Will Our Human Rights and Freedoms and a Free and Open Internet be the Next Victims of Cybercrime?

Manifesto Launch |

The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has joined civil society organisations and industry in a rally against the potential threat of cybercrime on human rights and freedoms as well as the open internet.

Day-by-day the effects of cybercrime continue to get worse. Although something clearly needs to be done, there is growing concern that any efforts to tackle this modern scourge come at the expense of fundamental human rights and that they threaten the open and free internet.

As countries are considering their input to the United Nations ahead of the scheduled January negotiations on a Cybercrime Convention, the CyberPeace Institute and the Cybersecurity Tech Accord have brought together a range of stakeholders to publish the Multistakeholder Manifesto on Cybercrime. The principles outlined in the Manifesto should be at the heart of any cybercrime legislation and to guide the negotiating process.

The Manifesto is supported by over 50 members of civil society, industry organizations (such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, World Wide Web Foundation, Cyber Threat Alliance, and Derechos Digitales) and individuals. Signatories to the Manifesto want to also ensure that any cybercrime convention preserves and upholds basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed under existing international UN and other treaties.

“Today, industry and civil society are coming together through a Multi-Stakeholder Manifesto on Cybercrime which provides a set of principles to guide governments in their negotiations at the United Nations” says Klara Jordan, Chief Policy Officer at the CyberPeace Institute. 

In the build up to the convention negotiations, this Manifesto is an urgent appeal to all UN member states, UN agencies, and others involved in the current process, to address concerns regarding the draft and align their submissions with the Manifesto.

The Manifesto also highlights the importance of ensuring cybercrime perpetrators are held accountable for their actions: “In an area as opaque as cyberspace, public-private partnerships are often an indispensable tool to gain insights into evolving cyber threats and those behind them,” said Annalaura Gallo, Head of Secretariat, Cybersecurity Tech Accord. “A new Cybercrime Convention should establish clear mechanisms for states to reduce the operating space for criminals,” added Annalaura Gallo

The Manifesto also tackles the challenges inherent in the current UN process, in particular the lack of multistakeholder participation. “We are concerned about the lack of consultation, inclusion and involvement of stakeholders from across civil society and industry”, said Klara Jordan, adding: “The participation of civil society entities is crucial to ensure that the impact of these crimes on society is properly taken into account.” “The technology industry is ready to offer its expertise and input to UN states in the upcoming negotiations on cybercrime. We hope that our input will be sought more consistently than has been the case in the past in discussions involving the security of our internet ecosystem,” emphasized Annalaura Gallo.

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About the CyberPeace Institute: Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the CyberPeace Institute is a nongovernmental organization whose mission is to reduce the harms from cyberattacks on people’s lives worldwide, provide assistance to vulnerable communities and call for responsible cyber behaviour, accountability and cyberpeace.

About the Cybersecurity Tech Accord: The Cybersecurity Tech Accord is a coalition of over 150 technology companies committed to advancing peace and security in cyberspace. The group’s mission revolves around four foundational principles: strong defense, no offense, capacity building and collective response.

How State Surveillance is Stifling Democratic Participation in Africa: State of Internet Freedom in Africa Study Findings

FIFAfrica21 |

As African countries embrace digital technologies, there is growing concern that the rising state surveillance, which is partly being enabled by the same digital technologies, is undermining African citizens’ digital rights and hindering their willingness to meaningfully participate in democratic processes.

One of the “democratising effects” of the internet was that it had provided a safe and alternative engagement platform that could help circumvent and diminish the repressive state’s control over the means of communication, thereby enabling greater organising and expression of dissenting opinions. However, autocrats in the region have appropriated the power of digital technologies to stifle dissent and to ramp up their capabilities to snoop on, punish, and silence critical and dissenting forces.

According to the 2021 State of Internet Freedom in Africa report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA),  surveillance has become a principal threat to digital rights in Africa, a weakening force to civil society and independent voices, and ultimately a driver of authoritarianism. The study maps the prevalent forms of surveillance, the laws that aid surveillance, and the impact of state surveillance on the ability of individuals and organisations to organise, mobilise, and engage in democratic processes.

Both physical surveillance and digital surveillance have for several years been prevalent in the countries studied. However, the study shows that  digital surveillance is expanding in scope, with several countries now deploying spyware, drones, and video surveillance (CCTV), as well as social media monitoring, mobile phone location tracking, and the hacking of mobile phones, messaging, and email applications.

