-party data governance, contractual safeguards, and accountability between data controllers and processors.⁵⁷ These cases show the need for stronger sanctions, mandatory breach notification, regular audits, enforceable data-sharing agreements, and accessible remedies.
26. Surveillance concerns remain unresolved. The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, Cap 101,⁵⁸ the Anti-Terrorism Act, Cap 120,⁵⁹ and the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103,⁶⁰ continue to provide broad powers for interception, monitoring, and regulatory control over communications without sufficient safeguards for legality, necessity, proportionality, independent authorisation, transparency, and remedy. The rollout of digital number plates, CCTV systems, biometric identity systems, and other AI-enabled social-media monitoring tools further heightens the risk of mass or targeted surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders, opposition actors, civil society organisations, activists, and online commentators.⁶¹ Uganda should amend these laws, strengthen independent oversight, require public Data Protection Impact Assessments for high-risk technologies, and ensure effective remedies for violations of privacy and data protection rights.
27. The Ugandan government threatened to procure social media monitoring tools in 2025, just months before the conduct of the general elections in 2026.⁶² ⁶³ Meanwhile, interception of communications is enabled by the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, in the absence of independent judicial oversight.⁶⁴ Based on WOUUNET's 2026 research on spyware and digital surveillance targeting women in Uganda, over 81% of women respondents reported having reason to believe their phone calls, messages, emails, or social media accounts were monitored or interfered with. A similar proportion experienced suspicious links, account takeovers, malware warnings, or unusual device behaviour. Half of respondents reported experiencing online harassment, impersonation, or threats, while 50% believed their movements had been monitored or that they had been followed in connection with their public activities.⁶⁵

⁵⁵ Mukasa, B. (2021, February 3). SafeBoda has been investigated on allegations of unlawful sharing of users' personal data. Kampala Associated Advocates. <https://www.kaa.co.ug/safeboda-has-been-investigated-on-allegations-of-unlawful-sharing-of-users-personal-data/>

⁵⁶ Mukasa, B. (2021, February 3). SafeBoda has been investigated on allegations of unlawful sharing of users' personal data. Kampala Associated Advocates. <https://www.kaa.co.ug/safeboda-has-been-investigated-on-allegations-of-unlawful-sharing-of-users-personal-data/>

⁵⁷ Personal Data Protection Office. (2023, June). Abridged investigation report of the data security breach at Uganda Securities Exchange (USE). <https://www.unwantedwitness.org/download/Abridged-Investigation-Report-of-the-Data-Security-Breach-Uganda-Securities-Exchange.pdf>

⁵⁸ Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, Cap. 101 (2010) (Uganda). https://media.ulii.org/media/legislation/126789/source_file/d8188e70ba23c0b3/regulation-of-interception-of-communications-act.pdf

⁵⁹ Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 (Uganda) https://media.ulii.org/media/legislation/17912/source_file/80e3f3fb52570584/2002-14.pdf

⁶⁰ Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103 (Uganda) <https://pmlawhub.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Uganda-Communications-Act-Cap-103.pdf>

⁶¹ CIPESA, 'Rollout of Digital Number Plates Poses Privacy Concerns in Uganda' (CIPESA, 21 August 2024) <https://cipesa.org/2024/08/rollout-of-digital-number-plates-poses-privacy-concerns-in-uganda/>

⁶² EU SEE. (2025, July 19). Government plans to introduce a social media monitoring tool that could threaten freedom of expression. <https://eusee.hivos.org/alert/government-plans-to-introduce-a-social-media-monitoring-tool-that-could-threaten-freedom-of-expression/>

⁶³ Kimbugwe, H. N., & Nassuuna, N. (2025, April 10). Uganda's move to procure social media tracking tool: A new threat to digital rights and freedoms. Defenders Protection Initiative. <https://www.defendersprotection.org/2025/04/10/ugandas-move-to-procure-social-media-tracking-tool-a-new-threat-to-digital-rights-and-freedoms/>

⁶⁴ Mwesige, P., & Wanyama, E. (2025, April 28). Uganda steps up pressure on social media critics ahead of 2026 polls. CIPESA. <https://cipesa.org/2025/04/uganda-steps-up-pressure-on-social-media-critics-ahead-of-2026-polls/>

⁶⁵ WOUUNET. (2026, March 10). Spyware and digital surveillance targeting women in Uganda. <https://wouUNET.org/download/spyware-and-digital-surveillance-targeting-women-in-uganda/>

Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence

28. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV)⁶⁶ encompasses acts of gender-based violence that are committed, abetted or aggravated, in part or fully, by the use of ICTs and has the same roots as other forms of gender-based violence and is part of the same continuum.⁶⁷ TFGBV is an increasing threat to women's freedom of expression, privacy, safety, equality, and participation in public life.⁶⁸ In Uganda, TFGBV manifests through non-consensual circulation or distribution of sexually explicit intimate images or videos, cyberstalking, sexist hate speech, misogynistic disinformation, sextortion, cyberbullying, cyber flashing, doxing, deepfakes, impersonation, online grooming, and unsolicited sexually explicit content.⁶⁹
29. WOUNET's online gender based violence knowledge portal cites a 2021 study finding that 88% of respondents had experienced or witnessed online gender-based violence in Uganda. Women withdrew from online spaces due to cyber harassment, and the freedom to express themselves online was curtailed.⁷⁰ Similar developments were noted during the 2026 general elections, where WHRDs experienced hardships such as surveillance in navigating the digital space.⁷¹ Some of the well-known prominent feminists and WHRDs who have experienced the same challenges include Brenda Kugonza,⁷² Dr Stella Nyanzi, Winnie Kiiza,⁷³ Dr Miria Matembe, former Speaker of Uganda's Parliament Rebecca Kadaga,⁷⁴ Yvonne Mpambara, Joyce Bagala, and Agather Atuhaire.⁷⁵
30. Online abuse disproportionately impacts youth and women, with emerging technologies such as AI tools being used to maliciously produce non-consensual sexual deepfakes, harass activists, and blackmail people using simple prompts. There has been a rise in AI enabled gender based violence, such as deepfakes and Grok, which has further amplified gendered disinformation.⁷⁶ Gendered disinformation relates to a specific type of violation of women's and gender-diverse people's rights, in particular their freedom of expression, generally based on gender bias and stereotypes.⁷⁷ Several women politicians in Uganda have faced gendered disinformation intended to undermine their credibility in the political arena.⁷⁸

⁶⁶ Association for Progressive Communications. (2025). Technology-facilitated gender-based violence. APC Glossary. <https://www.apc.org/en/glossary/technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence>

⁶⁷ Association for Progressive Communications. (2023, January 9). Feminist principles of the Internet: Advocacy brief on violence. GenderIT.org. <https://www.genderit.org/FPI-paper-on-violence>

⁶⁸ Iyer, N., Nyamwire, B., & Nabulega, S. (2020, August). Alternate realities, alternate internets: African feminist research for a feminist Internet. Pollicy. <https://firm.genderit.org/research/alternate-realities-alternate-internets-african-feminist-research-feminist-internet>

⁶⁹ Pollicy, Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, & Gender Tech Initiative Uganda. (2025, March). Considering technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as an offense in Uganda's 2024 Sexual Offences Bill. <https://pollicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/TFGBV-in-Sexual-Offences-Bill.pdf>

⁷⁰ Women of Uganda Network. (2025, November 24). Understanding online gender-based violence (OGBV) in Uganda. OGBV Knowledge Portal. <https://ogbv.wougn.net/understanding-online-gender-based-violence-ogbv-in-uganda/>

⁷¹ Nyapendi, E. (2026, May 18). Targeted, connected, and still standing: How Ugandan women human rights defenders navigated the 2026 elections and what comes next. WOUNET. <https://wougn.net/targeted-connected-and-still-standing-how-ugandan-women-human-rights-defenders-navigated-the-2026-elections-and-what-comes-next/>

⁷² International Service for Human Rights. (2022, November 15). Human rights defender's story: Brenda Kugonza from Uganda [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PktQDVzRYI8>

⁷³ Walulya, G., & Selnes, F. N. (2023). "I thought you are beautiful": Uganda women journalists' tales of mob violence on social media. *Digital Journalism*, 11(10), 1962–1981. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21670811.2023.2170899#d1e121>

⁷⁴ Uganda Radio Network [@ugandarn]. (2025, December 19). Kadaga responding well to treatment, death rumours dismissed [Post]. X. <https://x.com/ugandarn/status/2002048273184371086>

⁷⁵ Macaulay, C., Muia, W., & Ibrahim, S. (2025, May 24). Ugandan activist alleges she was raped while in Tanzanian detention. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4qlqxx9ql0>

⁷⁶ Schnidrig, D. (2026, July 1). Bridging the gap: Addressing technology-facilitated gender-based violence in global AI governance. Association for Progressive Communications. <https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/bridging-gap-addressing-technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence-global-ai-governance>

⁷⁷ Martins, P. (2025, September 11). Placing "gender" in disinformation. Association for Progressive Communications. <https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/placing-gender-disinformation>

⁷⁸ Sandra Aceng, 'The Role of Multistakeholderism in Countering Gendered Disinformation in Africa' (GenderIT, 24th September 2025) <https://www.genderit.org/feminist-talk/role-multistakeholderism-countering-gendered-disinformation-africa>