The abuse of surveillance is rife in countries with high levels of impunity for rights violations and a low level of accountability for the actions of the government and its institutions. In virtually all countries studied, not only has surveillance become commonplace but the right to communicate anonymously in digital spaces has been profoundly eroded through mandatory SIM card registration and creation of inter-linked databases for national ID, voters’ registers, and other services provisions.

Government critics including leading opposition leaders, human rights defenders and activists who do human rights and governance work, as well as investigative journalists, remain prominent targets of state surveillance.

Enablers of State Surveillance

Many countries have enacted various laws that permit surveillance, mandate telecommunication intermediaries to facilitate the interception of communication, stipulate the mandatory collection of biometric data, limit the use of encryption, require the “localisation” of personal data, and grant law enforcement agents broad search and seizure powers.

In countries such as Chad, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia, laws prohibit offering encryption services without licensing, and in other cases, encryption service providers are required to decrypt any encrypted information that they hold to aid lawful interception. Moreover, while all countries have laws that facilitate lawful surveillance, many of these laws have pervasive flaws, are partially implemented, indiscriminately applied, and widely abused.

While democratic participation is based on free will and freedom, the study found that the law has been instrumentalised in many countries including Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania, to intimidate and to carry out arbitrary arrests and detention, prosecution, and persecution of individuals. The limited oversight over surveillance activity, where the actions of those who conduct illegal surveillance remain shrouded in secrecy with limited accountability for their actions, or redress for victims of surveillance, remains of concern.

Impact on Democratic Participation

The overreach effect of increased surveillance across the region is the curtailment of rights to freedom of expression, access to information, association and assembly, and diminished appetite for participation in democratic processes.

Undermining the Right to Freedom of Expression and Access to Information

The rights to freedom of expression and access to information are critical to meaningful democratic participation and civic engagement. The inability to freely express oneself has a direct impact on democratic participation since it limits an individual’s engagement in political discussions and the capacity to influence others, especially during periods of political contestation, as well as limiting engagement in civic spaces.

The fear of repercussions associated with surveillance curtails the rights of individuals who have been victims of surveillance to freely express themselves. The study shows that this fear has forced human rights defenders, activists, government critics and journalists into self-censorship, to be less vocal, and to limit expression of their opinions especially on debates on political affairs.

Infringing on the Right to Privacy of Communications

Surveillance intrudes on the privacy of individuals and  has become a means through which fear is instilled in political activists, the opposition, HRDs and the public. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the right to privacy is not only impacted by the examination or use of information about a person by a human or an algorithm.  Rather, even the mere generation and collection of data relating to a person’s identity, family or life already affects the right to privacy, as through those steps an individual loses some control over information that could put his or her privacy at risk.

Overall, surveillance has  undermined the ability of democracy actors to use digital communication channels – some have stopped using the channels to communicate altogether or have restricted their communications. Further, it has increased their costs on communication and operations generally..

Curtailing Freedom of Assembly and Association

The right to freedom of assembly and association is intricately linked to the rights and ability to freely express oneself, seek information, and mobilise. The curtailment of these freedoms can be felt in the individuals’ withdrawal from active engagements with peers, their representatives to parliament and other political actors. The study shows that the rights to assembly and association have been limited for victims of state surveillance and other democracy actors.

The study found that victims of surveillance and those who closely work with or associate with them, tended to take an overly cautious approach due to fear of repercussions such as being arbitrarily arrested, prosecuted, and detained.

The ability to organise and mobilise for activities, especially political meetings, is among the aspects that have been adversely affected by state surveillance. Some actors have resorted to organising meetings online as opposed to physically, and only with trusted individuals, which has affected the reach and effectiveness of such meetings and the mobilising power of such actors.

Effect on the Work of Organisations

According to the report, state surveillance has adversely affected  the work of organisations, making it difficult for them to achieve their goals including gathering information and mobilising for activities. Some organisations  were affected by disruptions of their activities, including being evicted from their offices by landlords at the request of state officials.

In addition, the costs of running the organisations had gone up, due to the level of financial investments made towards implementing safety and security measures. Organisation staff  lost precious energy and time worrying about surveillance, and felt controlled and less free in undertaking their work. Some organisations scaled down their work especially on governance issues.

Impact on Personal Life and Relations

The impact of surveillance goes beyond affecting peoples’ ability to meaningfully participate in democratic processes, to their personal life and relations. Individuals who were targets of state surveillance had relationships with their family, friends and society affected. Many of them lamented their lack of a social life as they could no longer make new friends, visit their old friends or family members, invite them to their homes, or be seen with them in public.

The research found widespread fear among the respondents, including their families, friends, and colleagues because of the surveillance they had experienced, or due to the apprehension of ongoing or future surveillance. Surveillance of their communication, lives and work had affected their psychological well-being and mental health in various ways. The mental toll of surveillance had resulted in constant and increased feelings of anxiety, anguish, stress, worry, depression, paranoia, fear, isolation, danger, risk, hurt, and insecurity.

There was widespread fear among respondents of repercussions for expressing opinions, in the form of  threats, harassment, arrest, attacks, abduction, detention, prosecution, death, and making their family, friends and associates targets of state action.

The study makes the following key recommendations:

  1. Governments should repeal, amend or review existing laws, policies and practices on surveillance, interception of communication, biometric data collection, and limitations on the use of encryption to ensure  compliance with the established international minimum standards on human rights and communications surveillance.
  2. Judiciaries and Parliaments need to proactively check the excesses of the state and its agencies in surveillance to ensure accountability and transparency of the executive arms of government.
  3. Civil society organisations (CSOs) should continue to investigate, document, and expose data and privacy breaches such as unauthorised access, surveillance and non-compliance by data collectors, controllers and processors.
  4. CSOs should engage in strategic public interest litigation through collaborative efforts to challenge laws, measures and acts that violate privacy rights and push for policies and practices reforms that uphold privacy.
  5. Organisations under threat of surveillance should enhance their internal digital capacity and build capacity of their staff in digital literacy, cyber hygiene, physical and digital security and data protection measures; and how to manage new surveillance measures and other emerging threats to digital rights.
  6. Intermediaries should regularly publish, update and widely disseminate privacy policies and transparency reports and inform users about the collection, use, handling, sharing and retention of their data and the measures taken to protect their right to privacy.

How Surveillance, Collection of Biometric Data and Limitation of Encryption are Undermining Privacy Rights in Africa

By Paul Kimumwe |

The right to privacy online has become a critical human rights issue, given its intricate connection with, and its being a foundation for the realisation of other rights including the rights to freedoms of expression, information, assembly, and association and preservation of human dignity. However, many African countries have steadily taken measures to undermine this right, including enacting retrogressive laws and policies that facilitate surveillance and the collection of biometric data, and others that limit the use of encryption

The advent of the Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated the privacy concerns yet in several countries, digital rights were already under steady attack, including via internet shutdowns, criminalisation of “false news”, misinformation and disinformation campaigns by state and non-state actors, harassment and prosecution of social media users, and growing state surveillance.

In responding to the pandemic, many countries adopted regulations and practices, including deploying surveillance technologies and untested applications, to enable them collect and process personal data for purposes of tracing, contacting, and isolating those suspected to be carrying the virus and those confirmed to carry it. These measures were quickly adopted, often without adequate regulation or oversight.

In this research report, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has analysed laws and policies that impact on privacy, notably those that regulate surveillance, data localisation, biometric databases, and encryption.

The research covered 19 countries – Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

Summary findings

Growing Surveillance: The research findings show that overall, there has been notable progress in the enactment of specific laws and policies safeguarding the right to privacy, including requiring judicial authority to authorise surveillance in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda.

However, there are a few cases, such as in Zimbabwe, where authorisation for monitoring and intercepting communications is offered by non-independent and partial actors such as ministers. In addition, many of the countries’ laws do not measure up to international human rights standards and fail to establish clear and appropriate oversight, redress, and remedy mechanisms.

Indeed, “national security” considerations have been employed in laws in various countries broadly to justify and authorise the interception of communication, restrict privacy rights, grant wide search and seizure powers to law enforcement agencies, mandate intermediaries such as telecommunication service providers to facilitate interception, and to require data localisation.

In addition, while various countries have criminalised illegal surveillance and placed various safeguards on the conduct of state surveillance, many of them still contain retrogressive provisions that leave scope for intrusion, including enabling state surveillance with limited safeguards.

Limitation of Encryption Anonymity and the use of encryption in digital communications are critical in advancing both the right to freedom of expression and right to privacy. In the absence of these rights,  the capacity of individuals to communicate anonymously and without fear of their communications being intercepted cannot be guaranteed.

There are few positive provisions in some countries that require the protection of personal data through technical security measures which include encryption. On the other hand, many countries in the study have passed legislation that limit anonymity and the use of encryption through criminalisation of possession and use of cryptographic software or hardware, providing for fines and prison sentences.