An AI-generated image on TikTok falsely claimed that Rebecca Alitwala Kadaga, the former Speaker of the Ugandan Parliament, had been airlifted to Aga Khan Hospital in Nairobi.⁷⁹ Despite the story being fake, many people wished her a quick recovery, and others claimed she was incapacitated to take on political office without realising that the photos had been manipulated. Kadaga addressed the rumours, stating she was at home and had not been to the hospital.⁸⁰

31. Uganda's legal framework lacks a clear, survivor-centred and gender-responsive approach to TFGBV. In February 2025, CIPESA, Pollicy and the Gender Tech Initiative appeared before Members of Parliament to advocate for inclusion of TFGBV in the Sexual Offences Bill 2024, and raised the need for Uganda's legal system to close the gap between digital and physical sexual offences.⁸¹ The Sexual Offences Bill 2024 presents a critical, time-bound legislative opportunity.

⁷⁹ Ritah Kagwa Blog on TikTok (15 December 2025) <https://www.tiktok.com/@bruceofficial001/video/7584105318192319756>

⁸⁰ Rebecca Alitwala Kadaga, via X (8:32 PM · Dec 19, 2025) <https://x.com/RebeccaKadagaUG/status/200211475522462605>

⁸¹ CIPESA and Partners Advocate for Inclusion of Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence in Uganda's Sexual Offences Bill' (CIPESA, 25 February 2025) <https://cipesa.org/2025/02/cipesa-and-partners-advocate-for-inclusion-of-technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence-in-ugandas-sexual-offences-bill/>

Recommendations

Overall, Uganda's implementation record since the previous review is mixed. The country has expanded digital infrastructure, strengthened data protection enforcement, and secured important court victories against vague restrictions on online expression. However, these gains are offset by recurrent digital repression, exclusion, technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and weak privacy safeguards. Uganda is urged to undertake comprehensive legal and policy reform to ensure that digital transformation is anchored in human rights, inclusion, accountability, and meaningful access for all.

We recommend that the Government of the Republic of Uganda take the following measures:

Freedom of Expression and Opinion

1. Guarantee freedom of expression online and offline by ending arrests, intimidation, prosecution, and harassment of journalists, activists, artists, comedians, opposition supporters, human rights defenders, and citizens for legitimate expression, and by repealing or substantially amending sections 24 and 25 of the Computer Misuse Act, Cap 96, which have been used to criminalise protected expression through vague offences of cyber harassment and offensive communication.
2. Fully implement the March 2026 Constitutional Court decision on the Computer Misuse Act and criminal defamation by ensuring that vague, overbroad, or punitive speech offences are not reintroduced. In particular, Parliament should not re-enact, in their previous form, the provisions introduced by the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, 2022, including the amended section 12, section 23A, and sections 26A, 26B, 26C, and 26D on hate speech, unsolicited information, malicious information, and misuse of social media. Any future online harm legislation should be narrowly defined and include public-interest, journalistic, artistic, academic, human rights, and whistleblower defences.
3. Amend the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103, particularly sections 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(k), 5(1)(u), 5(1)(x), 5(1)(z), 6(1)(d), 6(1)(e), 6(2), 7, 8, 20 and 93, to narrow the powers of the Uganda Communications Commission, strengthen its independence from ministerial direction, remove overbroad content-control powers, and ensure that any restriction on expression complies with the requirements of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality.

Freedom of Information and Censorship of Content

4. Refrain from imposing, ordering, facilitating, or requiring the full range of internet shutdowns and network disruptions, including blanket internet blackouts, mobile network suspensions, bandwidth throttling, social media and messaging platform blocking, VPN blocking, and arbitrary content restrictions, especially before, during, and following elections, protests, public emergencies, and periods of political contestation.⁸²
5. Amend the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103, particularly sections 5(1)(b), 5(1)(u), 5(1)(x), 5(1)(z), 6 and 93, and any regulations made under the Act, to expressly prohibit network disruptions, platform blocking and related directives to telecommunications operators and internet service providers, except in the most exceptional circumstances where such measures are clearly authorised by precise and publicly accessible law, approved in advance by an independent court, strictly necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, non-discriminatory, time-bound, limited in scope to the least intrusive means available, publicly disclosed with their legal basis, scope and duration, and subject to timely, effective and accessible remedies.
6. Revise disproportionate licensing requirements for online media and digital publishers by amending sections 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27 of the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103, and the relevant provisions of the Uganda Communications (Licensing) Regulations, 2019, to ensure that bloggers, online journalists, citizen media, digital broadcasters and independent news platforms are not subjected to licensing obligations designed for spectrum-based broadcasting or telecommunications infrastructure.

Digital Connectivity and Inclusion

7. Reduce the cost of meaningful internet access by amending the Excise Duty Act, Cap 336, including the schedule imposing a 12% excise duty on internet data, and the relevant amendments introduced by the Excise Duty (Amendment) Act, 2021, to remove the levy on internet data, lower taxes on ICT services and devices, and adopt targeted affordability measures for women, rural communities, refugees, students, older persons and persons with disabilities.
8. Ensure inclusive and rights-respecting digital public infrastructure,⁸³ including the national digital ID system, by amending the Registration of Persons Act, Cap 332, particularly sections 5, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70, and the Registration of Persons Regulations, 2015, including regulation 23 on renewal, to provide for alternative identification, accessible enrolment and correction procedures, limits on mandatory use of the National Identification Number, safeguards on biometric data including iris scans, restrictions on data sharing, and protection against exclusion from health, education, social protection, financial, SIM registration and electoral services.
9. Adopt mandatory digital accessibility standards by amending and operationalising section 21 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 2020, and sections 5(1)(l), 5(1)(s) and 93 of the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103, to require accessibility of public and private digital services, including websites, e-government platforms, emergency communications, broadcast content, digital learning systems, public information portals and mobile applications, in line with recognised accessibility standards.

⁸² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, May 13). *Internet shutdowns: Trends, causes, legal implications and impacts on a range of human rights* (United Nations Doc. A/HRC/50/55).

⁸³ Freedom Online Coalition. (2025, October). *Rights-respecting digital public infrastructure principles*. <https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/rights-respecting-dpi-principles/>

Data Protection and Privacy

10. 10. Create enabling policy and regulatory environments for the development and sustainability of community-centred connectivity,⁸⁴ including community-led networks. This includes creating simple, affordable licensing and making public funding available for them and other small-scale networks, particularly through the effective use of universal service funds.
11. Strengthen the independence, funding and technical capacity of the Personal Data Protection Office by amending sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Data Protection and Privacy Act, Cap 97, to guarantee institutional independence, secure budgetary allocation, adequate staffing and protection from executive interference, and by amending the Act's enforcement provisions to enable the PDPO to issue binding corrective orders, administrative fines, audit directions and effective remedies.
12. Require mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessments and Human Rights Impact Assessments before deploying high-risk technologies by amending sections 19, 20, 21, 23 and 29 of the Data Protection and Privacy Act, Cap 97, and regulations 12, 13, 30, 33 and 47 of the Data Protection and Privacy Regulations, 2021, to cover biometric systems, digital ID systems, AI tools, digital number plates, CCTV systems, electoral technologies, health data platforms, social protection databases and cross-border data transfers.
13. Reform surveillance laws and practices by amending sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, Cap 101; sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Cap 120; and section 5(1)(u) of the Uganda Communications Act, Cap 103, to require prior judicial authorisation, individualised suspicion, necessity and proportionality assessments, independent oversight, transparency reporting, strict retention limits, protection for privileged communications, notification after surveillance where possible, exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence and effective remedies. Uganda should also ratify the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.

⁸⁴ Association for Progressive Communications. (n.d.). Meaningful community-centred connectivity. APC Glossary. Retrieved July 13, 2026, from <https://www.apc.org/en/glossary/meaningful-community-centred-connectivity>

Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence

14. Provide measures for redress and reparation as an effective, efficient, and meaningful way of aiding victims of violence online and ensuring that justice is achieved. Such measures should include forms of restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, combining measures that are symbolic and material, individual and collective, depending on the circumstances and the preferences of the victim.⁸⁵
15. Adopt a survivor-centred, gender-responsive, and intersectional legal and policy framework on TFGBV, including amending the Computer Misuse Act, Cap 96, particularly sections 23A, 24, and 25. The law should expressly recognise and provide effective remedies for the circulation or distribution of non-consensual intimate image abuse, deepfake sexual abuse, doxing, cyberstalking, sextortion, online grooming, misogynistic disinformation, coordinated online harassment, gendered hate speech, and technology-facilitated attacks. Building on WOUNET's report, adopt legal protections for WHRDs in digital spaces.
16. Conduct mandatory gender-sensitive and digital-evidence trainings for law enforcement, prosecutors, judicial officers, and frontline responders; hold meaningful consultations with women's rights, sexual rights, disability rights, and digital rights organisations and enforce clear obligations on platforms and digital service providers to adopt privacy, safety-by-design, due diligence, transparent reporting, and accessible remedy mechanisms.
17. Amend the Anti-Pornography Act, 2014, to ensure that victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse are not criminalised, and provide emergency takedown orders, anonymity protections, civil damages, accessible reporting channels, trained police and prosecutors, judicial remedies, platform accountability, local-language moderation, transparency reporting, and appeal mechanisms.

⁸⁵ Association for Progressive Communications. (2023, January 9). *Feminist principles of the Internet: Advocacy brief on violence*. GenderIT.org. <https://www.genderit.org/FPI-paper-on-violence>



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