The findings show that in countries like Chad, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia, there are penalties for offering cryptographic services without licensing, registration or authorisation. Interception of communications provisions often require service providers to decrypt any encrypted information that they may intercept in the course of offering assistance to lawful interception. In countries such as Mali and Tanzania, the laws require the encryption service providers, upon registration with the authorities, to disclose the technologies they plan to use for encryption.

Data Localisation The findings show that a growing number of African countries have been legislating on data localisation, which has mostly taken the form of a requirement to store data locally and forbidding unauthorised cross-border data transfers. Various countries have specified the conditions for authorising transfer, mostly where the data subject has offered consent and where an adequate level of protection is assured in the recipient country or international organisation.

Several African countries have adopted different approaches towards data localisation. Several countries use laws on financial services (Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda), cybersecurity and cybercrimes (Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), telecommunications (Cameroon, Rwanda and Nigeria) and data protection (Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda) to place restrictions on cross-border transfer of data.

Some countries have specified the data that cannot be exported without authorisation. Kenya specifies all public data; Nigeria mentions all government data and all subscriber and consumer data; while Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tunisia cite personal information.

Establishment of Biometric Databases  In several countries, government agencies are collecting and processing personal data without adequate data protection laws, amidst limited oversight mechanisms and inadequate remedies. While many have recently passed data protection laws and policies, implementation is not effective, and the safeguards are not water-tight as required under international human rights law.

Some laws in countries such as Chad, Kenya, Tunisia, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, prohibit the collection of certain categories of data, including specific types of biometric data generally, or where certain conditions are not complied with. In the other countries studied, the laws require the mandatory collection of biometric information for the registration of telecommunications subscribers, for digital identity programmes and during voters’ registration. Several laws and policies on biometric data collection contain provisions on sanctions and penalties for breach.

Weak Oversight, Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms The study found that countries have adopted different approaches to oversight, including specifying courts, data protection authorities, sector regulators and administrative bodies as key oversight bodies. Some of these bodies are located within the executive, and therefore may lack the proper legal, financial, and institutional independence to stem violations within government, and especially by state security agencies. The laws in most countries require judicial authorities to issue a warrant for interception or monitoring of communications. However, in some countries interception orders can be issued by non-judicial officials, such as ministers.

The deficiency of accountability and transparency is among the weakest links in the various countries’ surveillance laws. While some countries, such as Nigeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, have commendable oversight and accountability provisions, it is not known whether they are applied. No entity in any of the countries studied permits public access to records on interception which the laws require state authorities to compile periodically, or publishes any data related to interception warrants issued and if at all they do record such data, they are categorised as classified information under state secrets laws. Thus, the public and oversight institutions such as judiciaries and parliaments remain in the dark about the extent and legality of the conduct of surveillance in the respective countries.

Recommendations

  • Governments should review existing laws, policies and practices on surveillance, including Covid-19 surveillance, biometric data collection, encryption and data localisation to ensure they comply with the principles in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa and international human rights standards.
  • Governments should also adopt multi-stakeholder approaches to ensure meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the development of policies and laws that affect the right to privacy and data protection.
  • Civil society actors should use strategic public interest litigation as an avenue to challenge laws that violate privacy rights and push for policies and practices reforms that uphold privacy.
  • Civil society actors should also monitor and document privacy rights violations through evidence-based research, and report on state compliance with their obligations to human rights monitoring bodies.

See the full research report here.

One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa's Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.

One Year In: Covid-19 Deepening Africa’s Democratic Regression

By CIPESA Staff Writer |

In September 2020, our research on the State of Internet Freedom in Africa established that the ultimate effect of the measures instituted in fighting Covid-19 was that they had deepened the democracy deficit in several African countries. This was because, increasingly, more states in the region had fallen short of living up to their citizens’ democratic expectations as they implemented measures to fight the pandemic.

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was faring badly in its democratic credentials, fighting for bottom position with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Of the 44 African countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2019, half were characterised as authoritarian regimes and many of the others were semi-authoritarian.

As anticipated, it has gotten worse. According to the Democracy Index for 2020, the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa last year rose from 22 to 24 – more than half of the 44 countries in the region that the index covered. Burkina Faso and Mali were the new entrants to the unsavoury ranks of authoritarian regimes. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated at the bottom of the index, and the region boasts just one “full democracy” – Mauritius. During 2020, 31 countries in the region were downgraded, eight stagnated, and just five scored better.

“After experiencing two consecutive years of significant setbacks, democracy in Africa appears to be in a perilous state,” notes the index. The region’s overall average score “fell to by far the lowest score for the continent since the index began in 2006.” The fight against Covid-19, muddled and stolen elections, and insecurity (including Jihadist insurgencies in west Africa), all played their part in the democratic regression experienced in the region.

As is shown in the 2020 edition of the State of Internet Freedom in Africa report, a plethora of regressive measures were introduced in fighting the pandemic, and they had starkly undermined democracy, marked by a dwindling respect for rights to expression, information, assembly, and privacy. In many instances, these measures resulted in a lower level of stakeholder engagement in public affairs and a decline in governments’ transparency and accountability.

Deepening the Democracy Deficit: The democratic regression in a number of countries in the region could persist beyond the Covid-19 crisis, unless the measures imposed are reversed and deliberate efforts are taken to promote greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

While the Arab Spring was a turning point on digital rights in the region, Covid-19 could be another profoundly negative watershed moment. The Arab Spring, during which social media aided organising against autocratic regimes, some of which were overthrown, opened the eyes of many African authoritarian regimes to the power of digital technologies, and they went ahead to make laws to prescribe cyber crimes, to enable interception of communications, to control use of online platforms, and they started instituting measures such as website blockages, censorship of short messaging services, and disruption of networks. – State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2020

According to the index, world over the biggest regressions during 2020 occurred in the most authoritarian countries, where regimes took advantage of the global health emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic to persecute and crack down on dissenters and political opponents.

Full democracy Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Authoritarian regime
Mauritius Cape Verde Malawi Mali Eswatini
Botswana Madagascar Mauritania Guinea
South Africa Senegal Burkina Faso Togo
Namibia Liberia Angola Cameroon
Ghana Tanzania Gabon Djibouti
Lesotho Kenya Mozambique Guinea-Bissau
Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
Zambia Niger Burundi
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea
Benin Congo Brazzaville Chad
Gambia Rwanda CAR
Ivory Coast Comoros DRC
Nigeria

The index states that the decline in Africa’s overall democracy score in 2020 was partly driven by coronavirus-related lockdowns, which had a negative bearing on civil liberties, including stripping citizens of their freedom to assemble and travel, and causing severe interruption to livelihoods. There was high-handedness of the police in enforcing curfews, in such countries as Nigeria (where police killed people in enforcing the lockdown), Kenya and Senegal.

Africa’s deterioration was also precipitated by declining scores for many countries in the category of electoral process and pluralism, with disputed elections in Tanzania and Guinea cited as examples. Of note, Malawi’s standing improved on account of a smooth election held during the year, in which the incumbent president was defeated by an opposition candidate.

Yet some countries saw Covid-19 as an opportunity to stifle opposition campaigns during election times. The index states: “Constraints placed on political activity – applied disproportionately for the opposition – ahead of January 2021 elections in Uganda illustrated how autocrats use the excuse of new threats such as coronavirus to crack down on the opposition and hold on to power during a time of crisis.”

Covid-19 control measures have chipped away at many of hallmarks of a democratic society, such as the ability by citizens to participate in civic matters and the conduct of public affairs. In the countries where civil liberties have been eroded the most, growing hostility of governments to dissenting opinions, including on their handling of Covid-19, has contributed to the adoption of stringent measures and the enactment and enforcement of repressive laws on surveillance, fake news and criminal defamation and practices such as legal threats, intimidation, arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and state surveillance.

These measures have, in turn, forced human rights defenders, journalists, activists, the political opposition, and ordinary citizens to self-censor, disengage from participating in public affairs, and refrain from exercising their rights to participate online and offline. This has been the case in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. Yet, in the absence of engaged citizens, the respect for human rights, including the rule of law, suffers. Such a trend, if left unchecked, could persist well beyond the coronavirus crisis.

While Covid-19 could have served as a driver towards improving access and use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in Africa, it has potentially widened the digital divide on the continent, yet for the most part the actions of many governments have undermined, rather than promoted, greater access and affordability of digital technologies.

Although technology can play an important role in containing the pandemic, its application should not violate human rights. In most countries, the measures introduced to check the spread of Covid-19 were necessary to address a public health emergency, but some were applied beyond the intended purpose, and need to be revised to imbed human rights principles. As it is, the imposition of unregulated, unchecked and excessive emergency measures by governments in collaboration with non-state actors during the pandemic period raises fundamental questions on their commitment to protecting digital rights. Thus, the debate about the ethics and legality of measures undertaken, and the extent of the associated risks, is imperative in resetting digital rights amidst the Covid-19 fallout.

See more of our work on the impact of Covid-19 in the African digital rights and democracy landscape.